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Mr. Canning rose, and freely ac. knowledged that his suspicions of the conduct of ministers in the negotiation, were pointed quite another way than the charges brought against them by Mr. Whitbread; whose speech coming from one of their own body, from a friend and champion of their former politics, himself still apparently maintaining opinions, which they, very much to their own credit and the advantage of their country, had relinquished, he did not expect they would have suffered to remain unanswered. And he should have thought that the noble lord (Howick) who had made, or whose opinions had dictated so many motions in that house for peace and negotiation in the course of the last twelve years, would have sufficiently felt the pride and the comfort of the situation in which he now stood, the advocate for the justice of the cause of his country against France, not to have omitted an opportunity of vindicating that cause against the objections of his honourable friend. Since, however, neither the noble lord himself, nor any of his colleagues had thought it worth their while to endeavour to counteract the impression which Mr. Whitbread's speech was calculated to produce, he felt himself obliged, though very reluctantly, at so late an hour, to state his opinion of the question now before the house. He agreed with Mr. W. that there were assertions in his majesty's declaration, not borne out by the papers on the table: but not that the effect of these errors or misrepresentations, was, to prove that an opportunity had been lost of making an advantageous peace; that the negotiation had been broken off prematurely and unnecessarily on the part of this country, or that,

with a little more patience and dex. terity, we should have found France ready to give such terms as it became his majesty's ministers to accept. He could not believe that there was, from the beginning, any other intention on the part of the enemy than to delude and amuse us. He considered the false statements in the declara. tion, as only so many ill contrived attempts to conceal or excuse their having been so amused and deceived. And, so far from conceiving the rupture of the negotiation to have been premature, while he agreed in thinking the opportunity ill chosen, he blamed only that choice which let so many better opportunities pass by; that suffered a negotiation, which, it was evident, from the earliest stage, must terminate as it had done, to be protracted by the artifices of the enemy, to his advan. tage alone, and to the infinite detriment of this country.

Mr. Canning, following the order lord Howick had pursued in his speech, proceeded to state the grounds on which he had formed those opinions. It would serve but little purpose, did our limits admit, to follow Mr. Canning, in a speech of very great length, into new discussions about the uti possidetis, and the correspondence between the French and English ministers and negotiators. But two points in that speech claim attention.

While Mr. Canning admitted, and rejoiced in the admission, that the good faith of Russia and England towards each other had been sacredly observed, he regretted that so laudable a system should not have been carried fully and beneficially into execution; that there had not been as much wisdom, as sincerity and generosity displayed in the con

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duct of the alliance; that a concert, so perfect in principle, had been acted upon so negligently or ill-ad. visedly, as to lose in policy all the main advantages, which such a concert between two great powers was calculated to produce, and which constituted its principal value-what was, in truth, the main advantage of such a concert and union between two great powers, such as Russia and England, in a negotiation with a common enemy y? Not that it obliged their respective plenipotentiaries to communicate with each other, upon every step that each might advance in its treaty; not because it bound each not to conclude without the other. These, abstractedly taken, were not advantages, but rather disadvantages. They tended to complicate, embarrass, and retard the work of pacification; and might ultimately lead to the rejection of a peace in the highest degree desireable to one party, from the want of some petty object, or the failure of some unreasonable pretension of the other. But what was the advantage which more than compensated, especially at a moment like the present, all those mutual inconveniences; and which made the union of two such powers as Russia and England, not only a mutual security to themselves, but

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union existed, unless its existence were known. A concert might be perfectly cordial between two contracting parties; but if its operation could have been kept secret, if it should not be diligently, nay, and he had almost said, ostentatiously bla zoned to the world, it was utterly useless for any purpose of larger benefit. And what was the fact? Was it notorious that England and Russia acted in concert?---Was not the direct contrary more than suspected?---Was not the mission of M. D'Oubril universally believed to be a surprise upon our government? Was not the omission of any mention of Russia in the king's speech at the end of the last session of parliament, understood both here and abroad, as a tacit abrogation of our alliance?

Russia and England might still be true to each other. But Russia and England together, were no longer true to the cause of Europe and of the world. And were not the effects correspondent with the errors of the policy? What lost Prussia? Lord H. would lament that Prussia did not throw herself upon the courts of London and Petersburgh for counsel and assistance. But what induce ment had Prussia to take this course? In the declaration which was published by the court of Berlin, at the beginning of October 1806, it is said, "two negotiations were at that time (when Prussia was goaded by France into the measures which led immediately to war) car. ried on at Paris; one with Russia, the other with the English ministry. In both these negotiations, the inten tions of France against Prussia were evidently manifested." And then the declaration proceeded to specify the stipulations hostile to Prussia in each. And if, at the same time, at

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which this undoubted fact of the separate negotiations with M. D'Oubril and lord Yarmouth, were communicated by M. Talleyrand to the Prussian minister at Paris, he bad the goodness, as no doubt he had, of communicating in confidence, that sentence of the English secre. tary of state's letter of the 8th of April, in which Mr. Fox declares his persuasion that the project of a new combination against France was atterly chimerical: then what ration. al Prussian could have advised his king to look for aid against France, from the joint counsels and exertions of two powers, who were notori. ously pursuing courses separate from, and independent of each other; but each separately and re. spectively hostile to Prussia; and of whom one had voluntarily confessed to France herself, that the day of such confederacies had gone by, and that any attempt to revive them would be utterly chimerical? Mr. Canning trusted that in all alliances which this country might hereafter contract, it would be remembered that, though good faith between the contracting parties was much, it was not all; that such a connection lost half its value, as well as half its sanctity, when it was not avowed in the eyes of the world; that what we appeared anxious to conceal, or afraid to acknowledge ourselves, would not readily be believed or trusted by others; and that " sepa. rately in term but substantially in concert," was a form of treaty which had all the disadvantages of combination, without any of the advantages for which combination was most to be prized. How could

that concert be effectual which was
known to none but the parties who
concealed it, and to the enemy who
stipulated for its concealment, in
order that he might deny it, and
which presented to all other nations,
no other appearance than that of
disunion of counsels and a diversity
of objects? The reasoning of Mr.
Canning on this point, of a joint or
separate negotiation, was certainly
of great weight and importance.
The other point, of very great con-
sequence in his speech, above alluded
to, related to the policy or impolicy
of an open rupture with Prussia, on
account of Hanover. Prussia,
he observed, at the dissolution
of the
the confederacy of 1805,
by the battle of Austerlitz, or
rather by the peace of Presburgh,
was compelled to consult her own
safety, by concluding a separate
treaty of peace with France. By
this treaty France transferred Ha
nover to Prussia. From good-will
to Prussia? Oh no. Prussia accepted
the transfer in the first instance,
"under the condition that her posses-
sion of Hanover should not be con.
sidered as valid till a general peace,
and till the consent of the king of
Great Britain could be obtained*."
For a time Buonaparte appeared to
acquiesce in this condition, but no
sooner was he set at ease by the re-
tirement of the Russian army, than
he found himself at liberty to press
Prussia with less reserve. He in-
sisted on the recall of the patent by
which the occupation of Hanover
was declared provisional, and on the
ports being shut against the British
flag, in the same manner as if the
French had returned into the elec-

Prussian proclamation on taking temporary possession of the Electorate of Hanover, January 27, 1806.

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torate.

torate. Prussia had then no choice but war, or compliance, at the risk of war, with England: she saw this risk but could not avoid it. She saw that France, in the words of the king of Prussia, "triumphed in secret at the thought of having disunited two courts, the union of which might have been dangerous to her." We either did not see this, or, seeing, did not regard it. We fell into the snare; and the message from the king to parliament*, April 21, placed us in a state of war with Prussia.

Buonaparte had apprehended the union of Prussia with the two great surviving powers of the confederacy. He wished to punish Prussia, to insulate her, to have her at his mercy. In the space of three months, instead of Prussia plotting with England and Russia, jointly against France, he beheld Prussia at war with England; and England and Russia separately negotiating for peace.

But, to continue and secure to Buonaparte this bencficial state of things, it was necessary that the negotiation with England should be resumed. Otherwise we might have begun to see that war with Prussia, the only power by whose aid we could ever hope to make effectual head against France, was not precisely the policy most consonant with our interests, and we might possibly have corrected it be. fore it was too late. What, says lord H. "would your policy have abandoned Hanover ?" Had his policy, Mr. C. asked, recovered Hanover?

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What, would have made common cause with Prussia while you had such a just complaint against her unredressed?" Mr. C. hoped that we were making, or ready to make, common cause with her now, and he

did not see what great benefit we had derived from waiting till now to do So. Το prevent our recurring to this policy, however, at a period when it might have been more advantageous to us, M. Talleyrand resumed the ne. gotiation. And then came the message through lord Yarmouth. And then the separate treaty of M. D'Ou. bril: a treaty in which, most fortunately for us, Buonaparte and his minister were betrayed by the intoxica. tion of the success which had so far attended their plans, into the demand of such terms as it was impossible for the emperor of Russia to ratify. And then came those tedious bicker. ings, those perplexed and wearisome bickerings about the uti possidetis, contrived as it would seem, for the express purpose which France had at heart, of gaining time, of absorbing our whole attention, and of mak. ing the continent vanish from our view. And thus was the negotiation protracted till the fate of Prussia was ripe. And then Buonaparte left Paris for the field of battle.---To conquer Hanover for England, no doubt!--And the farce, as lord Lau. derdale had very properly called it, was ended. Mr. C. having made these explanations of his sentiments concerning the negotiation, willing to vote for the address.

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Lord Henry Petty said, that du. ring the last year it was evident to all the world, that the relations of Britain and Russia had never been more intimate. No communication of what was then passing, made by France to Russia, could have produced the effect he had supposed, of hurrying Prussia into a war with France. If Mr. C. would look at the date of Mr. Fox's letter to

* See Vol. XLVII. History of Europe, page 160.

Talleyrand,

Talleyrand, in which it is admitted that there was no longer any chance of organizing a combination against France on the continent, he would find the treaty of offensive and de. fensive alliance between Russia and France, was signed one month before the date of that letter.—It was difficult to discover on what ground Mr. C. supposed the French nego. tiators denied that the basis of the uti possidetis had been admitted. Let him look at the papers and he would find it stated by lord Lauder, da'c, that when the admission of that basis was urged by lord Yarmouth, general Clarke did not deny it, but pretended it had been talked of only in loose conversations, which be described as romans politiques. This was certainly a very different thing from a denial.

Mr. Perceval, from a review of all the circumstances connected with the negotiation, concluded that the enemy were never seriously desirous of peace, and that ministers were dupes of the artifices of the French government. He lamented that a man of Mr. Fox's great talents, and

incorruptible mind, had been be trayed into a private and confidential correspondence with such a man as the friend to whom he was attached, Talleyrand. He blamed ministers for not having sooner put an end to the negotiation, and declared his firm conviction that no peace could take place with France, at least, such a peace as would be worthy of the acceptance of this country, so long as the force and the counsels of that country were directed by two such men as Talleyrand and Buonaparte.

Lord Howick observed, that some honourable gentlemen blamed his majesty's ministers for having done too much in the way of negotiation, while his honourable friend and relation, Mr. W. blamed them for doing too little. But he thought it was not a little in their favour, that they had steered a middle course between two extremes.

Mr. Whitbread having withdrawn his motion, the address was put and carried, nem diss. And the house adjourned at five o'clock on Tuesday morning.

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