out by his affidavits that the house was occupied bona fide by him, or that it contained a sufficient distress when the view was taken and the possession awarded. Under these circumstances the summons ought to be dismissed with costs.

Dasent having replied,

PATTESON, J. said it certainly appeared that the application had been fully answered on the facts. As to the proceedings of the justices, and the mode of conducting the view, they were not required to enter the house, if that could only be done by breaking open the doors. They are not called on to do more than to satisfy themselves in the best and most reasonable manner within their reach of the fact that the house is deserted, and that there is not sufficient distress in it. To do this they need not look into every room, but they may infer the condition of the house generally from the state of those rooms, to which alone they, by using ordinary and peaceable measures, can have recourse. It may be taken that there was nothing at all in the one room, and as the tenant has not ventured to swear that there was any property in the other rooms, I do not draw a very strained conclusion when I say that I think the justices were correct in inferring that there was not more in the rest of the house than there was in that one room. On these points, therefore, I think the application fails. But as the first point raised by Mr. Dasent, I confess I entertain some difficulty and doubt which cannot be effectually dissipated until I shall have had an opportunity of consulting Lord Kenyon's Reports. Much will depend on the question whether the action there was for rent; for then it is quite certain that the right to distrain would be superseded or suspended by the judgment of the County Court in this case. There is, however, much weight in the argument that the possession of the house under the act was no satisfaction for the rent in arrear, as there was nothing to prevent the landlord from suing for it by by action; and, by analogy, why should he not have the power of distraining after he had got an unsatisfied judgment on an action for that rent? One thing was clear, namely, that if the power of distress was gone, it would not signify whether the house was empty or not, as the justices derive their jurisdiction from the right of distress, as well as the deserted condition of the house. For the purposes of the act, a landlord without the right to distrain is in the same position as though there was a sufficient distress. He cannot, in either of those cases, put the justices in motion; and the difficulty here was, whether the right of distress existed. On that point the authorities should be looked into, and if they supported the objection, then the summons would be absolute, with 51. costs; but in the mean time, as it was advisable that judgment should be pronounced pro formâ during the assizes, the summons would stand dismissed, with 57. costs, subject to the result of further consideration.

Judgment was accordingly given against the application; and shortly after the assizes, it was intimated to the parties that his lordship, on consulting Seven v. Mihill, saw no ground to alter that judgment.

BAIL COURT.

Summons dismissed.

November 11, 1850.

(Before Mr. Justice PATTESON.)
REG. V. THE JUSTICES OF MIDDLESEX.

A notice of appeal against an order of removal may be

signed by the attorney for the parish officers, and if so signed will be perfectly valid if the attorney is in fact duly authorized.

This was a rule, calling upon the justices of Middlesex to show cause why a mandamus should not issue com

manding them to enter continuances, and hear an appeal against an order of removal of a pauper, from the parish of Marylebone to the township of Leeds, in the county of York. The facts appeared to be as follows:-The order of removal in question was made on the 4th day of January, 1850; on the 21st the attorney for the appel lants applied for copies of the examinations, which were sent by post, on the 24th; on the 28th of the same month a notice of appeal, signed only by the attorney of the appellants, was sent to the respondents, and therein he stated himself to be the attorney acting for and on behalf of the churchwardens and overseers of the township, and signing it on their behalf; on the 7th of February following another notice, signed by the parish officers themselves, was sent, but this clearly too late. At the next sessions the appellants put in their notice of appeal of the 28th of January, but no evidence was given to show that the person signing the notice was really the attorney acting by the direction of the parish officers, and no objection was raised upon that ground; but it was objected on the part of the respondents that the signature by the attorney was insufficient, and the justices, being of this opinion, dismissed the appeal, whereupon the present rule was obtained.

Huddleston showed cause and argued that the signature to the notice of appeal by the attorney alone is insufficient. That the words in the old act of the 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 8, appear to require the notice "to be given by the churchwardens and overseers," and also in the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 79, where, in reference to notice of appeal, similar wording is used. That in Rex v Kimbolton, 6 A. & E. 609, Littledale says, that under the 79th section "it is clear that a notice sent by the attorney would not be enough, for it is to be sent by three or more guardians;" also Reg. v. The Justices of Surrey, 5 Q.B.

506.

W. H. Hall and Pashley, in support of the rule, con tended that the notice by the attorney was sufficient; that the section requiring the notice is precisely the same as that of sect. 5 of the 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, which requires the party suing out a writ of certiorari to give notice, under which it has been uniformly the practice for the notice to be signed by the attorney: (R. v. How, 11 A. & E. 159; R. v. The Justices of Lancashire, 4 B. & Ald. 989; Reg v. Darton, 14 L. J. 11, M.C.; Reg v. The Justices of Huntingdonshire, 4 New Sess. Cas.; Lown. Max. & Pol. 78.) The general principle must be the guide in this case, that a notice may always be signed by the attorney unless the statute expressly requires the contrary.

PATTESON, J.-The second notice is in this case out of the question, and the matter turns exclusively upon the first, viz. that of the 28th of January; on that, two points might have arisen, whether the person who signed this notice sufficiently appeared to be the attorney for the appellants; and whether, if that did appear, such a sig nature was sufficient. The first point, however, if intended to be relied on, should have been raised pointedly and distinctly at the sessions; whereas it is clear from the affidavits, that that was not the case, and therefore I cannot allow it to be raised now, because if it had been raised then, it might have been cured by evidence. The question resolves itself, therefore, into the one point of whether a notice given by an attorney is sufficient. No case has distinctly decided the point under this particular statute, and we must, therefore, look to the general prin ciples which regulate such matters. The common rule

is, qui facit per alium facit per se ;" and a signature by an attorney is usually sufficient, unless there is something to the contrary in the express terms of the act. The case of Rex v. Kimbolton, relied upon by Mr. Huddleston, turned upon the express words of the 79th section of the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, by which the notice must be sent by three or more of the guardians, which clearly implies a

His LORDSHIP, to-day, said that he had consulted the other judges upon the point, and that they thought the words of the statute sufficient to introduce a new practice, and that therefore the order would be granted as asked Rule accordingly.

for.

attorney, the act so expresses it; but an incidental expression dropped in the course of a case must not be pressed too far, and cannot be cited as an authority. A question is here distinctly raised, and it must be decided upon principle; and if, in the case of a certiorari, the notice may be given by an attorney, I cannot see why it may not in this. The case is different when the notice is to be served "upon" a party. There I can understand why service on an attorney may be held not to be good, for who can say whether he is the attorney or not? There is then no cause pending, but when a notice of appeal is to be given, an appeal must have been decided upon, and therefore an attorney must in all probability have been employed. I think, therefore, this notice of appeal was good, and the mandamus must go.

BAIL COURT.

November 6, 1850.

REG. v. FIELD.

Rule absolute.

Under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 18, a certiorari is unnecessary in order to bring up an order from Quarter Sessions to be enforced in this court, the order of a judge alone being sufficient.

Unthank moved for an order directing an order of quarter sessions to be returned into this court, in order that it may be enforced pursuant to the provisions of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 18, which enacts "that in all cases where any order shall be made by any Court of General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace, it shall be lawful for the Court of Queen's Bench, or for any judge of that court at chambers, either in term or vacation, upon the application of any person entitled to enforce such order, and upon the production of a copy of such order under the hand of the clerk of the peace or his deputy, and upon proof of refusal or neglect to obey such order, to order and direct such order of the Court of General or Quarter Sessions to be removed into the said Court of Queen's Bench, and thereupon such order shall be of the same force and effect, and may be enforced in the same manner as a rule made by the said Court of Queen's Bench," &c. Some doubts existing with the Crown office as to whether the proper mode of removing such order was not still by writ of certiorari, the opinion of this court was sought upon the subject, and it was contended that the words of the section sufficiently indicated that an order only, and not a writ of certiorari was all that was necessary, and that thereby great saving of time and expense would be the result.

PATTESON, J.-The Master informs me of a case in the last term (Reg. v. The Justices of Devon) in which my brother Wightman thought the better way would be to have a certiorari.

Unthank. That case was not argued, and I now rely upon the terms of the section; under sect. 22 of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, which authorizes the removal into this court of certain judgments of inferior courts, the words are very similar to those in the present section, and under that act it has never been the practice to issue a certiorari.

Cur, adv. vult.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
November 9, 1850.

REG. V. THE COMMISSIONERS OF HIGH AND LOW
HARROWGATE.

ficial occupation-Public purpose.

Local commissioners for the cleansing, watching, &c. of a town, were rated in respect of their occupation of a pump-room built over sulphur springs, under the powers of their act of Parliament. They were authorized to make a reasonable charge upon persons frequenting the pump-room; but were also required to provide a pump outside the pump room for the supply of water to the public without charge. They were also empowered to raise money by rates, but they could derive no profit or advantage either individually or collectively from any money coming into their hands as commissioners. They were invested with large powers for draining, cleansing, lighting and improving streets, and houses within their district; and all money received by them was to be applied first in payment of interest on money borrowed, and of annuities granted under the act, next to the various purposes of the act connected with the improvement of the steets, and lastly, in paying off the princi pal sums borrowed. A small part only of the parish was within their district, which included parts of several; but not the whole of any one parish or township. Held, that the purposes to which the revenue derived from the pump-room was applied were not so exclusively of a public nature as to entitle the commissioners to exemption from the poor rate.

Upon appeal against a poor rate for the township of Pannel, in the West Riding of the county of York, wherein the commissioners of High and Low Harrowgate were assessed to the relief of the poor in respect of their occupation of a pump-room, the Court of Quarter Sessions had confirmed the rate subject to the opinion of this court upon a case. The pump-room in question had been erected under powers conferred by 4 Vict. c. xvi., which appointed the commissioners and defined the limits of their jurisdiction. There are parts of several townships within those limits, but not the whole of any About one-twentieth part of the township of Pannel is included within them, but the said township is several miles distant from other townships which are within the limits of the act. The commissioners have not and cannot, either collectively or individually, receive any profit, advantage, or benefit from the moneys coming to their hands in virtue of their office.

one.

Sect. 88 of the local act provides that for the purpose of securing a larger and better supply of sulphur water from the old sulphur water springs at Low Harrowgate aforesaid, &c., and for affording greater convenience and accommodation to the visitors resorting to Harrowgate for the benefit of the said waters, it shall be lawful for the commissioners to make such additions or alterations to the present erections over all or any of the said springs, &c., and to erect a pump-room or other building over the said sulphur water springs, with suitable basins, &c.; provided always, that for the purpose of affording free access to all persons to the said wells free of any charge whatever, between the hours of half-past five o'clock in the morning and ten o'clock at night, if the said sulphur water wells shall be inclosed, and a pump-room or other building erected over the same, the commissioners shall in that case cause to be erected, and at all times there

after kept in good repair, a pump, &c., outside any such pump-room or other buildings, so as from time to time, and at all times thereafter, within the hours last aforesaid, to allow water to be obtained therefrom with the same facility, and in as pure a state, as the same is obtained in or from the said pump-room, &c.

Sect. 89. That it shall be lawful for the commissioners to cause to be levied from the persons frequenting the said pump-room, &c., a reasonable charge, not exceeding in the whole the sum of 1s. 6d. per week for each person; such charge being according to a printed scale, which shall at all times remain hung up in the said pump-room, &c. Sect. 98. That it shall be lawful for the commissioners from time to time to cause such common sewers, drains, vaults, culverts, watercourses, wells, and pumps, as they may think necessary to be constructed in or under any street within the limits of this act; and also to cause any of the common sewers, &c., to be altered, repaired, cleansed, and completed, as to them shall seem necessary, and to carry and continue the same into and through any land within the limits of this act.

Sect. 107. That where any house or building in or near any street within the limits of this act shall be burnt or pulled down, or shall be intended to be rebuilt, and the commissioners shall be desirous of widening such street, or of making any alteration in the line of the house or building, it shall be lawful for them to purchase and take any part of the site of such house or building, or of the land occupied therewith, with the consent of the parties interested therein, &c.

Sect. 108. That when any house or building, any part of which now projects, &c. shall be taken down to be rebuilt or altered, the same shall be set back to the line of the street, or the line of the adjoining house or building, in such manner as the commissioners shall direct for the improvement of such street, &c.

Sect. 119. That if any building, or excavation, or any land or place contiguous to any street within the limits of this act, shall, for want of sufficient repair, protection, or inclosure, be dangerous to the passengers along such street, it shall be lawful for the commissioners to cause the same to be repaired, protected, or inclosed, so as to prevent any danger therefrom; and the charges of such repair, protection, or inclosure, shall be repaid to the commissioners by the owner of the premises so repaired, protected or inclosed.

Sect. 123. That it shall be lawful for the commissioners, from time to time, to cause all or any of the streets within the limits of this act to be cleansed and watered, and the dirt, ashes and rubbish, except any such as shall be reserved by the occupiers for their own use, to be removed from any house or premises within the limits of this act, at such time and in such manner as they shall appoint.

Sect. 135. That it shall be lawful for the commissioners, with consent of a majority of the ratepayers, to cause the several trusts within the limits of this act, or such of them as they shall think proper, to be lighted with gas, oil, or otherwise, &c.

Sect. 193. That the money which shall arise from the said rates, as also all other money to be received by the commissioners under this act, shall be applied in the first place in payment of the interest of all moneys borrowed on mortgage of the said rates and of the annuities granted by virtue of this act, and afterwards in defraying the expenses of flagging, cleansing, watering, draining, and watching the several streets within the limits of this act, and of improving the same, and carrying the several purposes of this act into execution, and in paying off the principal sums borrowed on the credit of the rates in such order as the commissioners shall direct.

The question was whether the purposes to which the profits of the pump-room were under the Local Act applicable, were of such a public nature as to exempt the

Commissioners from liability to poor rates in respect thereof.

Pashley and Overend, in support of the order of sessions.-The pump-room is vested in the commissioners, and in their occupation is liable to rates: (The Governor of Bristol Poor v. Waite, 5 A. & E. 1; R. v. The Governors of Wallingford Union, 10 A. & E. 259.) The benefit conferred is not on the public in general, nor even on all the inhabitants of Pannel, but on the cupiers of a certain district, in fact, upon a class. (They referred to R. v. Badcock, 6 Q. B. 787; R. v. Longwood, 3 N. S. C. 377; R. v. The Mayor of York, 6 A. & E. 419; R. v. The Blackfriars Bridge Company, 9 A. & E. 828.) The ground would be clearly liable in the hands of a private occupier, and therefore the burden of showing exemption is cast on the other side. (They referred to R. v. Exminster, 12 A. & E. 2.) ́

Pickering and Hardy, contrà.-The commissioners have no present interest, and derive no personal advan tage from the profits of the pump-roon, and they are compelled to lay out the money they receive in accordance with the directions of the act. [Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.

Is there any section which specifically appropriates the profits of the pump-room? If the application is to be made under the 193rd section, the profits form a contribution to a general fund.] There is nothing in the act more precise than that; but the preamble states that the powers to be granted would be advantageous to the public. The case of R. v. Longwood is not in point. It cannot be said that the public does not derive benefit, for there is the pump outside at the service of the public gratuitously; and the pump-room may be used by the public at a small payment. (They referred to R. v. Salter's-road Sluice Company, 4 T. R. 735.) [Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-The question is, is the fund to be applied to the advantage of the public or in relief of the private occupiers ?] It is difficult to confer an advantage on the general public without at the same time conferring a benefit on individual occupiers; but the benefit conferred will not cease to be a public benefit on that ground. The question is whether it is of a public nature; and in this case the question must be answered in the affirmative.

Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-I am of opinion that the order ought to be confirmed. I have often regretted that property locally situated in the parish, and which, in the hands of the private owner, would be productive of profit, should become exempt by being devoted to public purposes. I think that it should be so devoted by the owner, subject to the charge under which he held it, and that his charity should not be conferred at the expense of others. The law, however, is otherwise settled, and while I seek not to disturb it, I would by no means extend the exemption. It is clearly not enough to show that the trustees do not derive any personal advantage from these profits; it must also be shown that the whole revenue must be entirely devoted to public purposes. It was said that all the pur. poses for which provision is made in this act are of a public nature; but several appear to me to be framed for the private advantage of the occupier. Thus, in section 133, the removal of the dirt, ashes, and rubbish, except such as shall be reserved by the occupiers for their own use, from any house or premises, seems to me something done for the occupier of the house, and I cannot distin guish it from the authority given by the 119th section to the commissioners to repair, protect, or inclose any building or excavation contiguous to any street, if dangerous to the passengers, where the public good or the getting rid of danger, is not so much sought as the relief of private individuals. I think, therefore, that the occupation of the commissioners is not brought within the condi tions of exemption.

COLERIDGE, WIGHTMAN, and ERLE, JJ., concurred.
Rule discharged.

A., one of the parties assessed, having made default in payment of the rate, a warrant was issued under the corporate seal and signed by B. the mayor. The warrant did not aver that the justices were acting within their jurisdiction, by stating that they were acting in and for the borough, but it had a venue in the margin. The goods of A. were taken under the warrant, and afterwards replevied. The defendant in replevin avowed setting forth the warrant, &c. Replication, de injuria and a special verdict was found.

Held, 1st. That though in general a retrospective rate is bad, yet that the fact of such legal expenses being included, did not make the rate retrospective within the meaning of that rule of law.

or

2nd. That borough justices may make a rate at an dinary meeting of the town council, and that they are not required, like county justices, to make their rates at a public meeting.

3rd. That the venue in the margin of the warrant showed with sufficient certainty that the magistrates were acting in and for the borough without a special averment to that effect.

This was an action of replevin for taking certain goods.

Avowry-That Lichfield is an ancient borough, having a body corporate. That the council made a rate, and that the goods were seized under a warrant in pursuance thereof.

Replication, de injuriâ. VOL. V.

There was a special verdict finding the following facts: The plaintiff at the time of the making of the rate by the council, was one of the overseers of the poor of the parish of St. Mary, in the borough of Lichfield-the defendants justices of the peace for the said boroughthat borough being included in the Schedule A. of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 (the Municipal Corporations Act), and the borough fund not being sufficient for the purposes mentioned in that statute on the 19th July, 1847, a meeting of the council of the borough was held according to sections 69 and 92 of that act, which meeting was not, however, a public meeting, the members of the town council and the reporters of the press only being allowed to be present; the meeting had not been advertized in any newspaper, there being no newspaper published at Lichfield; at such meeting the council made the rate in question, carried resolutions, and entered the minutes of the proceedings, under the corporate seal of the borough, duly signed by the mayor; Henry Hitchins was appointed collector of the rates to act as overseer, &c., and J. W. Profitt, treasurer, directed forthwith to make a demand in writing on behalf of the said council, from the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the respective sums thereby assessed and taxed upon such parish, &c., the said churchwardens and overseers being thereby required to levy and pay to the said treasurer the said sums so assessed and taxed upon such parish, &c., within 100 days after demand made, and in case of default such treasurer to levy the same by distress of the goods of the said churchwardens and overseers. A written estimate of expenditure and assets was made at that meeting; the proportions of the rate were according to the fair annual value of the rateable property, and on the said 19th July a precept or warrant signed by the mayor and sealed with the corporate seal issued to Mr. Profitt, to demand and collect the proportions therementioned. Mr. Profitt, accordingly on the 29th July, duly served a written notice requiring that within 100 days payment be made to him out of the poor rates; the plaintiff inspected the rate and gave notice of appeal to the then next sessions, when, upon hearing the appeal, the recorder confirmed the rate; afterwards the plaintiff paid three several instalments on account of the rate, leaving a balance due on the 30th March, 1848, when he went out of office and ceased to be such overseer; a successor was appointed on the 11th July, 1848, after the expiration of the 100 days, and after the plaintiff had ceased to be

α

overseer, the two persons who still then continued churchwardens, and the plaintiff and James Gilbert were by Mr. Profitt summoned to appear before the defendant, Thomas Johnson, he being then mayor of the said borough, and the other defendant, Major Butler Morgan, being a justice of the peace of such borough, under a complaint in writing, upon oath, by Mr. Profitt. On the 13th of July, 1848, the plaintiff attended, in obedience to the summons issued, and the hearing was adjourned until the 20th, and from thence to the 3rd of August following, and the plaintiff then promised the residue should be paid; and he did in fact afterwards pay a further sum on account before the said 3rd of August. The plaintiff did not attend on the 3rd of August, and the defendants, upon the application of the attorney for the council of the borough, decided that a distress warrant should issue, and such warrant was, on the 10th of August, 1848, prepared, signed, sealed, and delivered to the said attorney, who was then town clerk of the borough, for the purpose of having the corporate seal affixed thereto, it being his duty to attend when the corporate seal was affixed to documents; he, however, altered the date from the 10th to the 14th of August, but with the assent and direction of the defendants, who re-signed and re-sealed it, and the corporate common seal was then affixed by the defendant, the mayor, and signed by him. On the 4th of July, the council duly resolved at a meeting that this amount be enforced, and that the mayor do sign and affix the common seal to all necessary documents in reference thereto. On the 14th of August the corporate seal was duly affixed to the warrant, and it was delivered to Profitt, who took the goods and chattels of the plaintiff described in the declaration, and kept possession of the same until they were afterwards replevied. No notice of action was given to the defendants, or either of them, before the commencement of the suit. On the 19th of July, 1847, there were two high constables for the borough. Profitt never had been one.

Gray, for plaintiff.-There are several objections to the warrant, which, if sustainable, will make it void. 1st. In the avowry they state the rating to have been public, but in the special verdict it is stated that the rating was not public. The rate was made at a meeting of the council, and there were none of the public admitted, except the reporters for the public press. The rating could not therefore be public: 55 Geo. 3, c. 51, requires that the rating in counties should be at a general or quarter sessions, and in public. The provisions of that statute are by 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 92, made applicable to borough rating. That section, after directing certain debts, expenses, &c. to be paid out of the borough fund, proceeds to enact, that "in case the borough fund shall not be sufficient for the purposes aforesaid, the council of the borough is hereby authorized and required from time to time to estimate as correctly as may be what amount in addition to such fund will be sufficient for payment of the expenses to be incurred in carrying into effect the provisions of this act; and in order to raise the amount so estimated the said council is hereby authorized and required from time to time to order a borough rate in the nature of a county rate to be made within the said borough, and for that purpose the council of such borough shall have within their borough all the powers which any justices of the peace assembled at their general or quarter sessions in any county in England, have within the limits of their commission by virtue of an act made in the 55th year of His late Majesty King George the Third, intituled An Act to amend an Act of his late Majesty King George the Second, for the more easy Assessing, Collecting, and levying of County Rates, or as near thereto as the nature of the case will admit except as herein before excepted; and all warrants required by the said act to be issued under the hands and seals of two or more justices, shall in like case be signed by the

mayor, and sealed with the seal of the borough, &c. and this is confirmed by 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 48, s. 1. At the time of the passing of the Municipal Corporations Act, the rate must have been publicly made. Further the act says, "such power as the justices have" which was a power to rate publicly. 2ndly. The rate was invalid because it was retrospective. The expenses for which the rate was made had been already incurred: (Woods v. Reed, 2 M. & W. 700.) [POLLOCK, C.B.-Is it clearly laid down that in no case can there be a retrospective rate?] Stats. 7 Will. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 81, s. 2, was passed to remedy the inconvenience caused by the deci sion in Woods v. Reed, and it only afforded a temporary relief. It however showed that the general law was, that a rate could not be retrospective. Here the rate was clearly retrospective. [PARKE, B.-The question is, what is a retrospective rate? They are to make a rate within a reasonable time.] If parties choose to enter into litigation they ought to have money in hand to pay for it. They cannot leave the whole expenses to be paid by future inhabitants. [ALDERSON, B.-Many of the expenses mentioned in the statute for which they are to make a rate, are such as cannot be ascertained beforehand?] The general borough fund is applicable to the purposes for which the rate was to be made. The borough rate was to be made to assist the borough fund. If the borough should commence a litigation which might last for years, they cannot let the expenses run on without paying them by degrees as they were incurred. They can only include in a rate the expenses of the cur rent year. 3rdly. The power of rating given is in the alternative, that if there be already a rate made and collected, the amount chargeable on the borough is to be paid out of that, and if that be not enough then there may be a rate, but the order of council does not follow the words of the act. They do not use equivalent words, but they use the words of one branch of the sentence and not the whole. They do not aver that there was no such rate already collected. 4thly. The warrant calls upon the parties to pay the rate within 100 days after the date of the service of the warrant. It should, however, have been within a time limited from the date of the warrant. As it is, the person serving the warrant may give some parishes or individuals advantage over others by not serving the warrants at the same time, The warrant must, therefore, be bad. 5thly. It does not allege that Johnson who signed was mayor, and it was altered after it had been delivered to be executed. As soon as the justices had signed and sealed the warrant they were functi officio, and the subsequent alteration in the date and resealing avoided it. 6thly. The warrant is bad on the face of it, inasmuch as it does not appear that the justices acted within their jurisdiction. It merely states that they were justices for Lichfield, but does not state that they acted in and for the borough, &c. This was held to be insufficient in the case of Reg. v. Stockton, 2 New Sess. Cas. 16. 7thly. Stat. 27 Geo. 2, c. 20, s. 1, requires that the time should be stated within which the goods are to be sold, but here the time is not so fixed. The time is not limited by law, but the magistrates are required to fix it: (Reg. v. Williams, 19 L. J. 126, M. C.) All that is stated in the order is "you shall not sell until after five days," but there is no limitation to the other extremity. The warrant is therefore clearly bad.

Keating, Q. C., contrà.-As to the first objection, it appears clear that the meeting was as public as the act requires. It was attended by the public press. It would have been easy to say a public meeting, but not a word is said about it. [ALDERSON, B.-The statute says that they are to have all the powers of the county justices, to sit in open court is a restriction.] Then as to the rate being retrospective, it cannot be said that, because it was applied partly to legal expenses previously in