« EelmineJätka »
Held, (i.) that the complete contract in T.'s articles connected with the inventions, and that letter and D.'s acceptance could not be varied by the covering letter addressed to F. as T.'s agent; (ii.) that, as matter of construction, the covering letter was not intended to make the contract conditional upon H. being the English brokers; and (iii.) that even if such a condition were imported into the contract, it could be waived by D., being one for his benefit only. Maconchy v. Trower,  2 Ir. R. 663.
e. Joint or Several Contracts. Rule of Equity.]-There is no settled rule of equity that a contract which is in terms joint, and would be so construed at law, is to be treated in equity as joint and several. Kendall v. Hamilton, 48 L. J., C. P. 705; 4 App. Cas. 504; 41 L. T. 418; 28 W. R. 97.
Every joint loan, whether contracted in relation to mercantile transactions or not, is in equity to be deemed joint and several; therefore, where four persons had opened a joint account with certain bankers who had advanced to them money on such joint account-Held, that upon the decease of one of the joint contractors, the bankers had a right in equity to immediate relief out of his assets without claiming any relief against the surviving joint contractors, or showing that the latter were unable to pay by reason of their insolvency. Thorpe v. Jackson, 2 Y. & C. 553.
Intention.]-Where it appears upon an instrument that a promise by two contractors is intended to be joint, it may be treated as such although the promise is in terms several only; Lee v. Niron, 3 N. & M. 441; 1 A. & E. 201; 3 L. J., K. B. 160.
Names-Primâ facie Evidence.]-The name in which a contract is made is primâ facie evidence of the party for whom the contract was made, but it is not conclusive; therefore, where two persons sue on a contract between them and their bankers, and it appears at the trial that the bank account was opened in the name of one only, it is competent for the two to prove that the account was opened on behalf of them both; and it is sufficient to maintain the action if it is proved that the one who actually opened the account at the time, intended it to be the account of the two, without shewing that the bankers had, before the action, any notice that he had so intended. Cooke v. Seeley, 2 Ex. 746;
books of account of sale of the inventions should be kept there by the defendant, and be open at all times to the inspection of the parties, and the defendant should pay to the plaintiff 4007. a year, as a consideration for the licence for the sale of the patents, and that such sum should be charged as a payment by the defendant in his books of account; that he should pay a ratable sum on all machines used on his patent principle; that he should also pay the plaintiff a moiety of the net profits to arise from all the inventions (except those in which B. and C. were interested); to the plaintiff and B., two-thirds of the net profits to arise from them; and either of the parties might determine the agreement at the end of five, seven, or ten years. In an action on this agreement, by the plaintiff alone, to recover a half-yearly payment :-Held, that the declaration was bad on the ground of variance, inasmuch as it stated the agreement to be made between the plaintiff and the defendant; whereas there were other parties to it besides the plaintiff, from whom the consideration for the defendant's promise moved as well as from the plaintiff. Chanter v. Leese, 5 M. & W. 698; 9 L. J., Ex. 327-Ex. Ch.
A Spanish firm, C. & Co., authorised the plaintiff, a London merchant, by letter of attorney, to sign in the name of the firm a contract for the sale of their mines in Spain. The plaintiff was to be remunerated by part of the purchasemoney. Two documents were then made beunder the letter of attorney, for and on behalf of tween the plaintiff, "acting for himself, and, C. & Co,, co-proprietors with him of the mines, of the one part," and the defendants of the other part, whereby the plaintiff, "acting for himself and his co-partners, called the vendors," agreed to sell the mines belonging to the vendors to the defendants, and they agreed to buy them. One part was sealed with the defendants' seal: the other signed by the plaintiff "for self and partners":-Held, that C. & Co. were parties, and ought to be joined as plaintiffs in an action on this contract. Jung v. Phosphate of Lime Co., 37 L. J., C. P. 73; L. R. 3 C. P. 139; 17 L. T. 541; 16 W. R. 309.
At a vestry meeting the accounts of the defendant K., a surveyor of highways, were opposed and rejected, on the ground that he had incurred costs in defending appeals without due authority, but in consideration of his offering to pay 501. towards the bill of the attorneys for defending the appeals, a majority in the vestry agreed by a resolution not to oppose the accounts when preAll Parties to Consideration should Sue.]-sented to the magistrates for their approval. Generally, in an action of simple contract all the parties to the consideration should jointly sue. Jones v. Robinson, 1 Ex. 454; 17 L. J., Ex. 36 11 Jur. 933.
17 L. J., Ex. 286.
The sum of 50l. was to be paid by K. to his successor in office. The plaintiff, who was a member of the vestry, and who had signed the resolution, together with the other vestrymen, was appointed successor to K., as surveyor of the highways. The accounts having passed before
501., the plaintiff sued for that sum :-Held, that the other vestrymen should have joined as plaintiffs. Kilham v. Collier, 21 L. J., Q. B. 65 ; 15 Jur. 1175.
By an agreement between the plaintiff and A., B. and C., and the defendant. reciting that the plaintiff had obtained a patent for an improve-the magistrates, and K. having refused to pay the ment in furnaces, and was solely interested in another patent invention; that the plaintiff and A. had obtained a patent for another invention, the plaintiff and B. for another, and the plaintiff and C. for another; it was agreed between the parties, that it should be lawful for the defendant exclusively to use, manufacture, and sell any or all of the patent inventions within certain limits, during the continuance of the several patents, on certain terms: viz. that an office and warehouse should be prepared for the sale of
Semble, that the contract with the vestry was illegal as contrary to public policy. Ib.
Action for Work-Two Persons on Duty when Order given.]-A herald and a pursuivant at arms may maintain a joint action for work in making out a pedigree, both having been on duty
when the order was given, although only one of them was applied to by the defendant. Townsend v. Neale, 2 Camp. 190.
Offer of Reward-Communication afterwards made to another Person.]-A hand-bill relating to a stolen parcel offered a reward of 100l. to "whoever should give such information as should lead to the early apprehension of the guilty parties"-Held, that where the communication was first made by the plaintiff to C. in conversation, but the information was afterwards communicated to a constable jointly by the plaintiff and C., they ought both to have joined in the action. Lockhart v. Barnard, 14 M. & W. 674 ; 15 L. J., Ex. 1 ; 9 Jur. 929.
Acting on behalf of Others-Member of Orchestra.-The plaintiff, acting on behalf of the members of an orchestra to which he himself belonged, signed a proposal "on behalf of the members of the orchestra" to continue their services, provided the defendant would guarantee a certain salary then due to them. The defendant accepted this proposition, but failed to pay the salary due. The plaintiff alone brought an action for the whole money due to himself and the rest, and stated the contract to be with himself and the rest. The jury found that he had acted on behalf of himself as well as the rest-Held, that the contract was joint, and that he alone could not recover. Lucas v. Beale, 20 L. J., C. P. 134; 10 C. B. 739.
Member of Firm.]—Although in an action on a written agreement made by or with one or more members of a firm on behalf of the rest. all the members may be joined, it is otherwise when the agreement is inter partes, and there is no partnership between the person who is party to it on the one side or the other, and the third person whom it sought to join. Robinson v.
Rudkins, 26 L. J., Ex. 56.
A., being in want of money, applied to D. & S., who were in partnership, for an advance. They sent him an acceptance by D. alone; and A. agreed that, if he discounted that acceptance, he would give to D. & S. his own acceptance. He discounted D.'s acceptance, but failed to give his cross acceptance. D. was afterwards sued on his acceptance by the holder of it, and paid it out of the money of D. & S. D. sued A. for money paid :-Held, that the action could be maintained by D. alone, upon an implied contract to indemnify him, which arose when he paid the acceptance, upon which he alone was liable to be Driver v. Burton, 17 Q. B. 989; 21 L.J., Q. B. 157; 16 Jur. 373.
against the defendants jointly upon the following guarantee : "In consideration that you will sell to Mr. F. the distillery situate at, &c., and will take Mr. F.'s acceptance, to be dated 29th of September, 1849, for 4007. (the amount of the purchase-money), and interest, payable at six months after date, we undertake and guarantee that the 400%. and interest shall be duly paid to you when the acceptance arrives at maturity, in the proportion of 2001. each "-Held, that the defendants were severally liable to the plaintiff to the extent of 2001. each. Fell v. Goslin, 7 Ex. 185; 21 L. J., Ex. 145.
Effect of Death on Joint Contract.-A., B., C., D. and E. obtained a concession from, and entered into a contract with, the Egyptian government for the construction of certain works. Before the works had been actually begun, A. died. Doubts existing as to the rights of A.'s trustees and executors (who by his will had the fullest power of management given them, and of other contractors inter se, a contract was, after completing any existing contracts), and the considerable negotiations, drawn up between B., C., D. and E. and “
executors and trustees of
the will of" A., and signed by B., C., D. and E. before the will of A. had been proved. The agreement was that the work should be completed in the joint interests of the survivors and the estate of A. Subsequently one of the executors and trustees renounced and disclaimed, and the others signed the agreement. B., C., D. and E. filed a bill to set aside the agreement for a declaration that the partnership was dissolved by A.'s death, and for winding-up :-Held, first, that the agreement Clean v. Kennard, 43 L. J., Ch. 323; L. R. 9 was binding on all parties. Ch. 336; 30 L. T. 186; 22 W. R. 382.
Held, secondly, that independently of the agreement, the right of A.'s representatives was to have the contract completed, the estate being liable to contribute towards the required capital, and liable for any losses. Ib.
Right of Joint Contractors to sue for what one of them has Sanctioned. ]-Action by A. and two others on a contract, on the deposit of goods by the three with the defendant, not to give them up without the joint order of the three. Breach, that they were given up without such joint order. Plea, that they were given up to A. at his request, is a good plea for A. being disabled from suing for what he himself procured to be done, could not sue, though joining the others with him. Brandon v. Scott, 7 El. & Bl. 334; 26 L. J., Q. B. 163; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 362; 5 W. R. 235.
Alternative or Absolute.]-A declaration alleged that the defendant received certain bills of lading and drafts on the terms that on the acceptance of the latter by B., the former should be delivered to him, that he should present such accepted drafts to B. for payment, and remit to the plaintiff the proceeds if the same should be paid, and if the drafts should not be paid, either return them to the plaintiff, or pay him the amount, for reward to the defendant; that everything happened to entitle the plaintiff to have the drafts returned or the amount paid by the defendant, yet he did not return the drafts, nor did he pay the plaintiff their amount. Judg. ment went by default, and it appeared that the
drafts were of no value :-Held, by Keating, J., | loan, although it could not have been enforced Brett, J., and Grove, J., that, the true construc- until after the expiration of that time. tion of the declaration was that the defendant Per Bramwell, B., under the terms of the conpromised if he did not return the drafts to pay tract there was no power or right in defendants their amount, which was, therefore, recoverable; to repay the money until after an application but per Bovill, C.J., the contract alleged was first made by plaintiff for its repayment. only alternative to return the drafts or pay their amount, and that only the nominal damages arising from the least burdensome alternative were recoverable. Deverill v. Burnell, 42 L. J., C. P. 214; L. R. 8 C. P. 475; 28 L. T. 874.
Alternative or Optional.]-In general, where the contract is in the alternative, the clection is in the party who is to do the first act. Chippendale v. Thurston, 4 Car. & P. 98.
Option with whom-Penalty.]-Under an agreement to perform one of two things, the option is in the person who is to perform; and if one of the two things is prohibited under a penalty, no action will lie for the penalty unti! the party makes his election by performing the prohibited part of the contract. Layton v. Pearce, 1 Dougl. 15.
One Alternative Impossible.]-If an agreement is in the alternative, and one branch of the alternative cannot by law be performed, the party is bound by law to perform the other. Stevens v. Webb, 7 Car. & P. 60.
sideration of the plaintiff consenting to his disA. was in custody on a ca. sa., and, in concharge, B. agreed to pay 351. or to surrender A. to the sheriff; A. on a subsequent day offered to surrender himself to the sheriff, who would not retake him, as the plaintiff had consented to his discharge-Held, that the agreement was absolute for the payment of the 357., and that the other alternative was not satisfied by the offer of the surrender. Ib.
An agreement to do either of two things is not discharged when one of the two things becomes impossible by the act of God. Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1; 26 L. J., Ch. 153; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 34; 5 W. R. 156.
the interest in which was equal in all respects to those held by other shareholders; that A. by forming the company with two unequal classes of shares, had put it out of his power to comply with the one alternative of the contract, and that, therefore, he was bound to perform the other alternative, viz. to pay 1,000l. Studholm v. Mandell (1 Ld. Raym. 279) followed. Mellquham v. Taylor, 63 L. J., Ch. 758;  1 Ch. 53: 8 R. 740; 71 L. T. 484; 43 W. R. 297. Affirmed in C. A., 64 L. J., Ch. 296; 8 R. 750, n.; 71 L. T. 679.
Right to exercise Option, whether Determined -Payment by Cheque.]-On 15th June, 1864, plaintiff advanced 5007. on loan to defendants, In the case of an ordinary memorandum of on terms of an agreement between them of that association, according to which the capital is date, whereby it was agreed that "in considera- divided into shares of equal amount, the interests tion of F.'s making an advance for a period of two of the shareholders are equal in all respects. months, such advance shall be repaid at any Where, therefore, in consideration of the assigntime after the expiration of two months from the ment of a lease, A. agreed to pay B. 1,000l. withdate hereof on the application of the said F., in twelve months, or otherwise transfer to B. and further that the said F.shall have the option the like amount in fully paid-up shares in a comwhile the amount remains unpaid of accepting pany to be formed by A., and the company was paid-up shares in the company, or partly paid- formed by A., with preferred and deferred shares · up shares to the amount, or for such amount-Held, that B. was entitled to receive shares, thereof as the said F. may desire, or of accepting a deposit receipt of 17. per share on 500 shares, or any proportion thereof at his the said F.'s discretion." On 17th November in the same year, in pursuance of a resolution of the company that such advance should be repaid, the secretary of the company sent to plaintiff a cheque on the company's bankers for the amount of the said loan, which cheque the plaintiff immediately returned to the defendants, with a letter dated 17th November, in which he declined to receive the cheque, and applied to have 500 shares in the company allotted to him and a deposit receipt of 17. per share on the same forwarded to him in accordance with the terms of the agreement of 15th June. The defendants refusing to comply with his demand, plaintiff brought an action for damages for breach of contract to allot shares and for money lent, to which defendants, amongst other things, pleaded payment within the meaning of the agreement before plaintiff exercised his option:-Held, that the money advanced by plaintiff remained unpaid on 17th November, the date of his demand for an allotment of shares, inasmuch as the sending of the cheque, which was forthwith returned to plaintiff, did not amount to payment, and therefore plaintiff had a right to exercise an option, and to elect to be repaid by an allotment of shares, which application on his part not having been complied with by defendants, the present action was maintainable, the plea of payment not having been proved. Ferguson v. Washoe Mining Co., 17 L.
Or Illegal.]-If one of the parties to a contract stipulates for the option of performing his part in one of two lawful ways, he is, after having once made his election, bound by such election; and if the performance is impossible, and not illegal, he is liable to damages for not being able to perform it. Brown v. Royal Insurance Society, 1 El. & El. 853; 28 L. J., Q. B. 275; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 1255; 7 W. R. 479.
In an action on a policy of insurance against fire, which contained a condition by which the society reserved to itself the right of reinstatement in preference to the payment of claims, a plea by the company that, having elected to reinstate the insured premises, they were proceeding with the reinstatement, when, by order of the Commissioners of Sewers, lawfully acting in that behalf, the premises were taken down, being in a dangerous condition, such condition not being caused by the fire, and that if the premises had not been so taken down, they would have Per Bramwell and Channell, BB. The plain-proceeded with the reinstatement, and would tiff might have exercised his right of option have restored them to the condition they were within the two months from the date of the in before the fire, is a bad plea. Ib.
Where an agreement is entered into between | no debt accrued from the defendant to B. in B.'s two parties, whereby one of them covenants to lifetime, although the new agreement with A. do one of two specified things, if either of the amounted as between him and the defendant to alternatives is to do an illegal act, the whole a rescission of the original contract, which would agreement is void; but if the condition is to do entitle A. as administrator, to sue on a quantum an act which may be effected either by lawful meruit in respect of the work done by B. Crosor unlawful means, the law will presume in thwaite v. Gardner, 18 Q. B. 640; 21 L. J., Q. B. favour of the contract that the contracting 356; 17 Jur. 377. See further, SALE OF GOODS. parties contemplated the former. Lewis v. Davidsm, 4 M. & W. 654; 1 H. & H. 425; 8 L. J., Ex. 78; 3 Jur. 387.
g. Entire or Divisible.
To Let Milking of Cows.]-A contract by A. to let, and by B. to take, the milking of thirty cows, at 71. 108. per cow per annum, from 14th February, the rent to be paid quarterly in advance, and by C. to pay the rent, is an entire and not divisible contract. Whitcher v. Hall, 8 D. & R. 22; 5
Printing-Damage by Fire.]-Where a printer has been employed to print a work, of which the impression is to be a certain number of copies, if a fire breaks out and consumes the premises before the whole number has been worked off, the printer cannot recover anything, although a part has actually been delivered. Adlard v. Booth, 7 Car. & P. 108. S. P., Gillett v. Mawman, 1 Taunt. 137.
Part Performance with Assent of Both Par
B. & C. 269; 4 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 167; 29 R. R. ties. Although an entire contract is not
To Cure Sheep.]-Where in an action of assumpsit for curing 497 sheep of the scab, it appeared that the plaintiff agreed he should not be paid anything unless he cured all :-Held, that he could not recover, because 40 of the flock were not cured. Bates v. Hudson, 6 D. & R. 3.
Salary-Abandoning Contract.]--The defendant having contracted with the Lords of the Admiralty to provide a steam-vessel for exploring the river Niger, wrote to the plaintiff as follows: I am willing to give you the command of the steamer destined for an exploring and a trading voyage up the river Niger and its tributaries, your pay to be at the rate of 507. per month, commencing from the 1st of December, 1853, and a commission of twenty per cent. on the net proceeds of the produce you may bring down." In reply, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant as follows: "In answer to your letter of yesterday, offering me the command of the vessel to go out in a trading and an exploring voyage to the river Niger and its tributaries, at a fixed pay of 501. per month, and twenty per cent, on the net procods of the goods obtained, I beg leave to say, that I accept the service, and the terms you mention." The vessel proceeded up the Niger, under the command of the plaintiff, as far as Dagbo, when the plaintiff refused to proceed further, and abandoned the command-Held, that this was not an entire contract for the whole voyage, but a contract which gave a cause of action for the salary as each month arose, and which, when once vested, was not subject to be lost or divested by the plaintiff's desertion or abandonment of the contract. Taylor v. Laird, 1 H. & N. 266; 25 L. J., Ex. 329. See Cutter v. Powell, 6 Term Rep. 320; 3 R. R. 185.
Action by Administrator-Completion of Contract.]-A. declared as administrator of B., stating that the defendant in B.'s lifetime was indebted to B. in money to be paid by the defendant to B. on request. It was proved that B., had contracted with the defendant in writing to do certain works for him for 4007., to be paid upon completion of the works. B. died before their completion, and A., before he had taken out letters of administration, agreed with the defendant to complete, and did complete, the works:-Held, that these facts did not support the declaration, inasmuch, as the contract being entire, and the works unfinished at B.'s death,
divisible, and a part-performance cannot therefore be the subject of an action on the contract itself; yet if there be part-performance, with the assent of both parties, an action may be maintained to recover a fair value or reward in respect of that part-performance. Shipton v. Casson, 5 B. & C. 378; 8 D. & R. 130; 4 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 199.
Within Statute of Frauds.]-S. agreed by parol to procure for C., as purchaser, the estate of R., in consideration of C.'s making to S. a lease of a quarry, and of paying to S. the sum, if any, by which the purchase-money of the estate should fall short of a maximum price fixed on:Held, that the contract was indivisible, and being within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, no action could be brought by S. upon it to recover the difference between the purchase money and the maximum price. Sarage v. Canning, Ir. R., 1 C. L. 434; 16 W. R. 133.
"If Remainder are as good as Sample you may send me 30 more "-Less than 30 sent.]See Symes v. Hutley, ante, col. 236.
Validity.]-Where parties have expressed the matter of their agreement in such uncertain or
imperfect terms that it is impossible to ascertain any definite meaning, such agreement is necesL. J., Q. B. 836;  2 Q. B. 478; 67 L. T. sarily void. Baxter, Ex parte, Vince, In re, 61 70; 41 W. R. 138; 9 Morrell, 222-C. A.
In Part.]-An agreement to take a lease of a house if put into thorough repair, and the drawing-rooms "handsomely decorated according to the present style," is too uncertain for a court of equity to enforce. Taylor v. Portington, 7 De G. M. & G. 328; 1 Jur. (N.S.) 1057; 3 Eq. R 781.
"Et cætera"-Effect of.]-Where terms for letting farms provided that all materials required for building proposed to be built, or that might thereafter be built, should be led at the expense of the tenant; that the landlord should drain, the tenant leading tiles; that gates, buildings, "&c.," should be left in repair by the tenant, the landlord finding new gates when required; that the landlord reserved to himself all customary rights and reservations, such as liberty to cut and plant timber, search for and work mines or minerals, "&c.," allowing the tenant
for any reasonable damages:-Held, that these | for the landlord's consent, containing a stipulastipulations did not render the agreement un- tion that the latter sum should not be charged to certain, so as to be incapable of being enforced the purchaser. A deed of assignment, not specispecifically. Parker v. Taswell, 2 De G. & J. fying by whom the sum requisite to obtain the 559; 27 L. J., Ch. 812; 6 W. R. 608. landlord's consent should be borne, having been executed, the purchaser was compelled, by the default of the vendor, to pay it, in order to render his title valid :-Held, that the memorandum was a sufficient note of an agreement by the vendor, collateral with the deed of assignment, and not merged therein, to pay the sum necessary to obtain the landlord's consent to the assignment, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount which he had paid for that purpose from the defendant. Carrigy v. Brock, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 501.
The terms "goodwill, &c.," in a contract for the sale of a foundry, are not so uncertain as alone to prevent a decree for specific performance of it, for the words "et cætera" point to things necessarily connected with, and belonging to, the good-will, and to be defined in the conveyance. Cooper v. Hood, 26 Beav. 293; 28 L. J., Ch. 212; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 1266; 7 W. R. 81.
Specific performance of an agreement to purchase one-third of a foundry refused, on the ground of uncertainty, the contract not specifying what portion of the purchase-money was to be left in the business, but only a large portion, and not stating when it was to be paid, or how to be secured, and what interest was to be allowed in the meanwhile. Ib.
Promise to do Act-If Horse Lucky.] A. bought a horse from B., and promised that "if the horse was lucky to him he would give 5l. more, or the buying of another horse." It was held that such a promise was too vague to be considered in a court of law. See Guthing v. Lynn, 2 B. & Ad. 232.
To establish Trust-On Conveyance of Realty.] -L. agreed by parol with W. for a conveyance of a life interest in real estate, part of which, a cottage, was in his own occupation. The terms were, that W. should be repaid the purchase money and interests out of the rent, and should allow L. to continue to occupy the cottage. G. swore that this was the effect of the parol arrangement, but two other witnesses swore that they A short time after this had heard W. deny it. agreement, W. asked L. to execute an absolute conveyance of the same life interest to W.'s daughter, an infant, which L. accordingly did, "For such Remuneration as should be and W. entered into possession of the property, Deemed Right."]—A. agreed with B. to do certain leaving the cottage in L.'s possession, rent free. services for such remuneration as should be W. wrote letters afterwards to G. and to J., deemed right-Held, that there was no promise saying that he had bought the property out and that A. should receive anything, nor any engage-out, and offered L. an annuity for life if he would ment capable of enforcement. See Taylor v. Brewer, 1 M. & S. 290.
“So far as the Law Allows."]-A. covenanted with B. to retire from a trade "so far as the law allows." It was held that the parties must fix the limit of their covenant and not leave the Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. D.
court to do so. 359.
2. PAROL EVIDENCE.
give up possession of the cottage. W., by will, devised his real estate to his daughter, and apPointed B. his executor, and her guardian. B. made L. an offer of the annuity on the same terms as W. had done, but the offer was refused. Thereupon B., as the next friend of W.'s daughter, brought ejectment against L., who filed a bill to restrain it, alleging the parol agreement, and praying an injunction to stay the action, and a re-conveyance of the property on payment of To establish Collateral Parol Contract.]-A what was due :-Held, that evidence of the parol tenant entered on lands on the understanding agreement was admissible notwithstanding the that a lease should be signed at a future time. Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), and a decree When the lease was presented to him for signa-made declaring the daughter of W. to be a ture he refused to sign unless the landlord would undertake to destroy the rabbits. This the landlord by word of mouth promised to do, and the tenant thereupon signed. The lease contained a clause by which the tenant agreed not to shoot, hunt, or sport on the land, or destroy any game, but to use his best endeavours for the preservation of the same, and to allow his landlord or friends at any time to hunt, shoot, and sport on the land. In an action by the tenant against the landlord, for breach of agreement in not destroying the rabbits:-Held, that this agreement was collateral to, and did not alter or vary the written contract, aud that therefore evidence of such agreement was admissible. Morgan v. Griffith, 40 L. J., Ex. 46; L. R. 6 Ex. 70; 23 L. T. 783; 19 W. R. 957.
On the sale by auction of a lease, containing a covenant against alienation without the consent of the lessor, the auctioneer announced that the landlord would give his consent for a certain sum, then mentioned, which the vendor verbally agreed to pay; and the auctioneer, on the day of the sale, signed and delivered to the purchaser a memorandum of the names of the vendor and purchaser, the price and the amount to be paid
trustee for L., who was entitled to redeem on payment of what was due. Lincoln v. Wright, 21 L. J., Ch. 705. S. P., Haigh v. Kaye, 41 L. J., Ch. 567; L. R. 7 Ch. 469; 26 L. T. 675; 20 W. R. 597.
On Assignment of Leaseholds.]-Marborough (Duke), In re, Davis v. Whitehead, 63 L. J., Ch. 471;  2 Ch. 133; 70 L. T. 314; 42 W. R. 456.
Part Written, part Oral.]—A., having entered into a contract for supply of iron rails for Vera Cruz, applied to B. & Co., shipowners and brokers, to procure vessels to carry it thither; whereupon B. & Co. on the 19th of November wrote to A. :
We engage to find tonnage for about 5,000 tons of rails to load at M. for Vera Cruz, subject to the following conditions, viz. 1,000 tons to be delivered at Vera Cruz in three months from this time, and 1,000 tons per month afterwards." After a long correspondence and several interviews as to the class of vessels to be chartered, and the flag, B. & Co. on the 11th of December, wrote to A. as follows: "Our engagement to procure tonnage for Vera Cruz, in the letter addressed to your Mr. B. on the 19th November ;