state, and by the concurrent power which belongs to the civil authority in cases of discipline and external policy. 2. It is likewise proved by the mode of proceeding in three kinds of questions that were agitated in the Synod of Francfort of the year 974, in which a point of Faith, viz. the confirmation of the condemnation decreed in the Synod of Rome against the heresy of Elipandus; and the explanation of the second Council of Nice, respecting the worship of images, was settled by the sole authority of the Bishops: but the Canonical regulations in matters of Church Discipline were made in the name of the Synod and of the King, Can. 6. and 7.; whilst civil cases, such as the pardon granted to Tassilon, Duke of Bavaria, and the article concerning coin (Can. 5.) were published in the name of the king alone. If it be objected, I. That the legislative power of the Church is not dependent on the civil power, we observe that in the examination of Ecclesiastical decrees in cases of discipline and external policy, the Sovereign uses his political right extra-judicially, to know whether they are suitable, or prejudicial to the state, that the ecclesiastical matter may be left to the jurisdiction of the Church, and the political to that of the State. See D. Barthel, de jur. ref. antiq. a. 8. § 24. II. That because the Church has the right to declare Civil Laws unjust in consequence of their containing a manifest sin, it does not follow that the Civil Laws require the approbation of the Church; therefore there is no occasion for a Royal Placet in disciplinary Church Laws. Further, that many think even the indirect power of the Pope in the temporal concerns of princes repugnant to the majesty of their authority, and that therefore the Royal Placet is equally repugnant to the supreme ecclesiastical power. But in answer to these two objections, we observe respecting the first, that there is no parity, since Civil Laws can contain a sin only by chance, but that the subjects of disciplinary Church Laws are necessarily mixed on account of their connection both with the ecclesiastical and political state: and respecting the second objection, that the indirect power of the Pope in the temporal concerns of princes, is a temporal right, not conformable to the spiritual object of the Church: but the Royal Placet is grounded in the right of supreme superintendence, for the good of the state and the prerogatives of majesty, which leaves the liberty and independence of the Church uninfringed. III. If it be said that the Royal Placet opens to the civil power the road to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and disturbs the harmony of the temporal and sacerdotal authorities, we answer that the Royal Placet does not open to the civil power the road to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in concerns merely spiritual, and articles of faith, since it is limited to cases of discipline and external policy, and if these proper limits be observed, it does not impair the union between Church and State. IV. Lastly, to the objection that the Royal Placet is simply a prerogative granted by the See of Rome, we answer in the negative. It is a part of royal majesty so intimately and essentially connected with it, that no prince can abdicate or renounce it to the prejudice of his successor and of the state. APPENDIX K. Extract from Giannone's History of Naples, book 33. ch. 5. The Exequatur Regium*, which is given in the kingdom, not only in collations of prelatures, and other benefices of the kingdom sent from Rome, but to all the Pope's bulls and rescripts, even to the briefs of jubilees and indulgences, and to whatever other provision comes from Rome, does not proceed from this principle, nor did it begin in the troublesome times of war, when the contending princes were frequently driving one another out, and therefore had reason to be cautious in receiving bishops. Its origin is more ancient; it had its beginning not only in the kingdom of Naples, but in all the dominions of Christian princes, with principality itself, and belongs to them titulo sui principatus, or jure regaliæ, as the above-mentioned Van Espen † fully proves. It was con * Chiocc. tom. iv. de Regio Exequatur. † Van Espen, Tract. de Promulgat. Legum Eccl. pars 2. cap. 3. trived for the preservation of the state, and to prevent an inlet to commotions and disorders from foreign parts; therefore it has always been lawful for princes, and commendable in them, that whenever foreign writs came within their dominions, whereby it was pretended to exercise jurisdiction, either spiritual or temporal in them, to examine such writs before they were put in execution; so much the rather, that the Court of Rome, for a very long time, had assumed an authority far exceeding the bounds of a spiritual power, and often took upon them to decide points belonging to the temporal power of princes, and not within their province: whence the custom was introduced, that if writs from Rome are to be executed against laicks, they cannot be put in execution without applying to the secular magistrates for their concurrence, who, not as bare executors, but after having considered and examined the affair, if they find it just, they give their concurrence, otherwise they put a stop to the execution. If the writ concerns ecclesiastical affairs only, or if it relates to things merely spiritual, and that its being put in execution will not be prejudicial to the King's prerogatives, the state, or his subjects, or does not clash with the usages and customs of the country, it gets the Exequatur Regium; so that it is not pretended thereby to add force to, or undo what the Pope has done, as if in ecclesiastical and spiritual matters he stood in need of the authority of secular princes*; but it is required only, that the prince, who ought to be careful and vigilant that the government of his dominions be not disturbed, may know what is contained in writs that come from abroad into his territories, that under that colour or pretence, nothing be introduced that may disturb the peace and tranquillity of his state; and this is all that is intended by the Exequatur Regium, as Van Espen, in his treatise De Placito Regio † has at large demonstrated, which was very well understood by Bishop Covarruvias ‡, Belluga §, and the Cardinal Di Luca ||, * Salgad. in Tract. de Retent. Bull & Reg. protect. Covar. Pract. Qu. cap. 10. num. 56. § Belluga in Speculo Principis, rubr. 13. verb. restat. the last of which wrote, that for this end the Exequatur Regium was practised in our kingdom. Whence it comes, that no bull, brief, rescript, decree, or any other writ whatsoever that comes to us from Rome, is exempted from it; and even the bulls of jubilees and indulgences must have it *; yea, Van Espen, by many arguments, proves, that it must likewise be obtained to the very dogmatical bulls †: not that it belongs to the prince to decide or reason upon matters of faith; but because the clauses which are usually inserted in them, and with which, according to the modern style of Rome, they are generally coloured, the manner, time, juncture, and the occasion of publishing such bulls ought to be known by the prince, perhaps, to see if, besides the doctrine and the spiritual punishments therein defined, the temporal be incroached upon; perhaps, for other weighty reasons of state, it may not be proper to publish them at that time, but to wait till a more fit opportunity, and for other motives and reasons at large discussed by that writer: whence it likewise comes, that the Exequatur Regium is sought to all decrees of the tribunals of the Inquisition of Rome, and of the Index Expurgatorius, of which we have elsewhere discoursed at large. And whence it also comes, that the manner of proceeding in such cases is not by the ordinary way of taking cognizance, but by an extrajudicial method, and according to the rules of state and government, not of the courts of justice; so that we see how little this matter is understood by the casuists and canonists, who, thinking that these examinations ought to be made according to the methods of the courts of justice, prate and write ‡, that the Pope's bulls and rescripts can neither be stopped nor examined by laick judges, because they have no jurisdiction over spiritual or ecclesiastical matters, handling this subject after their own manner, and making use of law terms foreign to the purpose. *Van Espen, loc. cit. pars 3. cap. 1. s. 1 & 2. † Idem, loc. cit. pars 5. per tot. Marta de Jurisdict. pars 4. cap. 4. Tomaso del Bene de Immunit. c. 3. dub. 10. num. 4. 6. and 16. Diana, p. 4. tr. 1. resol. 9. s. igitur. Accosta in Bull. Cruciat. q. 69. per tot. Bellet. Disquis. Cler. pars 1. de Exempt. Cl. s. 3. num. 26 and 27. Whence likewise proceeded, that all tribunals of justice, though supreme, have not power to grant this Exequatur Regium, but that power is reserved to the King's supreme councils and counsellors only; so with us, it belongs solely to the collateral council, of which the viceroy is head, to grant it, but to no other tribunal of justice, be it ever so supreme.* And in the dominions of the other Christian princes of Europe, such as France and Spain, it is reserved to the King's supreme councils only: As in Flanders to the supreme council of Brabant, and the other supreme councils of those provinces †; therefore, in 1551, the regent and judges of the vicariate were deservedly reprimanded by the viceroy Toledo, for having taken upon them to grant the Exequatur Regium, by admonishing and ordering them to do so no more for the future, because that prerogative belonged solely to the viceroy and his collateral council, not to the tribunals of justice. ‡ Nor is this prerogative peculiar to our kings and kingdom only, as some have believed; it is common to all princes, who in their dominions practise the same. In Spain, as Covarruvius §, Belluga ||, and Cevallos ¶ testify, the bulls and all other provisions that come from Rome, before they are published, are examined in the royal council, and often, when they have no mind they should be executed, they retain them; so that Salgado, in order to justify that custom and constant practice, wrote that treatise De Retentione Bullarum, and that other, De Supplicatione ad Sanctissimum, &c.; and Agostino Manuel, in his History of John II. witnesseth, that the same is practised in Portugal.** It is well known, that in France and Flanders, nothing that comes from Rome is published till it be first examined by the King's officers; yea, they don't so much as make use of the *Camil. Borrel. in Comm. ad Stat. Neap. † Van Espen, de Plac. Reg. pars 2. cap. 3. s. 3. || Belluga in Speculo Princ. rubr. 13. verb. restat. ** Manuel, Ist. di Gio. II. lib. 4. |