vendors shall enter into a covenant with the said company to assign, as and when required by the company or their directors, all future patent rights or in the nature of patent rights which they, or any of them, may hereafter acquire with respect to the aforesaid inventions, or any of them, or any of a like nature, in the United & ingdom, or any part thereof, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, or all or any part of the Continent of Europe." Subsequently, the defendant obtained letters patent for an invention of "an improved rotary and multiplicate printing and numbering machine," whereby, according to the specification, strips or lengths of paper, card, or other material could be continuously printed with any desired subject-matter, and consecutive numbers impressed thereon; such strips being applicable to the manufacture of railway and other tickets, which required that certain subject-matter with consecutive numbers should be printed or impressed thereon. On a bill filed by the company, to compel the defendant to execute an assignment of his patent, and to deliver up the machines which he had constructed according to such patent: Held, that the defendant's patent, being a combination of a printing machine, a perforating machine, and a numbering machine, and an invention to produce a result of a like nature or of a similar kind to that which was produced by the invention which he had sold to the company, came within the agreement to assign future patent rights of a like nature, and the defendant was decreed to execute an assignment thereof to the plaintiff company. Held also, that an agreement to assign future patents or patent rights which a person may subsequently acquire, is not void as being against public policy

(See Company-—Shares.)

PAUPER CHILDREN.

(See School Fees.)
PAVING.

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Public cross roads-Land bounding, or abutting on a new street - Metropolis Management Acts 1855 & 1862 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, ss. 105 and 250; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77). The defendants, having laid out an estate they had purchased for building purposes, cut roads crossing each other, and conveyed the various lots to different persons, these roads being described as the boundaries. The plaintiffs assessed the owners of the houses in some of the streets, and the owners of land bounding or abutting on them, for the expense of paving these streets under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, sect. 105, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77; and in so doing they assessed the defendants as owners of such land in respect of those streets which ran into the sides or ends of the streets paved. Held, by the Exchequer Chamber (reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench), that, assuming the defendants still to possess their former interest in the soil of the streets which bounded the lots they had conveyed, they were not owners of the land at the points of intersection with the paved streets within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Acts...... New street-Apportionment of expenses-Appeal.-The respondents charged the owners of land in a less proportion than the owners of house property for the expenses of paving a new street under the Metropolis Management Amendment Act 1862, sect. 77. The appellant was owner of one of the houses and premises abutting on the said street, each of which consisted of a dwelling house and a garden. The several gardens were not of the same size, and the several frontages of the premises in the street varied considerably. The defendants had not apportioned the charges according to the frontages, but had charged the frontage of each dwelling house with only a small strip of ground used as an approach as house property, and the garden frontage, if more than this, as land at one-third of the house property. The appellant was charged at the higher rate on the whole of his frontage. Held, upon a case stated by the magistrate, who ordered payment by appellant of his proportion so charged, that the defendants under this section had discretion to make an apportionment, and there is no provision for any appeal. The court, therefore, refused to consider the principle upon which this apportionment was made 762

PERILS OF THE SEA. Damage to cargo-Charter-party-Liability of owner of chartered ship - Stowage Stevedore. - Damage to cargo caused by the oozing of wine from casks through straining in bad weather is damage occasioned by perils of the seas, and the shipowners are, under the usual exceptions, exempt from liability therefor, where the cargo is properly stowed, or is stowed in such a manner that the master is not responsible for bad stowage. Where a charter-party stipulates that a vessel is "to be stowed by charterers' stevedore, at risk and expense of vessel," and a cargo is supplied by the charterers and is stowed by their stevedore, the shipowner is not responsible for damage occasioned by bad stowage, Blakie v. Stembridge (6 C. B., N. S., 874) followed. Semble, that charterers proceeding in a Court of Admiralty juris liction, for damage to cargo carried under a bill of lading, containing no ex

Entertainment or amusement-Admission by payment on Sundays-21 Geo. 3 c. 49.-The defendants' buildings consist of an aquarium, a reading room, a restaurant, a café, together with conservatories, gardens, and ornamental resting places. The fish and animals are fed at stated hours, all the buildings are open and refreshments sold to the public on Sundays as well as other days; and every Sunday evening a band performs a selection of sacred music. The attendants employed amount to twenty-seven. The public are admitted on Sundays upon payment of sixpence a head at the door. Held in action for penalties under 21 Geo. 3, c. 49, that this was a place of entertainment or amusement within the meaning of the Act...

......

458

POLICY OF ASSURANCE. Forfeiture-New policy-Suit to rectify new policy dismissed-Injunction granted.-In 1812 a life assurance society granted a policy for £5000 to W. on his life, which was forfeited in 1816 for non payment of premiums. A fresh policy was granted to W. in 1817 on the same terms as the forfeited policy. In the meantime a bye-law of the society had been passed, whereby the holders of policies granted in 1817 were prevented from participating in certain bonuses to which holders of policies granted in 1812 were entitled. After the death of W., in 1855, his executors accepted payment of £8000 as due on the policy of 1817. In 1860 one of the executors filed a bill alleging that the policy of 1817 was accepted on condition that the assured should be entitled to the same rights as he would have been under the policy of 1812, and praying for an order for the payment of the further bonuses. The bill was dismissed, and the executor brought an action at law against the society to recover the further bonuses. The society filed the bill in the present suit to restrain the action. Heid, that the former suit having been brought on the footing that the policy of 1812 was void, the defendant could not now be allowed to bring an action at law on that policy. Held, also, that the right of the plaintiffs to plead the decree in equity in the action at law did not prevent the court from granting the injunction. 596 (See Restraining Action). POLLING BOOTH.

(See Election.) POOR LAW.

Insane prisoner-Inquiry concerning settlement-Prison contract-Justices of contracting and receiving authority -3 & 4 Vict. c. 54-27 & 28 Vict. c. 29-28 & 29 Vict. c. 126. -By sect. 1 of the Insane Prisoners' Act 1840, two justices of the peace of the county, city, borough, or place where an insane prisoner is imprisoned may inquire, with the aid of two physcians or surgeons, as to the insanity of such person. By sect. 2, in all such cases as aforesaid, unless one of her Majesty's Principal Secreta ries of State shall otherwise direct, it shall be lawful for such two justices or any other two justices of the peace of the county, city, borough, or place where such person is imprisoned, to inquire into and ascertain such person's legal settlement, with the object of ordering payment of the costs of his maintenance. Sect. 1 of this Act is repealed by the Insane Prisoners' Act Amendment Act 1861, and other provisions are made for inquiring into a prisoner's insanity by visiting or other justices, with physicians or surgeons, and in certain cases by physicians or surgeons only. The Prison Act 1865 provides for contracts between prison authorities for the detention of prisoners, and enacts (sect. 57) that every prison, wheresoever situate, shall, for all purposes be deemed to be within the limits of the place for which it is used as a prison; and also (sect. 65) that the prison of the receiving authority shall, for all the purposes of and incidental to the commitment, trial, detention, and punishment of the prisoners of the contracting authority, or any of such purposes, according to the tenor of the contract, be deemed to be the prison of the contracting authority: Upon demurrer to return to a mandamus, directing the justices of a county, in the prison of which an insane prisoner had been detained under a contract with a borough, to ascertain the settlement under sect. 2 of the said Act of 1840 Held by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the Queen's Bench, that this section imposes a duty upon the proper justices to make this inquiry upon receipt of a

conduct on the defendant's part. Plaintiff's affidavits, purporting to be in reply to defendant's affidavits, contained charges of dishonesty against the defendant, resting solely on hearsay. Defendant moved to have this evidence taken off the dle for scandal and impertinence. The motion was ordered to stand over until the hearing of the cause. At the hearing the motion was also heard, and a decree was made declaring the partnership dissolved from the date of the decree, and refusing the motion. The evidence complained of was entered in the decree, as read. Plaintiff, whose contention was that the partnership had been dissolved by a notice given by him to the defendant in May 1873, appealed from the decree so far as it declared the dissolution to be as from the date of the decree; but there was no appeal from the decree as related to the motion for taking the evidence off the file. Held, that the decree of the Vice-Chancellor must be varied by making the dissolution date from the filing of the petition for liquidation by the defendant entered into subsequently to the filing of the bill. The whole decree was open to the respondent on the appeal, and the evidence complained of, being irrelevant, must be expunged... ...page 105 Chancery Funds Rules.-An order directing a contract of sale to be carried out, and the costs to be paid out of a fund in court, but not indicating the parties by whom the conveyance is to be executed, may be amended by inserting a direction that the conveyance be executed by such persons as the chief clerk shall certify to be the proper parties.... Cross-examination of witness-Payment of expenses under Rule 19 of Order of the 5th Feb. 1861-Taxation.-Appeal from decree of Hall, V.C., refusing to make an order that the costs of producing a witness for cross-examination should be at once taxed and paid, holding that the taxation ought to stand over until the hearing: Held (reversing the decision of the Vice-Chancellor), that the plaintiff having been called upon to produce, and having produced, a witness for cross-examination, was entitled, ex debito justitia, to have the expenses thereof forthwith taxed and paid.

...

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Evidence closed-Affidavits filed after closing evidenceInjurious imputation-New issue-Leave to read.-Leave given to defendant to read at the hearing of a cause, affi. davits and affirmations filed after time for closing the evidence, in order to meet a charge affecting his business reputation, and to answer a new issue which might be material, both points being raised first in the evidence, and not noticed in the bill ... Foreclosure suit-Consolidation of mortgages-Form of decree. Where a mortgagee has consolidated several mortgages of different properties made by the same mortgagor, who has conveyed away the respective equities of redemption to various purchasers, upon foreclosure by the mortgagee, the earliest purchaser of any part in point of time, or a subsequent purchaser of that part from him who stands in his shoes, will have the first right of redeeming the whole; and if he does not do so then the purchasers of other parts will be entitled successively in order of date to redeem the whole. If the first purchaser of a part has bought that part subject to a mortgage debt he, or whoev stands in his place at the time of consolidation and redemption, must pay that mortgage debt. Beevor v. Luck (L. Rep. 4 Eq. 537) followed. Bartlett v. Rees (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 373; L. Rep. 12 Eq. 395) dissented from

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Foreign State-Cross bill-Discovery-Plaintiff republic to nominate person for purpose of discovery.-Where a bill has been filed by a republic, and the defendants have filed a cross bill, the defendants are entitled to have all pro. ceedings in the original suit stayed until some person in a position to give discovery has been nominated by the republic, for the purpose of such person being added as a defendant, and discovery obtained from him Infant-14 & 15 Vict. c. 85, s. 52-Supplemental orderSummons against infant to show cause.-An infant can be bound by proceedings in a suit, taken after his birth, by obtaining the usual supplemental order, and then taking out a summons calling upon the infant to show cause why he should not be bound by the proceedings taken after his birth Injunction-Trade security-Employer and agent-Deception of the public-Costs.-The plaintiff, who was a manufacturer of an article used as a substitute for hops, called "Estcourt's Hop Supplement," employed his son C., one of the defendants, as his agent, who thereupon undertook not to disclose the secret of the compound, or at any time be connected with the sale of any article which could be used as a substitute for hops. During the time of his agency C. discovered the secret of the manufacture. He shortly afterwards terminated his agency, and began to sell a practically similar compound, which he called "Hop Essence." A bill was filed against him by the plaintiff to restrain him from continuing the sale, when he submitted and signed an agreement binding himself to observe the former agreement and do the plaintiffs no injury in their trade. Subsequently C. associated himself with one Taylor, and circulars were issued advertising the sale of "Estcourt's Hop Essence, sole proprietor James Taylor." The defendant company was formed for the purpose of

194

213

424

689

426

423

selling the "Hop Essence "under the name of "Estcourt's Hop Essence." Although the plaintiffs ascertained in January 1874, that a circular had been issued by Taylor, headed "Estcourt's Hop Essence Company," they did not apply to the court until the following August. Held (reversing the decision of Malins, V.C.), that the plaintiffs were precluded by delay from any right to relief. The court will give no costs on either side in a case were both plaintiff and defendant are engaged in the manufacture of an article intended to be used to deceive and mislead the public

Breach of contract Bill to restrain defendant from completing his contract entered into with third parties-Parties to suit.-The corporation of B. advertised for tenders for the supply of stone to the borough of B. during the year 1875. A., C., D., and E., quarry owners, entered into an arrangement by which it was agreed that A. should send in the lowest tender, so that, if possible, it should be accepted, that C. should not send in any tender at all, and that D. and E. should sead in tenders higher than A.'s; it was also arranged that A. should purchase from C., D., and E. certain quantities of stone to be supplied by him under his anticipated contract to the corporation, so that by this means, A., C., D., and E. would each have some share in the profits to arise from A.'s contract with the corporation. Notwithstanding this arrangement C. sent in a tender which was accepted. Held on demurrer, that a bill for au injunction would lie against C. to restrain him from supplying any stone to the corporation under his contract with them, during the year 1875. Held, also, that the corporation were not necessory parties to the suit. Non-appearance of Defendants. A bill having been filed against a local board of health alleging that they were committing a nuisance and praying for an injunction to restrain them, all the members of the board resigned. There being no defence to the suit, the injunc tion was granted in the terms of the first paragraph of the prayer of the bill 250 Pleadings and evidence-User of in different suits-Order of Master of Rolls discharged with costs.-Two suits were instituted in different branches of the court, the same parties being plaintiffs in each. An order was made at the Rolls on the petition of the defendant in the second suit, allowing him to use the bill and six affidavits filed in the first cause, at the hearing of the second cause, saving all just exceptions. On a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs seeking to discharge the order, it was shown that the issues in each suit were different. Order discharged with costs. Proof of documents at the hearing-Discretion of courtMaterial issue-Election by conduct.-The court has a discretion whether it will allow documents to be proved at the hearing under an order of course. It will allow proof at the hearing for the purpose of curing an accidental slip or a purely technical defect, but will not allow a document affecting a material issue to be so proved. To establish a case of election by conduct it must be proved that the person alleged to have elected did so with full knowledge of his rights, and with the intention to elect. Decision of Malins, V.C. affirmed.

Redemption suit-Agreement to compromise-Motion to enforce.-Plaintiff filed a bill to redeem mortgaged premises consisting of a brickfield, and plant, and stock, defendant mortgagee being in possession. An agreement for compromise was entered into, plaintiff to pay a certain sum by a given day and defendant to hand over the property on payment, defendant meanwhile to carry on the business, keeping an account, and both parties to execute all necessary documents. The sum not being paid by the day appointed, defendant moved to have the agreement enforced, or that plaintiff's bill might be dismissed. Defendant had in the meantime sold some of the bricks, and had parted with some of the plant and tools: Held, that the agreement might be enforced by motion, and plaintiff ordered to pay the amount into court, less the value of the plant and tools... 238 Summons to administer the real and personal estate of a testator-Bill filed for same purpose-Summons abandoned, and second summons taken out for same purpose -Conduct of proceedings.-Where two creditors' suits have been instituted for the administration of the same estate, the question who is to have the conduct of the proceedings is purely a matter for the discretion of the judge, to be exercised in chambers; and in exercising his discretion the judge will have regard to whether the creditor, who has first obtained a decree, has conducted his suit with perfect fairness, and to the nature and amount of his interest in the estate. A creditor took out a summons to administer the estate of a testator. The summons was dismissed by the chief clerk, as, the will had not then been proved, but adjourned to be heard before the judge in chambers. After the will had been proved, another creditor filed a bill for the administration of the same estate, and obtained the usual decree. While the second suit was pending, the plaintiff in the summons (who had had no notice of the instition of the second suit), abandoned his adjourned summons, and took out a second summons for the administration of the estate. An order was then made, at chambers, staying all proceedings in the second summons, and giving the plaintiff in the summons the

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conduct of the second suit. The plaintiff in the suit now moved to discharge this order. Held, that, as the plaintiff in the summons was the first in point of time, was the larger creditor, and had had no notice of the second suit, he must have the conduct of the proceedings Trustee of unsound mind-Appointment of new trusteePetition-Service of notice-Trustee Act 1850.-Of three trustees of a settlement, two died, and the third became of unsound mind, but was not so found by inquisition. On a petition presented by persons beneficially interested under the settlement, praying for the appointment of three new trustees in the place of the two deceased trustees and of the trustee of unsound mind. Held, that service on the trustee of unsound mind was not necessary 446

PREFERENCE SHARES.

(See Company.)

PRESENTATION.

(See Ecclesiastical Law.)

PRESUMPTION.

(See Gift.)

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Commercial traveller-Authority to receive payment-Ac ceptance of bill drawn in blank-Evidence of authority. -The authority of an agent to receive payment by an acceptance of a bill drawn in blank does not carry with it an authority to the agent to draw a bill payable to his own order. The plaintiff supplied the defendant with goods ordered through M., the traveller of the plaintiffs, and the defendant, by way of payment, accepted a bill drawn by M. upon them, and made payable to his own order. M. absconded, having cashed the bill, and the value thereof did not reach the plaintiffs, who sued the defendant for the price of the goods. It was proved in support of the plea of payment that M. had, on a prior occasion, taken payment by a bill drawn in blank and accepted by the defendant, which the plaintiffs had afterwards filled up and cashed, and also that the plaintiffs had written a letter to M., which was shown to the defendant, in which they intimated a wish to draw upon him for an amount due. Held, that neither the previous dealing, nor the letter of the plaintiffs to M., was evidence of an authority to M. to draw a bill in his own favour, and a rule to enter a verdict for the defendant, discharged...

(See Contract.)

PRIORITY.

(See Mortgage.)

PROBATE COURT.

(See Injunction.)

...

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

800

Possession.-A defendant was ordered to produce documents which he had set forth in the schedule to his affidavit of documents, although, in a subsequent affidavit, he stated that such documents were no longer in his possession, custody, or power, and that, at or immediately before the time of his former affidavit, he handed over the documents to E. and Co., who were then his solicitors in the suit, and that the same were still in their possession 86 Sealing up names and addresses.-The defendant was agent to the plaintiffs for the sale of patent ruffles according to the terms of a certain agreement. The plaintiffs believed that the defendant had violated the terms of the agreement, and accordingly filed a bill against him for an account. The defendant, by his answer, submitted that the inquiries made by the interrogatories as to the names of the persons to whom he had sold the goods, and as to the quantities and particulars of such sales were wholly immaterial to the questions at issue. The plaintiffs took out a summons for the production of documents, and the defendant, by his affidavit, admitted the possession and relevancy of the documents, and agreed to produce the documents mentioned in the first part of the first schedule to his affidavit as relating exclusively to these transactions with the plaintiffs, but declined to produce certain other documents mentioned in the second part of the said first schedule, on the ground that in them were contained the whole of his business transactions, except those contained in the documents he had agreed to produce. The plaintiffs accordingly took out a further summons to produce the documents contained in the second part of the said first schedule, upon which the chief clerk made an order to produce the documents required. On this summons being adjourned into court, it was held by Vice-Chancellor Bacon that the defendant was bound to produce all the documents in question. Held (varying the order of the Vice-Chancellor), that the defendant must be allowed to seal up the names and addresses of his customers, and was only bound to produce the entries showing the quantities of goods sold, and the prices. A discovery

Intitling of affidavit-Account alleged to be within jurisdiction-Costs. Where a prohibition is applied for, the affidavit of the applicant ought not to be entitled in a cause, but it may be entitled "in the matter of an action" in the inferior court. The court may give costs in making absolute a rule for prohibition.

Mayor's Court-Account stated in the jurisdiction-Letter stating an account posted by defendant out of the jurisdiction received by plaintiff within.-The defendant in an action in the Mayor's Court had written a letter addressed to and received by the plaintiff in the City, but posted out of the City, in which there was a distinct admission of the debt afterwards sued for. A rule nisi having been obtained for a prohibition to the Mayor's Court, it was held that upon a claim on an account stated the prohibition could not issue, as the Mayor's Court had jurisdiction; that by the receipt of the letter in the City an account was stated in the jurisdiction, and, therefore, a complete cause of action arose there. Held (per Lord Coleridge, C.J., Archibald and Lindley, JJ.), that the statement of an account is analogous to the acceptance of a contract, and that on the authority of Dunlop v. Higgins (1 H. of L. Cas. 381), an account was here stated by the defendant at the moment when he posted the letter; but, further, that the statement was continuous until it reached the plaintiff, at which time it was an account stated to him at the place where he received it. Per Denman, J.-That Dunlop v. Higgins (ubi sup.) does not apply to a case of an account stated; and that where an admission of a debt is made by letter, the account is stated at the place where the person to whom it is addressed receives the letter, but that there must be evidence beyond the mere production of the letter that the account was stated to some person (See Mayor's Court.) MAYOR'S COURT. (See Cheque.)

Action on cheque

Application by a stranger to the suit-Declaration in pro1hibition-Right of defendant in prohibition to put plaintiff to declare-Discretion of Superior Court.-Where a writ of prohibition is moved for and the Superior Court incline to grant it, the defendant in prohibition has no right to an order from the court that the plaintiff in prohibition should declare in prohibition, but it is always in the discretion of the court to say whether the plaintiff shall or shall not be put to declare. Where the Superior Court is clear both in fact and law that the Inferior Court is acting in excess of or without jurisdiction, the writ of prohibition will issue without the plaintiff in prohibition being put to declare. If an application for a writ of prohibition to an inferior court be made, the Superior Court is bound, ex debito justitiæ, to order it to issue, if it be made clear both in fact and law that the Inferior Court is proceeding without or beyond jurisdiction, and it makes no difference if the application be made by a stranger or by a party to the suit, nor if the amount in dispute be small, as the discretion of the court to refuse the prohibition is only if it doubt as to the true state of facts, or as to the law applicable to recognised facts

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE.
(See British North America.)
PUBLICAN.

Bona fide traveller-Sale of intoxicating liquors-Belief of publican.-A policeman found some excursionists and some persons living about a mile off in the appellant's hotel during the forbidden hours on Sunday. The manager stated that he knew they were all excursionists, to his knowledge no one was served with refreshment who had not a ticket, and he asked al! if they had tickets. Upon the policeman naming one of the persons before whom some drink was standing, that person said he was not an excursionist, but, seeing the door open, he thought it no harm having a glass of ale. Held, that a conviction of the appellant under the Licensing Act 1872, was justified by this evidence

606

24

856

PUBLIC LIBRARIES.

Public Libraries Act 1855-Meeting of ratepayers-Right to demand a poll. Where the question is pat to a meeting of ratepayers held under the Public Libraries Act 1855 (18 and 19 Vict. c. 70), s. 8, whether the Act shall be adopted for the parish, a poll can be demanded as of right. At a meeting so held a resolution was proposed that the Act be adopted. The chairman put the question, and declared the resolution carried by show of hands. Certain ratepayers demanded a poll, which the chairman refused. At a subsequent meeting the vestry declared the resolution invalid in consequence of such refusal, and declined to act upon it: Held, that a poll was demandable of right, and a rule for a mandamus to compel the vestry to carry out the resolution discharged ...page 558

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Agreement to charge equal fares-Competitive trafficCompetitive stations-Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1873 -The fact that two railway companies have different stations in the same town is no proof of any competition. Where two railway companies agree to carry at equal fares, one of which companies, from the circumstances of the case, cannot carry at a profit, that company shall not be the one to fix the common rate required by the agreement, as it cannot benefit itself, and cannot be the best judge of what will be beneficial to the other company. The G. W. Co. and the M. Co. entered into an agreement in 1863, by which they bound themselves to maintain an equal scale of charges at all competitive stations on the two lines respectively, so as to satisfy the requirements of the public and to develope the traffic. The M. Co. subsequently reduced the first class fare from 2d. to lid. per mile, as a means of increasing their receipts: Held, that the M. Co. were free to use such a scale of charge, except where they had agreed to the contrary, as in the case of this agreement with the G. W. Co. with regard to the districts common to both companies, but that an agreement which neutralises the benefits of competition is to be construed strictly Pleading-Railway company-Action for personal injury caused by negligence of-Plaintiff "lawfully" engaged on the defendants' premises.-The first count of the declaration charged that before and at the time, &c., the plaintiff was engaged in loading a certain truck with stones, and was standing in the said truck for that purpose, and the defendants by their servants so negligently, &c., backed, shunted, and managed certain trucks, under the care and management of the defendants by their said servants, that the same were by the negligence and carelessness, breach of duty and improper conduct of the defendants, in that behalf, driven with great force and violence against the truck in which the plaintiff was standing as aforesaid, and the plaintiff was thereby with great force and violence cast out of the said truck in which he was standing, and was thereby greatly hurt, &c. The second count repeated the allegations in the first count, with the addition that the plaintiff was "lawfully engaged in loading the said truck:" Held on demurrer, that the first count could not be supported; but that on the second count, although it would probably have been set aside as embarrassing on an application at chambers, yet, inasmuch as it contained allegations showing some duty of care on the part of the defendants towards the plaintiff, to which he was entitled by being "lawfully" there, and a breach of that duty by an act of active negligence of the defendants, the plaintiff' was entitled to judgment Negligence of-Injury thereby to wife in husband's lifetime -Action by her as executrix for consequent loss to his personal estate-Tort or contract-Actio personalis, &c.— Survival of action to executor.-The plaintiff, in the lifetime of her husband, received, during a journey as a passenger on the defendants' railway, a bodily injury, in consequence of the defendants' negligence, by reason whereof her husband incurred expenses and suffered pecuniary loss; and, on her husband's death, without having received any compensation for the damage thereby incurred, she, as his executrix, sued the defendants, upon their contract safely and securely to carry, &c., to recover compensation for such expenses and loss to her testator's personal estate; and it was Held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Keating, Lush, Quain, and Archibald, JJ.), affirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer (Bramwell and Pigott, BB.), that the action was an action of contract, and that a loss or damage from the breach of the contract having accrued to the personal estate of the testator, an action to recover damages by reason of that loss survived to the plaintiff as executrix, and that therefore the action was maintainable

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(See Notice to Treat-Negligence.)

248

376

430

ine business of a carrier...

(See Carrier). RATIFICATION. (See Contract for Sale.) RATING.

Assessment and Collection Act 1869-Occupier.-The appellants, workmen in a colliery, lived rent free in houses owned by their employers, who filled up their houses with their workmen, giving preference to married men. Married men, for whom there was no house, received allowance for rent, but single men did not. A married man could be called on to go into a house when one was vacant, and if he did not would forfeit his allowance. Notice to quit the work was notice to quit the house. It was not necessary to live in a house to perform the work. The owners did not compound for their rates under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, but paid the full amount. Held, that the appellants were entitled to have their names entered in the occupier's column of the rate book under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, s. 19, and that the overseers were liable to a penalty under that section for omitting to enter them ... Derrick, rateability of-Moorings in the Thames.-A revocable licence to use does not affect the licensee with rateability. The Conservators of the Thames being owners of the soil and bed of the river, and having statutory powers to give and revoke licences to lay down moorings, allowed two coal derricks of the plaintiffs to be moored subject to the conditions (inter alia) that "if at any time it should be found by the conservators inexpedient to permit the moorings to remain," the conservators might, under their statutory powers, cause them to be removed. The moorings consisted of four anchors and two stones. Two of the anchors were made with one fluke each, and were such as are generally used for permanent moorings. In laying them down a hole was made large enough to contain the whole of the anchor, at a depth of seven feet below the bed of the river. The stones were placed in similar holes, and the derricks were attached by chain cables to both anchors and stones. The moorings formed were as firm as moorings could be, and the derricks could only be moved by casting off the cables, and leaving the anchors and stones behind. The derricks had been so moored for many years, but daily changed their position slightly with the ebb and flow of the tide. Held, upon a special case arising out of an action for illegal distress, that the derricks were not rateable Distillery fixtures-Machinery-Tanks and pumps-Rateability. The premises of a distillery contained tanks which formed the roofs of rooms and houses, boiling backs and mash tuns, lying on brick piers against the walls, which formed the floors of some of the rooms, and were connected by pipes to other houses, reservoirs, and other articles necessary for the process of distilling. They were all heavy and either unattached, except by the communicating pipes, to the walls or piers upon which they stood, or fastened only by screws for the purpose of being steadied. Each was to be bought and sold as a separate article, and if all were removed the premises might be used for other manufacturing purposes. Held, that these articles were not fixtures, and could not be properly rated in the assessment of the premises to the poor rate 433 Lighting and watching rate-Houses, buildings, and property other than land-Line of railway-3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 90, 8. 33.-By sect 33 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, the owners and occupiers of houses, buildings, and property (other than land) rateable to the relief of the poor in any parish, shall be rated at and pay a rate in the pound three times greater than that which the owners and occupiers of land shall be rated at and pay for the purposes of this Act. The appellants were possessed of railway property in the parishes of the respondents, in one case of about four miles of line, signal boxes and posts, signalmen's huts, a tank and pumping station, and certain bridges; in the other case, of about two miles of line, a railway station, and also similar things to those in the former case. Held, that lighting and watching rates imposed according to the higher scale upon the whole of the appellants' property in the respondents' parishes were bad, for the line in each case ought to be rated as land. 759 Method of ascertaining rateable value.-A better criterion of the receipts due to the portion of a line of railway within the limits of a certain parish may be gained by taking the average mileage receipts of the whole line than by taking a mileage division of the gross rates less the amount charged at each end for collection and delivery, although every line may not have equally contributed to the receipts of the whole line. Whatever part of a goods rate covers ordinary station work at a terminus, should all be taken to be receipts of the line to which the terminal station belongs...