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Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Wigan.-COURT OF Q. B. warrant a removal to that parish. It appears that the pauper received twenty-three weeks' relief in Wigan, and although as a general rule relief given in a parish is no evidence of settlement against that parish, it is different where a pauper comes from another parish for the purpose of claiming relief as a settled pauper: (Reg. v. Sow, 4 Q. B. 93.)

Whigham, contrà.-The only settlement set up in the examinations is a birth-settlement, and the evidence of that altogether fails; (a) and as the principal settlement falls to the ground, the other matters which are mere corroboration fall with it. The statement of relief given in Wigan is of course no evidence of acknowledgment by that parish that the pauper was settled there. Then does the letter of the clerk amount to anything? Certainly not. It states that the writer, Bullock, was directed to request that the relief should be given; but directed by whom? That can only mean directed by the clerk | to the guardians, who was his immediate principal. Further, it contains only a request to relieve on account of the union, and the statement "settled at Wigan" is merely introduced for the purpose of identification. If there was any order of the board of guardians it would be entered in a book, which ought to have been produced; and the nature of the application made to the board ought also to have been shown, as was done in R. v. Crondall. In that case the Application and Report Book of the relieving officer containing the order of the board of guardians verified by the initials of the clerk,and the abstract of the Application and Report Book of the union containing an entry of the same order signed with the initials of the presiding guardian were produced, and proved before the removing justices. [WIGHTMAN, J.-But suppose that this letter was in fact written by order of the board of guardians. [Still, it would be no evidence of acknowledgment, because such previous application and inquiry is not shown as was considered material in R. v. Crondall. In that case Lord Denman, C. J., delivering the judgment of the court, said:"Where an application for such relief has been made to the relieving officer of a union, whose duty it is to examine into the merits of the case, and to report thereon to the board of guardians, and when he has brought the application before that board, whose duty it is to inquire into the settlement, and to order such relief only in case of being satisfied that the settlement is in one of the parishes of the union, and relief has been ordered by that board on account of one of the parishes, and given by the relieving officer, according to such order, all the steps now required by the law have been taken, and such relief is legally given. We also think that the justices are at liberty to infer the authority of the parish for such relief from these steps, as the parish is represented at the board of guardians, and may have its guardian in attendance; and whether he attends or not it is the legal duty of the board to act for the parish, and to take care of its interest." R. v. Little Marlowe, and R. v. Bradford, are important as showing that the statements and acts of union officers cannot bind particular parishes in the union, unless such previous investigation is clearly shown. In R. v. Shitlington (1 Bit. & Par. New Mag. Cas. 432), it was held that the order book of the guardians ought to be produced.

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COLERIDGE, J.-I am of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged, and the order of sessions confirmed. The whole question is one of agency, whether certain things have been done by order of the board of guardians. It can hardly be denied now that if a board of guardians gives an order for relief on account of a particular parish, and relief is given under it, such order and such act are evidence against the parish of a settlement there. Now

(a) See Reg v. Rishworth (2 Q. B. 476.)

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Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Wigan.-COURT OF Q. B. here it is said, first, that there is no evidence that the guardians acted at all; secondly, that if they acted at all their acts were so irregular as not to bind the parish. The question, therefore is, first, was there agency? secondly, was the proceeding such as would bind the parish? First, then, is there evidence of agency? The letter produced is written by a person who is in the habit of writing for the clerk to the guardians, and who professes to act on his behalf. It may therefore be considered as the letter of the clerk, whom I think we must take to be a recognized officer of unions under the Poor Law Amendment Act; and, speaking of a person not residing in his own union he desires the guardians to whom it is addressed to relieve the pauper on account of this union;" and in what may be called a schedule to the letter, under the head "where settled," he inserts the name of the appellant parish. Mr. Whigham seems to think that we ought not to look at that schedule at all; if the two parts of the letter were inconsistent, it might be neccessary to consider that question; but even then, if it is once established that the letter is to be taken as an admission, it must be taken most strongly against the party making it. However, here there is no inconsistency at all; and if effect is given to all parts of the letter, then it is a distinct admission of the settlement of the pauper in Wigan. But the case does not depend solely upon the letter; for it is proved that the money has been paid in pursuance of that letter, that it was received by the clerk to the guardians of the union in which the pauper was residing, from the same source from which the letter came, that the amount mentioned in the letter was paid to the pauper by the relieving officer of the union on account of the parish in which she resided; and that the parish making that payment was recouped by the sum so received. Secondly, it was said that if the agency of the clerk was established, still there was no sufficient proof that the guardians did the act; that the books of the guardians ought to have been produced; but I do not think that that argument is open to the appellants. Suppose that the act, though done, was done irregularly,-that, at a particular meeting, the board directed their clerk to write the letter in question, but that no entry was made in the minutes, or the entry was not countersigned by the chairman,-it would be a strong thing to say, that in that case the letter so written would not be sufficient to bind them. Then all the parishes are represented at the board, and the guardians must be assumed to be there, because that is their duty; and, therefore, whether regular or irregular, I think this letter must be taken to be the act of the guardians if it can be shown that the clerk had sufficient authority to write it. That, in truth, is the main point. Mr. Pashley referred to several acts of Parliament, and to certain orders of the Poor Law Commissioners, as prescribing the duties of the clerk to the guardians. The latter are not here, and therefore I take no notice of them; and as to the acts of Parliament I only use them for this purpose, that, as I said before, I think they justify the court in treating the clerk as a recognized officer of an union. We have got, therefore, the fact that there is the office of clerk to the guardians; and there are certain duties which ex vi termini are attached to certain offices. A person cannot be clerk to the guardians of an union without having certain duties to perform, and one of these duties would naturally be to communicate with other unions. The very circumstance of their having a clerk leads to the supposition, that if they wished to transmit small sums of money to another union, the clerk would be the natural channel of communication. It appears therefore to me, looking at all the circumstances of the case, that there is sufficient ground for presuming that the clerk had authority from the guardians to write the letter; and if so, that makes an end of the case. Then we have an

Reg. v. Spotland.-COURT OF Q. B. acknowledgment of the settlement, which it is admitted, would bind the parish.

WIGHTMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion. After the case of R. v. Crondall, it can hardly be contended that, if there was distinct evidence that the board had ordered the letter to be written, that letter would not be sufficient to prove the respondent's case. The question is, whether there was sufficient evidence to raise the presumption that the clerk had authority from the board of guardians to write the letter. That depends upon the circumstances stated in the examination of Mr. Jones; and he proves, first, that Thomas Bullock was clerk to Mr. Ackerly, who was clerk to the guardians, and that Thomas Bullock was in the habit of writing Mr. Ackerly's letters on the business of the Wigan union; he, therefore, was the person whose hands were used to write the letters of the clerk to the guardians; and the case is the same as if the clerk himself had written it. Then, did he write it upon his own authority or that of the board of guardians? He is an officer of the union recognized by act of Parliament, and appointed by the Poor Law Commissioners; can we presume that it was part of his duty to carry on the correspondence of the union on behalf of the guardians? It seems to me, that the examinations do raise that presumption; and that, therefore, there is, at all events, a primâ facie case of authority in the clerk to write the letter in question.

ERLE, J.-The question on these examinations is not whether a distinct settlement is shown, but whether there is any evidence of an admission of a settlement by the appellant parish. The board of guardians is the authorized agent of all the parishes and townships in the union for the purpose of making admissions as to the settlement of paupers,-that is, they have to decide whether relief is to be given on behalf of any particular parish, and it it is clear, according to the cases, that if they give relief on account of a particular parish, their decision binds that parish. Here payment has been made by the Wigan Union of money for the relief of a pauper residing in another union. Have the board of guardians admitted a settlement in the township of Wigan? Their clerk writes a letter requesting the relief to be given on account of the union, but stating the settlement to be in the township. Is the clerk, the agent of the board, to write that letter? I think it is to be presumed that he is, and the case is the same as if the letter was in his own handwriting; for it is written by a man who habitually writes letters for him. Rule discharged.

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Poor-Removal-Complaint of chargeability-General Assistant Overseer of union.

Upon appeal against an order of removal, it appeared that the complaint of chargeability had been in fact made by the general assistant overseer of the union in which the respondent parish was situate. That complaint was in writing, and did not purport to be made on behalf of the overseers of the parish; but it was proved that the assistant overseer had the care and removal of chargeable paupers in the union, that he had frequently laid informations and complaints, upon which orders of removal from the respondent township had been granted, and that the present complaint was laid by him in the ordinary performance of his office.

Reg. v. Spotland.-COURT OF Q. B.

Held, that though the complaint of chargeability must be made by the overseers, there was evidence in this case of authority from the overseers to the assistant overseer, to make the complaint as their agent.

The ground of appeal was in this form: "That no complaint of chargeability was made by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the said township of P. or either of them, to the justices who made the order, at any place within their jurisdiction, or at which they could lawfully receive the same, and that the justices had no legal authority to make the order.”

Semble, that under that ground of appeal, the appellants were not at liberty to object to the competency of the assistant overseer to make the complaint.

Upon appeal against an order of two justices of the borough of Preston, for the removal of Ezra Chadwick, his wife and children, from Preston to Spotland, both in the county of Lancaster, the sessions confirmed the order, subject to the following case:—

This was an appeal against an order of two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the said borough, dated the 3rd day of March, 1848, for the removal of Ezra Chadwick, Jane his wife, and their eight children, from the said township of Preston to the township of Spotland aforesaid. The said order of removal was as follows:-The borough of Preston in the county of Lancaster, to wit. Complaint having this day been made by the overseers of the poor of the township of Preston, in the borough of Preston, in the county aforesaid, unto us the undersigned William Ainsworth, and Richard Pedder, Esqrs, two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the borough aforesaid, that Ezra Chadwick and Jane his wife, and their eight children, namely, Eadawf, aged eighteen years; Joseph, aged sixteen years; George, aged fourteen years; Isabella, aged twelve years; John, aged eight years; James, aged six years; Richard, aged two years, and Mary, aged one year, have come to inhabit in the said township of Preston, not having gained a legal settlement there, nor produced any certificate owning them to be settled elsewhere, and that they are poor and actually chargeable to the said township of Preston, and that their last legal settlement is in the township, parish or place of Spotland, in the county of Lancaster; and that the said Ezra Chadwick and his said family have not resided in the said township of Preston for five years next before the day of the date hereof, without having received relief from any parish, and that the said chargeability of the said Ezra Chadwick and his said family to the said township of Preston is in respect of relief made necessary by poverty, and not by reason of sickness or accident. We, the said justices, upon examination of the premises, upon oath, do adjudge the same to be true, and we do also adjudge, and are satisfied that the said chargeability is occasioned by poverty, and not by reason of sickness or accident, and we do also adjudge the place of the legal settlement of the said Ezra Chadwick and his said family to be in the said township, parish or place of Spotland aforesaid, and the said overseers of the poor of the said township of Preston having this day made application to us, the afore said justices, for a warrant or order for the removal of the said Ezra Chadwick and his said family to the said township, parish, or place of Spotland, as the place of their last legal settlement, these are, therefore, in Her Majesty's name, to require and command you to remove and convey the said Ezra Chadwick and his said family out of your said township of Preston into the township, parish, or place of Spotland, aforesaid, and there to deliver to, or leave them with, the churchwardens and overseers of the poor there, or to, or with some or one of them, together with this order, or a true copy thereof, who are hereby

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ADAM BITTLESTON, Esq., of the Inner Temple,

AND

PAUL PARNELL, Esq., of the Middle Temple,

BARRISTERS-AT-LAW.

VOL. IV.

FROM MICHAELMAS TERM, 1849, TO MICHAELMAS TERM, 1850.

LONDON:

JOHN CROCKFORD, LAW TIMES OFFICE,

29, ESSEX STREET, STRAND.

1851.

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INDEX.

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AUDITOR.

A corporation was constituted by a local act
for the relief and maintenance of the poor
of the several parishes of the city of
B., out of a common fund, and for various
other purposes not connected with the
relief of the poor. They were authorized
to levy rates, and to include therein the
moneys required to be raised for the other
purposes of the act, as for the relief of
the poor, distinguishing by separate
columns the amounts raised in respect
of each of the several charges. Held,
affirming the judgment of the Court of
Queen's Bench, 1st. That the Poor Law
Commissioners under sect. 32 of 7 & 8
Vict. c. 101, had authority to combine the
city of B. with other parishes and unions
into a district for the audit of accounts.
2. That they had sufficiently exercised
that power by an order combining not the
locality, but the corporation of the
governor and guardians with the other
parishes and unions; and 3rd. That the
corporation were bound to submit all their
accounts to the poor law auditor in order
to enable him to ascertain how much of the
whole amount raised by the rates was
applicable to the relief of the poor; al-
though he had no authority to allow or
disallow items in any acount relating to
other charges than the relief of the poor.
Governor of Poor of Bristol v. The
Queen, 76.

Justices may order payment of disallowances
by, 110.

BAINES'S ACT.

tricts consisting of several parishes; and it | Construction of, 167.

is not incumbent upon the commissioners

to appoint separate assessors or collectors
for each parish. Clark v. Ledger, 158.

ASSISTANT OVERSEERS.
The churchwardens and overseers for the
time being are the proper parties, with
the assent of the guardians of the union
in which the parish is, if in a union, to
enforce performance of the condition of a
bond given by an assistant overseer for the
due performance of his duties, under the
59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 7, and 7 & 8 Vict.
c. 101. s. 61. Shelton v. Rusby, 11.

ATTORNEY.
May sign notice of appeal, 164, 166.

BANKRUPT.

Poor rate may be proved against, 45.

BASTARDY.

Appeal, not of recognizances -The 4th sec-
tion of the 8th Vict. c. 10, requires notice
of the recognizance, but not of the con-
dition of it, to be sent to the woman in
whose favour an order of bastardy ap-
pealed against has been made. A notice,
therefore, which stated that a recognizance
to try the appeal had been entered into
without stating that the condition of the
recognizance was also to appear person-
ally and pay costs, was held good. If
the conditions of the appeal are not com-
plied with, so that the appellant has no
locus standi in court, the sessions ought

merely to dismiss the appeal. They have
no jurisdiction to confirm the order or
condemn the appellant to pay costs. Reg.
v. T. Holborrow, 20.

A notice of appeal given within twenty-four
hours after a verbal adjudication of the
justices, though before the written formal
order is signed by the justices, is good.
Upon the hearing of an application for an
order of affiliation, the justices pronounced
a verbal order, whereupon the putative
father immediately gave the woman notice
of appeal; a formal written order was
subsequently prepared and served upon
the putative father. On the case coming
on at the sessions, it was objected on the
part of the respondent that there was no
valid notice of appeal, none having been
served since the drawing up and signing
of the order of affiliation, the only notice
which, in fact, had been given being a
nullity, inasmuch as it was given before
any formal order had been drawn up and
signed. The sessions, holding this objec-
tion to be good, refused to hear the
appeal. Upon an application for a man-
damus to the justices to enter continu-
ances and hear the appeal: Held, that the
notice of appeal was properly given, and
the rule for the mandamus was therefore
made absolute. Reg. v. Justices of Hun-
tingdonshire, 60.

Notice of the recognizance duly entered
into to try an appeal against an order
of bastardy pursuant to stat. 8 Vict. c.
10, s. 3, was duly sent by post to the
address of the woman, who was, in fact,
dead at the time of the sending. This
fact having been proved at the trial of
the appeal, the magistrates dismissed it.
Held, that as the duty of sending the
notice was cast on the appellant by the
law, and not by his own voluntary con-
tract, and was by the act of God made
impossible of performance, the appellant
was excused from sending the notice, and
entitled to a writ of mandamus com-
manding the sessions to hear the appeal.
Reg. v. Justices of Leicestershire, 83.
To give justices at petty sessions jurisdiction
to make an order of affiliation where
the defendant has not appeared, proof
must be given them that he has been duly
served with the summons according to the
terms of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 3;
where, therefore, upon a rule for a cer-
tiorari to remove an order of affiliation
into this court to be quashed, it ap-
peared that the order was made in the
absence of the defendant, and upon
affidavits it appeared also that the service
of the summons was not in accordance
with the before-mentioned act, this court
made the rule absolute. Ex parte R.
Jones, 88.

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