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firmly and as extensively as the authors of it gave reason to expect, Zealand would not be at this moment under the government of the Danish crown, and Norway would be indebted still more than she is at present, to the moderation and for. bearance of Great Britain for any share of her antient prosperity which she might be able to enjoy.

But it has been said by those who perhaps attribute more firmness of character to the councils of Denmark, that she might have resisted the French, even after they were in possession of the duchies, and that she would have resisted them, had not England, by seizing her navy, deprived her of her principal means of defence. We attach little value to the argument, and for this reason: the Danes who well knew their weakness, and admitted that they had no means of resistance against the French, nevertheless denied the danger with which they were threatened, and which was obvious to the rest of the world; they refused to take any measures of precaution by which their defences might be strengthened, so that the French would not have had a naval force to contend with, but need only have taken possession of Copenhagen, and its dependencies, to have obtained their object of uniting all the maritime force of the Baltic against us. We see here a remarkable instance of the difficulties and the inconsistencies attending a predetermined resolution to impugn any particular measure upon mere party principles, without a reference to its real merits. The Danes say to the world, "we deny the notoriety of the enemy's intention which you all admit and recognize, but we acknowledge our in

ability to withstand those intentions, should they in fact exist." Their advocates in England have said, "this notoriety is evident to the most simple and unenlightened ob. server, but we maintain that they had not only the intention of resist. ing, but the means also of so doing, until you deprived them of their fleet. There cannot surely be much doubt as to the degree of credit to be given to each of these parties: the Danes we should imagine must know, better even than those who espouse their cause the most warmly, their own intentions, and their means of executing them. Still however it is argued, there could never exist a plea of necessity on the score of danger for Great Britain acting as she has done: for what material difference could be produced against her, by the addition to the enemy's navy of sixteen sail of the line, and as many frigates and smaller vessels? Have we not on former occasions shewn, that this very Danish navy, which is now so much an object of dread, could not offer the smallest impediment to the victorious career of the British flag?-Could we indeed admit that this numerical increase of the enemy's forces were, abstractedly taken, to have been the only incon. venience or danger resulting from the possession of Copenhagen by the French, so strong do we feel in the supremacy of our navy, that we might not perhaps have thought ne cessary a measure of such great and extensive consequence, as that which we are discussing. But, believing as we do, that the sixteen sail of the line formed only a part of the danger against which it was incumbent upon ministers to provide, and considering the circumstances of the

political

political state of Europe, to which we have more than once made allusion in this chapter, it appears to as that they would have incurred a most fearful responsibility, if knowing what they knew, and apprehending what they had so much reason to apprehend, they had neglected to avert the storm that was gathering round them, and we know of no better method by which they could have done so than that which they employed. If there should still be those who are prepared to dissent from these opinions, we would ask only the following questions, upon the issue of which, the merits or demerits of our government must altogether rest. Can it really be supposed that Russia, but for the expedition against Copen. hagen, would have remained in a state of neutrality to this country, and have withstood that fatal infatuation by which her sovereign has been prompted to aid and abet Buonaparte in his most atrocious acts of tyranny and usurpation? Would not the hostility and influence of Russia, in conjunction with those of France, have ensured the combination of the three Baltic navies against us? What would have been the feelings of this country, if, at some after-period, when engaged in other interesting pursuits, the campaign in Portugal, or in Spain, or possibly some indispensable measures of defence on our western coast, or in Ireland, we should have had farther to provide gainst the hostilities of forty or fifty sail of the line, accompanied by a powerful land-force in the North Sea? Would, under such circum. stances, ministers have been justifed against the reproaches of the public, and of their own conscien

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ces, by the plea now urged against them, that they had thought of no other danger than the sixteen sail of the line?

It has been said again, that the conduct of the Danish court, at this period, ought not to be judged of with a reference to any former event, or portion of its general policy; that its having joined in a hostile confederacy against Great Britain in 1801, ought not to be taken as presumptive evidence of its intention to do the same thing six years afterwards. If we could so far shut our eyes to the history of our own times, as to abstract this one transaction, both in its origin, its progress, and its consequences, from every other that had come to our knowledge, we might perhaps assent to this proposition. But as a country, like an individual, na. turally claims the benefit of any favourable interpretation to which its general policy may give rise, so, we apprehend, must she submit to any imputation which can be fairly deducible from the same source; and we must strongly maintain, in favour of the unblemished fame of our public morals, which has been, on this occasion, so violently, and, as we think, unjustly traduced, that, the circumstance of Denmark's having, in 1801, so far yielded to the influence of a third power, as to join in hostilities against us, avowedly at the suggestion of that power, and in contradiction to its own pro. fessed wishes and, interests, does afford most substantial ground for concluding that she would again do so, when urged to it by a power of greater and more impending magnitude. We do not see indeed how it is possible, in arguing the question, to lose sight of this probability;

bability; and we are informed, that the prince royal was so well aware of the influence which it must have against him, that he excused his conduct on the former occasion, on the score of its not having been voluntary, but forced upon him by the emperor Paul; and vindicated his present intentions, on the ground of no such exterior influence upon them being to be apprehended. Now to us it appears, on consider. ing the circumstances of the two periods, that the influence of Buonaparte was likely to be still more conclusive than that of the emperor Paul was admitted to have been (taking their intentions and indif. ference about their menaces to be the same), because Denmark might, at that time, have resisted, with the assistance of a British squadron, any attack on her capital, and there was no Russian army at hand to threaten her continental provinces; whereas, in 1807, nothing could prevent the French from overrunning those provinces, as soon as they, from whatever motive, deter mined so to do,

In the same spirit of impartiality which dictated the foregoing observations, we must in justice say, that the system according to which we think the Danish war not only justifiable but highly commendable, was not improved to the extent of which it was capable. We consider as highly impolitic, the terms of the capitulation of Copenhagen; the attempt to negotiate with Denmark, after she had unequivocally expressed her determination to rejeet all terms of reconciliation, as undignified; and the abandonment of the island of Zealand, from the

re-occupation of which the terms of the capitulation did not preclude us, as having been productive of nearly as much evil as we derived benefit from the original undertaking.

If as historians, not of the British empire only, but of the passing events in the political world, we should be called upon to say, whether, placing ourselves in the predi cament of the Danish government, we should have recommended them to make the sacrifice that was demanded, our answer must depend upon a view of the terms on which the demand was made. If it had been made abruptly, and unaccom panied by any other proposals which might render it at once conformable to the interests and inoffensive to the feelings of the Danish nation, we should say No. But as we are told, from unquestionable anthority, that, with reference to the point of feeling, it was left to the Danish government to prescribe the manner of the transaction, we conceive that the INTERESTS of that nation would have been better consulted by adhering to a policy, by which their principal dominions, their colouies, their commerce, and their navigation, would have been preserved entire, and independent of the yoke of France, than by form. ing that connection by which all these objects have been sacrificed, great and most oppressive burdens incurred, and by which the prosperity of Denmark, even of those very provinces, in the vain hope of preserving which, the remaindr were sacrificed, has been injured beyond the power of reparation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

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Partitions of power among conquering princes or military chiefs, not a novelty.-Projected partition of Europe at the conferences at Tilsit, between Buonaparte, and the Emperor Alexander.Measures taken by Buonaparte for carrying his design into execution.-Consolidation of his power at home and abroad.Flatters, cajoles, and at the same time, bridles more and more the French nation.-Continental blockade.-This a pretext for extending his conquests.-His intrigues in Spain.-Journey to Italy And Invasion of Portugal.

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JUMAN nature being at all times, and in all places, the same, the conduct of men is often found to be similar, in similar cir. cumstances. Partitions of power and territory have been made on sundry occasions, as we learn from history in antient times, among sovereign princes and other chiefs, at the head of immense armies; who afterwards, on the very first favoarable opportunity, quarrelled, attacked, and destroyed one another. Thus Julius Cæsar became perpetual dictator, and Octavius, emperor of Rome. It was thus, that in the decline of the Roman empire, the most powerful gover. nors of provinces first made a par. tition of the imperial dominions among themselves, and afterwards determined by the sword, which should wear the purple. It was on the same principle of mutual aggran. dizement, that peace was concluded between Buonaparte and the Rus. sian emperor, Alexander, who, not recollecting the danger of destroying every barrier between himself, and such a man as the ruler of France, so powerful, so unprin.

cipled, and of such insatiable ambition, fell into the snares of the Italian, with an imbecility bordering on insanity. The truth is, the youthful mind and conduct of Álex. ander, naturally weak, and prone withal to sensual gratification, was moulded at will by favourites who stamped it alternately with the impression of their own opposite characters and interests. Ever since the conclusion of the reign of Ca therine the Great, there had been at St. Petersburgh, what was called an anti-commercial party, in other words, a faction inimical to England: this party was composed chiefly of French emigrants, and Frenchmen become subjects of Russia by long residence. insinuated themselves into many situations that gave them opportu nities of exercising their talents, and indulging their natural inclination to intrigue; particularly those of tutors or preceptors in noble fami. lies. They breathed all the national enmity of France towards England; though sometimes foiled, they constantly renewed their at. tacks; and after the peace of Til.

These men

sit,

sit, finding that Alexander had suffered himself to be cajoled by Buonaparte, they improved every favourable occurrence to attach him more and more to France. Tutor. ed by this faction, he gave out, in a proclamation or declaration*, as his principal motive, or, "that which most sensibly touched his heart," for joining in a maritime confede ration against England, that she had harassed the Russian.trade. His other grounds of complaint were: that the British cabinet had refused to accept his offered mediation for peace between France and England; the seizure of the Danish fleet; and that England instead of bearing a part in the late war against France, instigated by herself, and which was her own cause, had, for her own selfish ends, sent out expeditions to Buenos Ayres, Sicily, Naples, and Egypt.-There was none of these grounds, except the last, that was in any degree even plausible.-Austria and Prussia, too were obliged to declare war against English commerce: but they had the modesty and good sense not to accompany their declarations with any grounds for this conduct.

The emperor of Russia farther declares in his proclamation," that he annuls for ever, every preceding convention between England and Russia, and particularly that entered into in 1801. He proclaims anew the principles of the armed neutrality, that monument of the wisdom of the empress Catherine, and engages never to recede from that system." Most improvident declaration! Either he must oue

*State Papers, p. 761.

day disavow this, or be for ever at war with his natural ally. How great the contrast! How direct the opposition between this, and the declaration of Russia against France, in September 1806! In an ukase of November 1806, the government of France is called an usurpation.-Though the emperor was seduced by the promises and cajoleries of Buonaparte, the Russian nation remained friendly to the English; though by an ukase of the 10th of November, 1807, an embargo was laid on all English ships in the harbours of Russia. But, through the favour of the inhabitants, and even the officers of the revenue, the English were ap prised of this beforehand so that they had time to set sail, and make their escape: which they did, with a favourable wind, to the number of eighty sail, with their cargoes, and arrived all of them safely in British harbours.

That a partition of Europe was carved out, and settled between Buonaparte and Alexander, in their conferences at Tilsit, cannot be doubted. His majesty, Napoleon, in his speech to the legislative body at the opening of one of their sessions, in August 1807, says: "France is united to the people of Germany, by the laws of the confederation of the Rhine; to those of the Spains, of Holland, of Switzerland, and the Italies, by the laws of our fe derative system. Our new relations with Russia are cemented by the reciprocal esteem of these two grand nations."-In the same speech, speaking of Alexander, he calls him

+ See State Papers, Vol. XLVIII, 1806, p. 799, † Moniteur, 17th August.

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