« EelmineJätka »
m. Contrary to Poor Laws, 226.
p. Consideration or Security
r. Champerty and Maintenance.-See
is entitled to the reward, and the motive of such
The defendants, who were the proprietors and
0. Trade Unions and Combinations, 227. manner required, and then contracted influenza :
8. Other Restrictions.-See STATUTE.
D. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS.
a. By what Law, 230.
b. Particular Words, Terms,
c. Implied Terms, 241.
d. Several Documents, 246.
e. Joint or Several Contracts, 247.
g. Entire or Divisible, 253.
h. Uncertain, 254.
2. Parol Evidence, 255.
On the 29th May the defendant instructed
Advertisement-Offer of Reward.]—Where a
42 L. J., Q. B. 171; L. R. 8 Q. B. 286; 28 L. T.
Statement of Minimum Price by Vendor.]-
price to the persons making the inquiry. Harvey | without noticing it.
H. telegraphed to F., "Will you sell B. pro-
the wagonette in the exercise of the power of
Vague and Indefinite Offers.]-See Uncertain 337; 47 J. P. 357.
terms of the contract constitutes the offer of the
Notice relieving Owner of Tug against
A master of a steam-tug, of which the de-
Delivered to Customer-Incorporation of
25th of January-Held, that the defendant's offer to renew the contract not having been in terms accepted by the plaintiff, the defendant was at liberty to retract it, and that his letter of the 19th of January was a sufficient retractation. Gilkes v. Leonino, 4 C. B. (N.S.) 485; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 537; 6 W. R. 620.
contract is a question independent of circum- | as indicated in our letter of yesterday." The stances which may excuse its non-performance. names of two ships were given on the 24th and If terms proposed by two parties to each other in themselves constitute a complete contract by which the one party is to do for the other a definite work at a certain time, and to receive a specified rate of remuneration, it is not the less a binding contract, which will subject the party who was to do the work to an action for not doing it, because at the time the terms were accepted something remained to be disclosed (as to the nature of the work, &c.) upon which it might depend whether there might not be a legal justification for refusing to perform it. Lara v. General Apothecaries' Co., 26 L. J., Ex. 225.
iii. Lapse or Revocation.
Lapse-Unreasonable Time.]—A proposal on one side, not answered by the other until after a delay of some months, and then not assented to, but some months after acceded to, is no evidence of a contract. Emmott v. Riddell, 2 F. & F.
An offer to guarantee moneys to be advanced to a third party on discount, to a certain extent, "for the space of twelve calendar months," is countermandable within that time. Offord v. Davies, 12 C. B. (N.s.) 748; 31 L. J., C. P. 319; 9 Jur. (N.s.) 22; 6 L. T. 579; 19 W. R. 758.
Invalid after Acceptance.]-A company advertised for tenders for the supply of stores for a period of twelve months. The defendant sent in a tender to supply the stores required for the period named, at certain fixed prices, "in such quantities as the company's storekeepers might order from time to time," and the company accepted his tender :-Held, that there was a Where an application is made for shares, the sufficient consideration for the defendant's prodirectors are bound to allot them within a mise to supply the goods, although there was no reasonable time, or the allottee may refuse to binding contract on the part of the company to accept them and recover back the deposit, whether order any. G. N. Ry. v. Witham, 43 L. J., C. P. he has withdrawn his application or not. Rams-11; L. R. 9 C. P. 16; 29 L. T. 471 ; 22 W. R. 48. gate Hotel Co. v. Montefiore, 4 H. & C. 164; 35 L. J., Ex. 90; 12 Jur. (N.s.) 455; 13 L. T. 715;
14 W. R. 335.
An allotment on 23rd November of shares applied for on 8th June, is not made within a reasonable time. Ib.
Revocation Valid before Acceptance.] Where a defendant offered to purchase a house from the plaintiff, and to give him six weeks for a definite answer :-Held, that before the offer was accepted, the defendant might retract it at any time during the six weeks. Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; 1 M. & P. 717; 3 Car. & P. 267; 6 L. J. (0.8.) C. P. 166; 29 R. R. 672.
The defendant, on the 19th of August, 1853, contracted to purchase of the plaintiff a parcel of chassum waste silk, " to arrive, in all probability, in January and February next; but further particulars will be furnished respecting the name of the ship or ships in the next mail, or on receipt of the next after that." The second mail after the 19th of August arrived in London on the 19th of September; no name of any ship was then communicated to the defendant; and on the 18th of January, 1854, the defendant wrote: "We give you one week from this day's date to give to us the name of the ship which the 20,000 lbs. of chassum are on board; and in default of your compliance with our request, we shall consider the same as a breach of the contract of the 19th of August last." To this the plaintiff replied on the same day: "I am happy to be able to remove the uneasiness you feel respecting the arrival of the 20,000 lbs. ehassum to your contract of 19.8.53, by informing you that it has already arrived, and that you will receive invoice in due course.' On the 19th the defendant wrote: "Your letter of yesterday is not an answer to ours of the same date, which required the name of the ship on which the chassum has been shipped, and this is the information which we now again call for; but as you say the chassum has arrived, there is no occasion for the delay of a week in giving the information which we now ask for in the course of to-morrow; in default of which, we shall act
Two of the plaintiffs were the legal owners of a leasehold interest in a house, and claimed 377. from the defendant for the use and occupation of it during the three last months of their term. They authorised him to pay this amount to another of the plaintiffs, who was owner of the reversion. She called on the defendant, who expressed his willingness to pay her the money, though he did not make any actual tender of it, but she refused to receive it and demanded more. The plaintiffs then sued the defendant for the use and occupation, and claimed 2381. The defendant paid 377. into court :-Held, that as soon as the defendant expressed to the agent his readiness to pay the 371. there was a concluded agreement between him and the plaintiffs for that amount, and that the plaintiffs could not recover more. Gretton v. Mees, 7 Ch. D. 839; 38 L. T. 506; 26 W. R. 607.
Held, also, that the defendant was entitled to the costs of the action from the time of the payment into court. Ib.
Communication of Revocation-Necessity for.] The defendant, being possessed of warrants for iron, wrote from London to the plaintiffs at Middlesborough asking whether they could get him an offer for the warrants. Further correspondence ensued, and ultimately the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs fixing 40s. per ton, nett cash, as the lowest price at which he could sell, and stating that he would hold the offer open till the following Monday. The plaintiffs on the Monday morning at 9.42 telegraphed to the defendant: "Please wire whether you would accept forty for delivery over two months, or if not, longest limit you could give." The defendant sent no answer to this telegram, and after its receipt on the same day he sold the warrants, and at 1.25 P.M. telegraphed to plaintiffs that he had done so. Before the arrival of his telegram to that effect, the plaintiffs having at 1 P.M. found a purchaser for the iron, sent a telegram at 1.34 P.M. to the defendant stating that they had secured his price. The defendant refused to deliver the iron, and thereupon the plaintiffs.
The defendants handed to the plaintiff, at their office in Liverpool, an offer in writing to sell him certain real property in Birkenhead, where he resided. On the following day the plaintiff's solicitor wrote by his direction accepting the offer. After the letter was posted, but before it reached its destination, the plaintiff received through the post a withdrawal of the offer:-Held, that the acceptance was complete before the offer was withdrawn. Ib.
brought an action against him for non-delivery | ance, the acceptance is complete as soon as it is thereof. The jury found at the trial that the posted; but this doctrine does not apply to the relation between the parties was that of buyer revocation or modification of an offer. Henthorn and seller, not of principal and agent. The v. Fraser, 61 L. J., Ch. 373;  2 Ch. 27; 66 state of the iron market was very unsettled at L. T. 439; 40 W. R. 433—C. A. the time of the transaction, and it was impossible to foresee when the plaintiffs' telegram was sent at 9.42 A.M. how prices would range during the day :-Held, that in the circumstances the plaintiffs' telegram at 9.42 ought not to be construed as a rejection of the defendant's offer, but merely as an inquiry whether he would modify the terms of it, and that, although the defendant was at liberty to revoke his offer before the close of the day on Monday, such revocation was not effectual until it reached the plaintiffs; consequently the defendant's offer was still open when the plaintiffs accepted it, and the action was therefore maintainable. Cooke v. Oxley, infra, discussed. Stevenson v. McLean, 49 L. J., Q. B. 701; 5 Q. B. D. 346; 42 L. T. 897; 28 W. R. 916.
By Letter posted before but received after Acceptance.]-An offer of a contract sent by letter cannot be withdrawn by merely posting a subsequent letter which does not, in the ordinary course of the post, arrive until after the first letter has been received and answered. By a letter of the 1st of October the defendants wrote from Cardiff offering goods for sale to the plain- | tiffs at New York. The plaintiffs received the offer on the 11th and accepted it by telegram on the same day, and by letter on the 15th. On the 8th of October the defendants posted to the plaintiffs a letter withdrawing the offer. This letter reached the plaintiffs on the 20th:Held, that the withdrawal was inoperative, a complete contract binding both parties having been entered into on the 11th of October when the plaintiffs accepted the offer of the 1st, which they had no reason to suppose was withdrawn. Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 49 L. J., C. P. 316; 5 C. P. D. 344; 42 L. T. 371; 44 J. P.
Where held Unnecessary.]-A., having proposed to sell goods to B., gave him a certain time at his request to determine whether he would buy them or not; B., within the time, determined to buy them, and gave notice to A. :- Held, that A. was not liable for not delivering them, for B. not being bound by the original contract there was no consideration to bind A. Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term Rep. 653; 1 R. R. 783.
A. and B. being together, B. offered goods to A. at a certain price, and gave A. three days to make up his mind. Before the three days expired B. offered the goods to C. A. cannot declare against B. as upon an absolute bargain. Head v. Diggon, 3 M. & Ry. 97; 7 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 36.
On Wednesday A. signed and delivered to B. a memorandum in these words :-"I hereby agree to sell to B. certain freeholds for 8001." Then followed a postscript, also signed by A. :-" This offer to be left over until Friday, nine o'clock A.M." On Thursday A. entered into a contract to sell the freeholds to C. On Friday morning, before nine o'clock, B., who had become aware that A., had entered into a contract for the sale of the property to C., but had received no notice of such contract from A., handed to him a written acceptance of the offer, which A. refused to receive, saying that the property was already sold. On a bill by B. for specific performance : -Held, that the memorandum signed by A. was a mere offer, which he was entitled to withdraw at any time before acceptance; that it was too late for B. to accept the offer after he had become aware that A. had entered into a contract to sell the property to another person, and that the bill must therefore be dismissed with costs. Dickinson v. Dodds, 45 L. J., Ch. 777; 2 Ch. D. 463; 34 L. T. 607 ; 24 L. T. 594—C. A.
A person to whom a written offer to sell an estate has been made cannot turn the offer into a binding contract by accepting it after he has heard that the person making the offer has sold the property to somebody else, although there has been no formal retractation of the offer. 1b.
M. applied in writing for shares in a company, and forwarded a deposit. After a letter of allotment was posted to M., but before it was received, he became aware of an alteration in the prospectus, and wrote withdrawing his application. Negotiations subsequently took place between M. and the chairman of the company, who was authorised by the directors to arrange a compromise with M., as the result of which an agreement was come to that M.'s name should be removed from the register. A petition to wind up the company was then presented, and a few days afterwards there was a meeting of the company, at which the directors resolved that the allotment of shares to M. should be cancelled :Held, that as M.'s letter of repudiation was not received until after the letter of allotment was posted, M. became a shareholder, but that a binding compromise, releasing him from his contract, had been concluded before the commencement of the winding-up, and that therefore he was not liable to be fixed on the list of contributories. Scottish Petroleum Co., In re, Maclagan's case, 51 L. J., Ch. 841; 46 L. T. 880. Where an offer is made in such circumstances that it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that, according to the Acceptance-Must be Absolute and Unconordinary usages of mankind, the post might be ditional.]-Where letters are produced to prove used as a means of communicating the accept- an agreement, the answer to the written proposal
Contract requires Two Parties.]-A contract requires two parties to it, and a man in one character can with difficulty contract with himself in another character. Collinson v. Lister, 20 Beav. 356.