superiority would be gradually diminished; for peace would furnish them with the means of advancing in that particular sort of power, in which our superiority was undis. puted. These were not arguments for eternal war, but they were circumstances that ought to have great weight with their lordships, in considering what we gained by a peace, as a proper compensation for what we lose. It was with great pleasure and pride that lord H. reflected on the flourishing state of our finances, which was to be ascrib. ed to two great measures, namely the sinking fund, (which lord II. considered as "unqestionably the greatest measure ever produced by the ingenuity and wisdom of man!") brought forward, and matured by his right honourable friend, the late Mr. Pitt: the other, that of raising a considerable part of the supplies within the year, also first brought forward by his right honourable deceased friend, and which had been acted upon, and in some degree improved by lord Sidmouth. The permanent taxes, were not less than eighteen millions. But the sinking fund at this time, produced eight millions and an half. And if we had but perseverance to go on, for a few years, with a strict regard to economy in our general system of expenditure, we should arrive at the happy period when the sinking fund would equal all the loans that might be necessary for the expences of the community.

Lord Sidmouth, was willing to admit, that in the documents which had been submitted their lordships, there was not to be found any spe. cific offer of the uti possidetis, on the part of the French government. But, he contended, the whole nego

tiation had been conducted on that very basis. In the letter addressed by M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, in the early stage of the correspondence between the two governments, M. Talleyrand states, that France de sires nothing of Great Britain that she already possesses.-Lord Sid. mouth, further, put the question, what was it that caused a temporary suspension of the negotiation? Was it any demur on the part of the French government on the point of uti possidetis? No. It was a delay occasioned by a matter of form, as to the manner in which the negotiation was to be conducted, and not any objection that was started to that understood basis. In five or six weeks afterwards lord Yarmouth arrived from Paris, when, by desire of ministers, he committed to wri ting the substance of the various communications he had held with M. Talleyrand, who, it appeared, in the name of the government of France, had made use of the following expression, "Nous ne vous deman♣ dons rien," words which he after. wards energetically repeated. appeared clearly from the papers before them, that previously to the 20th of July last, when M.D'Oubril ́ signed the provisional treaty with France, in the name of the Russian government. Lord Yarmouth did not entertain the smallest doubt that the state of actual possession was the mutually acknowledged basis of negotiation. In fact, the first at tempt to question it, though even then not expressly in words, was, after this period, when M. Talley. rand avowed that circumstances had altered, and that, in consequence, the French government had deter. mined not to agree to that which was consented to originally, and that

It

they

they must insist on having posses. sion of Sicily. On three subsequent occasions, attempts were made by the French negotiators to deny the statements of lord Yarmouth; but, though one of them endeavoured to evade and shuffle, they could not deny them, directly, when met by by our minister, face to face. This had been stated by lord Lauderdale. The French plenipotentiaries unquestionably wished our negotiators to understand the basis of negoti. ation to be the uti possidetis, although they cautiously avoided formally committing it to writing, in order, no doubt, to have room to cavil. But why, it was demanded, were they not called upon to avow their agreement to this principle in writing? There had been a clear admission originally, that such was the mutually under stood agreement.

Lord Eldon did not lament the failure of a pacific adjustment with an enemy, whose aggressions in times of peace, are equally hostile with their operations in war. He admitted that lord Grenville had proved in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, that the principle of actual possession was the only basis on which a beneficial treaty could have been concluded. But that the uti possidetis was the actual basis, agreed, and acted upon in the late negotiation, he really did not know in what part of the official papers presented to that house, ministers would be able to find that principle of actual possession once recognized by the French government. No such proposition was made out by the evidence, even in the remotest view of the case.-In the last letter, said in the French account of the negotiation, to have

been sent by M. Talleyrand to lord Lauderdale, there were calumnies which tended to exhibit the noble lord in the most savage form; calumnies, which he was fully persuaded were to him unfoundedly and improperly addressed. Lord Eldon wished to hear from the noble lord, that no such letter had been ever re. ceived, or that no minister of a hos tile power, would dare to send to the plenipotentiary of Great Britain, a communication replete with the most base and injurious calumnies.— Another practice of the same inveterate malice and unprincipled audacity, was the contradiction of one of the French plenipotentiaries, to the report the earl of Yarmouth had made of his conferences with the French minister on the basis.

It

Lord Lauderdale thought it sin. gular, that the learned lord should apply to him for evidence, after having considered that of lord Yar mouth as perfectly nugatory. happened, however, that lord Lauderdale could give ample testimony to the facts questioned by lord Eldon. For independently of lord Yarmouth's having repeatedly stated these facts to him, he was enabled to confirm them from other sources, particularly from his own conferences with the minister of France. But, without any corroboration from his testimony, lord Lauderdale contended, that the notes, and verbal communications of lord Yarmouth, were quite sufficient to sustain the assertion, that the French, from the outset of the negotiation, agreed to proceed upon the basis of actual possession. With regard to the letter alluded to by Lord Eldon, the earl of Lauderdale could say, that during his stay at Paris, he did not experience any want of civility

whatever.

whatever. Nor did he know of any thing different, until he saw in this country, the posthumous letter addressed to him in the Moniteur.

The address was then read from the woolsack, and agreed to, nem. diss.

The same subject underwent a very long discussion in the house of commons.

Lord Howick, having moved that the papers relating to the negotiation with France, should be now taken into consideration, said, that it had become his duty to offer that proposition to the house which had been usual on similar occasions; namely, that an humble address be presented to his majesty, expressive of such sentiments as the house might think fit to convey to the throne, after a careful review of the whole of that most important question, After lamenting the failure of the negotiation, and the death of Mr. Fox, he proceeded to shew, that as, on the one hand, the king's government had not in the course of the negotia tion, committed the honour of the crown, in any one instance, by any manifestation of a disposition to make improper concessions and sacrifices, so, on the other, it had neglected no means within its power, to conclude such a peace as was consistent with the honour, prosperity and interests of the country. It had been stated in Mr. Fox's first letter to M. Talleyrand, in answer to the first overture," that a peace, to be advantageous to the two countries, should be negotiated on principles honourable to both, and, at the same time, of a nature, as far as possible, to secure the future tranquillity of Europe." It was this principle that the ministry had made the basis of the negotiation. It was

this that they invariably pursued. They insisted that we should treat in conjunction with our ally, the emperor of Russia; and that the negotiation should be conducted on the basis of uti possidetis.-Lord Howick proceeded to shew, in nearly the same manner as had been done by lord Grenville in the house of peers, that the basis of the uti possidetis had been admitted by the French plenipotentiaries; that the English ministers always understood that to be the basis, and that they never admitted any other.-This principle the British ministers applied to Sicily, though not exactly a conquest, as we held it in con junction with its lawful sovereign. This our faith to the king of Naples required. Hanover, being unjustly attacked for the sake of England, the honour of this country compelled the ministers to stipulate for its recovery. The integrity of Turkey, of Sweden, and of Portugal, was stipu lated for, and it was also their ob ject to secure the little states from the insults and incroachments they had experienced from France. From these points they never receded. How far they might have receded as to particular terms, it would not be proper for him in that place to discuss. cessions was to be estimated by the probability of the advantages, and the duration of that peace for which they were made, was nothing in the aspect of affairs that could induce them to make valuable sacrifices to purchase peace. Suppose that Prussia, in making war on France, had succeeded, what wou'd have been said to a minister who should have concluded a peace, and thereby tied up the hands of his country from taking advantage of the new order of

But if the value of

things,

mouth should think the vindication he had entered into at all necessary. Sir Thomas Turton said, that in his view of the conduct of our am. bassadors, the history of their proceedings might be summed up in a very concise way. They were in this country when they should have been in France; and they had remained in France long after the period at which they should have dated their departure. He was of opinion, that the person whom Mr. Fox de nounced, was a spy of the French government. He condemned the employing in the negotiation, a person not used to diplomatic transactions. If an experienced person had been employed, the basis would have been early acknowledged, or the negotiation would have been broken off. The negotiation was meant but to entrap. And hence the aversion to written documents.

Mr. Montague regretted that in the whole of this business, he saw the complete success of the machina. tions of France. Mr. Fox was eager. ly desirous of making peace, and of this eager desire the French had taken advantage. He lamented the death of Mr. Fox, though he had always differed from him in politics, during the last twenty years; he ralued him as a man. Mr. Fox during the whole of that period had never altered his conduct, which in that period of shifting and turning was rather a singular instance. The first overture for peace Mr. Montague considered as having, beyond a doubt, come from Mr. Fox, for his letter to Talleyrand had broken the ice. It was impossible that those

glancings and oglings at peace, which it contained, could escape the notice of such a penetrating politician as M. Talleyrand. He did not like the expression of perfect attach ment, to the man who had been so long the disturber of Europe. When the friendship between M. Talleyrand began, he could not say. Perhaps it was in 1792, when Talleyrand was here, and had kindled the flames of war over Europe. He acknowledged that Mr. Fox had exposed the sophistry of Talleyrand in a clear and manly manner. But, was it the. policy of Talleyrand to obtain peace? No. The negotiation was nothing more thau a truce, made use of for the purpose of blinding our government, and enabling Buonaparte to make preparations for his attack on Prussia and Russia. The French mi nisters had treated our late plenipo tentiaries, as Mr. Burke said they treated lord Malmesbury, "Poor baby bunting, the king is gone a hunting." Yes! he had gone a hunting with a vengeance. But it was to hunt the royal tyger of Prussia, and he carried with him a train no less numerous than that which preceded the tyger hunting in the East. Talleyrand had chosen lord Yarmouth to carry on the nego tiation, under circumstances in which he was not a proper person for the business, because he was then a prisoner in France, and had hopes of freedom only through the medium of peace. ought not to have committed such a burthen to the shoulders of a man unaccustomed to diplomacy. He said this without any disrespect to

This country

.708.

lord