mence from the quarter preceding the completion | by which he authorised and requested the tenant, of the work-Held, that the landlord, having done the work, might recover arrears of the 57. a year against the tenant, though the agreement had not been signed by either party; for that it was not a contract for any interest in or concerning lands within the statute; nor was it, according to that statute, an agreement "not to be performed within one year from the making there," no time being fixed for the performance on the part of the landlord. Donellan v. Read, | 3 B. & Ad. 899; 1 L. J., K. B. 269. In consideration that A., who was tenant of premises under a parol agreement for a seven years' lease, would give up immediate possession to B., in order that B. might enter thereon as tenant, and also as a compensation for improvements made by A. on the premises, and for the value of articles left thereon by A., B. agreed to pay A. 100Z. A. accordingly relinquished and gave up possession of the premises to B., who was thereupon accepted as tenant from year to year, at a different rent from that formerly paid by A., and B. afterwards in part performance of the agreement on his part paid A. 51. In an action by A. to recover the balance of the 1007. :Held, that the contract, in respect of which he sued, was not a contract for the sale of an interest in or concerning lands. Kelly v. Webster, 12 C. B. 283; 21 L. J., C. P. 163; 16 Jur. 838. Agreement as to Alterations.]-The plaintiffs agreed in writing with the defendant to let him a public-house from year to year, with an option for him to call on them to grant him a lease for twenty-eight years, and a stipulation that if he sold such lease for more than 1,2007. he should give the plaintiffs half the difference. The plaintiffs subsequently granted him a lease differing from that agreed to be granted in the following particulars :-It was for thirty-two years instead of twenty-eight. The rent was 1057. instead of 1007. The premium was 8007. instead of 1,2007. There was no covenant as had been agreed, against assignment without the lessor's consent, nor binding the lessee to take his beer of the plaintiffs. Some other covenants burthensome on the defendant which had been agreed for were omitted. These alterations were arranged by parol only. The defendant sold the lease for 2,500l. The plaintiffs sued upon the agreement for half the difference between that sum and 1,2001. The jury found that the stipulation as to dividing the surplus remained in force or was renewed:-Held, that the effect of the alteration of the original terms agreed upon between the parties was that the old agreement was dissolved, and a new one made incorporating such parts of the old agreement as the parties did not choose to alter; and that as such new agreement related to land, and was not in writing within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, it could not be enforced by action. Sanderson v. Graves, 44 L. J., Ex. 210; L. R. 10 Ex. 234; 33 L. T. 269; 23 W. R. 797. Agreement to Repay Loan out of Rent.]-A customer, in July, borrowed 2007. from his bankers upon the terms of a verbal agreement that the loan should be repaid out of the rent of a farm which would become due to him at Michaelmas. The money was advanced by the bankers, and the customer then gave them a letter addressed by him to the tenant of the farm, when his Michaelmas rent became due, to pay 2007. to the bankers. The letter contained no reference to the loan, and did not show that any consideration had been given for the authority. The bankers sent the letter to the tenant. The customer was adjudicated a bankrupt upon an act of bankruptcy committed in August :-Held, that as the rent was an interest in land, the agreement was one which by virtue of s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, could not be proved by parol evidence, and that, therefore, the letter could alone be looked at. And that the letter amounted only to a revocable authority to pay the rent to the bankers, and that it was revoked by the bankruptcy. Hall, Ex parte, Whiting, În re, 48 L. J., Bk. 79; 10 Ch. D. 615; 40 L. T. 179; 27 W. R. 385—C. A. Contract to Furnish.]-An agreement by which A., in consideration of B. hiring a house for him, agrees to furnish the same house, relates to an interest in land, and must be in writing. Mechelin v. Wallace, 2 N. & P. 224; 7 A. & E. 49; 6 L. J., K. B. 217. house to the defendant, and to sell him the furFixtures. The plaintiff agreed to let a niture and fixtures therein, and to make alterations and improvements in the house; and the defendant agreed to take the house and pay for the furniture and fixtures and alterations :-Held, an agreement relating to an interest in land. Vaughan v. Hancock, 3 C. B. 766; 16 L. J., C. P. 1. Tenant's fixtures of over 107. in value having been sold by the tenant's trustee in bankruptcy to the plaintiff and resold by him to the defendant, who was landlord of the premises :-Held, that no memorandum of this latter sale was necessary under the Statute of Frauds, it being neither a sale of an interest in land, under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, nor of goods and chattels under s. 17. Lee v. Gaskell, 45 L. J., Q. B. 540; Q. B. D. 700; 34 L. T. 759; 24 W. R. 824. And see Sleddon v. Cruikshank, 10 M. & W. 71; 16 L. J., Ex. 61. Lanyon v Toogood, 13 M. & W. 27; 13 L. J., Ex. 273. Machinery Affixed.]-Machinery affixed to a Statute of Frauds. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 63 L. J., building is land within the meaning of the Ch. 10; 8 R. 361; 69 L. T. 412; 1 Manson, 199. Right of Shooting-Taking away Game.]A grant of a right to shoot and take away a part of the game killed is a grant of an interest in land and within the Statute of Frauds. Webber v. Lee, 51 L. J., Q. B. 485; 9 Q. B. D. 315; 47 L. T. 215; 30 W. R. 866; 47 J. P. 4-C. A. -An Agreement to Charge Hereditaments. agreement to charge hereditaments with the value of property which has been lost through the wrongful act of a third person must be in writing, as being within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds; but it may be taken out of the Statute by a deposit of title-deeds. Whitmore v. Farley, 43 L. T. 192; 28 W. R. 908. And see S. C., in C. A., 45 L. T. 99; 29 W. R. 825; 14 Cox, C. C. 617. See also Alderson v. Maddison, in C. A., 50 L. J., Q. B. 466; 7 Q. B. D. 174; 45 L. T. 334; 29 W. R. 556. And in H. L., 52 L. J., Q. B. 737; 8 App. Cas. 467; 49 L. T. 303; 31 W. R. 820. band to draw for interest due on a bond which was never executed, cannot prevail as evidence of a promise, which, if subsequent to the marriage, is void as nudum pactum. Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 67; 8 R. R. 289. veyance. Other evidence was given of directions | subsequent to the marriage, authorising the husby her, that she had abandoned the claim, and of a promise, often repeated, that she would never trouble M. about it :-Held, that this promise, if it constituted a contract, was not a contract made in consideration of marriage, so as to bring it within the words of the Statute of Frauds. Jorden v. Money, 5 H. L. Cas. 185; 23 L. J., Ch. 865. Promise to Confer Benefit by Will.]-Prior to a marriage the intended husband and wife caused a settlement of the wife's property to be prepared in accordance with a memorandum in the husband's handwriting; but before its execution the husband verbally promised the wife that if she would forego the settlement he would give her the same benefits by his will. In accordance with this promise, he, immediately after the marriage, executed a will to that effect prepared before the marriage. Upon his death, some years afterwards, that will was not forthcoming, but a later will was found disposing of the property in a different manner:-Held, that there was no contract within the Statute of Frauds binding the husband to make a will, or any fraud or part performance to take the case out of the statute. Caton v. Caton, 35 L. J., Ch. 292; L. R. 1 Ch. 137; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 171. Affirmed on appeal, 36 L. J., Ch. 886; L. R. 2 H. L. 127; 16 W. R. 1. P. V., shortly before his marriage with the plaintiff, wrote her a letter, in which occurred the following passage: "And now, my dearest Lizzie, as life is very uncertain at my time of life, and as you are of all the world the person I love best, I hereby will and bequeath to you, after my death, the eight cottages in Peckham's Walk, occupied by Charles Warren and Edward Neath and others. You will keep this letter as a proof of my intention, in case of any sudden change occurring to me, rendering me incapable of, or not in a state of mind fit for, the performance of so important a document, and making null and void any former will and bequest I may have made previously. I am doing this, my dearest, as a temporary provision for you in case of any emergency . . . I am your future husband in its most holy sense.-P. V." Another part of the will contained a reference to the wedding-ring, of which the plaintiff then apparently had the custody. After the marriage P. V. died, leaving a will whereof the defendants were executors and trustees. By this will the eight cottages were not left to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that P. V. duly contracted with her to leave to or to settle upon her the eight cottages, and that by virtue of the letter the plaintiff was entitled to them in equity. The court held that the letter did not satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds with respect to a memorandum, either as to the statement of consideration or a promise:-Held, on appeal, that no contract had been intended, that the writer had mistakenly thought that he was making a gift, and that the judgment must be affirmed. Vincent v. Vincent, 56 L. T. 243—C. A. Memoranda Sufficient.]-A written memorandum after marriage of a prior agreement is sufficient within the 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4. Barkworth v. Young, 4 Drew. 1; 26 L. J., Ch. 153; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 34; 5 W. R. 156. Part Performance.]-See infra. And see HUSBAND AND WIFE. g. Interest in Lands. Agreement for Lease-In Consideration of Share of Crops.]-A. agreed with B. to let him land rent free on condition that A. should have a moiety of the crops such an agreement need not be in writing. Poulter v. Killingbrick, 1 Bos. & P. 397. See Waddington v. Bristow, 2 Bos. & P. 452; (N.R.) 355. Contract to Let Dock.]-A corporation, being the owner of a graving dock, issued regulations for its use, that the dock would "be let to parties requiring the same for the repair of vessels" at certain rates; that a book would be kept by the borough treasurer for the entering of the names of vessels intended for repair, and that as far as practicable priority would be given to vessels in the order of entry. A sum of three guineas was to be paid to the borough treasurer on entering each vessel, which "entrance money, and the right of turn for the use of the dock." were to be forfeited if the vessel did not take her turn at the specified time; and the corporation was to have a lien for dockage upon the vessel, with a power to detain the vessel for the same. In an action by a shipowner against the corporation for not allowing his vessel, for which the entrance fee had been paid, to enter such dock in her turn, according to these regulations : - Held, that the contract for the use of the dock did not amount to an interest in land within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and that it did not require to be under seal. Wells v. Kingston-upon-Hull Corporation, 44 L. J., C. P. 257; L. R. 10 C. P. 402; 32 L. T. 615; 23 W. R. 562. To Let Furnished Lodgings.]—A contract to let furnished lodgings is a contract for an interest in land. Edge v. Strafford, 1 C. & J. 391; 1 Tyr. 293. S. P., Inman v. Stamp, 1 Stark. 12; 18 R. R. 740. Secus, as to board and lodgings. Wright v. Stavert, 2 El. & El. 721; 29 L. J., Q. B. 161; 8 W. R. 413. Contract to Procure Assignment of Lease.]— A contract to procure for a person the assignment of a lease of a house is a contract for an interest in or concerning land within the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 4, and must therefore be in writing, although it is made by one who has not the lease himself, or any interest under it. Horsey v. Graham, 39 L. J., C. P. 58; L. R. 5 C. P. 9; 21 L. T. 530; 18 W. R. 141. Agreement as to Improvements.]—A landlord, who had demised premises for a term of years at 50l. a year, agreed with his tenant to lay out 501. in making certain improvements upon them, the tenant undertaking to pay him an increased rent of 51. a year during the remainder of the term Subsequent to Marriage-Evidence.]—A letter (of which several years were unexpired), to com mence from the quarter preceding the completion | by which he authorised and requested the tenant, of the work :-Held, that the landlord, having done the work, might recover arrears of the 57. a year against the tenant, though the agreement had not been signed by either party; for that it was not a contract for any interest in or concerning lands within the statute; nor was it, according to that statute, an agreement "not to be performed within one year from the making there," no time being fixed for the performance on the part of the landlord. Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 899; 1 L. J., K. B. 269. when his Michaelmas rent became due, to pay 2001. to the bankers. The letter contained no reference to the loan, and did not show that any consideration had been given for the authority. The bankers sent the letter to the tenant. The customer was adjudicated a bankrupt upon an act of bankruptcy committed in August :-Held, that as the rent was an interest in land, the agreement was one which by virtue of s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, could not be proved by parol evidence, and that, therefore, the letter could alone be looked at. And that the letter amounted only to a revocable authority to pay the rent to the bankers, and that it was revoked by the bankruptcy. Hall, Ex parte, Whiting, in re, 48 L. J., Bk. 79; 10 Ch. D. 615; 40 L. T. 179; 27 W. R. 385—C. A. Contract to Furnish.]-An agreement by which A., in consideration of B. hiring a house for him, agrees to furnish the same house, relates to an interest in land, and must be in writing. Mechelin v. Wallace, 2 N. & P. 224; 7 A. & E. 49; 6 L. J., K. B. 217. In consideration that A., who was tenant of premises under a parol agreement for a seven years' lease, would give up immediate possession to B., in order that B. might enter thereon as tenant, and also as a compensation for improvements made by A. on the premises, and for the value of articles left thereon by A., B. agreed to pay A. 1007. A. accordingly relinquished and give up possession of the premises to B., who was thereupon accepted as tenant from year to year, at a different rent from that formerly paid by A., and B. afterwards in part performance of the agreement on his part paid A. 517. In an action by A. to recover the balance of the 1007. :— Held, that the contract, in respect of which he house to the defendant, and to sell him the furFixtures.-The plaintiff agreed to let a sued, was not a contract for the sale of an interest in or concerning lands. Kelly v. Web-niture and fixtures therein, and to make alteraster, 12 C. B. 283; 21 L. J., C. P. 163; 16 Jur. tions and improvements in the house; and the defendant agreed to take the house and pay for the furniture and fixtures and alterations :-Held, an agreement relating to an interest in land. Vaughan v. Hancock, 3 C. B. 766; 16 L. J., 838. The Agreement as to Alterations.]—The plaintiffs agreed in writing with the defendant to let him a public-house from year to year, with an option for him to call on them to grant him a lease for twenty-eight years, and a stipulation that if he sold such lease for more than 1,2007. he should give the plaintiffs half the difference. plaintiffs subsequently granted him a lease differing from that agreed to be granted in the following particulars:-It was for thirty-two years instead of twenty-eight. The rent was 1057. instead of 1007. The premium was 8007. instead of 1,2001. There was no covenant as had been agreed, against assignment without the lessor's consent, nor binding the lessee to take his beer of the plaintiffs. Some other covenants burthensome on the defendant which had been agreed for were omitted. These alterations were arranged by parol only. The defendant sold the lease for 2,500l. The plaintiffs sued upon the agreement for half the difference between that sum and 1,2001. The jury found that the stipulation as to dividing the surplus remained in force or was renewed :-Held, that the effect of the alteration of the original terms agreed upon between the parties was that the old agreement was dissolved, and a new one made incorporating such parts of the old agreement as the parties did not choose to alter; and that as such new agreement related to land, and was not in writing. within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, it could not be enforced by action. Sanderson v. Graves, 44 L. J., Ex. 210; L. R. 10 Ex. 234; 33 L. T. 269; 23 W. R. 797. Agreement to Repay Loan out of Rent.]-A customer, in July, borrowed 2001. from his bankers upon the terms of a verbal agreement that the loan should be repaid out of the rent of a farm which would become due to him at Michaelmas. The money was advanced by the bankers, and the customer then gave them a letter addressed by him to the tenant of the farm, C. P. 1. Tenant's fixtures of over 107. in value having been sold by the tenant's trustee in bankruptcy to the plaintiff and resold by him to the defendant, who was landlord of the premises :-Held, that no memorandum of this latter sale was ne cessary under the Statute of Frauds, it being building is land within the meaning of the 199. Right of Shooting-Taking away Game.]— A grant of a right to shoot and take away a part of the game killed is a grant of an interest in land and within the Statute of Frauds. Webber v. Lee, 51 L. J., Q. B. 485; 9 Q. B. D. 315; 47 L. T. 215; 30 W. R. 866; 47 J. P. 4—C. A. Agreement to Charge Hereditaments.]—An agreement to charge hereditaments with the value of property which has been lost through the wrongful act of a third person must be in writing, as being within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds; but it may be taken out of the Statute by a deposit of title-deeds. Whitmore v. Farley, 43 L. T. 192; 28 W. R. 908. And see S. C., in C. A., 45 L. T. 99; 29 W. R. 825; 14 Cox, C. C. 617. See also Alderson v. Maddison, in C. A., 50 L. J., Q. B. 466; 7 Q. B. D. 174; 45 L. T. 334; 29 W. R. 556. And in H. L., 52 L. J., Q. B. 737; 8 App. Cas. 467; 49 L. T. 303; 31 W. R. 820. Advance of Money on Security.]-An agreement to advance money on the security of land is an agreement which requires to be in writing by s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. Mounsey v. Rankin, 1 Cab. & E. 496. Declaration of Trust.]—A. verbally agreed to bid for B. at an auction of a house; the house was bought and the deposit paid by A. In an action by B. against A. to have it declared that A. was his agent and trustee-Held, that although under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds an agency might be established by parol, s. 7 applied, by which all declarations of trusts of lands, tenements, &c., must be proved by some writing. James v Smith, [1891] 1 Ch. 384; 63 L. T. 524: 39 W. R. 396. Affirmed on other grounds, 65 L. T. 544-C. A. Sale of Building Materials.]—A contract for the sale of building materials to be taken down and removed by the purchaser is a contract for the sale of an interest in land within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. Marshall v Green (1 C. P. D. 35) discussed and distinguished on this point. Lavery v. Purssell, 57 L. J., Ch. 570; 39 Ch. D. 508; 58 L. T. 846; 37 W. R. 163. An agreement to become partners in a colliery which was to be demised upon royalties, and the royalties to be divided in certain proportions, is an interest in land within the Statute of Frauds (21 Car. 2, c. 3), and must be in writing. signed by the parties. Caddick v. Skidmore, 3 Jur. (N.S.) 1185. Where an agreement is to be performed on a contingency; which may happen within the year after it is made, and it does not appear on the face of the agreement that it is to be performed after the year, it does not fall within the statute; where, therefore, a debtor to the plaintiff stated to the plaintiff's solicitor, on being applied to for payment, that he, the debtor, could not pay then or during his lifetime, but that he had provided for payment by his will, and directed his executors to pay :-Held, to be binding on the executors, although there was no promise in writing by the testator to pay. Wells v. Horton, 12 Moore, 176; 4 Bing. 40; 2 Car. & P. 383 ; 5 L. J. (0.s.) C. P. 41; 29 R. R. 498. By one Party.]-Where by the terms of a contract one party can perform his part of it within a year, a subsequent request by the other party that such performance should be postponed till after a year does not bring the case within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, although such request be acceded to. Beran v. Carr, 1 Cab. & E. 499. An agreement whereby all that is to be done by the plaintiff, constituting one entire consideration for the defendant's promise, is capable of being performed within a year, and no part of what the plaintiff is to do constituting such consideration is intended to be postponed until after the expiration of the year, is not within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, notwithstanding the performance on the part of the defendant is or may be extended beyond that period. Smith v. Neale, 2 C. B. (N.S.) 67; 26 L. J., C. P. 143; 3 Jur. (N.S) 516; 5 W. R. 563. Partnership.]-Where a partner agrees to retire from a partnership, the assets of which include an interest in land, and it is an essential Publication of Book in Parts-Sufficient Conterm of the agreement that the retiring partner | tract.]—If it appears to have been the undershall assign his share in the assets, the contract standing of the parties to a contract at the time, is within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and must that it was not to be completed within a year, be in writing. Gray v. Smith, 59 L. J., Ch. 145; though it might and was in fact in part per43 Ch. D. 208; 62 L. T. 335; 38 W. R. 310-formed within that time, it is within the statute; C. A. and if not in writing signed by the party to be charged, it cannot be enforced against him. And his signature in a book entitled "Shakspeare subscribers, their signatures," not referring to a printed prospectus, which contained the terms of the contract, and which was delivered at the time to the subscribers to the "Boydell Shakspeare," cannot be connected together, so as to take the case out of the statute, as such connection could only be established by parol evidence. Boydell See also cases sub tit. VENDOR AND PUR-V. Drummond, 11 East, 142; 2 Camp. 157; 10 Contract for Purchase of Debentures-"Floating Security."]-The sale of debentures in a company that create a "floating charge" on its property consisting in part of leaseholds is a contract for the sale of an interest in land within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. Driver v. Broad, 63 L. J., Q. B. 12; [1893] 1 Q. B. 744; 4 R. 411; 69 L. T. 169; 41 W. R. 483-C. A. CHASER. h. Not Performable within a Year. Where Possibility of Performance.]-That part of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, which requires agreements not to be performed within a year to be in writing and signed, does not apply to cases in which the performance may, by possibility or accident, be extended beyond that period; it is to be confined to cases where the agreement is not to be performed and cannot be carried into execution within that space of time. Ridley v. Ridley, 34 Beav. 478; 34 L. J., Ch. 462; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 475; 12 L. T. 481; 13 W. R. 763. Therefore, when A. agreed by parol, for valuable consideration, to leave C. a certain amount by his will, and he died fourteen years after the agreement:-Held, that the Statute of Frauds did not apply 1b. R. R. 450. But where a party agreed to take a work which was to be published in twenty-four numbers, at intervals of two months, and after receiving several numbers refused to take any more, though he had notice from the publisher that the others were ready for him if he would send for them; and the plaintiff, the assignee of the publisher, who had become bankrupt, sued him for the value of the whole. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff for the price of the numbers received by the defendant, the court refused to disturb it, although it was contended that the contract was entire and void under the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, it not having been reduced into writing, or to be performed within a year. Mavor v. Pyne, 11 Moore, 2; 3 Bing. 285; 2 Car. & P. 91; 4 L. J. (0.s.) C. P. 36; 28 R. R. 625. Hire for more than a Year-Determinable within.]-An agreement to hire a carriage for more than one year, determinable by the custom of the trade, at any time, upon payment of a year's hire, is an agreement not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, and must be signed by the party to be charged therewith. Burch v. Liverpool (Earl), 4 M. & Ry. 380; 9 B. & C. 392. To Leave by Will.]—An agreement to leave money by will need not be in writing although uncertain as to the time of performance. Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278; 1 W. Bl. 353. S. P., Ridley v. Ridley, 34 Beav. 478; 34 L. J., Ch. 462; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 475; 12 L. T. 481; 13 W. R. 763. And see Alderson v. Maddison, 52 L. J., Q. B. 737; 8 App. Cas. 467; 49 L. T. 303; 31 W. R. 820. Partnership.]—But an agreement to enter into partnership for ten years must. Williams v. Jones, 7 D. & R. 548; 5 B. & C. 108; 29 R. R. 181. Contract of Service.]-A contract to serve for one year, the service to commence on the second day after that on which the contract is made, is a contract not to be performed within a year within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, 8. 4. Cawthorne v. Cordrey (13 C. B. (N.S.) 406) distinguished. Britain v. Rossiter, 48 L. J., Ex. 362; 11 Q. B. D. 123; 40 L. T. 240; 27 W. R. 482. A contract for a year's service to commence at a subsequent day, is a contract not to be performed within the year, and must be in writing; therefore, no action can be maintained for the breach of a verbal contract made on the 27th May, for a year's service to commence on the 30th June following. Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1 B. & Ald. 722; 19 R. R. 442. year on a given event, is within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and must therefore be in writing. Dobson v. Collis, 1 H. & N. 81; 25 L. J., Ex. 267; 4 W. R. 512. A. entered the service of B. under a written agreement as follows :-"I agree to receive you as clerk in my establishment in consideration of your paying me a premium of 3007., and to pay you a salary at the following rates, viz., for the first year 70l., for the second 907., for the third 1107., for the fourth 1307., and 150/. for the fifth and following years that you may remain in my employment" :-Held, that the agreement was one that, by the Statute of Frauds, was required to be in writing: that there being a precise stipulation for yearly payments, evidence was not admissible to show that at or after the time the letter containing it was sent by B. to A., it was verbally agreed that the salary should be paid quarterly, and that the facts of the payments having usually been made quarterly, did not vary the rights of the parties under the agreement. Giraud v. Richmond, 2 C. B. 835; 15 L. J., C. P. 180; 10 Jur. 360. Incomplete Contract.] Six persons signed a document purporting to be the basis of a partnership to last for three years and to commence at a subsequent date. By the terms of the document the interest in the partnership was to be divided into thirty-six shares. J. R. was to hold twelve shares, and E. R., F. H., H. R., and A. S. T. were each to hold six shares, and B. T. was to receive a salary of 500l. per annum. H. R. objected to this arrangement, and wished that he himself should hold seven shares, and that J. R. should hold eleven. On signing the document, H. R. wrote before his signature to the document the words, "Excepting clause as to shares." A. S. T. insisted that H. R. should hold only the same number of A., on the 20th July, made proposals in writ-shares in the partnership as he did. A correing (unsigned) to B., to enter his service as bailiff for a year; B. took the proposals and went away, and entered into A.'s service on the 24th of July:-Held that this was a contract on the 20th, not to be performed within the space of one year from the making. Snelling v. Huntingfield (Lord), 1 C. M. & R. 20; 4 Tyr. 606; 3 L. J., Ex. 232. The plaintiff agreed on a Sunday to serve defendant for a year, the service to commence on the Monday. On the Monday the plaintiff, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant, commenced the service, and received 207. on account-Held, in an action for a wrongful dismissal within the year, in which an objection was taken that there was a contract for a year's service to commence on a future day, that the jury might infer a new implied contract on the Monday for a year's service from that day. Cawthorn v. Cordery, 13 C. B. (N.S.) 406; 32 L. J., C. P. 152. By a parol agreement defendant agreed with plaintiff to serve him for a year from a future day, and that the service thenceforth should continue, subject to be determined by three months' notice. After the expiry of the year, defendant quitted plaintiff's service without notice-Held, that plaintiff might maintain an action for this breach of their agreement, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds. Collis v. Botthamley, 7 W. R. 87. But a contract for service for more than a year, but subject to determination within the VOL. IV. spondence ensued with reference to the terms of the partnership; and, ultimately, A. S. T. withdrew his objection by letter. H. R. never assented to the provision that he should hold only six shares. J. R., E. R., F. R., and H. R. having afterwards refused to take A. S. T. into partnership unless he would consent to be a salaried partner only, A. S. T. brought an action for breach of the terms of the document :-Held, that the document set forth an agreement not to be performed within a year, within the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4, and that as there was no complete agreement in writing, signed by the parties to be charged thereby, no action would lie for a refusal to perform the terms of the document. Tomkins v. Randell, 19 W. R. 413. Reference to other Documents.]-A company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1862, entered into negotiations with the plaintiffs to employ them as managers for five years. A draft agreement was prepared and submitted to them; they objected to some of its terms, and thereupon the directors of the company wrote out a paper modifying the draft agreement in some particulars, but concluding with the words "all other provisions as in draft." The plaintiffs agreed to the draft agreement as modified by this paper. The secretary of the company entered in the minute book a resolution that the plaintiffs having signified their willingness to undertake "the management of the company's 3 |