to the law of God. Another, by confining his observations to the duty of disobeying the latter, may relax the feeling of obligation to obey those which are just and good. Another still may dwell at large on the right of private judgment, with re\spect to the rectitude or injustice of particular laws; while he Jomits to state, that our belief of their expediency is not to be the condition of our obedience.

The question is often asked, shall we obey God or man; the divine law, or human law? Answer, both; the divine law always, human law, when it is not in conflict with the divine; the latter because obedience to it is not only permitted but enjoined by the higher law of God.

If the view which has now been taken of this subject is just, a solemn responsibility rests upon us, to be prepared to make a correct distinction between the cases in which obedience to human law is required by God, and those in which it is forbidden by Him. We may incur the divine displeasure by omitting to obey righteous enactments, as well as by obeying those which are unrighteous. It will not be safe to follow implicitly the lead of any violent political party. We cannot throw off personal responsibility, by yielding to the current of popular opinion. We must be ourselves accountable to God, for the manner in which we discharge our duties to civil government.

Is not conscience a safe guide, in cases of difficulty and doubt? If we follow its dictates, shall we not be sure to go right? Is it not a law in our hearts, higher than the law of the land? When our conscience is itself right, the conduct which is conformed to it will undoubtedly be right. But the scriptures speak of an evil conscience, as well as of a good one; of one that is weak, as well as one that is enlightened. The conscience of the same individual may be at one time honest, at another time perverse. It may be under the influence of prejudice, of self-conceit, of party spirit, of corrupt propensi

ties.

Conscience is that by which we distinguish between right (and wrong in our own case ;—with respect to our own feelings, purposes, and conduct. In nothing, perhaps, are we more liable to erroneous, partial decisions, than in what respects ourselves. Self-interest has a powerful influence over our moral judgments. Conscience includes two elements at least, consciousness, which is a notice of our own mental acts, and a comparison of these with some standard of right, as the law of God, impartial benevolence, or the principle of immutable rectitude. To these there is frequently added, in customary use, certain emotions, as self-complacency or remorse, a feeling of

good or ill desert, an apprehension of danger. But the two essential elements are consciousness, and a reference to a standard of right. Now the decisions of conscience may be erroneous, in consequence of false views of this standard. He who makes his own inclinations the rule of right is almost sure to err in his moral judgments. What some persons call their conscience is far from being, in all cases, an unerring standard of rectitude. If a civil or ecclesiastical ruler deems it his duty, in obedience to the canons of the Catholic church, to prohibit the reading of the scriptures by the people of his charge, his conscience is guided by a law which he places above the law of the Bible. Most governments forbid and punish perjury. But if a Romanist believes that his church, or its pontificial head, has authority from on high to set aside the obligation of an oath, he adjusts his conscience to a standard which he considers higher than the law of the land.

But are not the decisions of conscience intuitive; and is not intuition infallible? Can a man be deceived with respect to that which he knows to be right? To this we answer, conscience may be infallible in some cases, and not in all. Its prerogative is analogous to that of the intellect, which is given to enable us to decide between truth and error. In some cases, its determinations are intuitive, immediate, and infallible. But in a far greater number of instances, a process of investigation is necessary; and the conclusions which are reached may be merely probable. Those truths only are properly denominated intuitive which, like mathematical axioms, are immediately discerned, are perfectly certain, and are acknowledged by all who have thought on them enough to understand the meaning of the terms in which they are expressed. Propositions concerning which any reasonable doubt can be raised, are not strictly intuitive. Intuitional philosophy and intuitional theology are becoming popular. But much that passes current as such wants the character of certainty, which is necessary to give it a valid claim to the title which it assumes. Without some intuitive truths, there could be no reasoning at all; as they enter into the structure of every argument. But because these are immediately discerned, and universally acknowledged, it by no means follows that all other truths have this character. So is it with the dictates of conscience. Some of them are sponta- ( neous and indubitable. Others are the result of various reasonings and influences; and are far from being infallible.

Are we not under a moral obligation to "have a conscience void of offense, both toward God, and toward men ?" How can this result be effected by our efforts, unless we make con

science the standard of our conduct? Can we ever be justified in acting contrary to the decisions of our conscience? Certainly not. Hence arises the momentous responsibility under which we are placed in relation to conscience. It is a double responsibility; in the first place, to do all in our power to maintain a good conscience, and then to see that it is made invariably the guide of our conduct. The only way in which we can act right, is by having our conscience right, and obeying its dictates. If our conscience is wrong, we shall do wrong, whether we obey it or not. Obedience to it will be a deviation from the law of righteousness. To disobey it must be wrong, because though the external action, in itself considered, may happen to be no violation of any right rule of duty; yet the agent is culpable, as he acts not from moral principle, but does that which he believes to be wrong; as in the case referred to by Paul, the eating of things offered to idols.

A man's conscience is his own rule of right. It is not a standard for others; except so far as their's accords with his. They are bound to conform to their own convictions of their duty. As he is not infallible, it is possible that they may be right, and that he is wrong. He ought to consider, that they have consciences, as well as he. They may indeed violate their obligations, and so may he. In their relations to civil government, they may be convinced, that they are bound to obey a law, which he thinks he ought to disobey.

The claims of conscience are appealed to, to justify disobedience, more frequently than to enforce obedience. But its authority is as sacredly binding, in the one case, as in the other. In one, a man's conscientious regard to the divine will coincides with his reverence for the law of the land; in the other, the authority of God releases him from any obligation to obey those laws which are known to be in opposition to the divine commands. This may show the reason why he may deem it his duty to refuse to obey a law of the land, when he is not authorized to offer forcible resistance to the ministers of justice, in their endeavors to execute the law. If he claims a right to disobey it, because he thinks it unjust, he ought not to oppose them, in their efforts to execute that which they deem to be just, and which the nature of their office requires them to enforce. He is not forbidden, it is true, to use arguments to convince them that they have formed an erroneous judgment of the character of the law. But so long as they retain their opinion of its justice, he is bound not to resist them, in the performance of that which they deem to be their duty. He ought also to consider, that the members of the legislature which framed the

law, were acting under the obligations of conscience; and that this is presumptive, though not decisive evidence, that it is not an unrighteous statute, however inexpedient it may be. While he disobeys, from regard to the demands of his own conscience, the officers of justice may be required by their consciences to enforce obedience, or to inflict the penalty for disobedience. In this conflict of opinions, and of conduct, in which one party or the other is wrong, each is under high obligations to see that his conscience is right, in the view of God his final Judge.

ART. II.-FASHION IN RELIGION.

Memorials of Christian Life, in the Early and Middle Ages.
Including his "Light in Darkness."
Light in Darkness."

By Dr. AUGUSTUS NEANDER. Translated from the German. By J. E. RYLAND. London Henry G. Bohn, 1852.

We cannot but regard with favor, the circulation of this admirable book. It is full of historical pictures, representing Christian life as it clearly ought to be, and as it was prior to the degeneracy which it early suffered by forming alliances with the world. These pictures portray the beauty of genuine Christianity. They illustrate the virtues, domestic and social, which were the natural and ordinary growth of piety, so long as the personal influence of Christ and of his apostles was felt. The book contains also graphic sketches of the lives of heroic Christian men who stood manfully for the truth and purity of religion, during the centuries subsequent to this early period, after Christianity had become greatly corrupted, even down to the close of the middle ages. Its history of the men and missions by which Ireland, England, and Central Europe were visited with Evangelical influences from the time of Patrick, patron Saint of the Celtic people, down to the fourteenth century, is a fine exhibition of the spirit that should animate the missionary at the present day. It is an eloquent exhibition of the self-sacrificing philanthropy and heroic faith which, not missionaries alone should cherish, but equally those who send them, Christians in every walk of life. He who can rise from its perusal without being quickened in his missionary spirit, and quickened in

every Christian grace, must have wandered nearly beyond the sphere of the Saviour's attraction. He cannot fail at least to gather from it this lesson, that whatever degeneracy Christianity suffered by the growth of Hierarchy, and other causes, however far it departed, from a true spiritual worship, and a true spiritual life, yet wherever and whenever it was left to develop itself freely in auspicious circumstances, it elevated and adorned the character; it produced humility, self-denial, and loyalty to the Redeemer; it produced an earnest assiduity in doing good.

In reading this volume we naturally inquire why it is, that Christians at the present day illustrate these virtues no more frequently and eminently? Doubtless a variety of agencies contribute to deteriorate modern Christianity, to impede its progress and depress the character of its developments. One of these we propose to consider in the present article-we refer to Fashion.

In accuracy of conception, a fashionable Christianity is no Christianity at all. The element of Fashion, however, may assume such prominence in circles professedly Christian, as to justify the application of this epithet to their religion. There is actually in some circles of Christian society, such an approximation to it, and in others such eager and unscrupulous aspiration after it, as to demand the attention of the friends of spiritual Christianity. There are bearings of this subject on the salvation of the world, especially on the interests of Protestantism and of Religious liberty, too vital to be disregarded by those who are set to guide the popular and religious instincts.

What son of New England, acquainted with the history of Puritanism, how it set up the pillars of our cherished institutions, what obstacles it encountered, and how at length it worked itself clear of the last vestige of ecclesiastical tyranny, imported with it from the Old world, will not deem it quite worth while to survey whatever currents of influence are imperiling his dearest interests; imperiling the purity and progress of spiritual Christianity, indeed religious liberty itself? Among these none is more mighty and dangerous than that of fashion. Every increment of wealth contributes to swell this current, and will do so, unless the piety of the country demonstrate that wealth has a far more rational and religious channel to flow in than that of ostentation and arrogance. Certainly wealth may be put to better uses than to carry on a rivalry in extravagant and luxurious living. Certainly by the votaries of a religion whose fundamental mandate is "deny thyself and take thy cross," it should be put to a better use.

We need to know how much influence is actually exerted upon