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Reg. v. Glossop.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

the forms in the schedule to the 8 Vict. c. 10, with the notes to those forms, that whether the defendant appears in person or by attorney, to answer the complaint of the woman before the justices, that the order ought to state upon the face of it, that the evidence was given in the presence and hearing of the defendant or of his attorney, as the case may be, and that if there is any special reason for omitting that statement after appearance, it should be suggested on the face of the order. The ordinary rules of law require that if the party against whom the proceedings are taken appears and makes no default, that the witnesses against hin should be examined in his presence and hearing. In the present case no reason whatever is given for the omission of the statement that the evidence on the part of the woman was given in the presence and hearing of the putative father, though it stated that he appeared to answer the complaint. This view of the case is consistent with the case of The Queen v. Skipperbottom, and the rule, therefore, will be absolute. Rule absolute.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

Wednesday, July 12, 1848.

REG. v. GLOSSOP.

Poor Removal Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66-Irremovability Residence Widow-Ground of appeal. Residence in a parish, as wife, will coalesce with residence as a widow, so as to make up the five years, and constitute irremovability under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. It is no ground of appeal against an order of removal made before the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, that since the making of it the pauper has become irremovable under that statute, unless the pauper has been, in fact, removed after the passing of it.

In such case the sessions should confirm the order, but make an entry in their judgment that the pauper, since the order was made, had become irremovable.

Upon an appeal against an order for the removal of Margaret James and her children, the order was confirmed, subject to the following case:—

This was an appeal against an order of two magistrates of the county of Chester, dated the 20th day of July, 1846, for the removal of Margaret James and her four children from the township of Mottram, in the county of Chester, to the parish of Glossop, in the county of Derby. The order was confirmed by consent, without hearing evidence, the facts and acknowledgment of a settlement, by relief in the appellant parish, being admitted, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench on the following case :

The examinations, as far as they are material, proved that the husband of the pauper died about two years ago; that his last place of settlement was in the appellant parish, in right of his father Samuel James, who was a settled inhabitant, and was relieved by the overseers of the poor of Glossop in and about the year 1812, the said Samuel James being then about twelve years of age, and forming a part of his father's family residing in the respondent township. That Samuel James continued to reside there until his death in 1837; that he was also relieved by the overseers of the poor of Glossop aforesaid with a regular sum of money weekly, for about two years next preceding his death, and his widow for two years afterwards.

The following, so far as affects the present case, were the grounds of appeal:-That the said order is null, inoperative, and cannot legally be executed, nor can the pauper therein mentioned be legally removed, because from the year 1830 up to the time of application being

Reg. v. Glossop.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. made for the said order or warrant being a period of five years and upwards, the said Margaret James, as well during the lifetime of the said John James, her late husband, as after his decease, and their four children in the said order or warrant mentioned, resided in the parish of Mottram, in Longdendale, in the said county of Chester, to wit, in your township in the said parish, and are therefore irremovable by statute.

And also, because for five years next before the application for the said warrant or order of removal, the said Margaret James, and also the said William James and Ann James, two of the children by her late husband John James, in the said order or warrant mentioned, resided in the parish of Mottram, in Longdendale aforesaid, to wit, in your township in the said parish, and are therefore by statute irremovable. It was admitted that notice of appeal had been served on the overseers of respondent township on the 8th of August, and within twenty-one days after the making of the said order of removal, and that in consequence the pauper was not removed from Mottram, where she had resided for upwards of twenty years.

It was also admitted that neither her late husband nor herself had ever received relief from the parish of Glossop, and that on the 8th day of June last she became chargeable to the said township of Mottram, and continued so chargeable until the making of the

said order of removal.

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The questions for the opinion of the court are, whether, on the facts stated in these examinations, the said pauper and her four children may be removed from Mottram to whether, since the passing of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, they are Glossop under the order of removal in question; or irremovable; and whether appellants had a right of pealing before actual removal, inasmuch as they rely on the applicability of the statute, and do not deny the pauper's statement in their grounds of appeal. If the court should be of opinion that the paupers may be removed from Mottram, or that the appellants could not avail themselves of the statute before removal, then the said order of sessions to be confirmed; but if the court should be of a contrary opinion, then the said order of sessions to be quashed.

June 19, 1848.

Pickering, in support of the order of sessions.-First, the order is a valid order, it was made before the statute passed, and the grievance appealed against in this case is the order, not the removal under it. [ERLE, J.-After one appeal against the order, could there be another against the removal?] Yes; there would be a new grievance. He cited R. v. Willoughby, 4 Ad. & El. 143. Secondly, the pauper has not resided five years in the respondent township; her husband was settled in the appellant township, and removable thereto until the time of his death. Now she is removed to the place of his settlement, and there is no residence in her own right sufficient to exempt her from liability to be removed.

Egerton, contrà.-First, the words of the statute are quite clear. They prohibit, first, the making of any order: secondly, the execution of any order already made. But an order made before the act is valid, and available hereafter as evidence of the settlement; therefore the irremovability constitutes no ground of appeal against the order: (R. v. The Justices of Middlesex, Secondly, the death of the husband 11 Jur. 909.) makes no difference; the wife has resided five years in the respondent parish, and therefore cannot be reCur, adv. vult. moved.

JUDGMENT.

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-The question is, whether a residence as widow would coalesce with a residence as

Reg. v. Salford.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

wife, to complete the five years' residence required for the irremovability. We are of opinion that it would be such residence as is within the terms of the statute. It is residence, and we see no reason why effect should not be given to the meaning of that word. A question also was raised whether the statute created a ground of appeal against an order of removal made before the statute, and valid at the time it was made, by reason that the pauper had become irremovable before the time the appeal was heard; and we think the question ought to be answered in the negative. The appeal was given by the 13 & 14 Car. 2, to any person aggrieved by the judgment of two justices. Now, the order affords no grievance, having been valid when made, and not having been acted upon by removal since the statute has taken away the power to remove; and as the statute provides both that no person shall be removed, and also that a warrant shall be applied for, it appears to us that effect can only be given to both clauses by deciding that a pauper may become irremovable although a valid order is in existence. The sessions, therefore, did right in confirming the order; but as the order is not to be acted upon, and the only use of their confirmation is as evidence of the settlement in case the question should arise hereafter, and as the circumstances are peculiar, we would suggest that an entry of the judgment be made thus: "Order confirmed, although the pauper has since it was made become irremovable;" and that will explain the matter in any case in which it may be necessary hereafter to refer to it. The order of sessions is confirmed.

REG. v. SALFORD.

Reg. v. Salford.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. computation "for all purposes;" and then five years' residence remains. The words are, "provided always, that the time during which such person shall be a prisoner in a prison, &c. shall for all purposes be excluded in the computation of time hereinbefore mentioned." Whether the prison be in or out of the parish is immaterial; the proviso is quite general; it applies to all prisons. [COLERIDGE, J.-In some of the cases mentioned in the proviso, it would seem that the residence must be out of the parish-for example, the period during which such person "shall be serving Her Majesty as a soldier, marine, or sailor, or reside as an in-pensioner in Greenwich or Chelsea Hospitals," is to be excluded. And the words about relief are very remarkable" during which any such person shall receive relief from any parish, or shall be wholly or in part maintained by any rate or subscription raised in a parish in which such person does not reside."]

Pashley, contrà.--In this case the right of removal had completely attached before the act passed; because the twenty-one days given by sect. 79 of the Poor Law Amendment Act had been allowed to pass without any notice of appeal, and before the statute. But under the statute the pauper did not acquire irremovability; first, because the proviso to sect. 1 is altogether prospective, and does not apply to an imprisonment before the statute: and secondly, because it is quite clear that it applies, at all events, only to an imprisonment in the respondent parish. The court will not, unless compelled by the clearest terms, give a retrospective effect to the principal enactment of this statute; and the words do not necessarily require it. "No person shall be removed," are the words relied upon; but they may be

Poor-Irremovability by residence-Exception of period intended to apply to the case of suspended orders; and of imprisonment-9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.

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Upon appeal against an order of removal, the sessions quashed the order subject to a case.

Two points were raised; first, whether the pauper was removable from the respondent parish: secondly; whether, if removable, his removal afforded any ground of appeal against the order.

The order was made on the 29th of July, 1846, and the pauper was removed to the appellant parish on the 29th of August, no notice of appeal having been given, and the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, having passed in the mean time (26th of August.)

The facts proved were, that the pauper had resided in the respondent parish thirteen years before the date of the order, excepting a period of fifteen months during the years 1843 and 1844, when he was imprisoned for misdemeanor in a prison situate in an adjoining parish. The sessions, upon those facts, held the pauper irremovable by virtue of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.

Townsend, in support of the order of sessions.-The pauper was irremovable; because he had not been removed when the act passed, and he had resided in the respondent parish five years next before the order. The only interruption to the residence was his imprisonment in 1843; but that period is to be excluded from the

at all events it can hardly be said that they are applicable to a case where the respondent parish had, before the act, acquired a complete vested right to remove the pauper at any moment. (He cited Moore v. Durden, 12 Jur. 138 ham v. Bradshaw, 2 Atk. 56; The Attorney-General v. (Exch.); 2 Inst. 86, citing Bracton, fol. 228; AshburnPanter, 6 Bro. P. C. 553; The Attorney-General v. Atk. 551; Thompson v. Lack, 16 L. J., C. P. 75.) Andrews, 1 Ves. 225; The Attorney-General v. Lloyd, 3 Cur. adv. vult.

JUDGMENT.

made and delivered before the late statute passed, and LORD DENMAN, C. J.-In this case a valid order was the residence during the required five years, the pauper was moved after it passed. With respect to the pauper fifteen months, but he had resided immediately before had been imprisoned out of the respondent parish for the five years in the respondent parish. The sessions set aside the order, on the ground that the residence had after the statute of a person rendered irremovable thererendered the pauper irremovable, and that the removal by was a good ground of appeal against a valid order of removal made before the statute. As their decision on the first point appears to us to be wrong, it is unneceswhether the time that is within the terms of the exceptsary to consider the second point. The question is, ing clause is to be excluded in the computation of the five years, when such time was passed out of the parish where the irremovability is supposed to attach, and we are of opinion that it is not. We have stated our opinion before as to the structure of the two clauses, (a) until that which is the requirement of the enacting clause and it is clear that the excepting clause has no operation found that for part thereof the residence was not in the In computing the five years it is parish, and the enacting clause does not apply; it follows

has been fulfilled.

(a) See Reg v. Harrow, New Mag. Cas. 9, N. S.

Reg. v. St. Giles.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. that the residence is deficient, and the excepting clause does not operate to supply the deficiency, therefore the order of sessions is quashed. Order quashed.

June 24, 1848.

REG. v. ST. GILES.

Appeal against order of removal-Denial of settlement in ground of appeal-Respondent's evidence.

Upon appeal against an order for the removal of a widow and her children, the examinations disclosed only a birth settlement of the husband in the appellant parish. One of the grounds of appeal was that the widow and her children were not at the date of the order, nor was the husband at the time of his decease, legally settled in the appellant parish.

Held, sufficient to put the respondents to proof of the birth settlement of the husband, set up in the ex

aminations.

Upon appeal against an order of two justices for the removal of Hannah Halls and her six children, the court of quarter sessions confirmed the order, subject

to a case.

The case raised several points, but the following particulars are alone material to the point decided:-The examinations disclosed only a birth settlement of the husband of the pauper; and the material ground of appeal was, that the said Hannah Halls and her children were not at the date of the order, nor was her husband at the time of his decease, legally settled in the appellant parish.

On the part of the appellants it was contended that that ground of appeal rendered it necessary for the respondents to give evidence of the birth settlement of the husband; but the sessions held it unnecessary for the respondents to do so; and without any such evidence the order was confirmed, subject to the opinion of this court upon the question whether that decision was

correct.

Rodwell, in support of the order of sessions.-This ground of appeal does not traverse any fact stated in the examination; it denies only a conclusion of law. It does not even say that the paupers were not settled "as in the examinations alleged;" it is, in short, not inconsistent with the examination. He cited R. v. Widdicombe, 2 N. S. C. 539; 2 New Mag. Cas. 64; R. v. Killerby, 2 N. S. C. 26; 1 New Mag. Cas. 326; R. v. Whitley Upper, 11 A. & E. 90. (a)

Pashley, contrà, cited R. v. Hockworthy, 7 A. & E. 492; R. v. Bedingham, 5 Q. B. 653; R. v. Newcastle, 1 B. & Ad. 933.

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-The settlement examined is the birth settlement of the husband and father of the family; and the ground of appeal puts in issue that settlement. I am clearly of opinion that the respondents were bound to prove that issue; and I cannot understand why the appellants even should not have been at liberty to give negative evidence upon it.

PATTESON, J.-There is but one settlement shown on the face of the examination; and the ground of appeal must therefore be taken to apply to that settlement. The parish of St. Giles might not be able to give particulars as to the birth of the husband in any other parish, but might have reason to believe that the witness who deposed to the birth was not the witness of truth; and I think it may fairly be said that this ground of appeal gives the respondents notice that they wished to have the witness called for the purpose of cross-examination. Whether, if that witness should not be shaken, this

(a) See R. v. Hockworthy, Ad. & E. 492.

Reg. v. Inhab. of Halifax.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. ground of appeal would let in evidence of birth in another parish is another question; and R. v. Widdicombe does not decide it; because there were several different settlements set up. R. v. Bedingham, also, is quite distinguishable.

COLERIDGE, J. and ERLE, J. concurred.

Rule absolute to quash the order of sessions.

July 12.

REG. v. THE INHABITANTS OF HALIFAX. Poor-Irremovability—Five years' residence-How broken -9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.

A pauper, after her husband's death, was removed under a former order of removal from B. to A. She remained in parish A. about nineteen days, receiving relief during that time; she then returned to B. parish, A. paying the expenses of her journey back, and continuing to relieve her weekly after her return. She had rented a cottage in B. and upon her removal to A. she locked up the cottage, and took away the key, leaving her furniture there. She always desidered to return to B. If her residence in B. before her removal could be coupled with her residence in B. after her return, she had resided there more than five years next before the granting of the order of removal appealed against.

Held, that it could not; that the residence was broken by her removal under the former order; and that therefore she had not acquired irremovability under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. It is not necessary that an order of removal, or the examinations upon which it is made, should, since 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, negative that the chargeability has been occasioned by sickness or accident.

Upon appeal against an order for the removal of a widow and five children from Halifax in Yorkshire to Alnwick in Northumberland, the court of quarter sessions quashed the order subject to a case.

The order of removal appealed from was made after the passing of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66; and the principal question was, whether the pauper was rendered irremovable by that statute. The pauper had been married about twelve years before the date of the order, and had resided with her husband in the respondent parish to the time of his death, which took place in January 1845. Shortly after his death she became chargeable, and in March following was removed under an order of removal to the appellant parish. Against that order there was no appeal; and the pauper remained in that parish about nineteen days, during the whole of which time she received relief. The appellant parish then gave her 31. to return to the respondent parish, and agreed to allow her so much per week; that allowance was regularly paid until after the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. ing then discontinued the pauper again became chargeable to the respondent parish, and the order now appealed against was obtained. At the time when the pauper was removed under the former order she was renting a cottage in the respondent parish, and upon her removal she locked it up and took away the key, leaving her furniture therein. The case found that she was always desirous of returning to the respondent parish. Upon the above facts the sessions were of opinion that the pauper was irremovable, and quashed the order on that ground.

It be

The order did not negative that the chargeability of the paupers had been occasioned by sickness or accident, and the examinations stated that James (one of the children) was afflicted with ulcer; but that the chargeability of the widow and her five children was not occasioned by the affliction of James.

It was objected that the order and examinations ought to negative distinctly that the chargeability was at all

Reg. v. Inhab. of Halifax.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. occasioned by sickness or accident, and that the order and examinations were defective in that respect. These objections were overruled by the sessions. If the Court of Queen's Bench should be of opinion that the paupers, under the circumstances, were removable, or that the objections taken to the order and examinations were valid, the order of sessions to be quashed, otherwise confirmed.

June 24.

Pashley and Hamerton in support of the order of sessions. First, if the proviso is prospective only that would dispose of the case; but assuming it to be retrospective, its effect is to exclude from the calculation altogether the period during which relief was received, whether in or out of the respondent parish. It is to be "excluded for all purposes." [PATTESON, J.-Does not that necessarily imply that the party must be residing in the parish at the time? Because if not residing in the parish the period never could be included in the calculation; and surely it is absurd to say "you shall exclude that which never could by possibility be included." COLERIDGE, J. -But the period " during which such person shall be serving as a marine" is to be excluded; can that apply to a period of residence in the parish?] So with reference to the period during which any person shall reside as an in-pensioner in Greenwich or Chelsea Hospitals. [PATTESON, J.-In the large sense of the term residence, there may in all those cases be the animus revertendi.] That is found here. The statute provides the mode of calculation. The five years may be made up of different broken intervals; because, for example, a residence even for ten years in Greenwich Hospital is to be disregarded altogether. [PATTESON, J.-This enactment was for the benefit of the paupers; and I think that the meaning of the proviso is, that those who have received relief or who come within any of the clauses of the proviso are not to have that benefit.] The residence which the statute contemplates is fully satisfied here. It means that no person shall be removed from the place where their home has been continuously for five years. There must be bodily residence to some extent; but it cannot have been intended that occasional absence should destroy the continuity of residence. Suppose a railway labourer going a distance of several miles to his work, but coming home frequently to his wife and children, would he not reside in the place where his wife and children lived, though absent occasionally for days together? or would absence on a visit to a friend break residence? (They referred to the cases collected in the notes to Leigh v. Chapman, 2 Wms. Saund. 423 b. last edit. Lambe v. Smythe, 15 M. & W. 433; Robinson v. Learson, 6 M. & G. 763; Whithorn v. Thomas, 7 M. & G. 1; 3 Story. Com. on Const. U. S. 471; R. v. Newington, 1 T. R. 354; R. v. St. Michael, Norwich, 6 T. R. 536; R. v. Rotherfield Greys, 1 B. & C. 345; R. v. Ribchester, 2 M. & S. 135; and Lady Dalhousie v. M'Doualt, 7 Cl. & F. 817, as to inhabitancy, residence and domicile.) Secondly, the order and examinations ought to show that the chargeability arose otherwise than from sickness.

R. Hall and Pickering, contrà.-First, as to the residence the whole argument on the other side turns upon the animus revertendi, and the idea of home: but how could the respondent parish continue to be the home of the pauper, when, by returning to it in a state of chargeability she would have been punishable as a vagrant? By becoming chargeable she forfeited her home; and was bound to continue at her place of settlement while her chargeability continued. Further, the appellant parish, which relieved the pauper while she remained there, is estopped from saying that that residence in their parish was a residence in the respondent parish: (R. v. St. Giles,

Reg. v. Inhab. of Halifax.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. 5 Q. B. 872.) By keeping the key, she only showed that she did not intend to put an end to the contract. They referred to R. v. Fillongley, 2 T. R. 709, and R. v. Willoughby, 4 Ad. & E. 143. But at all events the proviso is inapplicable. First, it is not retrospective: and secondly, if it be, it applies only during the continuance of a residence in the removing parish. [COLERIDGE, J.How then can it apply to the service of a sailor, which is generally in no parish?] There could be no such time to exclude; because it never could be included. The period to be excluded is that which, but for the proviso, would be included. Can it be intended that a young man, who, having resided in a parish five years, enlists, and serves abroad twenty-one years, and then returns, is to be irremovable from that parish? No; that which is really intended is an industrial residence in the parish for five years next before the order. The object of excluding the periods of residence in Greenwich and Chelsea Hospitals, and in barracks, or other places where soldiers, sailors, or marines may happen to be quartered, is clear enough. It is to protect those particular parishes from the burden which might otherwise be cast upon them.

In R. v. Mitchell, 10 East, 511, substitutes in the militia quartered at Colchester were held, nevertheless, to be inhabitants of Norwich, where they had dwelling-houses and their families resided; and this proviso was, no doubt, introduced to meet also cases of that sort. The object was to make personal residence for five years the ground of irremovability; and that is in harmony with the law of settlement, which requires personal residence. Cur. adv. vult.

JUDGMENT.

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-In this case an order of removal was made, on the ground that a former order had been unappealed from. The objection to the form of the order was, we think, properly overruled by the sessions. The objection was, secondly, that the examinations did not negative the chargeability, being occasioned by sickness or accident. This, also, we think, was properly overruled. It further appeared, that in respect of the residence for five years, the pauper had, in March 1845, been, under an order of removal, removed from Halifax to the appellant parish, and had remained in that parish nineteen days, and had then returned to Halifax. She had been renting a cottage before her removal, the key of which she had kept, and she left her furniture therein when she was removed from Halifax, and had always had a desire or returning to her dwelling, though she resided in Alnwick more than nineteen days after the beginning of the five years now in question. The sessions decided that she had become irremovable, and discharged the order; and we are of opinion that the sessions came to a wrong conclusion. We take it to be clear, as a general proposition, that removal puts an end to residence. A review of the statutes under which the power of removal has been exercised, from the 13 & 14 Car. 2, downwards, conclusively showing that a pauper was orignally considered an intruder on the inhabitants, and that the power of removal was given to prevent him becoming an inhabitant: a removal therefore is in its nature a disruption of residence and inhabitancy, and that being the general principle, do the facts stated with respect to the cottage and the desire to return constitute an exception ? We think not. The right to return was taken away by the statement of chargeability; and the desire to return without the right, is very different from the animus revertendi which in some cases keeps up a continuity of residence. The facts relating to the cottage are not stated with precision; the possession of the property does not constitute, with the chargeability, an exception to

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REG. V. THE INHABITANTS OF ST. MARY,
WHITECHAPEL.

Poor-Irremovability of widow within twelve months from husband's death-Ground of appeal against order -9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.

An order was made before 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, for the removal of a widow, whose husband had died within twelve months, and she was removed under that order after the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, had passed. Held, first, that the widow was rendered irremovable by sect. 2 and secondly, that her removal after the statute afforded a good ground of appeal against the order. Upon appeal against an order for the removal of Sarah Badman, widow, and her five children, the sessions confirmed the order, subject to a case.

The date of the order was the 11th of August, 1846, and at that time Sarah Badman was a widow, her husband having died on the 6th of June in the same year. A settlement was proved in the appellant parish; but the material questions arose upon the following grounds of appeal:

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3. That the said Sarah Badman and her said children were removed, in pursuance of the said order, to the said parish of St. Mary, Whitechapel, after the passing of an act of Parliament made and passed in the 10th year of the reign of Her present Majesty Queen Victoria, intituled "An Act to amend the Laws relating to the Removal of the Poor," to wit, on the 3rd day of September now last past.

4. That on the said 3rd day of September the said Sarah Badman was and still is the widow of her late husband William Badman.

5. That the said William Badman, the late husband of the said Sarah Badman, died on the 6th day of June last, as is stated and set forth in the examination of the said Sarah Badman, upon which the said order of removal was founded, and that at the time of his death the said Sarah Badman was residing with him at No. 18, John-street, in the said parish of St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey.

6. That by virtue of the said act of Parliament the said Sarah Badman and her said children were not removable from the said parish of St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey, for twelve months next after the death of her said husband; and that the said order having been executed by the removal of the said Sarah Badman and her said children, is illegal, and should be quashed.

If the court should be of opinion that the pauper was, under the circumstances, irremovable, and that the objection was properly raised as a ground of appeal, the order to be quashed; otherwise, confirmed.

June 10.

Wallinger and Knapp, in support of the order of sessions. First, the stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, is not retrospective; it applies only to cases in which the husband has died since the passing of the act; and in those cases, certainly, sect. 2 prevents the removal of a widow for twelve months from her husband's death. R. v. The Justices of Middlesex, 11 Jur. 909, is not a decision upon this statute; the mandamus was issued only that the questions might be raised. Retrospective effect is never given to a statute unless the words clearly require it.

Reg. v. Whitechapel.-COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. (Gilmore v. Shuter, 2 Mod. 310; Couch v. Jeffries, 4 Burr. 2460; Towler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258; Wilkinson v. Meyer, Ld. Raym. 1352; Hodgkinson v. Wyatt, 4 Q. B. 749; Binns v. Hey, 1 D. & L. 661; and Vin. Ab. Stat. E. 157, were referred to.) The right to remove was vested when the order was made; and all the notices necessary to render the order effectual were given by the respondents as soon as the order was made. Secondly, if the pauper was by the statute irremovable, still an appeal against the order is not the proper mode of taking advantage of the statute. It is only the removal on the 3rd of September which is bad-not the order itself; and there is no appeal against a removal independently of the order. This appeal is against the order. Reg. v. Brixham, 8 Ad. & E. 375; and Reg. v. Mylor, 11 Jur. 1037; 2 New Mag. Cas. 298, are not in point, because there the orders were never available at all. Here it was available for fifteen years. The proper subject of the appeal is the judgment of the justices (2 Nolan, 240); and if an improper removal takes place, the parish is not without remedy. It may refuse to receive the paupers, or proceed by indictment for the breach of the law. This second section only renders the pauper irremovable for a year, so that it has the effect of suspending the order for that time. R. v. Englefield, 13 East, 317, was decided upon the statute relating to suspended orders.

Pashley, contrà.-First, the case of R. v. The Justices of Middlesex, 11 Jur. 909, is misreported. [WIGHTMAN, J.-No; I have no doubt that I said all that is reported, and I am still of the opinion there expressed.] There is no rule requiring express words to give to a statute a retrospective operation. Hodgkinson v. Wyatt is in point. There the court decided that the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, s. 1, is retrospective, saying "We can see nothing in the statute that restrains it from operating retrospectively." Here the case falls within the express words of the 2nd section. (He also referred to Doe dem. Evans v. Page, 5 Q. B. 767; Nepean v. Doe dem. Knight, 2 M. & W. 894; Russell v. Ledsam, 14 M. & W. 574; Hume v. Haig, 8 Bro. P. C. 198.) Secondly, the cases of R. v. Brixham and R. v. Westbury, 5 Q. B. 500, show conclusively that orders may be invalidated and quashed upon appeal by matter subsequent to the order; and many orders have been quashed in consequence of a removal within the twenty-one days; then why should it not be a good ground of appeal that the pauper has become irremovable? Before the Poor Law Amendment Act the removal was the only grievance; but since that statute it has been considered that the order and the removal constitute separate grievances, and that the appeal may be after either: (R. v. Leeds (Recorder), 8 Q. B. 623; 2 New Mag. Cas. 104; R. v. The West Riding Justices, 5 Q. B. 1.) In R. v. Penkridge, 3 B. & A. 538, the omission to serve a suspended order within a reasonable time was considered a good ground of appeal.

JUDGMENT.

Cur. adv. vult.

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-In this case a valid order of removal was made before the passing of the statute, and the removal took place after that time. The pauper had become a widow on the 6th of June, 1846, before the passing of the act, and was removed on the 3rd of September following. The sessions confirmed the order of removal, subject to two questions, of which we take the effect, though not in the precise terms, to be-first, was the pauper irremovable by virtue of the 9 & 10 Vict. which enacted that "no woman residing in any parish with her husband at the time of his death shall be removed, nor shall any warrant be granted for her removal from such parish for twelve calendar months next after

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