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works upon the terms of the draft agreement | the parish, to allow and pay the plaintiff the submitted to them by the board, it was resolved whole income arising from the money in the that the agreement be engrossed in duplicate, hands of the governors of the bounty of Queen signed, sealed, and executed." At the next Anne, in respect of the curacy, and to take all meeting of the directors of the company the necessary measures for payment of the annual chairman signed the resolution pursuant to the grant from the society, by renewing the applicaCompanies Act, 1862, s. 67:-Held, that there tion on behalf of the plaintiff, according to the was a valid contract within the Statute of rules and regulations of the society, through the Frauds, s. 4, by the company to employ the bishop of the diocese, by forwarding the same to plaintiffs during five years: for the terms of the the bishop, to be by him sanctioned and forservice were completely ascertained when they warded to the society, and to receive the same assented to the draft agreement as modified by as long as it should be paid for the use of the the paper, and it was immaterial that the plaintiff :-Held, that the agreement was within directors of the company intended the contract the Statute of Frauds, as not being to be peras finally arrived at to be afterwards "engrossed formed within a year from the making thereof. in duplicate, signed, sealed, and executed;" and Roberts v. Tucker, 3 Ex. 632. the draft agreement and the paper modifying it might be identified by parol as the draft agreement referred to in the resolution entered in the minute book; and although the signature of the chairman was affixed to the minute book for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the entry therein contained, pursuant to the Companies Act, 1862, s. 67, it nevertheless operated as an admission of the contract contained in the draft agreement and the paper, and was sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, s. 4. Jones v. Victoria Graving Dock Co., 46 L. J., Q. B. 219; 2 Q. B. D. 314; 36 L. T. 347; 25 W.

R. 501.

Appointment to Clerkship of House of Peers.] Action for specific performance of a parol promise by defendant to procure plaintiff to be made deputy to defendant's son, as clerk of the House of Peers, or otherwise to provide for him, in consideration of plaintiff's insisting upon and soliciting in procuring a reversionary grant of that place for defendant's son, which defendant now enjoyed. Defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds, because not in writing, and not to be performed within one year; and also the Statute of Limitations, that the promise was made above six years before the bill filed. Both pleas allowed. Reynolds v. Cowper, 5 Vin. Abr. 524, pl. 47.

Appointment to Curacy-Payment of Stipend. A declaration, after reciting the existence of a society for promoting the employment of additional curates in populous places, in order to provide a fund for contributing to the maintenance of additional clergymen in those parishes within the dioceses of England and Wales most requiring such assistance, and that the society had made annual grants in pursuance of such objects, by quarterly payments to the several incumbents, for the use of the stipendiary curates of such parishes, upon a proper application made to the society by the incumbent, through the bishop of the diocese, and by him sanctioned and forwarded to the society on behalf of the curate, approved by the bishop, and by him licensed, and that the defendant was incumbent of such parish, stated, that in consideration that the plaintiff would, in case the bishop of the diocese should approve of and license him, undertake the office of stipendiary curate of the parish and perform the duties and reside there; that the defendant duly nominated the plaintiff to the bishop as stipendiary curate, for the approval and license of the bishop, and promised the plaintiff that in case the bishop should approve of and license the plaintiff, to employ the plaintiff as curate, and so long as he should so continue, under the license of the bishop and to reside in

Held, also, that the following document, signed by the defendant, was not such a memorandum or note in writing as satisfied the statute :-" I, A. B., the perpetual curate of St. B., of C., in the E. diocese of L., nominate H. R. (the plaintiff) to the curacy of St. B., and I propose to allow him, for his stipend, 701. per annum, granted by the society for promoting the employment of additional curates in populous places (so long as it continues to be paid), and the whole interest of 2,6007. in the hands of the governors of Queen Anne's bounty, appropriated to the augmentation of the perpetual curacy of St. B.”


Clause in Articles of Association insufficient.]-A solicitor sued a joint stock company for breach of contract, alleging in his declaration that it was agreed between him and them that he should be employed by the company as and appointed by the company to the office of solicitor of and for the company, upon the terms that the company would, so long as he should continue to act as and hold the office of solicitor to the company, employ him to transact all the legal business of the company for the usual fees and charges, and that he should not be removed from his office unless for misconduct. In the articles of association, which were prepared by the solicitor, there was a clause that "Mr. W. E. shall be the solicitor for the company, and shall transact all the legal business of the company for the usual fees and charges, and shall not be removed from his office except for misconduct." The articles were signed by seven persons, who became directors. The solicitor held shares in the company. For some time after the incorporation of the company he was employed by them to transact all their business, and his name alone appeared in the prospectus as the solicitor to the company. Subsequently other solicitors were also employed, and their names appeared in the prospectus together with his name, although he protested against their appointment. Finally, the company ceased to employ him, which was the breach of contract declared on :-Held, that there was no evidence to support the declaration, for the contract, if any, was one not to be performed within the space of one year, and was therefore within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and there was no memorandum in writing to satisfy the terms of the section, because the articles, made alio intuitu, formed a contract only between the members of the company inter se, and not between the company and the plaintiff. Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co., 45 L. J., Ex. 58; 1 Ex. D. 20; 33 L. T. 743; 24 W. R. 252. Affirmed, 45 L. J., Ex. 451; 1 Ex. D. 88; 34 L. T. 190; 24 W. R. 338.

Restraint of Trade.]-The statement of a day, at 3s. 6d. a ton, to be delivered at the tip claim alleged that in 1866 the defendant entered of the colliery, into waggons to be provided by into the plaintiff's employment as a foreman C. & Co.; payment to be made monthly by tailor for three years, on the terms that if he bills. The coal was delivered in pursuance of the should leave the plaintiff he should not engage contract, when a company was formed to carry in the service of any one carrying on, or himself on the business which had been carried on by carry on, the business of a tailor within five C. & Co. After that time the coal was supplied miles of D.; and that on the expiration of the by P. & Co. to the company, on the terms of the three years he continued in the plaintiff's em- contract, and the bills for payment were drawn ployment on the like terms (except as to the upon and accepted by the company. The conperiod of employment) till 1877. Breach, that tract stipulated that it might be determined on in 1877 the defendant left the plaintiff, and six months' notice. Afterwards the company carried on business as a tailor in D. The state- gave notice to determine the contract at the ment of defence alleged that the contract was expiration of six months. P. & Co. continued to not in writing as required by the Statute of deliver 100 tons of coal a day at the tip of the Frauds-Held, on demurrer, by Hawkins, J., colliery; but the company not providing waggons that the contract amounted to an agreement not for its removal, it was stacked by P. & Co. in an to set up the trade during the joint lives of the adjacent field, and notice given to the company. defendant and the plaintiff; and was, therefore, The company having become bankrupt, P. & Co. primâ facia not to be performed within a year, claimed to prove against them for the amount of and therefore fell within s. 4 of the Statute of the coal so stacked :-Held, that the proof must Frauds. Davey v. Shannon, 48 L. J., Ex. 459; be disallowed, as the contract between P. & Co. 4 Ex. D. 81; 40 L. T. 628; 27 W. R. 599. and the company, being one that could not be performed within a year, ought to have been in writing, and as it was not, it was void. Pentreguinea Fuel Co., In re, Acraman, Ex parte, 4 De G. F. & J. 541; 31 L. J., Ch. 741; 8 Jur. (N.S.) 706; 7 L. T. 84; 10 W. R. 656.


To Maintain Persons.]-A parol agreement to maintain a child known to be about five years old until she is able to do for herself, is an agreement not to be performed within a year within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, although determinable within the year by the-An agreement entered into by a contractor to happening of a collateral event. Farrington v. Donohoe, Ir. R. 1 C. L. 675; 14 W. R. 922.

An agreement to keep, maintain, and clothe A. during his life, and supply him with grass for two sheep during the same period, is not within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and does not require to be in writing. O'Sullivan v. Murphy, 14 W. R. 407-Ex. Ch.


Contractor-Share in Profits of Undertaking.]

share in the profits of an undertaking for making

a canal, although the contract is not capable of being completed within a year, is not such an agreement as by the Statute of Frauds is required to be in writing, but may be proved by parol evidence. M Kay v. Rutherford, 6 Moore, P. C. 414; 13 Jur. 21.

Sale of Practice.]-The following memorandum A contract for the maintenance of a child at the defendant's request, to enure "so long as the was made between the plaintiff and the defendant defendant shall think proper," is a contract upon of Practice. 801. per annum for five years, comand signed with their respective initials: "Dict. a contingency, the performance of which is not necessarily to take place beyond the space of a mencing Michaelmas, 1828; 607. per annum for year, and, therefore, not within the 4th section the rest of Mr. Lee's life, if he survives the five of the Statute of Frauds. Souch v. Straw-years, payable in either case quarterly, the first bridge, 2 C. B. 808; 15 L. J., C. P. 170; 10 Jur. payment, Michaelmas, 1828; Mr. Lee to separate the practices, K. B. and C. P. :"-Held, that parol A husband and wife having taken out cross-evidence was admissible to explain the document; summonses against each other for assaults, entered into an oral agreement with each other to withdraw the summonses and to live apart, the husband agreeing to allow the wife a weekly sum for maintenance, and the wife agreeing to maintain herself and her children and to indemnify the husband against any debts contracted by her. An action having been brought in the county court by the wife against the husband for six weeks' arrears of maintenance under the agreement:-Held, that the agreement was not an agreement" not to be performed within one


within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and, therefore, need not be in writing. Davey v. Shannon, (4 Ex. D. 81) not followed. Mc Gregor v. Mc Gregor, 57 L. J., Q. B. 591; 21 Q. B. D. 424; 37 W. R. 45; 52 J. P. 772-C. A. Affirming 58 L. T. 227.

And see Knowlman v. Bluett, infra, col. 72.

Novation.]-C. & Co., manufacturers of fuel, entered into a contract for three years, determinable within the first year, and if continued longer, at six months' notice, with P. & Co. for the supply of small coal, not less than 100 tons

but that, inasmuch as it appeared to be a memorandum of a contract that was not to be performed within a year, and no consideration was stated on the face of it, it came within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and was therefore not capable of being enforced by action. Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & G. 452; 4 Scott (N.R.) 77; 5 Jur. 1134.

Agreement to Lend Money-Calls.]—By an act of parliament trustees were created for who should agree to lend money towards carrying building a bridge, and it provided that persons the act into execution should pay the same to the treasurer of the trustees as they should direct. In an action against a party, who had agreed to lend 25l., for non-payment of calls :-Held, that an agreement to lend the 257. might be inferred from a paper signed by him, which referred to an engagement to subscribe a sum therein set against his name, coupled with proof of payment by him of an earlier call corresponding to that on the 251., and of his taking a receipt for a call on a loan of that sum; and that such agreement was not within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, though a prospectus had previously issued stating that

the whole sum would not be, nor was it, called for within a year. Miles v. Binigh, 3 Railw. Cas. 668; 3 G. & D. 119; 3 Q. B. 845 ; 12 L. J., Q. B. 74 8 Jur. 81.

Agreement to Abandon Proceedings-Defence to Action.]-An agreement to abandon threatened proceedings which might otherwise be brought at any time within six years, is, if followed in fact by an abstention from proceedings, a contract which is performed by one of the parties within one year, and consequently is not such a contract as is required by sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. That section does not require that an agreement which is set up as a defence to an action should be in writing. Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co., 54 L. J., Ch. 1035; 32 Ch. D. 266; 53 L. T. 219; 34 W. R. 669.

on either side within the year. Cherry v. Heming, 4 Ex. 631; 19 L. J., Ex. 64.

Contract to Support.]-The father of seven illegitimate children agreed with their mother verbally to pay her 300l. per annum, by equal quarterly instalments, for so long as she should maintain and educate them. At the time of making the promise the eldest child was about fourteen years old. For several years the mother maintained and educated the children, and the father paid the agreed sums. At Michaelmas, 1870, he discontinued his payments. The mother still continued to maintain and educate the children, and in May, 1873, brought an action for two and a-half years' arrears :- Held, that, the consideration being executed, she was entitled to recover as for "money paid at the father's request," at the rate fixed by the verbal agreement, even assuming that the agreement was on one 66 not to be performed within a year." Knowlman v. Bluett, 43 L. J., Ex. 151 ; L. R. 9 Ex. 307; 32 L. T. 262; 22 W. R. 758-Ex. Ch.

Agreement not in Writing-Evidence quantum meruit.]-Plaintiff by the first count of his declaration alleged that by an agreement between himself and defendant, in consideration that plaintiff would serve defendant as his clerk for three years, defendant agreed to pay him 607. and averred performance of all conditions, and assigned as breach the non-payment by defendant of the 607. The second count was for wages payable by defendant to plaintiff for work done by plaintiff as defendant's clerk :Held, that although the agreement not being one to be performed within a year, came within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and so, not being in writing could not be sued upon under the first count, yet it was evidence on quantum meruit of the value of plaintiff's services and might be referred to and taken into consideration by the jury as the rule or measure of damages under the second count, and as showing the estimate which defendant himself had put upon plaintiff's services. Scarisbrick v. Parkinson, 20 L. T. 175;

17 W. R. 467.

Interest in Land.]-The equitable doctrine of part performance has not been confined to contracts for an acquisition of an interest in land. Probably it applies to all cases in which the court would entertain a suit for specific performance if the contract had been in writing. A verbal agreement for an easement may be enforced where there has been part performance, whether it is or is not within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. And semble it is within the section. Britain v. Rossiter (11 Q. B. D. 123) discussed. McManus v. Cooke, 56 L. J., Ch. 662; 35 Ch. D. 681; 56 L. T. 900; 35 W. R. 754; 51 J. P. 708.

The doctrine as to part performance, whereby a contract not enforceable by an action at law, owing to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, s. 4, was made enforceable in equity, was confined to suits as to the sale of interests in land, and its operation has not been extended by the Judica

i. Contract Executed or Partly Performed. ture Act, 1873. Britain v. Rossiter, 48 L. J., Ex.

362; 11 Q. B. D. 123; 40 L. T. 240; 27 W. R.

Contract not Performable within a Year. 1-482. The services of a clerk had been continued for some years. In an action for dismissing him before the end of a current year :-Held, that the agreement need not be in writing. Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309; 2 Car. & P. 607; 12 Moore, 552; 5 L. J. (o.s.) C. P. 180; 29 R. R. 576.

Sale of Patent.]-The plaintiff assigned letters patent to H. & N., who covenanted to pay him a sum by instalments extending over several years, provided that if, at the expiration of twelve months from the date of the deed, they should not approve of the patent, and should give notice of their disapprobation and of their intention to sell the patent, then the payment of the first instalment should be suspended; and if, having given such notice, they should, within six months, sell the patent, the covenant should cease. The deed was executed by N., but there was no signature of H., but only a seal for him in the usual way. H. & N. attempted to work the patent, but, being dissatisfied with it, sent the plaintiff a notice, signed by both, referring to the deed, and in the terms of the proviso:-Held, that the contract having been performed on one side within a year, the case was not within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, inasmuch as that enactment applies only to contracts not to be performed |

Where a contract which by reason of its relating to land, and so being within the Statute of Frauds, cannot be enforced by action, has been performed by one party, and the benefit thereof accepted by the other, the former can recover on the implied contract arising out of such performance, and it is immaterial whether the express contract has or has not been rescinded. Savage v. Canning, Ir. R. 1 C. L. 434; 16 W. R. 133.

The general principle as to the circumstances under which a part performance of a parol contract relating to land will be regarded as sufficient to take it out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds is accurately stated in the judgment in Alderson v. Maddison (7 Q. B. D. at p. 178):

Held, also, by Baggallay, L.J., that the illustration which is there given of such general principle that "payment of part or even of the whole of the purchase-money is not sufficient to exclude the operation of the statute" is rightly qualified by the following words, which are there stated, "unless it is shown that the payment was made in respect of the particular land, and the particular interest in the land, which is the subject of the parol agreement," those qualifying words being used to cover such a case as Nunn v. Fabian (L. R. 1 Ch. 35). Humphreys v. Green,

52 L. J., Q. B. 140; 10 Q. B. D. 148; 48 L. T. 60; | company, made an oral promise to the directors 47 J. P. 244—C. A.

Semble, per Brett, L.J., that Nunn v. Fabian (L. R. 1 Ch. 35) is not an authority for those qualifying words, and that mere payment of part, or even of the whole, of the purchase-money will not be sufficient under any circumstances to exclude the operation of the statute. Ib.

to give them, when required, security for the debt. He was then entitled to a reversionary interest in one-fifth of a farm, to come into possession on the death of his mother, who was tenant for life, and who held the title-deeds. The mother afterwards died, and the title-deeds came into the possession of the respondent, who was manager of the bank, and who was also entitled to one-fifth of the property. The respondent told the bankrupt that he had possession of the deeds, and that he held his (the bankrupt's) one-fifth for the bank. The bankrupt expressed his assent :-Held, that the company had not a valid equitable mortgage of the bankrupt's share in the farm, for there was no memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and the conversation which took place between the bankrupt and the respondent as to the custody of the deeds, not being followed by any act which altered the legal position of the parties, was not such a part performance of the oral promise to give security as would exclude the operation of the statute. Broderick, Ex parte, Beetham, In re, 56 L. J., Q. B. 635; 18 Q. B. D. 766; 35 W. R. 613-C. A.

The plaintiff as heir-at-law of an intestate claimed the title-deeds of the intestate's farm, of which the defendant had taken possession on his -death. The defendant counter-claimed for a declaration that she was entitled to a life estate in the farm, and to retain the title-deeds for her life. The jury found that the defendant was induced to serve the intestate as his housekeeper without wages for many years, and to give up other prospects of establishment in life by his promise, which was a verbal one, to make a will leaving her a life estate in his farm, if and when it became his property :-Held, that neither the -continuance of the defendant in the service of the intestate, nor the fact that the latter had executed a document which he intended to operate as a will in the defendant's favour, but which failed to take effect from want of proper attestation, was any evidence of a sufficient part performance In consideration of B. and C. agreeing to of the parol agreement between the intestate execute a conveyance of property, part of the.r and the defendant, upon which the defendant's father's estate, to a purchaser, A. verbally pro-counter-claim was based, to exclude the opera-mised to leave them as much as they would get tion of the Statute of Frauds, and therefore that s. 4 of that statute was an answer to the counterclaim. Alderson v. Maddison, 50 L. J., Q. B. 466; 7 Q. B. D. 174; 45 L. T. 334; 29 W. R. 556-C. A. Affirmed in H. L., 52 L. J., Q. B. 737; 8 App. Cas. 467; 49 L. T. 303; 31 W. R. 820; 47 J. P. 821.

When a person has contracted for the purchase of land by an agreement, the terms of which are partly written and partly verbal, and has obtained possession upon performance of the written terms, to attempt to retain possession and refuse to perform the verbal terms amounts to a fraud. Jervis v. Berridge, 27 L. T. 436. Affirmed, 42 L. J., Ch. 518; L. R. 8 Ch. 351; 28 L. T. 481; 21 W. R. 395.

A. signed a contract for the purchase of land from B., an on the same day transferred the benefit of the contract to C. by a memorandum in which some of the terms of the transfer were not expressed. C. entered into possession under the memorandum, but refused to perform the terms which were not expressed therein. A. filed a bill for cancellation of the memorandum, alleging | that C.'s conduct amounted to fraud; and C. on -demurrer contended that he was not guilty of fraud, inasmuch as under the Statute of Frauds the unwritten terms of the transfer were not binding upon him:-Held, that C.'s contention could not be sustained. Ib.

Per Lord Selborne :-The observation stated in Jervis v. Berridge, that "the Statute of Frauds is a weapon of defence, not offence, and does not make any signed instrument a valid contract by reason of the signature, if it is not such according to the good faith and real intention of the parties," affirmed. Hussey v. Horne-Payne, 48 L. J., Ch. 846; 8 App. Cas. 311; 41 L. T. 1; 27

W. R. 585.

Whether a deposit of title-deeds, in pursuance of a contract to charge real estate, is a sufficient part performance to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds, quære. Whitmore v. Farley, 45 L. T. 99; 29 W. R. 825; 14 Cox, C. C. 617-C. A.

The bankrupt, being indebted to a banking

under their father's will:-Held, that the case did not come within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, and that A.'s estate was bound to make good the promise. Ridley v Ridley, 34 Beav. 478; 34 L. J., Ch. 462; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 475; 12 L. T. 481; 13 W. R. 763. See also Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278; 1 W. Bl. 353.

Of Verbal Agreement for Lease.]-A landlord having verbally agreed with his tenant to grant him a new lease at an increased rent, the tenant laid out money on the premises, and paid one quarter's rent at the increased rate :-Held, that the case was taken out of the statute. Nunn v. Fabian, 35 L. J., Ch. 140; L. R. 1 Ch. 35; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 868; 13 L. T. 343.

F. was tenant to C., with a promise of a lease for twenty-one years, from September, 1851, to September, 1872, at the rent of 847. 168. Afterwards C. entered F.'s name in his rentbook as tenant of 128 acres at 168. an acre, at the yearly rent of 1021. 88., less 41. for county cess-981. Ss. "Tenure thirty-one years from September, 1872, at rent of 16s. per acre, allowed 41. for county cess-981. 88." To which was added the following remark:-"F.'s tenure ceased September, 1872. Mr. C. agreed to give a lease of thirty-one years at 16s. per acre, and to take the old rent for one year, ending September, 1873, in consequence of failure of potato crop." F. continued in possession, and paid the increased rent from September, 1873. The entry in the rent-book was in C.'s handwriting. In an action after C.'s death by his son, as the owner of C.'s estate, against F. to enforce specific performance of an agreement to take a lease for thirty-one years --Held, that the continuance in possession of F., and payment of the increased rent, being upon the evidence referable solely to the agreement of 1872, were acts of part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Nunn v. Fabian (L. R. 1 Ch. 35) followed. Conner v. Fitzgerald, 11 L. R., Ir. 160.

Where a new letting at an altered rent is made to a tenant in possession under a pre-existing

tenancy, the payment by the tenant, and the | the plaintiff the balance of the rent. In an acceptance by the landlord, of the altered rent, if shown to have been paid and accepted on foot of the new tenancy, is a sufficient part performance to enable either party to sustain an action for specific performance of the contract for such new tenancy. Ib.

The plaintiff, who was proposing to enter into business as a milliner, was induced by C. to abandon the project, C. promising her verbally that she should occupy a leasehold house of C.'s during her (the plaintiff's) life, the plaintiff to pay the ground rent, rates and taxes, and maintain herself by letting lodgings. The plaintiff thereupon abandoned the idea of the millinery business, and entered into possession of C.'s house, and continued there for several years until C.'s death, paying the ground rent, rates and taxes. C. bequeathed the house to P., who brought an action of ejectment against the plaintiff, who thereupon filed a bill to restrain the action-Held, that there had been a part performance of the verbal contract between the plaintiff and C. sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Colex v. Pilkington, 44 L. J., Ch. 381; L. R. 19 Eq. 174 ; 31 L. T. 423; 23 W. R. 41.

The payment of an increased rent, draining and planting, done by the tenant in pursuance of a concluded parol agreement with his landlord for a lease, are a sufficient part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Howe v. Hall, Ir. R. 4 Eq. 242.

But where the rent of neighbouring tenants had been increased at the same time as plaintiff's, the sum expended on improvements was small, and such as a tenant from year to year might have prudently expended, and the tenant had on different occasions given different versions of the agreement, the court, not being satisfied on the evidence that a concluded agreement had been proved, refused specific performance after the landlord's death. Ib.

M., a tenant of L., was offered a lease of certain lands, and a written agreement was produced for a term of thirty-one years, at 381. rent, and tendered to her for signature. M. objected to 381. as a mistake for 331. Whereupon L.'s agent said that M. should have the farm for 331., and wrote a memorandum upon the agreement that M. said her rent was 337. M. then signed the agreement. She paid the 337. and continued in possession for six years, when L. commenced an action to enforce specific performance of the agreement at the rent of 337. :-Held, that there was a complete agreement, partly written and partly verbal, for a lease at the rent of 337.; and that the circumstance of M. being permitted to continue in possession after the expiration of her lease, and the payment of rent by her at the agreed amount, constituted part performance sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, and to entitle L. to a decree for specific performance. Lanyon v. Martin, 13 L. R. Ir.


The plaintiff orally agreed to let a piece of waste ground to the defendant for three successive bank holidays; the defendant was to have exclusive possession of the ground on those days, and to pay 451. for the use of the ground, paying an instalment of 157. for each of the three days. The defendant entered and occupied the land on the first of the three days, and after entry paid the first instalment of 151.; he refused to occupy the ground on the other two days, or to pay to

action by the plaintiff to recover the two remaining instalments, the defendant contended that the claim was barred by virtue of s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds :-Held, that there having been an entry for the purpose of occupation under an agreement for a single letting (although the period of the agreed letting was not continuous) at a single rent, and a payment of rent on account of the entry, the plaintiff's right to recover the balance was not affected by the fact that the agreement was not in writing, and the Statute of Frauds afforded no defence to the claim. Smallwood v. Sheppards, 64 L. J., Q. B. 727; [1895] 2 Q. B. 627; 73 L. T. 219; 44 W. R. 44.

Possession by a lessee continued after, though taken previously to, a parol agreement for a lease exceeding three years, is a sufficient act of part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, provided the continuance in possession is unequivocally referable to the agreement. Hodson v, Heuland, 65 L. J., Ch. 754; [1896] 2 Ch. 428; 74 L. T. 811; 44 W. R. 684.

The making of alterations in premises by the intended landlord under a verbal agreement to let:-Held, not to be a part performance, taking the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Whittick v. Mozley, 1 Cab. & E. 86.

Agreement in Consideration of Marriage.]— A father, shortly before the marriage of his daughter, told her intended husband that he meant to give certain leasehold property to the couple on their marriage. After the marriage he gave up possession of the property to the husband, to whom he directed the tenants to pay the rents, and handed to the husband the title-deeds. The husband expended money upon the property :-Held, sufficient part-performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. Surcome v. Pinniger, 3 De G. M. & G. 571; 22 L. J., Ch. 419; 17 Jur. 196.

A father verbally promised, in consideration of his daughter's marriage, to give her a house as a wedding present, and immediately after the marriage he put the daughter and her husband into possession. The father was then the owner of the house, which was leasehold and was subject to a charge in favour of a building society, payable by instalments. The father paid the instalments which fell due during his lifetime, and at his death there remained a balance of 110., which fell due shortly afterwards :-Held, that the verbal promise to give the house having been established, the possession took the case out of the Statute of Frauds; that the contract was to give the house free from incumbrances; and that the 110l. was payable out of the father's estate. Ungley v. Ungley, 46 L. J., Ch. 854; 5 Ch. D. 887; 37 L. T. 52; 25 W. R. 733—C. A.

The plaintiff on his son's marriage gave him the lease of a certain house under a parol agreement; the son lived therein for eighteen months, and paid the rent to the landlord-Held, sufficient part performance to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, and specific performance was granted free from an incumbrance created by the plaintiff subsequently to the marriage. Ungley v. Ungley, supra, followed. Sharman v. Sharman, 4 R. 124; 67 L. T. 834-C. A.

Before the marriage of A. and B. B.'s father verbally promised to pay his daughter 3007. a year, and in consequence of that promise and representation, as was alleged, A. and B. married.

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