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applies even without the super-added words of limitation :Dubber d. Trollope v. Trollope (Amb. 453): There the limitation



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was to A. for life and after his death to the first heir male of his body, and for want of such heir over. It is submitted, however, that that case turned largely on the gift over, which was analogous to "for want of such issue," words which create an estate tail. Again the word does not occur there. person Richards v. Lady Bergavenny (2 Vern. 324), where the expression was “such heir as should be living at the death"; and Fuller v. Chamier (L. Rep. 2 Eq. 682), where the limitation was "unto the next lawful heir of A. for ever." On the other hand, Mr. Butler's note in Coke upon Littleton, 377a, is against the rule being applicable. He says: "If it shall be decided that the testator or donor did not mean to involve the whole line of heirs to the tenant for life; did not mean to engraft a succession on his estate and to make him the ancestor or terminus; but instead of this intended to use the word “heirs” in a limited, restrictive, and qualified sense; intended to point at that individual person who should be the heir at the moment of the ancestor's decease; intended to give a distinct estate of freehold to such single heir and to make his or her estate of freehold the groundwork of a succession of heirs; to construe him or her the ancestor terminus or stop for the succession to take its course from—in every one of these cases the premises are wanting upon which the rule in Shelley's case interposes its authority, and the rule therefore becomes extraneous matter." The use of the words "6 such person or persons" coupled with the word 'heir' points strongly to a particular person to be ascertained at the death of the tenant for life, and the absence of the super-added words of limitation are of less importance in construing a will than in construing a deed. The question which is the subject of this article must be considered very doubtful, and it is submitted that, even if the rule in Shelley's case applies to a devise in the terms above referred to, a very slight circumstance would be sufficient to turn the scale.




Ecclesiastical Law-Holy Communion-Marriage with deceased Wife's Sister-Right of Clergyman to refuse to administer Sacrament-1 & 2 Edw. 6, c. 1, s. 8-Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 47), s. 1.

The proviso in sect. 1 of the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act 1907 to the effect that no clergyman shall be liable to any suit, penalty, or censure, whether civil or ecclesiastical, for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the performance of the duties of his office to which he would not have been liable if the Act had not been passed does not justify a clergyman, after the passing of the Act, in refusing to administer the Sacrament of Holy Communion to a member of the Church of England resident in the parish who has contracted a marriage with his deceased wife's sister, on the ground that such person is an "evil liver" within the meaning of the rubric in the Prayer Book, and therefore that he had lawful cause within the meaning of sect. 8 of 1 & 2 Edw. 6, c. 1, for so refusing.


Judgment of the Court of Appeal (101 L. T. Rep. 722; (1910) P. 57) affirmed.

[Thompson v. Dibdin and others. H. of L. June 20.Counsel: Sir R. Finlay, K.C., P. V. Smith, and E. W. Hansell; Sir R. Isaacs, K.C. (A.G.), Sir J. Simon, K.C. (S.-G.), and Rowlatt; Danckwerts, K.C., F. H. Errington, and J. S. Franey. Solicitors: Brooks, Jenkins, and Co.; Solicitor to the Treasury; Collyer-Bristow, Curtis, Booth, Birks, and Langley, for Mills, Reeve, and Co., Norwich.]

Practice-Arbitration-Appointment of Arbitrators-Failure to appoint Umpire-Application to Court by Summons-Appearance by Arbitrator-Order making Appointment-Arbitration Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), s. 5.

By a submission in writing, a dispute between the respondents, who were buyers, and the sellers was referred to arbitration. The buyers appointed one L. as their arbitrator, and the sellers appointed the appellant, T., and power was given to the arbitrators to name an umpire. The arbitrators failed to deter

mine the matter in dispute, and also to agree upon an umpire, and the respondents then served a written notice on the arbitrators to appoint an umpire under sect. 5 of the Arbitration Act 1889. The arbitrators failed to make the appointment, and the respondents applied to the court by summons for an order that an umpire should be appointed. The summons was served on the two arbitrators, but not on the sellers, who were out of the jurisdiction. At the hearing of the summons the question in dispute was whether the umpire should be a lawyer or a business man, but it was contended on behalf of the appellant that he should not have been made a party, and that no order should be made against him. The master made an order appointing a lawyer as umpire as desired by the respondents. The appellant appealed and asked that the order should be varied by appointing a business man as umpire, but the judge at chambers affirmed the order of the


Held, that, having regard to the position taken up by the appellant, he was properly made a party to the proceedings, and, further, that where an application is made by a party to an arbitration under sect. 5 of the Arbitration Act 1889 ex parte, it is competent for the court to make an order ex parte, though the other party has not been made a respondent to the application. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (106 L. T. Rep. 237) affirmed.

[Taylor v. Denny, Mott, and Dickson Limited. H. of L. June 21.-Counsel: Atkin, K.C. and Jowitt; Ernest Pollock, K.C. and Stuart Bevan. Solicitors: Trinder, Capron, and Co.; Coward, Hawksley, Sons, and Chance.]

Will-Demonstrative Legacy-Payment out of reversionary Fund -Interest on Legacy-From what Date to be calculated.

A testator who died in 1903 by his will bequeathed to his sister, the respondent, the sum of £10,000 to be paid out of the estate and effects inherited by him from his mother in terms of her will. The estate and effects inherited by the testator from his mother under her will consisted entirely of reversionary property in which his father had a prior life interest. The father died in 1910.

Held, that the £10,000 was a demonstrative legacy, that there was nothing in the will of the testator expressly directing payment thereof to be made when the reversion fell in, and that it carried interest from the expiration of a year after the testator's death. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (105 L. T. Rep. 739; (1912) 1 Ch. 219) affirmed.

[Walford v. Walford. H. of L. June 21.-Counsel: Buckmaster, K.C. and J. E. Harman; G. Cave, K.C. and W. M Cann. Solicitors: Trotter and Patteson; Johnson, Weatherall, and Sturt, for George Hadfield, Bennett, and Carlisle, Manchester.]

JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL. Law of British Columbia-Employer and Workman-Workmen's Compensation Act-Dependant-Alien-Right to Compensation.

The Workmen's Compensation Act of British Columbia, which is practically identical with the English Act, provides for the payment of compensation to the dependants of a workman who has been killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Held, that the legal personal representative of a workman so killed, being resident in the province, could obtain an award of compensation under the Act on behalf of a dependant of the deceased who was an alien resident in a foreign country. Judgment of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia reversed.

[Krzus v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company. Priv. Co. June 18.-Counsel: Martin, K.C. and Eckstein (both of the Colonial Bar); Sir R. Finlay, K.C., Rowlatt, and Herchmer (of the Colonial Bar.]

COURT OF APPEAL. Bankruptcy-Decree for specific Performance of Contract to purchase Land-Purchase Money not payable before a certain Date-Master's Certificate-Final Judgment-Execution “not having been stayed"-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 52), s. 4.

An order for specific performance of a contract to purchase land was made on the 17th Feb. 1911 in the usual form, and directed the defendant to pay the purchase money to the plaintiffs, but such payment was not to be made "before the 6th July 1911." A bankruptcy notice was on the 23rd March 1912 served on the defendant by the plaintiffs in respect of the purchase money, and they claimed it as due on a final judgment or order obtained by them against the defendant, dated the 17th Feb. 1911, "whereon execution has not been stayed." Held, that the order of the 17th Feb. 1911 and the master's certificate dated the 12th Jan. 1912 made thereunder was "a final judgment " within sect. 4 (g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1883.

Re Poole; Ex parte Twisaday (63 L. T. Rep. 321) approved. Held, also, that the direction in the order of the 17th Feb. 1911 that the money should not be payable until the 6th July 1911 was not a stay of execution within that section, and therefore the bankruptcy notice was not bad because it stated that execution on the order had not been stayed.

[Re A Debtor (837 of 1912). Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. June 21.-Counsel: Hansell; Tindale Davis. Solicitors: B. F. Browne; Surtees, Philpot, and Co.]

Bankruptcy-Judgment Debt in County Court-Part Payment into Court by Debtor before the Sum due under Order of the Court -Repudiation by Creditor-Amount of Debt reduced below £50 -Bankruptcy Notice for full Amount bad-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46&47 Vict. c. 52), s. 4 (g)-County Courts Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 105-County Court Rules 1903 and 1904 Orders XXIII., r. 13, and XXV., rr. 7, 8, 23.

A debtor who owed the sum of £57 5s. 6d. submitted to have judgment given against him in the Clerkenwell County Court for that sum on the 12th Oct. 1911. The amount due was to be paid into court on the 7th Nov. 1911, but on the 6th Nov. the debtor paid into court the sum of £10. The creditors at once repudiated this payment, and on the 10th Jan. 1912 served him with a bankruptcy notice requiring payment of the full amount of £57 5s. 6d. On the 28th Feb. 1912 the registrar of the County Court of Brentford set aside the bankruptcy notice, holding that such notice could only issue for the amount for which the creditor was entitled to issue execution, and that by the debtor's payment into court that amount had been reduced below £50. From this decision the creditors appealed, and it was contended on their behalf that they could not be compelled to accept the registrar as their agent for the receipt of money paid into court so as to deprive them of their right of taking bankruptcy proceedings.

Held, that, whether or not the registrar of the County Court was bound to accept the money paid to him by the debtor, this sum having been paid into court, the County Court office would not have levied execution for more than the balance of £47 5s. 6d., and therefore the creditors could not validly serve upon the debtor a bankruptcy notice for any greater amount, and that consequently the bankruptcy notice served by them for £57 5s. 6d. was bad. Decision of Divisional Court (132 L. T. Jour. 606) affirmed.

[Re A Debtor; Ex parte Judgment Creditors v. The Debtor. Ct. of App. Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. June 21-Counsel: Coumbe; Jacobs. Solicitors Clarke, Lewthwaite, and Co.; Percy R. Gibbs.] Company Debenture-holder's Action-Receiver appointed Creation of specific and floating Charges by Debenture Trust Deed-Property acquired thereafter-Subsequent Creation of Debenture Stock-Priorities.

By a debenture trust deed dated the 21st Aug. 1899, £250,000 4 per cent. debenture stock was secured by a specific charge on all the freeholds and leaseholds then owned by a company and by a general and floating charge on the assets for the time being, both present and future, including its uncalled capital. Such charge, by clause 9, was in no way to "hinder or prevent the company from selling. alienating, such assets in the ordinary course of its business and for the purposes of carrying on the same, but so that (subject as hereinafter mentioned) the company shall not have power so long as any of the stock hereby secured shall remain outstanding to create any further charge on or over its undertaking or property generally to rank pari passu with or in priority to or otherwise than subject and in subordination to the security hereby constituted." Subsequently, but prior to the 7th Sept. 1903, the company acquired some additional freehold property at D., and executed a deed of that date to secure an issue of £100,000 6 per cent. "A" debenture stock. The last-mentioned deed created a charge on all the freeholds and leaseholds "then" owned by the company subject to the provisions of the deed of the 21st Aug. 1899. A receiver and manager was appointed on the 9th July 1909, and, by an order dated the 14th Nov. 1910, an inquiry was instituted raising the question as to whether the freeholds at D. were subject to a first specific charge in favour of the holders of the "A" debenture stock in priority to the holders of the 4 per cent. debenture stock, or whether the floating charge in favour of the holders of the 4 per cent. debenture stock had become crystallised on the appointment of the receiver and accordingly entitled the holders of the 4 per cent. debenture stock to a first charge upon the freeholds at D. On behalf of the 4 per cent. debenture stockholders it was contended that the effect of (1) the words " subject to the provisions of the deed of the 21st Aug. 1899, (2) clause 9, and (3) the words in clause 23, "subject to the power of dealing with the same herein before conferred upon the company," in the A" debenture trust


deed was to postpone the charge thereby created to the charge in favour of the 4 per cent. stockholders. It was decided by Parker, J. (106 L. T. Rep. 595) that as soon as the floating charge on the freeholds at D. was crystallised by the appointment of the receiver it became a first charge; and that the security created by the "A" debenture trust deed was subsequent to it. On appeal:

Held, that the decision of Parker, J. was perfectly right and that the security created by the first deed ranked in priority to that created subsequently. Appeal dismissed.

[Re Robert Stephenson and Co. Limited; Poole v. The Company. Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and June 25.-Counsel: for the appellant, Kennedy, L.JJ. Martelli, K.C. and R. H. Hodge; for the responder.ts, Romer, K.C. and G. M. Simmonds; Maugham. Solicitors: for the appellant, William A. Crump and Son; for the respondents, Slaughter and May; Rawle, Johnstone, and Co., agents for Cooper and Goodger, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.]

Friendly Society-Surplus-Distribution-Pension Fund-Rules - Collecting Societies Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 26), s. 5, sub-ss. 2, 3.


The L. Friendly Society was established in 1843, and had a membership of millions. It was provided by rule 21 of its rules that there should be a valuation of its assets and liabilities once, at least, in every five years, and that any surplus disclosed by the valuation, after all claims had been met, might, on the recommendation of the committee of management, and by resolution passed by a majority at a general meeting, be distributed by way of free policies or bonuses, or in such other manner as the actuary should certify might with perfect safety be done. A resolution was passed by the society on the 21st March 1911 to transfer £50,000 out of the actuarial surplus to the pension fund. In consequence of proceedings having been taken attacking this resolution on the ground of insufficient notice of the intention to propose it, a second meeting was held on the 18th July, when the resolution was passed unanimously. Previous to this meeting an alteration had been made in the rules authorising such a transfer by adding to rule 21 a power to the society to authorise the transfer of not more than 20 per cent. of the surplus to the pension fund. That fund had been established under rule 8, which empowered the committee of management to appoint officers and servants and pay their salaries, and directed the committee to contribute each year out of the sum to meet contributions of those management fund a engaged in the active service of the society, towards providing pensions on retirement. Rule 15 provided that no rule should be made or amended except with the consent of a majority of the members present at a general meeting specially called, and that no amendment should be valid till registered. The alteration made on the 18th July was registered on the 21st July. Rule 27 provided that the committee of management should annually hold one general meeting "at the chief office of the society, on the first Wednesday in March of each year, at seven o'clock in the evening "; that the meeting might be adjourned to any one of six specified areas, to be held within twenty-eight days of the first Wednesday in March; and that not less than fourteen clear days' notice of the place of any adjourned meeting was to be advertised. K., a member of the society, brought this action on behalf of himself and all other members except the defendants against the trustees of the society and the committee of management, claiming a declaration that the meeting held in March was not convened in accordance with the Act of Parliament or the rules, because the notice in the newspapers did not specify its object, and that it was ultra vires the society to make the transfer, and an injunction restraining the society and committee from carrying the resolution into effect. Sect. 5, sub-sect. 2, of the Collecting Societies Act 1896 provides that "except when the day, hour, and place of an annual or other periodical meeting" are fixed by the rules, notice of every general meeting shall either be given by advertisement to be published at least twice in two or more newspapers or be served upon every member; and sub-sect. 3 provides that this notice shall specify the day, hour, place, and objects of the meeting.

Held, that rule 27 took the case out of the Act of 1896, as an adjourned meeting was in a legal sense part of the original meeting, and the business transacted at the adjourned meeting had been specified in the agenda for the original meeting. Held, also, that, having regard to rules 8 and 21, the resolution was intra vires. Decision of Warrington, J. (132 L. T. Jour. 156) affirmed.

[Kirksopp v. Heighton. Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. June 20.-The plaintiff in person. Counsel for the defendants, Gore-Browne, K.C., Buckmaster, K.C., and Roope Reeve. Solicitors: John A. Roberts; J. Tickle and Co.]

Revenue-Settled Land-Land Values-Increment Duty-Provisional Valuation for Purposes of Duty-"Owner"-Duties of Trustees-Rights of Remainderman-Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7, c. 8), ss. 26, 27, 39, 41.


The Finance Act 1910 casts no duty upon the trustees of settled land to check the provisional valuations of the land which have been made by the commissioners for the purposes of duty and served upon the trustees as owners" in accordance with the Act. The trustees have a discretion in the matter, and the court will not order them to incur the expense except in cases where there are special circumstances. Decision of Neville, J. (106 L. T. Rep. 421) affirmed.

[Re Knollys' Settlement; Sanders v. Haslam. Ct. of App. : Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. June 22.Counsel: Peterson, K.C. and G. B. Hamilton; Butcher, K.C. and T. L. Wilkinson. Solicitors: Burnie and Co.; Lindsay, Greenfield, and Masons.]

Trade Mark-Registration-" Lactobacilline "-"Invented Word' -Word having no direct Reference to Character of Goods-User -Trade Marks Act 1905 (5 Edw. 7, c. 15), ss. 3, 9.


In March 1910 applications were made, under sect. 9 of the Trade Marks Act 1905, by a French company carrying on business as manufacturers of drugs and chemical products, to register the word "Lactobacilline" in classes 3 and 42 as a trade mark in respect of a pharmaceutical preparation for human use, and also in respect of alimentary goods. The usual note appeared at the foot of each application, that the applicants did not claim the registration under the special provisions of par. 5 of sect. 9. The applications were opposed by the proprietors of certain stores on the grounds that the word was not an "invented word," and was a word having "direct reference to the character of the goods" indicating lactic acid bacilli; that the registration thereof would unduly hamper the opponents and others in connection with the sale of preparations containing lactic acid bacilli; and that in the alternative the word had such resemblance to the trade mark Lacticine" used by the opponents in connection with preparations containing lactic acid bacilli as to be calculated to deceive. The applications came on to be heard before an official at the Patent Office acting for the Registrar of Trade Marks on the 14th June 1911. He decided that the registration ought to be allowed to proceed. The opponents appealed to the court, contending that the word had been used by the applicants and others as a word descriptive of the article itself. The applicants, however, adduced evidence to the effect that the word had been invented by themselves, and that it had always been understood by scientists and the public who used their preparation as referring to their preparation only and no other. In Dec. 1911 it was decided by Joyce, J. that the word, which came obviously from "lactobacillus," now a well-recognised word in the English language, had for several years been used to designate a preparation that anyone might manufacture; that it was doubtful whether there ever was enough invention in the word to bring it within the meaning of sect. 9 (3) of the Act of 1905; and that it was a word having a direct reference to the character of the preparation. The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Held, that the applicants alone had used the word to describe their own preparation of lactic ferment; that the evidence showed that the word was an "invented word" within sect. 9 of the Act of 1905; and that the prior user of it by the applicants did not deprive it of that character. Appeal allowed.

[Re Société Anonyme le Ferment Trade Mark Applications. Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. June 17, 18, and 19.-Counsel: for the appellants, Walter, K.C. and J. Hunter Gray; for the respondents, Hughes, K.C. and Sebastian. Solicitors: for the appellants, Irvine, Borrowman, and Browne; for the respondents, McKenna and Co.] Will-Bequest of Business-Direction to Executors and Trustees to carry on the same- -Power to employ one of them at a Salary as General Manager-Claim for Remuneration as against Creditors of insolvent Estate.

A testator, by his will dated the 5th Oct. 1907, after appointing the defendants executors and trustees thereof and after bequeathing certain pecuniary legacies and annuities, gave his business and the premises where it was carried on to the defendants upon trust to carry on the same for such period as they might think fit, with full and uncontrolled discretion as to the management of the business, and he gave power to the defendants to employ one or more of them at a salary to manage the business as general manager, and he directed the defendants to divide the net profits arising from the business equally amongst his brothers and sisters; and, after directions as to certain specific parts of his estate and the realisation thereof and empowering the defendants to employ A. B. (who was one of their number) as the agent for managing the estate and to pay him such a sum for so acting as they might think fit,

devised and bequeathed his residuary real and personal estate to the defendants upon the trusts therein-mentioned. The testator died in Oct. 1907. A. B., one of the defendants, was appointed to manage the testator's business. In Oct. 1908, in an action commenced by originating summons by one of the beneficiaries, an order was made for the administration of the testator's estate. In July 1909 an order was made for the sale of the business as a going concern, and the same was sold accordingly. The business having been disposed of, the defendants' further accounts were lodged in chambers and vouched, and the master's certificate was completed. By the minutes of the order on further consideration the defendants asked that the remuneration of A. B. and his expenses in carrying on the business, which items were submitted by the master to the court, should be allowed. It was anticipated that the testator's estate would prove to be insolvent. The creditors of the testator objected to the allowance of any sum in respect of the remuneration of A. B. until they had been paid, and then not without showing that his management had been beneficial to the estate. On the 16th Jan. 1912 it was decided by Eve, J that the defendants were not as against creditors entitled to the sum charged by the defendant A. B. as tioned in the master's certificate, or any part thereof, without prejudice to any question between any of the parties if the assets of the testator should ultimately prove to be sufficient for payment in full of his debts and liabilities. The defendants appealed, asking for a declaration that the defendants were entitled to be allowed in their accounts the sum charged by the defendant A. B.; or alternatively that an inquiry might be directed what was the proper amount to be allowed to the defendants for remuneration in respect of the carrying on and management of the testator's business by the defendant A. B. The defendants' contention was that the will expressly authorised the employment of A. B. as general manager of the business at a salary; that the business required a manager; and that, the amount paid to A. B. being a fair and reasonable sum to pay to a manager and such as would have had to be paid to a stranger, the creditors had not suffered by the appointment. Dowse v. Garton (64 L. T. Rep. 809; (1891) A. C. 190) was relied upon.


Held, that, having regard to the decision in Re White; Pennell v. Franklin (78 L. T. Rep. 770; (1898) 2 Ch. 217), the allowance asked for could not be made to the defendants as against creditors of the testator's estate. Appeal dismissed.

[Re Salmen; Salmen v. Bernstein. Ct. of App.: CozensHardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. June 24.Counsel for the appellants, Dighton Pollock and Beebee; for the respondents, P. Ogden Lawrence, K.C. and Stamp. Solicitors: for the appellants, Arthur E. Eves; for the respondents, Morton and Patterson.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Trust-Tenant for Life and Remaindermen-Leaseholds-Freeholds -Repairs-Liability of Corpus or Income for.

By his will, dated the 2nd July 1900, the testator appointed W. T. S. and others executors and trustees, and devised and bequeathed his residuary real and personal estate to his trustees upon trust for sale and conversion and out of the proceeds to pay his debts, &c., and to stand possessed of the residue of such proceeds upon trust to pay the rents, dividends, and annual income thereof to his wife, the plaintiff R. S. during her life, and from and after her death for others in remainder. And the testator declared that it should be lawful. for his trustees to postpone the sale and conversion of all or any part of his residuary estate for such time as they should in their absolute discretion think fit, and directed that the whole of the rents, profits, and annual income of his residuary estate, however the same might from time to time be represented, should be paid to his wife and no part applied to capital, and that no apportionment in respect of such rents, profits, dividends, and annual income should be made at the time of his decease, but the whole thereof should be paid to his wife. The testator's property at the time of his death in July 1900 consisted (inter alia) of real and leasehold weekly properties which were retained by the trustees of the will. The trustee W. T. S. managed the said real and leasehold properties, and during the succeeding years charged and retained out of the rents of the property large sums for repairs. The plaintiff R. S. brought this action against the trustees, alleging (inter alia) that those sums were improperly charged out of income and should have been paid, if at all, out of capital, and in this behalf the plaintiff relied on Re Courtier (55 L. T. Rep. 574; 34 Ch. Div. 136), Re Hotchkys (55 L. T. Rep. 110; 32 Ch. Div. 408), and Re Horne (92 L. T. Rep. 263; (1905) 1 Ch. 76). For the defendants, Lewin on Trusts, p. 266; Re Gjers (80 L. T. Rep. 689; (1899) 2 Ch. 54), and Eccles v. Mills (78 L. T. Rep. 206; (1898) A. C. 369) were cited.

Held, that what was necessary to put the leasehold property into proper repair at the death of the testator ought to be paid out of corpus, and that the income ought to bear the cost of keeping the property in repair after that date, with reference to the covenants in the leases. All the repairs to the freeholds must be borne by the corpus.

[Re Sutton (deceased); Sut'on v. Sutton. Ch. Div.: Neville, J. June 13 and 17.-Counsel: Jenkins, K.C. and R. Roope Reeve; Peterson, K.C. and MacSwinney; Poyser. Solicitors: Torr and Co.; Edell and Co.; W. W. Young, Son, and Ward.]

Will-Construction-Gift of Realty-"Die without leaving a Male Heir"-Failure of Heirs at Time of Death-Estate in fee simple-Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26), s. 29.

A testator by his will devised and bequeathed "the manor of M. with the appurtenances thereof and also all other my freehold and leasehold messuages or dwelling-houses or lands of any other holding upon the trusts hereinafter declared, namely, upon trust to pay the rents, produce, and annual income arising therefrom unto my nephew R. until he shall assign, charge, or otherwise dispose of the same or some part thereof or become bankrupt or do something whereby the said annual income or some part thereof would become payable to or vested in some other person, which of the said events shall first happen, and, if the trusts hereinbefore declared shall determine in the lifetime of R., to accumulate at compound interest for the benefit of the male heir of his body till he attain the age of twenty-one years, and should he die without leaving a male heir then I direct my trustees to apply the annual income to my nephews W., F., and H. and the respective male heirs of their bodies successively in tail," with gifts over in the event of W., F., and H. not leaving male heirs. The testator died on the 10th Oct. 1906 possessed of no leasehold property. This summons was to determine (inter alia) to what estate or interest in the real estate devised by the will R. was entitled For the plaintiff, R., it was argued that he was entitled to an estate in fee simple, or alternatively an estate tail, determinable upon assignment or bankruptcy. For the defendants, other parties interested under the will, it was contended that the plaintiff took no more than a determinable life interest.

Held, that (without prejudice to any claim of the person who might be male heir or male heir of the body of R. at the time of his death) R. was entitled to an equitable estate in fee simple, determinable in the event of his assigning, charging, or becoming bankrupt, and if he should die without so assigning, charging, or becoming bankrupt, an estate in fee simple absolute, subject to the executory limitation over to W., F., and H. in the event of R. dying without leaving a male heir of his body at the time of his death.

[Re Walter Leach; Leach v. Leach. Ch. Div.: Joyce, J. April 23 and May 24.-Counsel: J. G. Wood; Owen Thompson; E. F. Spence; Popham. Solicitors: Paynter, Newman, and Co.; Morrison and Co.]


County Court-Practice-Costs-Taxation-Claim and Counterclaim-Taxation where Plaintiff succeeds on Claim and Defendant on Counter-claim-County Court Rules, Order LIII., r. 16 (3).

Appeal from the decision of the learned deputy judge sitting at the City of London Court. An action was brought by the plaintiff in the City of London Court claiming arrears of salary from the defendants, who contested the plaintiff's claim and also counter-claimed for the return of certain articles from the plaintiff. The learned judge gave judgment for the plaintiff on the claim for £25 and costs, and for the defendants on the counter-claim for £26 and costs. The registrar taxed the plaintiff's bill of costs on scale B and allowed a fee of £3 3s. to the plaintiff's counsel. He then taxed the defendants' bill o costs and allowed the defendants' counsel a fee of the same amount in respect of the counter-claim. Order LIII., r. 16, of the County Court Rules provides that "Where a counter-claim is raised and tried, unless the judge otherwise orders, the scale upon which the costs of the parties are to be taxed shall be determined as follows: (3) If both parties are successful, by the amounts which they recover on their respective claims. The plaintiff appealed from the taxation of the registrar on the ground that, having allowed the plaintiff's counsel a fee of three guineas the claim, he had exhausted the amount for upon counsel's fees which was provided for under the scale applicable, and therefore he was not entitled to allow any fee to the defendants' counsel in respect of the counter-claim. The deputy judge affirmed the decision of the registrar and disallowed the plaintiff's objection.

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Held, that, in taxing the costs, the claim and the counterclaim must be treated as separate actions in respect of each of

which a total fee of three guineas was payable to counsel, and that in each case the registrar must determine what proportion of that sum was referable to the claim and counter-claim respectively and allow to the successful plaintiff the amount to which he was entitled for proving his claim, but nothing in respect of the counter-claim, and to the successful defendant the amount referable to his proof of his counter-claim, but nothing in respect of his unsuccessful resistance of the plaintiff's claim.

[Fox v. Central Silkstone Collieries Limited. K. B. Div.: Ridley and Bray, JJ. June 19.-Counsel: Coutts-Trotter ; Neilson. Solicitors; Corbin, Greener, and Cook, for Hugh Bury, Barnsley; Pritchard and Sons, for Collins, Robinson, Driffields, and Kusel, Liverpool.]

Master and Servant-Liability of Master for Act of ServantScope of Employment-Injury to Person invited by Servant to enter Master's Cart.

Appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Hamilton sitting at the Chorley County Court. The defendant was the owner of a milk round, and employed H. to drive a milk-float and also a boy to help deliver the milk. During the course of a round, the boy fell out of the float and was rendered unconscious. The plaintiff, seeing the accident, went to the boy's assistance. She said to H.: "Shall I help you to take him home"? He replied: "You can, if you will. Get in." The down to plaintiff got into the float and was bending

put the boy's head to rest on her arm when the float started and the plaintiff was thrown out and injured.


an action by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover damages for the injury sustained, the learned County Court judge held that in the circumstances there was an obligation upon H. to secure assistance on behalf of his master; that the plaintiff was entitled to care on the part of H.; and that, there having been a breach of the duty owed, the defendant The was liable. He gave judgment for the plaintiff for £30. defendant appealed, and it was contended on his behalf that there was no implied authority on the part of his servant to obtain assistance in case of an accident, and that, unless express authority to do so had been given, the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.

Held, that the decision of the learned judge was wrong, and that the defendant's servant by inviting the plaintiff into the cart could not impose upon the defendant an obligation to exercise care in regard to her, the breach of which entitled her to damages.

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[Houghton v. Pilkington. K. B. Div.: Bray and Bankes, JJ. Solicitors: June 21.- Counsel: Eastham; Compton Smith. Barlow, Barlow, and Lyde, for J. Chapman and Co, Manchester; E. C. Rawlings and Butt, for J. H. Neville, Chorley.]


Company Law and Precedents. By ARTHUR STIEBEL. Butterworth and Co.

ALTHOUGH Mr. Stiebel's book is very bulky, extending as it does to over 1500 pages, it is undoubtedly convenient to have the statute and case law relating to companies, and such company forms and precedents as are likely to be of service in ordinary practice, together with the Assurance Companies Act 1909, in one volume. Cases decided in the Hilary Term 1912 and the more important of those decided in the Easter Term 1912 have been incorporated in the text. For convenience of reference, forms have, throughout the book, been placed immediately after the part of the text dealing with the subject-matter to which they relate, and references to the forms will also be found in the text. Mr. Stiebel--who has obtained both expert assistance and advice as to the practice that prevails in the various courts and departments concerned with companies-is to be congratulated upon turning out such a useful and compendious work, and we only hope that it will meet with the success that his labours deserve.

Encyclopædia of the Laws of England; Supplement to the end Sweet and of 1911. Edited by MAX A. ROBERtson. Maxwell Limited; William Green and Sons. THIS, the third annual supplement to the second edition, is a temporary volume for use during the current year, in which the arrangement of the main work has been followed. The system adopted allows quick and easy reference to be made. A demand having been made by subscribers for an index, this

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A Short History of English Law. By EDWARD JENKS. Methuen and Co. Limited.

THIS Volume attempts to cover the whole field of English legal history from the earliest times to the present day, although it only touches lightly on that side of the subject which has already been adequately treated, as, for instance, the origin and development of the courts, and the relations of the State towards its subjects. From the end of the sixteenth century Mr. Jenks has, as he expresses it," sailed over an almost unchartered sea," and presents, therefore, work which has entailed much original research. Besides an index there is a full synopsis of chapters, and, although extending to nearly 400 pages, the book is light in weight and well printed a matter of no small importance to readers. The name of the author is sufficient guarantee of accuracy and, so far as is possible in a work of this size, of completeness.

Privy Council Practice. By NORMAN BENTWICH. Sweet and Maxwell Limited.

THE full title of Mr. Bentwich's book describes its scope. It is: The Practice of the Privy Council in Judicial Matters in Appeals from Courts of Civil, Criminal, and Admiralty Jurisdiction, and in Appeals from Ecclesiastical and Prize Courts, with the Statutes, Rules, and Forms of Procedure. The work is founded upon Safford and Wheeler's Practice of the Privy Council in Judicial Matters, since the publication of which in 1901 the practice dealt with has been greatly simplified. Certain rules have been standardised, the rules of the Judicial Committee itself consolidated, jurisdiction in some cases transferred to other courts, and other modifications instituted, rendering it possible to reduce by more than half the earlier bulky work. The book is divided into three parts, Part 1 dealing with rules of appeal from the colonies, &c., Part 2 treating of the practice before the Privy Council, and Part 3 containing the practice in Admiralty, Prize, and Ecclesiastical appeals. Great care has evidently been expended in the preparation of the work, which is eminently practical. We think, however, that its value would have been further advanced had references to all contemporary reports been added to the table of cases.

War and the Private Citizen. By A. PEARCE HIGGINS. P. S. King and Son.

MR. ARTHUR COHEN, K.C., has written an appreciative introductory note to this interesting book, which consists of a series of studies in international law. Mr. Higgins presents his subject in five chapters, dealing with (1) The laws of war in relation to the private citizen; (2) Hospital ships and the carriage of passengers and crews of destroyed prizes; (3) Newspaper correspondents in naval warfare; (4) The conversion of merchant ships into warships; and (5) The opening by belligerents to neutrals of closed trade. Some of the matter has appeared in print before, chapter 2 in the Law Quarterly Review, and chapter 3 in Die Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht, but their republication together with the other articles is very welcome, and they show the great possibilities of harm which war may occasion to the civilian population.

The Moneylenders Acts 1900-1911. By CHARLES L. COLLARD' Butterworth and Co.

THIS volume with its verbatim reports of the authoritative cases and appendices of statutes, rules, and precedents of pleading presents a complete review of the law and practice under the Moneylenders Acts. After an introduction in which equitable relief is discussed, both statutes are given in an annotated form with clear and concise notes, followed by a discussion of the practice in these cases. As the author points out, the 1911 Act has entirely altered the law on the subject of the position of assignees of moneylenders'

securities, and its effect is duly dealt with. It is useful to have a collection of the cases in a single volume, citation being thus simplified.

The National Insurance Act 1911. By A. S. PRINGLE. William Green and Sons, Edinburgh. INNUMERABLE publications are being issued to explain this complicated Act and to assist employers and employees to ascertain their obligations. Mr. Pringle, however, limits himself to the proper functions of a law book, and refrains from expressions of opinion on questions of policy and avoids prophecy as to the actions of the commissioners or committees. He has, however, endeavoured to avoid legal technicalities for the sake of laymen to whom the book will certainly be useful. The value of the work is greatly enhanced by an exhaustive index.

We have received from Messrs. Butterworth and Co. vol. 5 of the Quarterly Advance Sheets (Part 2-1912) of Butterworth's Workmen's Compensation Cases, edited by Mr. Douglas Knocker, containing all cases in which judgment was given during March and April.

Part 2 of Reports of Cases under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, edited by Mr. William E. Gordon, the new series recently commenced by Messrs. Stevens and Sons Limited and Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, has reached us. Scottish and Irish appeals are included.


Vol. 3 of the sixth edition of Chitty's 'Statutes of Practical Utility, by Mr. W. H. Aggs, has just been issued by Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited and Messrs. Stevens and Sons Limited, and deals with the subjects "Copyright" to "Customs." It has been a little delayed in publication, but this delay has been amply justified, for it has enabled the editor to include the Copyright Act 1911 and the Perjury Act 1911. Half the volume is occupied with the subject "Criminal Law," which includes the numerous statutes passed since the last edition. This section has been arranged under sub-headings, and, in order to facilitate reference, a complete table of all the Acts, arranged chronologically, has been placed at the beginning. "Crown Office is a new title, under which will be found the rules of 1906, the title "Certiorari," under which in the last edition some of the rules of 1886 were printed, having been dropped. Under "Customs" those parts of recent Revenue and Finance Acts which affect the Customs Consolidation Act of 1876 or impose new customs duties have been added. The cases cited in the volume are, as a general rule, brought down to the end of March 1912.

The sixth edition, just published by Butterworth and Co., of that excellent book, Hunt's Law of Boundaries, Walls, and Fences, is more than merely a new edition. Mr. R. G. Nicholson Combe has revised and substantially rewritten the work. The difficulties the editor has had to encounter will be appreciated by those who know something of the subject, for there is no narrow code or branch of law peculiar to the subject, inasmuch as the law of boundaries and fences is part of the general law of land. Special attention has been paid to the development of a useful feature of the original book-namely, the collection of the numerous presumptions of law which exist with regard to the ownership of highways, rivers, and fences, and with regard to boundaries generally. There is a new chapter on the Law of Support, and the introduction and several other chapters have been rewritten, including that on the boundaries of registered land. Mr. Combe's revision has been thorough, and the present edition will well maintain the high reputation of its predecessors.

It is fifty-four years since Professor Westlake first published his well-known Treatise on Private International Law, and now Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited have brought out a fifth edition, the learned author having been again assisted in his work by Mr. A. F. Topham. As our readers

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