« EelmineJätka »
in writing of the terms of a contract. Chinnock v. Ely (Marchioness), 4 De G. J. & S. 638; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 329; 12 L. T. 251; 13 W. R.
Held, secondly, that the letter of the solicitor to the intended purchaser was no recognition of the fact that there had been a complete sale, and did not amount to an acceptance of the terms stated by the intended purchaser in his letter to the agent, but merely to either a conditional acceptance of the intended purchaser's terms, subject to a draft contract being agreed to, or an expression of unwillingness to continue the interrupted negotiation, and for that purpose to prepare a form of agreement. 1b.
Name in Body of Instrument.] The secretary of a company entered into a contract with the plaintiff, on behalf of the company, to supply them with coals. The contract was made out by the secretary, approved of by the company, and transmitted to the plaintiff, and by him altered and returned; and the alterations having been assented to by the company, a fair copy of the agreement was finally made by the secretary, and sent again to the plaintiff. The agreement contained in the body of it the names of all the parties to be charged, and, at its foot, the clause In witness whereof we have hereto set our hands," &c., but it was never signed by any one. The contract had been acted upon by both parties, until it was violated by the defendant:
Held, thirdly, that if the letter of the solicitor of the intended purchaser had had the effect-Held, that the plaintiff could not sue upon it, which the court decided that it had not, it would not have been binding on the intended vendor, as being beyond the authority vested by her in her solicitor. Ib.
At a sale of land by auction on the 9th of May, 1872, premises were knocked down to the defendant. An agreement as to the contract was attached to the conditions of sale, and signed by the plaintiff, but not by the defendant, in consequence of his being too drunk to sign. On the 10th of May the defendant's solicitor, after seeing the defendant, wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor a letter to the following effect "I have been instructed by Mr. Baxter (the defendant) to prepare his title to the property which he purchased last evening. My client proposes to take possession forthwith if the vendor will consider such taking possession as without prejudice to his right to object to the title. Please send me the abstract of title and copy conditions when ready":-Held, that the letter was not a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, s. 4. Matthews v. Baxter, 28 L. T. 669; 21 W. R. 741.
W. entered into a verbal agreement with S. to sell him an inn called the "Lion Inn" for 9501. On the following day W.'s solicitor wrote to S.'s solicitor: "W. has been with us to-day, and stated that he had arranged with your client S. for the sale to the latter of the Lion Inn' for 950l. We therefore send herewith draft contract for your perusal and approval" :-Held, that this letter was not such a note or memorandum of an agreement as is required by the Statute of Frauds. Smith v. Webster, 45 L. J.. Ch. 528; 3 Ch. D. 49; 35 L. T. 44; 24 W. R.
Essential.]-There must be a signing, either by an actual signature of the name, or something intended by the writer to be equivalent to a signature; such as a mark by a marksman. Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2; 17 R. Ř. 1.
Position of.]-Provided the name is inserted in an instrument, in such a manner as to have the effect of authenticating it, the requisition of the act with respect to signature is complied with and it does not matter in what part of the instrument the name is found. Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 53; 17 R. R. 13.
as it was not signed in pursuance of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. Hubert or Herbert v. Turner, 4 Scott (N.R.) 486; 3 Man. & G. 743; Car. & M. 351; 11 L. J., C. P. 78; 6 Jur. 194.
The names in the body of the document are inserted there of necessity, to make the document sensible, and cannot be used over again to satisfy the requirements of the statute, that there shall be a signature by the parties to be charged or their agents.-Per Tindal, C.J. Ib.
The mere circumstance of the name of a party being written by himself in the body of a memorandum of agreement will not of itself constitute a signature. It must be inserted in such a manner as to govern, or to have the effect of authenticating, the whole instrument. Caton v. Caton, 36 L. J., Ch. 886; L. R. 2 H. L. 127; 16 W. R. 1.
The mere circumstance of the name of the party being written by himself in the body of a memorandum of agreement for a lease will not constitute a signature within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219; 1 R. R. 24.
"I, A. B., agree."]-An agreement in the handwriting of the party, beginning “I, A. B., agree to sell," though not signed by the vendor, is good within the Statute of Frau s. Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp. 189; 5 R. R. 729. See Hubert v. Turner, supra.
In Third Person.]-J. R. Bridges, having five freehold houses, but no other property, in Cable Street, Liverpool, agreed to sell them to J. Bleakley for 2487., and thereupon drew up the following memorandum in his own handwriting: "July 26, 1839. John Bleakley agrees with J. R. Bridges to take the property in Cable Street for 2487. 10s." :-Held, that the agreement was sufficiently signed by the vendor. Bleakley v. Smith, 11 Sim. 150.
If the defendant himself writes the agreement for the purchase of a leasehold house, and states his own name in the third person as “ Mr. A. B. has agreed." this is a good contract within the Statute of Frauds, though he does not otherwise sign the agreement. Propert v. Parker, 1 Russ, & M. 625.
Whether a note written in the third person, "Mr. T. proposes," &c. (making an offer to The signature must be inserted in such a purchase), being accepted, amounts to a contract manner as to govern or have the effect of authen-in writing signed within the Statute of Frauds, icating the whole instrument. Caton v. Caton, quære. Morison v. Turnour, 18 Ves. 175. 36 L. J., Ch. 886; L. R. 2 H. L. 127; 16
W. R. 1.
Initials.]-Semble, that a signature by initials
to a contract or a memorandum is sufficient. Chichester v. Cobb, 14 L. T. 433.
An agreement between an author and a bookseller, by which the latter is to be paid an annuity for life, without any apparent consideration, and without any signature other than the initials of the parties, is void under the Statute of Frauds. Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & G. 452; 4 Scott (N.R.) 77; 5 Jur. 1134.
Illiterate Person making Mark.]-An agreement annexed to conditions of sale by auction to which D., an illiterate person, had put his mark is sufficiently signed within the statute. Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. R. Ir. 590. Affirmned, 9 L. R. Ir. 520-C. A.
There must be a signing, either by an actual signature of the name, or something intended by the writer to be equivalent to a signature; as a Inark by a marksman. Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2;
17 R. R. 1.
"Your Affectionate Mother."]-A letter from a mother to her son, beginning "My dear Robert," and concluding "Your affectionate mother," is not signed so as to constitute a binding agreement on the part of the mother," within the intent of the Statute of Frauds.
"Approved by me, J. 8."]—Quære, whether the words "approved by me, J. S.," affixed to certain memoranda, by way of approval of an arrangement in which the party is interested, is a signing within the Statute of Frauds. Parker v. Smith, 1 Coll. 608.
Alteration of Draft.]—A. alters the draft with his own hand; this is not a signing to take it out of the Statute of Frauds, though the seller afterwards executes a conveyance, and being in Middlesex it is caused to be registered. Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. W. 770.
Acting on Unsigned Agreement.]-Acting on an unsigned agreement may render it binding. Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry., 2 App. Cas. 666. S. P., Liverpool Borough Bank v. Eccles, 4 H. & N. 139; 28 L. J., Ex. 122; Barber v. Allen, H. & N. 61; 2. L. J., Ex. 100; 6 Jur. (N.s.) 23 ; 1 L. T. 167; 8 W. R. 127.
Reference Incorporating ]-A parent by his agent, on the marriage of his daughter, entered into an engagement in writing with her intended husband, in which his name was written, but not signed-Held, that a letter written by the parent after the marriage, referring to the memorandum as stating the terms of the engagement, was either a sufficient agreement, signed by the party within the Statute of Frauds, or a sufficient recognition of the use made of his name in the memorandum. De Bert v. Thompson, 3 Beav. 471; 12 Cl. & F. 45.
Though an agreement is not signed, the party is bound by a letter containing the terms, which by the contents can be connected and identified with the agreement. Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 250; 1 Smith, 233; 7 R. R. 167.
menced thus: "I had quite omitted to tell you," but it contained no other reference to the letter, and the letter in no way referred to it. It was alleged that the "supplement" contained declaration of trust of the land in favour of the infant :-Held, that the "supplement" was not signed so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Kronheim v. Johnson, 47 L. J., Ch. 132; 7 Ch. D. 60; 37 L. T. 751; 26 W. R. 142.
You cannot by words of reference bring up a signature, and give it a signification and effect different from that which the signature has in the original place where it is found. Caton v. Caton, 36 L. J., Ch. 886; L. R. 2 H. L. 127; 16 W. R. 1.
Where, therefore, the name of the party against whom specific performance in equity was sought to be enforced appeared in different parts of the paper, but only in such a way that, in each case, it merely referred to the particular part where it was found, and that part was in the form of reference or description, and not of a promise or an undertaking :-Held, that the paper did not constitute a contract signed within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. Ib.
Contract for land within s. 4 of Statute of Frauds, by letter signed by vendor combined with his proposal by note to third person specifying price. Western v. Russell, 3 Ves. & B. 187; 13 R. R. 178.
Printed.]-A letter containing proposed terms of a contract between A. B., the sender, and the sendee, written out by the sender, upon paper bearing a printed heading," Memorandum from A. B.," was held to be a sufficient note in writing to charge A. B. A memorandum of a contract is sufficiently signed within s. 4 of the Statute of and the name of the party charged, and is given by him to the other party under circumstances which show a recognition of the name as it stands for his own. Tourret v. Cripps, 48 L. J., Ch. 567; 27 W. R. 706.
Frauds if it contains the terms of the contract
Semble, that the name of the auctioneer printed on the back of the particulars and conditions of sale is sufficient to bind the vendor. Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. R. Ir. 590. Affirmed, L. R. Ir. 520—C. A.
Pencil-Condition.]-On the treaty for the under-lease of a house, the agent for plaintiff tendered an unconditional agreement to be signed, to which the defendant attached his name and initials in pencil, subject to the condition of there being nothing unusual in the covenants of the original lease. The defendant subsequently discovered that there was a nuisance which would prevent his occupation of the house, but which was unknown to the plaintiff, and he therefore abandoned the treaty-Held, that under these circumstances the court would try the case strictly between the parties, and in the absence of actual evidence that the agent had direct or implied authority to accede to the pencil additions, would not bind the plaintiff, and that until the latter had assented to the alterations, the agreement was only a proposal and might be abandoned by the defendant. The bill was dismissed with costs. Lucas v. James, 7 Hare, 410; 18 L. J. Ch. 329; 13 Jur. 912.
The absolute beneficial owner of land vested in a trustee wrote a letter to the mother of her infant grandson. The letter was signed with the writer's initials. Inclosed in the same envelope, but on a separate piece of paper, was another document in the handwriting of the same person, and headed " 'Supplement." This document was not signed in any way. It com- On Telegram Form. ]-A., by letter, offered to
buy an estate for a given sum. B. answered by bound is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of telegram, "Your offer for the L. estate is Frauds so as to enable the court to enforce accepted." The instructions for the message specific performance. Field v. Boland, 1 Dr. & were signed by B., but the telegram received by Wal. 37. A. contained merely the names of the sender and receiver written by the company's clerk on the usual printed form :-Held, that this was a sufficient signature by B. Godwin v. Francis, 39 L. J., C. P. 121 ; L. R. 5 C. P. 295; 22 L. T. 338.
There is no provision in the Statute of Frauds to prevent the specific execution of an agreement signed only by one of the parties. Ormond v. Anderson, 2 Ball & B. 370; 12 R. R. 103.
An agreement signed by one party only is sufficient to charge him within Statute of Frauds. Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265; 6 R. R. 124.
Contract for the purchase of tithes not signed by the party chargeable :-Held, under the circumstances, to have been taken out of the Statute of Frauds. Blachford v. Kirkpatrick, 6 Beav. 232; 12 L. J., Ch. 108.
A. sold houses to B., and a note was made by A. of the agreement, but it was only signed by B. Decreed, that both parties were bound. Hatton v. Gray, 2 Ch. Ca. 164.
B. having entered into a contract with C., the brother of the defendant, for the sale of hay, brought an action against the defendant for not accepting. The judge at the trial admitted letters and telegrams signed by C. as evidence against the defendant, and the jury found for the plaintiff :-Held, that there was sufficient evidence of the authority, and that the two telegrams, of which one was sigued in C.'s name, and in the other the name of the defendant was not mentioned as buyer, together con- Agreement in writing for sale of estate, bindstituted a sufficient memorandum of the contracting, though signed only by vendor, and followed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, on the ground up by direction to attorney to prepare proper that the defendant might be treated as the un- agreement for both parties to sign. Fonele v. disclosed principal of C., who appeared on the Freeman, 9 Ves. 351; 7 R. R. 219. telegrams to be liable as principal. Mc Blain v. Cross, 25 L. T. 804.
Purpose of.]-A signature to a document which contains the terms of a contract is available for the purpose of satisfying s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, though put alio intuitu, and not in order to attest or verify the contract. Jones v. Victoria Dock Co., 46 L. J., Q. B. 219; 2 Q. B. D. 314; 36 L. T. 347; 25 W. R. 501; and see Eley v. Positive Government, &c., Co., 45 L. J., Ex. 451; 1 Ex. D. 20, 88; 34 L. T. 190.
As Witness.]-Where there is a complete agreement in writing, and a person who is a party and knows the contents subscribes as a witness only, he is bound by it, for it is a signing within the Statute of Frauds. Welford v. Beazley, 3 Atk. 503.
By Clerk.] A signature by an auctioneer's clerk, in the character of witness merely, to a contract for the sale of property which is signed by the purchaser alone, is not a sufficient signing of an agreement or memorandum, or note thereof, by an agent of the seller, to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Gosbell v. Archer, 4 N. & M. 485 ; 2 A. & E. 500; 1 H. & W. 31; 4 L. J., K. B. 78.
Of one Party.]-A written proposal containing the terms of a proposed contract signed by the defendant and assented to by the plaintiff by parol is a sufficient agreement within the 4th section. Smith v. Neale, 2 C. B. (N.S.) 67; 26 L. J., C. P. 143; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 516; 5 W. R. 563. S. P., Reuss v. Picksley, 4 H. & C. 588; 35 L. J., Ex. 218; L. R. 1 Ex. 342; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 628; 15 L. T. 25; 14 W. R. 924 -Ex. Ch.
A contract of purchase (of leasehold property sold by auction) written on the back of the particulars of sale (which contained the names of the owners of the property), and signed by the purchaser only, is a sufficient note or memorandum of the agreement between the parties; the vendor's signature is not essential. Laythorpe v. Bryant, Scott, 238; 2 Bing. (N.C.) 735; 2 Hodges, 25; 5 L. J., C. P. 217.
Semble, the signature of the party to be
Agreements signed by one party only, enforced against the other. Hall v. Butler, 1 Eq. Abr.
An agreement may be enforced in equity, although not binding on both parties at the time of its being signed; it is sufficient if signed only by one party and accepted and acted on by the other. Dowel! v. Dew, 1 Y. & Coll. C. C. 344; 12 L. J., Ch. 158; 7 Jur. 117.
Specific performance of a contract, not signed by the party enforcing it. Backhouse v. Mohun, 3 Swanst. 434; 19 R. R. 252.
The written undertaking of one party will be enforced, although the other party is not mutually bound by writing. Palmer v. Scott, 1 Russ. & M. 391; Taml. 488; 8 L. J. (0.s.) Ch. 127.
Quære, whether, where a contract signed by one party only, he is not at liberty to recede from it till the other party has done some act to bind himself. Martin v. Mitchell, 2 J. & W. 428; 22 R. R. 184.
Semble, a contract signed by one party only, may be enforced by the other, as the filing a bill makes it binding on that party. Ib. 426.
Semble, under contract by husband and wife for sale of wife's estate, court will not decree him to procure her to join. Ib. 425.
If a written agreement is not signed by the defendant, the plaintiff need not give it in evidence, although he has signed it, and it relates to the matter in issue between the parties. Wilson v. Bowie, 1 Car. & P. 8.
Variance between Memorandum and Counterpart.]-The memorandum of a contract for sale of land was signed in counterpart, one copy being signed by V. and Son, as agents for" C. C., who was the vendor's solicitor. The other copy was duly signed on behalf of the purchaser :-Held, that the latter being a complete memorandum as against the purchaser, the defect in the former was no bar to the vendor's suing for specific performance. Butcher v. Nash, 61 L. T. 72.
Of Agent.]-Specific performance of a contract concerning land, not decreed on the signature of an agent without authority. Howard v. Braithwaite, 1 Ves. & B. 202.
A contract for the purchase of land made by an agent in his own name, vests the equitable estate in the principal, and may be established by him against the agent and persons claiming under him, although the agent is appointed merely by parol. Cire v. Mackenzie, 46 L. J., Ch. 564; 37 L. T. 218.
An agent not being able to write, held the top | 1862, was signed as follows:-" A., secretary of the pen while another person wrote his name for the B. Company, Limited." The Companies to an agreement :-Held, a sufficient signature. Act, 1867, s. 37, sub-s. 2, provides that such an Helshaw v. Langley, 11 L. J., Ch. 17. agreement may be signed on behalf of the company by any person acting under the express or implied authority of the company. By the memorandum of association it appeared that one of the objects of the company was to sell houses :-Held, that as selling houses was part of the ordinary business of the company, the secretary in signing was acting under the implied authority of the company; and that, therefore, the agreement was sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Beer v. London and Paris Hotel Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 412; 32 L. T. 715.
The plaintiffs appointed by parol W. F. M. as their agent to purchase land on their behalf. W. F. M. entered into a contract for the purchase of the land in his own name, and then assigned the benefit of the contract to J. T. M. for valuable consideration. In an action by the plaintiffs against W. F. M. and J. T. M. to establish the agency, the vendor not being a party-Held, that the appointment of W. F. M. was an agency within s. of the Statute of Frauds, and not a trust or confidence within s. 7, and therefore was not required to be evidenced by writing. Ib.
The defendant, an estate agent, contracted to sell land to the plaintiff, who paid a deposit. The defendant signed a receipt in his own name for the deposit, and the plaintiff signed an agreement containing the terms of the purchase. The owner of the land refused to complete the purchase, and the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for breach of the contract to sell. At the trial the jury found that the defendant sold as principal:-Held, that the defendant was personally liable, and that the agreement and receipt taken together formed a sufficient contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, s. 4. Long v. Millar, 48 L. J., C. P. 596; 4 C. P. D. 450; 41 L. T. 306; 27 W. R. 720-C. A.
Agent's Clerk.]-Vendor is bound by signature of agent's clerk, thus: "Witness E. P. for Mr. S. agent for the seller," upon evidence of assent; but clerks in general have no authority to bind the principal. Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234; 1 Smith, 233; 7 R. R. 167.
Auctioneer's Clerk.]-A direction by the purchaser at a sale of lands by auction to the auctioneer's clerk to fill up the memorandum annexed to the conditions of sale constitutes such clerk a person "lawfully authorised within the meaning of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and such memorandum so filled up by the auctioneer's clerk with the name of the purchaser, although not signed by the latter, complies with the requirements of the statute." Sims v. Landray, 63 L. J., Ch. 535;  2 Ch. 318; 8 R. 582; 70 L. T. 530; 42 W. R. 621. And see Dyas v. Stafford, 7 L. R. Ir. 590. Affirmed, 9 L. R. Ir. 520.
d. Promise of Executor or Administrator. See EXECUTOR.
See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
Agreement in consideration of Marriage.
Clerk.-H., head clerk to the defendants, drew up with their authority a letter addressede. Debt, Default, or Miscarriage of Another. to them, and containing the terms upon which the plaintiff was to serve them for three years. The plaintiff signed the letter:-Held, that the f. letter constituted a sufficient compliance with the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, being a memorandum of the contract signed by the agent of the defendants. Evans v. Hoare, 61 L. J., Q. B. 470;  1 Q. B. 593; 66 L. T. 345; 40 W. R. 442; 56 J. P. 664.
Solicitor. Quære, whether the signature of an attorney to a statement at the foot of a draft agreement, signifying his approval of the draft on behalf of his client, is a signature within the Statute of Frauds. Thornbury v. Bevill, 1 Y. & Coll. C. C. 554; 6 Jur. 407.
A person who was in treaty for taking the lease of a house, stated in a letter to the owner, that he had authorised his solicitors to settle the terms of the agreement. They subsequently sent the owner a draft agreement signed by them stating that its provisions were approved by their client, who afterwards refused to sign or acknowledge it:-Held, in a suit for specific performance, that the solicitors were agents in what they did and that a defence under the Statute of Frauds failed. Jolliffe v. Blumberg, 18 W. R. 784.
Secretary of Company.]-An agreement for the sale of leasehold houses, the property of a company incorporated under the Companies Act,
What is.]-M. had given a bond and warrant of attorney to secure the repayment of a sum of money. Judgment had been entered up, but not executed; the bond and warrant of attorney came into the possession of L., as personal representative of the original obligee. She was on terms of affectionate friendship with M., and often said that he had been unfairly treated, in being made to enter into these securities. L. had in early life received from the father of M. a conveyance of some property in India; the deed of conveyance was expressed to be for a money consideration of 10,000 rupees. In truth, the money consideration was, if any, a debt of 1,200 rupees; the rest was a purely voluntary gift, and no money whatever passed when the conveyance was executed. M. was about to marry, and when his marriage was in contemplation, discussions arose about the bond and warrant of attorney. M.'s father had told L. that he was advised, if she did not abandon the claim on the bond and warrant of attorney against his son, to execute a deed, which would put an end to the conveyance of this Indian property as a voluntary conveyance made without consideration. In his depositions he said that L. promised not to enforce the bond and warrant of attorney, if he would abstain from interfering with the con
veyance. Other evidence was given of directions by her, that she had abandoned the claim, and of a promise, often repeated, that she would never trouble M. about it :-Held, that this promise, if it constituted a contract, was not a contract made in consideration of marriage, so as to bring it within the words of the Statute of Frauds. Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185; 23 L. J., Ch. 865.
Promise to Confer Benefit by Will.]—Prior to a marriage the intended husband and wife caused a settlement of the wife's property to be prepared in accordance with a memorandum in the husband's handwriting; but before its execution the husband verbally promised the wife that if she would forego the settlement he would give her the same benefits by his will. In accordance with this promise, he, immediately after the marriage, executed a will to that effect prepared before the marriage. Upon his death, some years afterwards, that will was not forthcoming, but a later will was found disposing of the property in a different manner:-Held, that there was no contract within the Statute of Frauds binding the husband to make a will, or any fraud or part performance to take the case out of the statute. Caton v. Caton, 35 L. J., Ch. 292; L. R. 1 Ch. 137; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 171. Affirmed on appeal, 36 L. J., Ch. 886; L. R. 2 H. L. 127; 16 W. R. 1.
P. V., shortly before his marriage with the plaintiff, wrote her a letter, in which occurred the following passage: "And now, my dearest Lizzie, as life is very uncertain at my time of life, and as you are of all the world the person I love best, I hereby will and bequeath to you, after my death, the eight cottages in Peckham's Walk, occupied by Charles Warren and Edward Neath and others. You will keep this letter as a proof of my intention, in case of any sudden change occurring to me, rendering me incapable of, or not in a state of mind fit for, the performance of so important a document, and making null and void any former will and bequest I may have made previously. I am doing this, my dearest, as a temporary provision for you in case of any emergency . . . I am your future husband in its most holy sense.-P. V." Another part of the will contained a reference to the wedding-ring, of which the plaintiff then apparently had the custody. After the marriage P. V. died, leaving a will whereof the defendants were executors and trustees. By this will the eight cottages were not left to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that P. V. duly contracted with her to leave to or to settle upon her the eight cottages, and that by virtue of the letter the plaintiff was entitled to them in equity. The court held that the letter did not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds with respect to a memorandum, either as to the statement of consideration or a promise:-Held, on appeal, that no contract had been intended, that the writer had mistakenly thought that he was making a gift, and that the judgment must be affirmed. Vincent v. Vincent, 56 L. T. 243—C. A.
Memoranda Sufficient.]-A written memorandum after marriage of a prior agreement is sufficient within the 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4. Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1; 26 L. J., Ch. 153; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 34; 5 W. R. 156.
subsequent to the marriage, authorising the husband to draw for interest due on a bond which was never executed, cannot prevail as evidence of a promise, which, if subsequent to the marriage, is void as nudum pactum. Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 67; 8 R. R. 289.
Part Performance.]-See infra. And see HUSBAND AND WIFE.
g. Interest in Lands.
Agreement for Lease-In Consideration of Share of Crops.]-A. agreed with B. to let him land rent free on condition that A. should have a moiety of the crops: such an agreement need not be in writing. Poulter v. Killingbrick, 1 Bos. & P. 397. See Waddington v. Bristow, 2 Bos. & P. 452; (N.R.) 355.
Contract to Let Dock.]-A corporation, being the owner of a graving dock, issued regulations for its use, that the dock would "be let to parties requiring the same for the repair of vessels at certain rates; that a book would be kept by the borough treasurer for the entering of the names of vessels intended for repair, and that as far as practicable priority would be given to vessels in the order of entry. A sum of three guineas was to be paid to the borough treasurer on entering each vessel, which "entrance money, and the right of turn for the use of the dock." were to be forfeited if the vessel did not take her turn at the specified time; and the corporation was to have a lien for dockage upon the vessel, with a power to detain the vessel for the same. In an action by a shipowner against the corporation for not allowing his vessel, for which the entrance fee had been paid, to enter such dock in her turn, according to these regulations :
Held, that the contract for the use of the dock did not amount to an interest in land within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and that it Wells v. did not require to be under seal. Kingston-upon-Hull Corporation, 44 L. J., C. P. 257; L. R. 10 C. P. 402; 32 L. T. 615; 23 W. R. 562.
To Let Furnished Lodgings.]—A contract to let furnished lodgings is a contract for an interest in land. Edge v. Strafford, 1 C. & J. 391; 1 Tyr. 293. S. P., Inman v. Stamp, 1 Stark. 12; 18 R. R. 740.
Secus, as to board and lodgings. Wright v. Stavert, 2 El. & El. 721; 29 L. J., Q. B. 161; 8 W. R. 413.
Contract to Procure Assignment of Lease.]— A contract to procure for a person the assignment of a lease of a house is a contract for an interest in or concerning land within the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 4, and must therefore be in writing, although it is made by one who has not the lease himself, or any interest under it. Horsey v. Graham, 39 L. J., C. P. 58; L. R. 5 C. P. 9; 21 L. T. 530; 18 W. R. 141.
Agreement as to Improvements.]—A landlord, who had demised premises for a term of years at 50l. a year, agreed with his tenant to lay out 507. in making certain improvements upon them, the tenant undertaking to pay him an increased rent of 51. a year during the remainder of the term Subsequent to Marriage-Evidence.]—A letter (of which several years were unexpired), to com