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House of Lords, August 4.-On the order of the day being read for the second reading of the bill for preventing the granting of offices in reversion, it was supported by the earls of Grosvenor, Lauderdale, and Selkirk, and the lords Holland and Boringdon. Lord Boringdon expressed his regret at differing from many noble lords with whom he usually acted; but when he considered that this bill had been supported by ministers, had passed the other house, and been received with nearly an unanimous consent, and also the circumstances of the present moment, he thought it his duty to vote for it. On the other hand, by lord Arden and the lord viscount Melville. The house having divided, on a motion for reading the bill a second time, that day three months, there appeared, Contents

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Non-contents The bill was therefore lost.-But in the house of commons, August 10, Mr. Bankes, after many prefatory

observations, moved, "That an humble address should be presented to his majesty, praying that he would be pleased not to grant any office in reversion, until six weeks after the meeting of the next session of parliament;" adding, by way of notice, that early in that session, he would move for leave to bring in a bill, similar to the one which had been lost, that the house of commons, at least, might have an opportunity of unequivocally shewing its own opinion. After a good deal of conversation, the question was put on Mr. Bankes's motion, which was carried, nem, con. And it was ordered, that the address should be presented to his majesty, by such members of that house as were also members of his majesty's most honourable privy council.

House of Lords, August 14.-A speech was delivered by the lord chancellor, in his majesty's name, to both houses of parliament, which was prorogued to Thursday, the 24th of September.

See State Papers, p. 725.

СНАР.

СНАР. XIV.

The Year 1807 characterized by a calamitous Extension of the War. -War with Denmark.-The Circumstances in which it originated, and the military and naval Measures by which it was commenced. -Attempt to preserve Peace and Amity between Great Britain and Denmark by Negotiation.-Expedition under the Command of Lord Cathcart and Admiral Gambier.-Its Progress and Result.-Reflections.

N contemplating the events of the year 1807, the mind is forcibly impressed by a very general, and, as it should at first sight appear, a very calamitous extension of the war in which our country has been for so many years, almost uninter. ruptedly, engaged. We call this extension apparently calamitous, because, although we see powers hitherto neutral, and some of them the allies of Great Britain, reversing their respective relations, and engaging in hostilities against her; yet, on a slight view of the means of annoyance possessed by those powers, and on reference to what has actually happened, it will be seen also, that in reluctantly sub. mitting themselves to the dictates of the French ruler, they have forced upon us contests for the most part bloodless, in which the pen rather than the sword has been the arbiter of our differences. Austria, Russia, the Ottoman Porte, Prussia, and Denmark, have, in the present year, been added to the already formidable host of our enemies, and it cannot escape observation, with what indifference so large an ac. cession of hostile agency was received by the British public, and we may also add, by the government into whose balance the weight

of it was thrown. Perhaps the consideration above alluded to, may be taken as a sufficient reason for their indifference on both sides. The rupture with the four first of these powers, was not indeed passed over without discussion or animadversion in the British public, or in the British senate. The circumstance attending particularly the commence. ment of the war with Turkey, necessarily occasioned long and animated debates. Still, however, it is true, that the excitement of the national sensibility, was chiefly reserved for the Danish war: a cir. cumstance highly creditable to the national feelings and character, as it must be recollected, that Den. mark was, with one exception, the weakest of our new adversaries, and that it was from hostilities against her only, that Great Britain derived those advantages by which she succeeded in counteracting the designs of the more powerful of them. A nation thus scrupulous as to its own means of action, and which employs so large a portion of its political capacity in scrutinizing those acts by which it is itself most benefited, may lay claim with some degree of confidence to its share of political and moral justice. Few instances, indeed, have occurred, in which the

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motives, the wisdom, and the efficacy of the executive government, have been more nicely analysed, where a more animated attempt, supported by more splendid abili. ties, has been made to discredit them all, or where the amiable feelings of a generous people, together with the strongest operations of party spirit, have been more power. fully employed for that purpose.

The war with Denmark, and the military and naval measures by which it was commenced, offering the first grand feature of active and successful warfare that occurred in this year, as well as the first speci. men of the politics of the new administration, it is now our duty to present this subject to our readers in one connected view; in order to which, we must take a short retrospect of preceding events. We shall then narrate the progress of the war, and we shall also, in this place*, briefly state the discussions to which it gave rise, in the public and in parliament; concluding with such observations connect ed with it, as may be expected from the impartial historian.

In the course of the negotiations which, from the unfortunate peace of Presburg, and the still more la. mentable policy of the Prussian cabinet, terminated in the conclusion of the treatics of Vienna and Paris between Prussia and France, repeated intimations were given by Buonaparte, when he found that the tide of fortune continued to run in his favour, that one of the first and principal uses he should make of his success, would be, to cut off those channels of communication which

Great Britain still preserved with the continent. As the concurrence, and even the co-operation of Prussia was necessary for this purpose, to her were these intimations first addressed. By a most unaccountable infatuation, and inveig ed by motives which it were charity not to characterize, she was not long in acceding to those fatal measures, which, ere many months elapsed, proved the cause of her own down. fall. She took forcible possession of the king's German dominions, and excluded the British flag from her own ports, and from others to which her power or influence extended.

Previously however to the court of Berlin proceeding to this extremity, it was not consistent with Buona. parte's policy that his intentions on the subject should remain secret. It was, on the contrary, very ge nerally rumoured, and as generally credited by the best-informed per. sons in the north of Europe, that the French ruler would proceed to the immediate execution of this longthreatened measure. He was, at the time, sure of Prussia: Denmark offered yet a feeble obstacle to his wishes; it was to overawe her that he next turned his attention. engage her by fair or foul means to shut the ports of her German provinces, and to attempt to obstruct the commerce of England in its passage through the Sound, was the next step in his restless career. This was announced in no unintelligible terms, by the many official and unofficial agents, which his active diplomancy employed in every court of Europe: the public news

To

* A more copious statement of these, will of course be given in our account of parlamentary business and debates in 1808.

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papers were sometimes made the expounders of his will upon these topics.

The court of Denmark could not be the last informed of what was passing; her own interests, and the desire of Buonaparte, that she should at once learn his determination, and the success he had met with in binding Prussia to it, speedily put her in possession of what she was to ex ect. She took the alarm. In hopes. perhaps, of obtaining some consolatory information, or in the stili more delusive expectation of deriving some assistance by which to aver the impending storm, count Bernstorff, the Danish minister for foreign affairs, undertook a journey to Berlin. That court, divided as it had been, for some months, be tween the honest but feeble endea vours of one minister, and the infamous intrigues of another, to regulate its concerns according to their respective views, had not yet thrown itself into the gul, h from which it was never to arise. Its final and official consent to Buonaparte's proposal had not been given. He indeed knew what he had to depend upon; but the well-inten. tioned part of the Prussian ministry was still in hopes of preserving their own and their country's honour. To these men, count Bernstorff directed his attention—on them his hopes rested; and as they did not despair of maintaining their own independence, they allowed him to believe that they would assist in the support of that of Denmark. He accordingly did not hesitate to assert, that Denmark would resist any attempt upon her independence, from whatever quarter it came. At that time, possibly, he believed it, and the events of the

summer of 1806, rather tended to confirm him in this belief. The battle of Jena, however, and its immediate consequences, dissipated the delusion. Then Buonaparte became the absolute disposer of all the north and north-east of Germany: he plac ed garrisous in the Hans-towns; he violated the neutrality of the Danish territory, and assumed, for the winter, a position so bordering upon it, held himself, and by his agents, such language, and authorized acts of such magnitude, that there could no longer remain, in the mind of any unprejudiced man, a doubt as to his future intentions. The first of these portentous acts was issued, as soon as the suspension of military operations allowed of a moment's repose. It was his decree of the 21st of November, declaring the British isles to be in a state of blockade, and rendering the circumstance of this pretended blockade being violated by any neutral vessel, a ground of legal capture against such vessel. The nature and extent of this decree have been developed in another part of this work; it is sufficient, therefore, to state here, that without individualizing any, it was a virtual declaration of hostility against every neutral power that was in habits of commercial intercourse with Great Britain. If his means of giving full effect to this decree did not equal the injustice on which it was founded, no inference could thence be drawn in favour of its admissibility. It might be fortunate for neutral nations, that these means were not commen surate to the disposition thus shewn of abusing them; but the intention, although in some instances harmless for want of the power of realizing it, did not the less indicate a hostile

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mind, a spirit of encroachment totally incompatible with every idea of independence and neutrality. In this light, even the American government still professes to consider the French decree; a set-off against it has been found in our measures, which arose out of that decree; but in the utmost effervescence of their partiality to France, and of their enmity to Great Britain, the Americans have never pretended that Buonaparte's decree was not essentially hostile. As such they remonstrated against it; as the Danes also professed to have done; but, besides that they have never, although repeatedly called upon for the purpose, produced one public or official act, by which to shew the efficacy of their resistance, it seems to have lasted only until it was ascertained whether the French government could carry their decree into full effect. When this was decided in the ne gative, it became convenient to call the Berlin decree absurd, impracticable, and to put quite out of view its injustice and offensive aggression upon the rights of neutrals. It was

then, only a vain and impotent at. tempt, which was made merely for form's sake, to try to distress the natural enemy of France; but which it was wholly unworthy either of England or any other power, to treat otherwise than with indifference. It was to be regarded as an act entirely null and void.

Far other had been the conduct of Denmark upon an antecedent and not dissimilar occasion. When the British flag and commerce had been excluded from the Elbe and the Weser, and those rivers were, in consequence, blockaded by British squadrons, althou h little was

said of the violation of all right, justice, and public law, by which this blockade was occasioned, yet the English government was incessantly harassed with complaints and remonstrances. Prussia, the power principally concerned, and which suffered the most from our measures, acknowledged the justice of them; nevertheless, we were importuned from day to day, for the interests of Gluckstadt and Altona, and called upon to give up a great measure of national policy for the benefit of the Danish herringfishery. The consequence of these importunities, was, our allowing of such modification in the exercise of our right of blockade, as entitled us to the gratitude of Denmark. But they produced only an increase of angry and captious remonstrance. What had been conceded, was taken only as a ground for asking more, and for aggravating the pre. tended injustice of withholding any thing. This also was the case, in respect to the very mitigated mea sure of retaliation adopted by Great Britain, in consequence of the decree of the 21st of November. There too, all the injustice was on her side. Remonstrances, in a tone little suited to the relative power of Great Britain and Denmark, were addressed by the Danish chargé d'affaires in London, to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, against his majesty's order in council of the 7th of January. They were answered by that minister with all the strength which the justice of his cause afforded him, with all the dignity which his station required, and with that degree of temperate reproof which well suited the occa sion, and the character of the person to whom his answer was addressed. Although

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