The nomothetical authority is sometimes vested

in:

1. The whole people

2. A selection from them—

3. The king absolutely

4. The king, with the assent of the people or nobility, or both of them.

The ends for which political society was established, explain the necessity and the origin of civil authority.

In the early times of civilisation and government, the necessity for the division of the powers of government into its distinct branches, was not perceived; and in the first legislators, as we have reason to believe, were combined the legislative and executive branches of authority.

Government should be founded upon love, not upon fear. The civil power is admirable in proportion to the general happiness which it consults, and the means which it possesses and takes for its own pre

servation.

II. The physical union, and the intellectual concurrence of the people, in the plans of the state, is the great bond of the public power.

III. The legislative authority (a) originates in the power surrendered by every one in the society, to make

(a) See Warburt. Alliance, book ii. c. 3.-Tayl. Civ. L. p. 70.-Prynne's Plea for Lords.-Prynne's Surv. of Parl. Writs.-Montesq. Esp. d. L. liv. xi. c. 6.-Co. 4 Inst. p. 3.-Locke of Parl.-Mod. Un. Hist. xxiii. 307, & xxxiii. 18.-Glanv. lib. ix. c. 10.-Com. Dig. Parliament.-Adolph. Pol. State of

laws. It has a right to make, alter, and repeal laws, and to affix those penalties to their infraction, which are necessary in order to enforce their observance. It also ordains to whom the appointment of public officers shall be confided, and has an absolute right of directing and controlling the executive branch of power. It may limit the succession to the sovereignty, or exclude from it particular claimants. It cannot alienate its power; and is bound to dispense its rules with equity and prudence. It is at liberty to restrain the exercise of the natural rights of the people, for the purpose of the general good, but for no other object what

soever.

The legislature should not decide on guilt:

1. As the guilty denies it; and,

2. As it is doubtful whether it will properly apply the punishment.

Legislative power, when distinct from executive, should be frequently assembled; but not without intermission. Its election should take place at occasional periods, with moderate intervals. The sovereign power has usually the right to convene, prorogue, and dissolve it. The legislature is entitled to enquire into and punish for the wrongful exercise of executive power.

He is the most skilful legislator who restrains the evil, and cherishes the good, dispositions of mankind. In a civil state, the authority of the legislature is the

Brit. Emp. vol. i. p. 187 to 298.--Lamb. Arch.--Lambard.--Tac. de Mor. Germ. c. 11.-Whitelocke of Parl.--Jac. L. Dict. tit. Parliament.-Ulpian. Fragm, 1. 3.—Turnb. Hein. ii. sec. 139.-Locke on Gov. book ii. sec. 212 to 217. -Burlamaq. ii. p. 65.--Bl. Com. i. c. 2.

Of taxation.

test of civil justice. The people then owe it to their own happiness and preservation, to impose upon the legislative body such constitutional checks, as are necessary to guard against its undue exercise of power.

IV. By virtue of the general right of the legislature to direct the subjects to do such acts as the common good renders necessary, it embraces a power to tax the subjects, according to its discretionary views, but justly.

Taxes are such contributions to the public revenue, as a man pays, and is supposed to be ready to pay, out of his property, to secure the other part of it, and his personal rights. This explains why a man in very good circumstances, or in times of danger, should be more heavily taxed, than if he were in a low condition, or if the society were not exposed to the costs of a war. No taxes but what the public good requires should be levied. As little as possible should be taken from each subject. Taxes should be demanded from every man, so far as it is practicable, according to the ratio of his means, and the consequent protection of those means by the public power; and should be levied as nearly as can be to the time when wanted. They should be disposed of consistently with the obligations due to the several members of the state. Causeless taxes, and taking a man's whole property, or a part of it, without taxing others in the same proportion, are unjust impositions; for that which is used for all, should be proportionably contributed by all.

Those taxes are the most expedient, which are paid immediately by the subject to the government, for it

cannot escape the attention of financiers, that taxes upon commodities of life have the tendency, in case of their repeal, to perpetuate high prices, without advantaging the state.

power.

V. The executive power is necessarily established of executive to render the law effectual-to secure public rightsto prevent wrong-to enforce reparation-and to inflict punishment. It should therefore be irresistible in the exercise of its functions. It is either internal or external.

Internal executive, or judicial power, is that which enforces the legislative directions of the state, according to their prescribed letter, either civilly, for the recovery of private remedies, or criminally, for the infliction of punishment for crimes. It is the duty of judicial authority to apply the force of the society, in exact accordance with the law of the land.

External executive, or military power, is that which guards against external injuries, by defence, by insisting upon reparation, or by inflicting punishment. A discretion is generally allowed to this authority, in addition to waging war against the immediate enemy, to apply to other states for assistance, if necessary; to guard against the interference of foreigners; to send flags of truce; to propose terms of accommodation; to suspend hostilities; to make temporary peace; and to agree to terms of capitulation. The latter powers are rather legislative than executive; although, from the necessity of the case, they are vested in the military commander. But sometimes national deputies accompany armies, and dictate when they shall act on the offensive. Their power, however, cannot extend to

Of sovereign

power.

stop a battle begun; for if so, military command would be paralysed, unless the enemy agree to the demands made; and then it is the duty of the general-in-chief to put an end to bloodshed.

The external or military power being employed to guard against attacks from without, ought not, for obvious reasons, to act discretionarily within. But the internal executive power may call for the assistance of the soldiery, as members of the state, to enforce the laws, if its own civil forces be insufficient for the purpose. They then become an instrument in the hands of the civil power, and are bound to act under its entire control, and consistently with the laws of the country.

Valuable as are the blessings of peace, military power ought not to be despised (a). Its legitimate objects are only the acquisition and protection of right. It is, when well regulated, alarming only to the oppressor.

Both internal and external executive power are dependent upon the control of the legislature; and it is highly important to the happiness of nations, that their legislative and executive branches should be kept distinct from each other, as their nature plainly designs them to be.

In a monarchy, the executive power should be reposed in the king. It is inconvenient to vest it in a council.

The two great arts of government are to produce happiness, and to remove temptation and error.

VI. Sovereign power is such an independent power of ruling over a state, as cannot be invalidated by any

(a) See contra: Dr. Swift.