was by profession an architect and had had no experience of the coal trade prior to the assignment. For these reasons they contended that there was a personal element connected with the contract which rendered it unassignable. Held, that the contract was not one which was assignable in law. [Cooper v. Micklefield Coal and Lime Company Limited. K. B. Div. Com. Ct.: Hamilton, J. July 3.-Counsel: Frank Phillips; Compston. Solicitors: Ridsdale and Son, for Chadwick, Son, and Nicholson, Dewsbury; Arthur E. Burton, for Scatcherd, Hopkins, Middleworks, and Brighouse, Leeds ] Ship-Damage to Cargo by Fire-Unseaworthiness. On the 18th Aug. 1910 the West Point sailed from Glasgow to Charleston with the plaintiffs' cargo on board. On the 27th Aug. a fire broke out in the engine-room which spread to the cargo and the rest of the vessel with the result that it became necessary to abandon the vessel and save the lives of those on board. The vessel was scuttled to prevent her from becoming a danger to navigation, and she went to the bottom. In this action, which was brought by the cargo-owners against the owners of the ship, these questions arose: (1) How the fire happened; (2) whether the cause amounted to unseaworthiness of the vessel for the carriage of the cargo at the time when she loaded the cargo and sailed from Glasgow; and (3) whether, if unseaworthy, all reasonable means had been taken to provide against such unseaworthiness, it being provided by the bill of lading that the shipowners should not be liable in respect of unseaworthiness provided all reasonable means had been taken to provide against such unseaworthiness. The cargo was burnt because of the fire in the engine room, and the fire broke out because a store of paraffin kept in the engineroom escaped so as to come in contact with some naked light and started a conflagration. Evidence was given to the effect that the oil was carried in a store in the engine room, which was drawn off by means of a cock. After the vessel put out to sea, the cock was observed to be leaking. An attempt was made to repair the cock, after which the second engineer occupied himself with something else in connection with the tap, the result of which was to cause an escape, and so cause the fire. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the leakage, though not from any crack or unprecedented kind of repair, was such that the vessel was unseaworthy to go to sea unless it was cured before she sailed, and that, although seaworthiness need not be maintained at the cost of always introducing the latest or best appliances, yet there must be appliances capable of carrying the cargo in safety even though there be some negli gence. Held, that as there was no defect existing that could not be ordinarily remedied in the course of the voyage, that did not constitute a structural defect existing in the vessel at the time of sailing, and therefore she was not unseaworthy. [Virginia Carolina Chemical Company v. Norfolk and North American Steam Shipping Company Limited. K. B. Div. Com. Ct. Hamilton, J. July 3.-Counsel: Atkin, K.C., Maurice Hill, K.C., and R. A. Wright; Bailhache, K.C. and Dawson Miller. Solicitors: Parker, Garrett, and Co.; William A. Crump and Son.] PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. Divorce-Decree Nisi obtained by Wife-Rescinded on King's Proctor's Intervention-Subsequent Petition by Husband-Discretion of Court under Sect. 31 of Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 -Decree Nisi granted to Husband. By a petition dated the 22nd March 1912 H. C. W. sought a divorce by reason of the adultery of his wife, N. I. M. W., with the co-respondent G. W. The suit was undefended. The parties were married in 1905. On the 17th Feb. 1908 the wife filed a petition for divorce, on the ground of the cruelty and adultery of her husband, who did not defend. A decree nisi was pronounced on the 30th April 1908; but, on the intervention of the King's Proctor, alleging that the wife had committed adultery with one R., the decree was rescinded on the 15th Dec. 1908. Husband and wife were reconciled in July 1909, and from Christmas 1911 until February 1912 lived and cohabited as man and wife. On her return from Monte Carlo in the early part of 1912 the wife lived with the co-respondent G. W., and subsequently sailed with him to America. H. C. W. asked the court to exercise its discretion under sect. 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 in his favour, notwithstanding his own adultery. Held, that as the petitioner had given a straightforward and honest account of his married life, and as there had been a complete condonation by the wife of his matrimonial offences, the court was justified in exercising its discretion in his favour, and would grant him a decree nisi. [Woltereck v. Woltereck and Walters. P. Div.: Sir S. T. Evans, P. July 9.-Counsel: P. Rose-Innes. Solicitor: G. R. Cran.] Head on the Transfer of Stocks, Shares, and other Marketable Securities. Second Edition. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Limited, 1, Amen-corner, E.C. Price 5s. net. Criminal Appeal Cases. Vol, 7, Part II. Stevens and Haynes, Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Price 2s. net. British Citizenship. A discussion initiated by E. B. Sargant. Longmans, Green, and Co., 39, Paternoster-row, E.C. Price 2s 6d. Cross on Limited Liability Companies. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, and Co. Limited, 4, Stationers' Hall-court, E.C. Price 10s. 6d. net. COUNTY COURTS. SITTINGS OF THE COURTS. FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, JULY 20. Aberayron, Tuesday Barnstaple, Tuesday, at 10 Blackburn, Monday, at 9.30 * Brackley, Monday, at 12 Burton, Wednesday, at 9; Thursday, at 11 Chelmsford, Monday, at 10 Cheltenham, Thursday and Friday Chesterfield. Friday (R. By at 2.30), at 9.30 Chippenham, Tuesday, at 10.15 Chorley, Wednesday, at 9.30 Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Clitheroe, Thursday, at 9.45 Congleton, Tuesday, at 10 Darlington, Wednesday, at 9 Dewsbury, Friday (J.S. at 10.30) Denbigh, Thursday Downham, Thursday, at 11 Durham, Monday and Tuesday, at 10 Edmonton, Thursday, Friday, and Evesham, Saturday at 10 Glossop, Wednesday, at 10 Great Grimsby, Tuesday and Wed- Hanley, Wednesday and Thursday, at 9.30 Hastings, Monday Henley-on-Thames, Wednesday, at Lampeter, Monday Leeds, Monday (J.S. & A.O.), Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10 Leicester, Wednesday, at 10 Leominster, Monday, at 10 Liverpool, Monday (By at 11), Tuesday Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (B., A., & W.C.), at 10 Llanfyllin, Tuesday, at 10 Loughborough,* Tuesday, at 9.30 Ludlow, Wednesday, at 10 Lutterworth, Monday, at 2 Macclesfield, Thursday, at 10 Manchester, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday Thursday, and Friday (R. By), at 10 * Mansfield, Monday, at 10 March, Tuesday, at 10 * Market Drayton, Friday, at 10 Merthyr Tydfil, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Mountain Ash, Tuesday Nelson, Tuesday, at 9.45 Newcastle-on-Tyne, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday (By & W.C.). and Friday (Adm.), at 10 Newcastle-under-Lyme, Tuesday, at 9.30 Newmarket, Thursday New Mills, Monday, at 10.30 Nuneaton, Friday, at 9 Poole, Monday, at 10 Portsmouth, Monday and Thursday, at 10.30 Redditch, Friday at 10 Richmond (Yorks), Thursday, at 10 Ringwood, Tuesday, at 10 Rochester, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, at 9.30 Rotherham, Tuesday and Friday, at 10 Rye, Tuesday St. Austell, Monday, at 10 St. Neots, Wednesday, at 11 Salford, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday Salisbury Thursday, at 10 Scarborough, Tuesday Scunthorpe, Monday, at 10 Sevenoaks, Monday, at 10 Shaftesbury, Wednesday, at 10 Sheffield, Thursday (By at 2), at 10 Shoreditch, Tuesday and Thursday Soham, Friday, at 10 Southampton, Tuesday, at 10 Southport, Tuesday, at 10 Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday, at 10.30 Stockton-on-Tees. Tuesday, at 9.30 Stone, Monday, at 12.30 Stourbridge, Wednesday Thursday, at 13 Stowmarket, Friday and Sunderland, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (By), at 10 Swindon. Wednesday (By at 11), at 10.30 Tavistock, Saturday, at 10 Tenterden, Monday at 1 Torrington, Thursday, at 10.30 Tredegar, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10.30 RECENT DECISION. OSBORN v. HERDMAN. Agricultural Holdings-Yearly Tenancy-Notice to quit given by Landlord-Expenses of Tenant in quitting Holding-"Reasons inconsistent with good Estate Management"-Rights of Tenant -Agricultural Holdings Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 28), s. 11. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MACKARNESS, on the 1st July, gave judgment in this case in the Hastings County Court. Horton-Smith (instructed by J. C. Buckwell and Co., Brighton) for the appellant; H. G. Rooth (instructed by Dowson, Ainslie, and Garle) for the respondent. : His HONOUR said:-This was a special case stated for the opinion of the court in accordance with the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908. The points reserved arise upon the construction of sect. 11 of the Act. are of considerable interest to landlords and tenants, and have They not yet, so far as I know, been the subject of judicial decision by any of the Superior Courts of this country. The section provides that "Where the landlord of a holding, without good and sufficient cause and for reasons inconsistent with good estate management, terminates the tenancy by notice to quit the tenant, upon quitting the holding, shall, in addition to compensation (if any) to which he may be entitled in respect of improvements, and notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, be entitled to compensation for the loss or expense directly attributable to his quitting the holding which the tenant may unavoidably incur upon or in connection with the sale or removal of his household goods, or his implements of husbandry, produce, or farm stock, on or used in connection with the holding." The tenant, William Osborn, came into possession of his holding, Court Lodge Farm, Ewhurst, containing 450 acres, under an indenture dated the 28th July 1908 by which the respondent landlord, Arthur Widdrington Herdman, demised the farm to him for the term of one year and thereafter from year to year determinable by either party giving to the other not less than twelve months' notice in writing. On the 8th Oct. 1910, the respondent wrote to his tenant as follows "Dear Osborn,-Please find the enclosed formal notice to give up Court Lodge next year. I have not any intention of turning you out, but as I am proposing to build one or two bungalows or cottages on Court Lodge, it will be necessary to readjust rents, &c., and without this notice you could prevent my building if you felt inclined.-Yours, A. W. HERDMAN." The formal notice to quit was enclosed in this letter. On the 26th Oct. the applicant replied as follows: "Dear Sir,-You having given me notice to determine my tenancy of Court Lodge Farm, by reason whereof I am preparing to quit, I hereby give you notice that it is my intention to claim compensation for unreasonable disturbance under the provisions of sect. 11 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908, and I have to inform you that, if you propose to make a valuation of my goods, implements, produce, and stock, I shall be pleased to give you a full opportunity of doing so.-WILLIAM OSBORN." On these facts two points were submitted by the arbitrator for my decision: (1) Whether the arbitrator ought to have admitted as evidence correspondence which passed between the parties subsequent to the above letters of the 8th Oct. and 26th Oct. ; (2) whether the tenancy had been determined by notice to quit without good and sufficient cause and for reasons inconsistent with good estate management." The case stated that both sides had agreed that the determining reasons must be those which influenced the landlord at the time of his giving the notice, and no other. I cannot doubt that the arbitrator was right in admitting the subsequent correspondence, on the ground that any evidence is admissible which might throw light on the genuineness of the motives of the landlord or the adequacy of the cause assigned by him for giving the notice to quit. I do not see how the section of the Act could be made to serve its purpose unless these matters were investigated, especially in such a case as this, where the notice to quit was declared by the landlord on its face as not intended to be acted upon. The other point is more difficult to decide. I should certainly be of opinion that the reasons given for determining the tenancy were 66 prima facie good and sufficient and not inconsistent with good estate management. But the correspondence makes it doubtful whether the reasons given were the real ones. It appears that neither the notice to quit nor the claim for compensation were regarded as more than formalities, and that for over six months the parties continued to negotiate, the landlord offering to grant the tenant a seven years' lease, while the tenant endeavoured, without success, to obtain from the landlord the terms under which such a lease would be granted. The negotiations finally broke down in April because neither side would commit themselves, and in June the landlord sold the farm (except seventythree acres) to a third party. In the meantime no bungalows had been built. Under these circumstances, it was strongly contended for the tenant that the reasons as given in the notice to quit were not the real ones and were on that account bad and inconsistent with good estate management. After full consideration, I have come to the conclusion that they cannot be so regarded. I will assume that the landlord did change his mind after he had given the notice to quit, and determined to sell the estate instead of merely building the bungalows as he had stated. But that would not, to my mind, lay him open to pay compensation to the tenant, inasmuch as I think a sale of the estate for the purpose of getting a larger income out of the money invested in the land would be a good and sufficient cause for giving notice to the tenant and one not inconsistent with good estate management. In this particular case the effect of the correspondence is to show that the landlord wanted to keep the tenant and offered him a seven years' lease, and that the negotiations fell through because neither landlord nor tenent would take the first step in proposing the new rent. The tenant might, I have little doubt, have obtained a lease from his landlord if he would have stated what rent he was prepared to pay, but he declined to do so, and I cannot think that after that he is entitled to claim compensation under sect. 11 of the Act. Nor do I think that sect. 23 is of any assistance to him, though that section was prayed in his aid by his counsel. The notice to quit was not attacked on any other ground. The answers therefore to the questions submitted to me must be that the correspondence was properly admitted and that the notice to quit was given for a good and sufficient cause and one not inconsistent with good estate management. Grounds for refusing a Mandamus. IN a case heard this week before the Divisional Court, in which a rule nisi for a mandamus had been directed to a revising barrister, a point was raised by those showing cause against the rule that is of considerable interest to practitioners, although the court did not actually give a decision thereon. It was suggested that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel an officer or magistrate to do an act or perform a duty which the law imposes upon him, unless and until there shall have been a demand that such act should be done or such duties performed, and a refusal to do or perform the same. Blackstone defines the writ of mandamus as being "in general, a command issuing in the King's name from the Court of King's Bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the King's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office or duty, and which the Court of King's Bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice." The writ of mandamus is a "high prerogative writ "-that is to say, it issues not of strict right at the instance of one of the King's subjects, but at the discretion of the court (per Lord Mansfield JURE ES in Rex v. Askew, 4 Burr. 2189). This discretion has been exercised according to a number of well-known general principles, and subject to certain long-recognised rules. Thus, for instance, it has been one of the principal general rules governing the cases in which the writ of mandamus should issue that there must have been a demand made upon the person or body on whom the performance of the duty sought to be enforced is incumbent, and a neglect and refusal by such person or body to perform it. This general principle has been recognised in a long line of cases decided in the Queen's Bench during the earlier part of last century, as the series of Adolphus and Ellis and the Queen's Bench Reports testify. Whether there has been a refusal or not is to be collected from the facts of each particular case: (per Lord Denman, in Reg. v. Conservators of the Thames, 8 A. & E. 904). But the refusal may be implied by showing that the party withholds compliance with the demand lawfully made, and distinctly determines not to do what is required: (Reg. v. Brecknock Canal Company, 3 A. & E. 223). The demand must, of course, be a demand to do something which the party refusing has a legal duty to perform, but a demand which embraces, as an alternative, something which cannot rightly be demanded, is sufficient, if such alternative may be rejected: (Reg. v. St. Margaret's, Leicester, 8 A. & E. 889). As stated above, the act required to be done must be one which the law authorises or directs shall be done, so that where an Act of Parliament directs that, under certain circumstances, one or other of two things shall be done, the party to do the act has the option of doing which act he pleases; and a mandamus not giving such option, or not stating a sufficient reason why such option no longer exists, is bad in law: (Reg. v. South-Eastern Railway Company, 4 H. L. Cas. 471). The general rule as to the necessity for a demand and refusal has been so strictly adhered to that when once a writ of mandamus has been discharged on the ground of the absence thereof the court will not entertain a second application for the writ founded upon a subsequent demand and refusal (Reg. v. Mayor of Bodmin, 66 L. T. Rep. 562; (1892) 2 Q. B. 21). The Dentists Act 1878. A DECISION, under the Dentists Act 1878, by the learned stipendiary magistrate sitting at the Clerkenwell Police-court may evoke some criticism. Two summonses were issued against a person who carried on business under a trade name of an Artificial Teeth Institute for a contravention of sect. 3 of the Dentists Act 1878. That section enacts that "a person shall not be entitled to take or use the name or title of dentist' (either alone or in combination with any other word or words), or of 'dental practitioner,' or any name, title, addition, or description implying that he is registered under this Act, or that he is a person specially qualified to practise dentistry, unless he is registered under this Act. Any person, who, not being registered under this Act, takes or uses any such name, title, addition, or description as aforesaid, shall be liable to a fine The evidence showed that the defendant, after treating the complainant, said he would give him a certificate which had to be given by a registered dentist. Upon these facts the magistrate dismissed the summons, holding that the defendant was not shown to have taken or used a name, title, addition, or description within the section. This question is apparently one of fact (Brown v. Whitlock, 67 J. P. 451), so that the learned magistrate was the proper person to decide the point, but the case is somewhat analogous to that of Panhaus v. Brown (63 J. P. 435), in which the appellant was held by the Divisional Court to have been rightly convicted. In that case, the appellant, the sole director and manager of the West Central Dental Institute Limited," not being a duly qualified person, had used an additional title, "The German Dental Institute Limited," implying that he was duly registered, or was specially qualified to act as a dentist. In the case in question it will be observed that the defendant Artificial Teeth Institute," and the word "dental" was not used. The words "specially qualified to practise dentistry," used in the section quoted, import a professional qualification entitling the holder to registration under the Act: (Bellerby v. Heyworth, 102 L. T. Rep. 545; (1910) A. C. 377). traded as an For Half Year ending 3th June 1919. (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52) By the same document, the debtor undertook to pay the debt within a specified period. The question was whether, in these circumstances, the old debt which had accrued before the commencement of the bankruptcy was revived by that new promise to pay; or whether sect. 30, sub-sect. 3, of the Act of 1883 was a complete answer to any proceedings in respect of the debt, the same having been effectually released. To the document-privata scrittura, as it is styled in Italy-the English doctrine of a valuable consideration being requisite to support it has not any application. It is far more than a written acknowledgment of the amount of a pre-existing debt. The moral obligation to pay the debt is sufficient to found a legal obligation, if a privata scrittura has been executed, and it would be enforceable in Italy. This being so, the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion, reversing the decision of Mr. Justice Eve, that the creditor was in precisely the same position in this country as he would be if there had been a valid enforceable new contract subsequent to the discharge of the kind contemplated in Jakeman v. Cook (ubi sup.). While the facts of the present case are doubtless too special ever to be likely to be of common occurrence, the recognition of the soundness of the decision in Jakeman v. Cook (ubi sup.) imparts to the judgment of the Court of Appeal a much wider value than otherwise it would possess. 30 Poole... Portsmouth Preston 15 27 19 24 44 34 7 9 2 Stockport... 10 Stockton-on-Tees :: Swindon Taunton Winchester Windsor 4 IT is scarcely open to assertion that the proposition that bankruptcy, followed by an order of discharge, is no bar to a promise to pay an unproved-for debt, provided it is supported by a new and valuable consideration, is so self-evident as never to need confirmation by the Court of Appeal. All the same, very many years elapsed before the proposition came before that court in a form to obtain such confirmation. But this it did in the recent case of Re Bonacina; Le Brasseur v. Bonacina (noted ante, p. 228). Apparently, the proposition was originally enunciated in distinct terms by a Divisional Court in the case of Jakeman v. Cook (4 Ex. Div. 26) upwards of thirty years ago. It afterwards met with the approval of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, as he then was, in the case of Re Aylmer; Ex parte Crane (1 Manson, 391). Whether an express promise by a bankrupt who had obtained his discharge to pay a debt personally from which his certificate of discharge had released him could be enforced against him was decided in the affirmative under the old bankruptcy statutes prior to that of 1869 (see Kirkpatrick v. Tattersall, 13 M. & W. 766). But as regarded the Act of 1869, the view was that the debt was gone, the promise to pay it being a mere nudum pactum, and, therefore, would not serve to maintain an action: (see Jones v. Phelps, 20 W. R. 92; and Heather and Son v. Webb, 2 C. P. Div. 1). In other words, there must be a new and valuable consideration to support the promise to pay the debt, instead of a voluntary promise to pay for which there is no consideration. If, however, such a new and valuable consideration exists, that will suffice, according to the decision in Jakeman v. Cook (ubi sup.) now approved by the learned judges of the Court of Appeal, and applied by them to the peculiar facts of Re Bonacina; Le Brasseur v. Bonacina (ubi sup.). It will be seen from our note that, although no proof was made in that case by the creditor, an Italian subject, in the bankruptcy of the debtor, a fellow countryman, because he was not aware of the adjudication, the debtor acknowledged in writing his indebtedness to the creditor some years after obtaining an order of discharge under sect. 28 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 LEGISLATION. Death Certification. THE fact that during a period of five years there have been no fewer than 35,418 deaths in England and Wales in regard to which no certificate of causation has been given, must open the eyes of any legal man who is inclined still to think that we have reached finality in death certification. In 1893 a series of recommendations were made by a Select Committee after the reception of some startling evidence as to the possibilities of foul play. The committee expressed the opinion in plain language that "uncertified deaths should, as a class, cease to exist, and that means should be devised whereby a medical certificate should be obtained in every case not certified by a registered medical practitioner in attendance." Yet again, the Departmental Committee on Coroners sitting in 1909 reported in significantly warning terms to the effect that "it is no fault of the law if premature burials do not take place. The present law of death certification offers every opportunity for premature burial, and every facility for the concealment of crime." The joint effects of a law permitting non-certification, and a system of casual certification founded thereby on the ambiguous accounts of relations, are the justification of the new Bill recently introduced by Mr. Greenwood. Deaths and Burials. THIS Bill is intended to deal generally with the defects to which we have adverted, and its result would be to amend several sections in the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1874 and in the Coroners Act 1887. It is suggestive of the present vacuity of law on these subjects that the remedy of the perils in view is, at this stage of our national life, so little a matter of amendment of existing statutes and so largely a matter of original legislation. The method advocated to surmount these grievances is the appointment of a public death certifier. It is proposed that such an officer should be appointed in each sub-district in poor law unions, the holder of the office to be a registered medical practitioner. His duties are to be such as may be prescribed by regulations to be made. Unless the registrar is provided with a "proper" certificate or, where an inquest is held, unless there is delivered to him in addition to the coroner's certificate a "proper" verification certificate, he is not to register any death. A person, required under the Act of 1874 to give information of death, who has duly attended for the purpose is not, however, to be required to make a further attendance if such "proper" certificates were not previously delivered. turn on the exact requirements made by the Legislature on the point of formalities. A proper certificate must be one of two varieties. It must be a certificate in a prescribed form signed by the doctor in attendance at the last illness, or, alternatively, one signed by the official certifier of death. A doctor will not be considered to have been in attendance during the last illness unless he has personally attended the deceased at least twice, one of the occasions being within eight days of the death. The doctor is to be obliged "within thirty-six hours next after the day of death" to send to the registrar a proper certificate and may claim from the registrar the sum of 2s. 6d. The certificate will set out the following material facts-that the signatory has inspected the body, the fact of death, and the grounds for inferring death, the cause of death, and that the signatory was in attendance at the last illness or was the official certifier of death. The verification certificate already mentioned is to be signed by this official or by a doctor and will certify the fact of death, and it will have to be framed in such a manner as to state the signs from which the fact of death was inferred. Other Reforms. WHERE the person required to certify is not satisfied as to the certainty of the cause of death, or thinks that for any other reason further investigation is desirable, he is to furnish the registrar and the coroner with a written statement in a prescribed form. A very important amendment of the existing law of registration is made in a short clause which requires that any still-born child which issues from its mother after the twentyeighth week of pregnancy is to be deemed to have been born alive and to have died after birth, and not to be still-born. It is, however, desirable that this clause should be very carefully considered if the Bill goes to committee, for there are obvious difficulties in regard to administration. The Bill also lays down certain prohibitions of burial in the absence of a registrar's certificate or a coroner's order, and this prohibition is directed to the controller of the ground, the undertaker, the sexton, the clergy, and those in more general terms who otherwise carry out, procure, or take part in a burial, a collocation of words which might, apparently, include members of the cortège. The miscellaneous clauses in themselves deserve attention, and the whole Bill is worth careful consideration as an attempt to deal with a gruesome subject with serious possibilities of facilitating crime. Employment of Children. THE Bill on this subject will be fortunate if it succeeds in escaping the wreckage inevitable to a large number of worthy projects. It has, however, been reprinted so as to represent its provisions after undergoing amendment in Standing Committee A. One of the chief points in which the Bill would modify the principal Act, entitled as above, of 1903, is that sect. 13 thereof is to be read as subject to the provision that the expression "young person means a person over fourteen and under sixteen. Again, the definition of "street trading" will be subjected to the addition of words showing that the definition does not affect the sale in a market or fair of agricultural or horticultural produce by a person in the employment of the producer or an occasional sale to others than the customers of his employer of articles of a kind which he is engaged to deliver and is in course of delivery from door to door. In regard to the restrictions of street trading, the Bill roundly declares that a boy under seventeen or a girl under eighteen is not to be employed in or carry it on. This, however, is subject to the proviso that a boy over fourteen or a toy under fourteen who, before the Bill becomes an Act, was lawfully engaged in street trading may continue so to be on holding a licence. This sub-section will not apply in municipal boroughs, or urban district areas with populations of not exceeding 10,000, or in the areas of rural district councils. In such areas it shall not be lawful for a child under eleven to carry on street trading. Licences. THE power to grant these is vested in the school authority, and they may exact conditions and may restrict their operation to certain areas, and they can enter into arrangements so that the provisions of the Education (Choice of Employment) Act 1910 may be brought to tear. A very important principle is set out in clause 5, for no licence is to be granted to any boy to whom the authority can secure other and more beneficial employment of a character suitable for his capacities within a reasonable distance of his home, but, on the other hand, it is somewhat striking to find that a licence cannot be refused on the ground of "general bad character of the applicant." There is a power to call for attendance at continuation schools as one of the conditions of licensing. Save as provided by by-laws, it is not to be unlawful for a person over fourteen to assist a parent or guardian in street trading if bona fide, and not for improper purposes, and if it constitutes the principal means of support of the family. Conveyance of Cycles. THIS Bill is introduced at a late stage, but it is now well known, for it has appeared in much the same form on previous occasions. Its general purport is to compel railway companies to provide better facilities for the conveyance of cycles alike in the matter of their physical accommodation on trains and steamers, and as regards through rates and fares. A scale of charges is scheduled which will affect both carriage and storage. In regard to the latter the Bill calls upon the companies to afford reasonable means of reception, storage, safe custody, and delivery at the stations. To get over the onerous conditions now imposed the companies are to be liable for loss or damage to a cycle or part thereof, while in the charge or custody of any servant, whether in course of transit or not. If the loss does not exceed 10s. the company is not to be liable, unless an insurance fee of 1d. is paid, and the damage pointed out before removal from the company's premises. The bill does not cover tricycles, nor does it refer to bicycles propelled by more than one rider, or by mechanical power. OCCASIONAL NOTES. Appeal motions-Ex parte (Chancery, Probate, and Divorce Divisions) will be in the list of Appeal Court II. for hearing on Monday next. In Appeal Court I. judgment will be delivered in the following appeals to-day (Saturday): Doleman and Sons v. Ossett Corporation; Petersen v. The Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Limited and D. G. Pinkney. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady will deliver judgment on Monday next in Tooley and Co. Limited. Motions for judgment will be taken in the King's Bench Division to-day (Saturday). Appeals from County Courts will be heard by a Divisional Court, sitting in Bankruptcy, on Monday next. Bankruptcy motions will be heard by the Hon. Mr. Justice Phillimore on Monday next, after the Divisional Court appeals in Bankruptcy, and continued on Tuesday next (if necessary). Mr. Justice Bray will take the following cases to-day (Saturday), at 10.30: Lagos v. Grunwaldt and another; Fisher v. Thurston and Abbott. Defended divorce cases before the court itself will be taken in Court I., on Wednesday, the 17th inst. Mr. Justice Scrutton and Mr. Justice Bankes will open the commission at Leeds, being the last town on the North-Eastern Circuit, next Tuesday. It is understood that they will not be able to return to London before the Long Vacation. The second July Session at the Central Criminal Court will commence on Monday, the 22nd inst., at 10.30. Law clerks coming under the National Insurance Act will be well advised to join the United Law Clerks Society. Forms of applications and full particulars can be obtained of the Secretary, 2, Stone-buildings, Lincoln's-inn. A memorial service was held at the London Necropolis Chapel, Westminster Bridge-road, on Thursday, for Mr. Harry Dallas Helmcken, K.C., of Victoria, British Columbia, who died suddenly in London on Saturday last. At the Central Criminal Court on Wednesday a juryman complained to the Recorder in the afternoon that two juries had been kept waiting all day and were still being detained, notwithstanding that there was no possibility of their being required.The Recorder: You should have been discharged long age. The way in which juries are kept here is most unreasonable. |