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CHAP. IV.

Considerations on the late Negotiation with France, in the House of Peers-Apology by Lord Grenville for the Omission of certain Papers in the Number of those laid before the House. -The Ends is view,and the Principle on which the British Ministry acted during the whole of the Negotiation-Review of the Negotiation, in the four different Stages into which Lord Grenville divided it.-Causes of the Rupture of the Negotiation.—Address to His Majesty on the Subjec of the Negotiation, moved by Lord Grenville.-Observations on the Address, and the Subject of the Address by Lord Hawkesbury-Lor Sidmouth.-Lord Eldon-And the Earl of Lauderdale-Addres carried, Nem. diss.—Address to the same effect moved in the House of Commons by Lord Howick,-Conduct of the English Ministry in the Negotiation vindicated.-Speeches on the present Question by Lord Yarmouth-Sir Thomas Turton-Mr. Montague-Mr. Whit bread-Mr. Canning-Lord Henry Petty-and Mr. PercevalAddress carried, Nem. diss.

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HE subject of the negotiation being brought under the consideration of the house of peers, according to the order of the day, the 2d of January 1807,

Lord Grenville rose, and said, that the documents in their lordships' hands, were fuller and more ample than any that had been presented to parliament on any former occasion of a similar nature. This would not have been necessary, if it had not been for the very full, though not equally correct statement, published by the French government. It would nevertheless be perceived by their lordships, that there were se. veral omissions in the papers, of instructions given to our ministers, which could not be supplied with. out the risk of injury to ourselves, or our allies.-Lord Grenville pro. ceeded briefly to notice a few of the leading principles that characterized the negotiation which was the subject of their discussion.

That peace was a desirable object,

there could be no doubt. Ther might be cases in which a nation actuated by views of sound policy might think it advisable to mak great sacrifices for the purpose o obtaining a peace that promise to be permanent; nay even, if a peace could not be considered a permanent, it was worth the mak ing sacrifices to obtain it, if i promised a considerable interval o tranquillity; an interval which migh then be calculated upon, as serving to recruit and increase the busines of the country. But those who con sidered the state of Europe for si years, or, he might say, for thirteen or fourteen years past, must be con vinced that there was no rationa hope of any considerable interval o tranquillity following a treaty o peace with France. It becam therefore, in this negotiation, a ne cessary object to seek out for a equivalent to be set up against tha want of permanence, which mus attend any peace under such circum.

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stances. He was therefore of opision, that the only basis on which we ought to treat with France, was that of actual possession. This country being a great maritime and colonil power, and France a great continental power, there would be no reciprocity of cession between the two powers, that could in any degree tend to their mutual advantage. The conquests made by this country, could be of no use to France, unless she would become A great commercial and colonial power: the conquests made by France, could be of no use to this country, unless this country would become a great continental power.

But, though the state of actual possession was the only basis that appeared to his majesty's ministers to be a proper basis for their negofiation with France, it did not follow that such a negotiation was to exclude the necessary discussion of equivalents to be given for certain cessions to be agreed on. And such a discussion became the more necessary where a negotiation involved the interests of allies. When his majesty's present ministers came into efice, they found a treaty concluded by their predecessors with Russia, by which each party bound itself not to conclude peace without the consent of the other. That he considered as a wise, and a fair measure. Bat, even supposing that the treaty, with Russia had not been wisely concluded, still the sacred engage. ment of the sovereign having been given to Russia, his majesty's ministers were bound to fulfil its con. ditions.

Our allies might be divided into two classes: those to whom we are bound by treaty; and those to whom we are bound by the circumstances

which had occurred during the war, and the situations in which they were placed in consequence of the events of that war. Of the former class of our allies were Sweden and Portugal; and of the latter, Napies and the elector of Hanover With respect to Sweden and Portugal, nothing more was required than to guarantee to those powers their state of actual possession, The king of Napes stood in a different situation. He had been deprived by the power of France of all his dominions on the continent of Europe. Lord Crenville had no hesitation in saying, teat he would have consented to make sacrifices, not merely valuable in finance, in revenue, or in commerce, but even sacrifices of safety and of strength, to procure the restoration of the kingdom to the king of Naples. But no sacrifices that we could make, could have been an equivalent to France for the restoration of that kingdom. With respect to Sicily, the king of Naples was sti in possession of that island, or rather it was in the possession of a brave, and, as it had been proved, an invincible British army. That army had entered the island with the consent of the king of Naples, who had received them there in the full confidence that they would defend it bravery, and that it would not be given up to the enemy. Would it not therefe e, have been an indelible disgrace to this country to have given up Sichy to France on her offer of an equi valent? It was not for us to barter it away for any equivalent without the consent of the sovereign. As to Hanover, it was sacrificed to in us tice on the part of France, for the express purpose of injuring this country. Wou'd it not therefore, be disgraceful in us not to insist on

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the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign, from whom it had been taken, solely on account of its connection with this country? The restoration of Hanover, thus unjustly seized, was therefore insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to the negotiation. The principle on which ministry acted during the whole of the negotiation, was, that of good faith to our allies: that of the French government to effect a separation between us and our allies as clearly appeared from the negotiation from first to last, which was divided into four stages.

The first, when we were offered terms, which might have been considered as the fair price of peace; had we been concerned for ourselves only, but which were offered as the price of dishonour, as the price of the desertion of Russia, our faithful ally.

The second stage of the negotiation was, when the French government, partly by threats, partly by promises and inspiring hopes, contrived to persuade the Russian mini. ster at Paris, M. D'Oubril to sign a separate treaty of peace. This being done, there was in the tone of the French government, a very rémarkable alteration. "No," said they to our ministers, "we cannot now grant you the same terms we were willing to do before. The signature of a separate peace with Russia, is equivalent to a splendid victory" An expression not loosely used in conversation, but forming a part of the written sentiments of the French government upon that

event.

The French government, finding the treaty would not be ratified, immediately offered the English negotiators better terms, in the hope of be

ing able, though they could not separate Russia from this country, to separate this country from Russia. And this was the third stage of the negotiation.

The fourth and last stage of the negotiation, was, when the French ministers, finding that Great Britain and Russia were inseparable; at length agreed to the negotiation to be carried on conjointly for the in. terests of Russia and Great Britain, They refused to agree to the terms asked on behalf of Russia, and again offered terms to this country on the principle of a separate nego. tiation. The rupture of the nego, tiation followed of course.

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Had Russia insisted upon extra. vagant terms, or on points trifling and uninteresting, it would have been painful to lord Grenville t have stated, that the rupture of the negotiation arose from any such con duct on the part of Russia. the very contrary of all this was the case. The terms insisted on by Russia were very moderate, and di rected only to the security of he allies. She demanded the guarante of Sicily to the king of Naples, and that the French troops should era cuate Dalmatia, which was not ne. cessary to the vast empire, obtaine by the arms of France, and coul be held by this power, only a a post of offence towards Austri and the Porte, and of hostility to wards Russia. The guarantee o Sicily to the king of Naples wa clearly a British object. That Rus sia, in requiring the evacuation o Dalmatia, confined her demand to that object, and did not make a de mand of the territory, was also o importance to this country as wel as to our ally. With this good faith and moderation on the part a

Rusia, would it not have been an indelible disgrace to this country, if we had violated good faith on our part? And what were the terms that were offered to us, as the price of disgrace and dishonour? We were to keep, what the French could not without a naval superiority take from us-Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, India, and the Island of Tobago!-It had been stated in the papers now before the house, that if we had made peace at the period alluded to in the papers, the treaty of the confederation of the Rhine, would never have been signed, or at least, would not have been published. It appeared however, that supposing peace to have been concluded with the utmost rapidity, after the arrisal of our ministers at Paris, the treaty could not have been signed before the publication of the last German treaty. This very confederation must unavoidably have preceded the treaty, and supposing it to have happened the day after, it would have necessarily been a cause for war.- Lord Grenville concluded by moving," That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to as sure his majesty that that house had taken into serious consideration the papers relative to the late negotiation which he had been pleased to lay before them, and that they saw with gratitude, that he had employed every means to restore the blessings of peace, in a manner consistent with the interests and glory of his people, and at the same time, with an observance of that good faith with our ales, which this country was bound to retain inviolate. That, while we lamented that by the unbounded ambition of the enemy, those laudable endeavours to his kingdom had been frustrated, no exertion should be

wanting on their part to support and assist him, in the adoption of such measures as might yet be found necessary, either for the restoration of peace, or to meet the various exigencies of the war in that most important crisis."

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The same motion, introduced by speech to the same effect, was made by lord Howick, in the house of commons, January 5.-Never did any motion meet with more cordial and unanimous support in either house, and yet none, perhaps, ever gave rise to a longer conversation; which turned, for the most part, on the mode and course that had been pursued in the negotiation.

In the house of peers, lord Hawkesbury expressed his complete concurrence with lord Grenville, on the great points he had stated, but at the same time said, that if he did agree to the address, it must be with some qua'ifications. It had been stated in his majesty's declaration, that the French, from the outset of the negotiation, had agreed to proceed on the basis of actual possession, subject to the interchange of such equivalents as might be for the advantage and honour of the two countries. Now, he confessed, that after a careful examination of the papers before them, he found nothing in the whole of them, that could be considered as a certain and unequivocal foundation for such a declaration. Before the arrival of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of actual possession was so far from being actually agreed on, that another, very different, was expressly stated to be the grounds on which the French government would enter on a negotiation. Lord Yarmouth, indeed, had given a statement in writing, of a conversation he had E 4

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had with Talleyrand, and he, no doubt, believed that Talleyrand had proposed the basis of actual possession. The words were : Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas." But in order to affix the peper and precise meaning to these rods, they ought to look at the xt, and, this shews that the words are not general, and that they sele or y to Sicily. Ministry ought deranded a precise and pacagoricas recognition, of the basis of accoch, tron, before they gave full powers to incat to their negotiator. Yet lord H. most heartily concurred in the general result of the negotiation, and with the above exception joined in the address, and in the assurances of support to his majesty in prosecuting the war, which it had been found impossible immediately to put an end to, on grounds in any degree consistent with the security and honour of this country, or the maintenance of good faith to our allies.

His lordship proceeded to shew both that the war was necessary, and that we possessed the means of supporting it. At the commencement of the treaty with France in 1801, that country was in a very different situation from what it is in now. At that time, Holland and Switzerland, though subject to the influence of France, were not completely united to it. Naples was entire, and Austria, though she had lost much of her military reputation, was still a great power; and in point of population and extent of territory, equal to what she had been at the commencement of the war with France. Many, there. fore, thought, and lord H. confessed he had joined in the opinion, that if France were to be left to her.

self, her power would sink to its natural level. Now, however, all the states to which he had alluded, had been either completely subdued by France, or reduced within comparatively narrow limits.

In 1801, the British government wished to try the feelings of France, and to find out what would be the policy of its government on the restoration of peace. It might endeavour to acquire confidence at home and abroad, which could be done only by a system of moderation; or it might consider its security to lie in pursuing that system of aggression which had marked the progress of that revolution from whence it had sprung. It had adopted the latter system: so that scarcely three months had elapsed from the time of signing the treaty of Amiens, till the spirit of the treaty was violated by repeated aggressions. Ever since that time, these aggressions had been continued; as an instance of which, their lordships had only to look at the confederation of the Rhine, to which lord Grenville had adverted.-In con. sidering the question of peace or war, they would observe, that while they continued at war they had at least this advantage, that whatever exertions France might make, they must be confined to the continent of Europe. But peace would open to her the way to Asia, Africa, and America. To these at least, he hoped, her power could not extend. Another thing to be considered was, that while we were at war, we were on perfect equality with our enemies. We were as powerful by sea as they were by land. But if peace should take place, from the very nature of the two cases, their power would not be made less, while our

superiority

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