21 By a disentailing deed, dated the 12th November, 1863, and executed by the father and son, all the real estates of the testator, and all the money which, under the trusts of the will, was subject to be invested in the purchase of land, including money, whether invested or to be invested, and whether the amount thereof was or was not ascertained; and the lands to be purchased with such money, were settled, subject to the life estate of the father, upon the son in feesimple. petition, or whether it was so altered in its character | Fordham, attained his age of twenty-one on the 11th that it must be treated as a distinct application from November, 1863. the time of amendment, and therefore as requiring new advertisements. Now, I find in the act of Parliament a discretionary power given to the Court of directing the issue of such advertisements as it should think fit. I think that this discretionary power continues with regard to an amended petition, and that it is competent to the Court to take into consideration the issue of advertisements of an amended as well as of an original petition. Every case must depend upon its peculiar circumstances. If the amendment involves new facts and new parties, so as to give to the peti- The plaintiffs claimed to have the legal estate in tion a new character, the Court will hardly act dis- the property conveyed to them, but the trustees recreetly in not directing new advertisements. In fused to convey or give up possession. The plaintiffs the particular case before me, the amendment in- thereupon instituted this suit against the trustees and volved two alterations. It originally stated the eldest the remaindermen, praying a declaration that they son to be the heir-at-law and the customary heir were the only persons entitled to any beneficial inof the testatrix. It has been since found on in- terest in the rents and profits of the testator's estates, quiry, that the youngest son was the customary and that the trustees might be ordered to deal with heir. Both the eldest and the youngest sons were the estates as the plaintiffs should direct. parties to the original petition. That alteration, therefore, does not involve the necessity of new advertisements. The second alteration consists in thisthat a power of appointment in favour of his wife has been exercised by one of the sons since the presentation of the petition. But that circumstance, in my opinion, is not such as to render the case introduced by the amendment substantially different from the case of the original petition, nor can I suggest to myself any possibility of danger such as to warrant the necessity of fresh advertisements. I think, therefore, that in this particular case, it is not necessary to have fresh advertisements. It by no means follows, that, upon an amended petition, you must begin de novo with respect to advertisements; the course to be adopted will depend upon the discretion of the Court, which will, of course, be governed by the particular circumstances of each case. ROLLS COURT. FORDHAM v. FORDHAM.-Dec. 8. Disentailing deed-Money to be invested in the purchase of land-Future rents. Real estate was devised to trustees, upon trust to accumulate the rents during a period of twenty-one years; and subject thereto, upon trust for A. for life, with remainder upon trust for his first and other sons in tail, with remainders over. The accumulations were to be invested in land to be settled to the same uses. A. and his eldest son, before the expiration of the twenty-one years, executed a disentailing deed, and resettled the property to the use of the father for life, with remainder to the son in fee:-Held, that the father and son were entitled to a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustees of the will. Baggallay, Q. C., and Bedwell, for the plaintiffs. Archibald Smith, for the trustees, submitted whether the disen tailing deed operated to affect the rents not yet received. Prior to the 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 56, the only cases in which the Court allowed money which was subject to be invested in the purchase of land to be entailed, to be paid direct to the persons beneficially entitled, was where the entail could be barred by fine, or where the remaindermen consented. (Benson v. Benson, 1 P. Wms. 130; Short v. Wood, Id. 470; Traffore v. Bochen, 3 Atk. 446). The effect of the statute was to extend the principle to cases where a recovery was necessary to bar the entail; but for the protection of the remaindermen, the Court retained the money until the second day of the following term, when a recovery might have been actually suffered by the tenant in tail. (See Lowton v. Lowton, 5 Ves. 12, note). The effect of the stat. 7 Geo. 4, c. 45, did not alter the principle; and the Fines and Recoveries Act (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27) merely provided a less circuitous mode of disentailing lands. The deed executed by the plaintiffs did not operate upon the moneys to be received during the remainder of the twenty-one years term. Snape, Hawkins, and Yates Lee, for other defendants. Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-I am of opinion, notwithstanding the able argument of Mr. Archibald Smith, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree. Suppose accumulate for twenty-one years, he would be entitled there was only a tenant in tail, with directions to from year to year to receive the rents as they accrued due; and even before the Fines and Recoveries Act, it would not have been necessary to have invested the moneys in land. Moreover, the words of the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, are clear. The 71st section enacts, that " money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands to be invested, so that any person, if the lands shall, for all the purposes of the act, be treated as were purchased, would have an estate tail therein, lands to be purchased." And by the interpretation clause, the expression "money subject to be invested in the purchase of lands," is to include "money raised, or to be raised," which obviously includes the future rents to accrue from year to year. No one has any interest in these moneys except the plaintiffs, and the trustees must deal with them accordingly. Motion for decree.-George Fordham, by his will, dated in April, 1854, devised his real and personal estates to trustees; and he declared that his trustees should, until the expiration of twenty-one years after his decease, receive the rents and profits thereof, and, after payment of all expenses, accumulate and invest the surplus in the purchase of real estates; and he declared, that from and after the expiration of twentyone years, and in the meantime subject thereto, the trustees should hold his estates, and the estates to be purchased, upon trust for the plaintiff F. N. Fordham for life, with remainder upon trust for his first and Principal and agent-Bailee of spurious goods—Injuncother sons in tail male, with remainders over. Note for reference-Brown's Real Prop. Stats. 120. HUNT v. MANIÈRE.-Dec. 8. tion-Damages. The plaintiff F. J. Fordham, the eldest son of F. N. | The bailee of spurious goods, who has been requested by Jan. 21, 1985. the persons injured not to part with them, as an injunction was going to be applied for, is justified in refusing to deliver them to his principal, although he has not received actual notice of an injunction, a reasonable time to obtain it not having elapsed. Injunction granted to restrain the owner from proceeding with an action at law for damages, for unlawful conversion of the goods. Motion for injunction to restrain an action at law. The plaintiffs were wharfingers in the city of London. In January, 1862, they warehoused 136 cases of wine, for one Bernard, and the warrants had been duly indorsed to the defendant Manière, as security for the sum of 678% and interest. On the 6th February, 1863, the plaintiffs were informed by the solicitor of the firm of "Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin," that the wine was spurious, and was corked with corks fraudulently bearing the brand of "Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin," and that an injunction was about to be applied for to restrain the sale of the wine, and they were requested to detain it until an injunction could be obtained, which the solicitor hoped to do on the next day. An injunction to restrain the present plaintiffs from parting with the wine, or delivering it to the holders of any warrants, except under the direction of the Court, was obtained in a suit of Ponsardin v. Stear on the 13th February, and informal notice was given to the plaintiffs about four o'clock of the same day. Between five and six o'clock they received formal notice of the injunction. On the same 13th February, the defendant Manière (who was not a party to the suit of Ponsardin v. Stear) paid the duty on part of the wine, and at three o'clock applied to the plaintiffs for its delivery. The plaintiffs refused to deliver, and immediately sent to ascertain, and found that an injunction had actually been granted, and accordingly upon the following day they refused a similar application by the defendant. By an order made in the suit of Ponsardin v. Stear, and by consent, the wine was recorked and sold by auction, and the balance, amounting to 1207., was paid into court. On the 17th June, 1864, the defendant's solicitor claimed 6781. from Messrs. Hunt for compensation for refusing to deliver up the wine; and a writ of trover was subsequently issued by them. The present plaintiffs had pleaded to the action, and it had been set down to be heard. The present bill was filed to stay all further proceedings in the action. Selwyn, Q. C., and Joseph Howard, for the plaintiffs, cited Birch v. Corbin (1 Cox, 144; and see 1 Bro. C. C. 571). Hobhouse, Q. C., Lovell, and Morgan Howard (of the common-law bar), for the defendant, cited Farebrother v. Welchman (3 Drew. 122). Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-I am of opinion that the plaintiffs acted rightly. They were in possession of wine which they had been informed by the parties attempted to be defrauded were spurious, and that a bill would be filed, and an injunction obtained, on a particular day. Before they had received any notice of the injunction, they were required to deliver up the wine, and they refused, saying that an injunction was about to be applied for. They then sent to ascertain, and found that an injunction had actually been granted; and, in my opinion, they would have acted culpably if they had parted with the wine. I assume that they were bound at law to deliver up the wine to the holder of the warrants, and that a jury would find that the holder had sustained damages by reason of their refusal to deliver the wine. In equity, however, the case is different. The Court acts upon the same principle in analogous cases. For instance, suppose that trust money is deposited with bankers, and they receive notice that the trustees are about to draw out the money, and apply it to their own purposes, and that a bill for an injunction is about to be filed, if after that they refused to pay the money over to the trustees, this Court would restrain an action against the bankers to obtain the benefit of a breach of trust. The only benefit which the defendant Manière would have obtained by the delivery of the wine on the 13th February was, that he would have been enabled to sell spurious wine as the wine of Cliquot & Co., and thus, by the fraud of another person, have obtained a higher price, and he is not entitled to bring an action to ob tain that benefit. The plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction. The delay in filing this bill amounts to nothing, and will affect the question of costs only, which must be determined upon the hearing of the cause. The injunction will go to restrain further proceedings in the action until the hearing of the cause, or the further order of the Court. Note for reference-Eden on Inj. 67, 343. BULLOCK v. BULLOCK.-Dec. 8 and 10. Trustees-Gift for maintenance, comfort, and support— Discretionary power. A testator directed his trustees, in their uncontrolled discretion, to apply such part of his residuary estate for the maintenance, comfort, and support of his wife, as together with her own property, should make up her annual income to 500l. At the date of the will and at the testator's death, the wife was of unsound mind, but she afterwards recovered:-Held, that she was entitled to have her income made up to 500l. per annum. Special case.-Thomas Bullock, the testator, directed his trustees to hold his residuary estate upon trust, out of the annual income thereof, to apply from time to time, at their uncontrolled discretion, such annual sums of money, for the maintenance, comfort, and support of his wife during her life, as, together with the interest of the moneys to which she was entitled in her own right under her marriage settlement, should not exceed 5001. per annum. At the date of the testator's will and his death the wife was of unsound mind; but she afterwards recovered. Her income from property to which she was entitled in her own right, under her marriage settlement, was about 4127. per annum. The following question was submitted to the Court whether the widow was entitled from the testator's death to have the full sum of 500l. per annum made up out of the testator's residuary estate; whether such sum was or was not absolutely necessary or essential for her maintenance, comfort, and support; and whether, if she was so entitled, she was also entitled to require that she should be at liberty to alter the investment of her own property at her pleasure, and to require that the existing investments of the property comprised in the settlement should remain undisturbed; and that the same should not, without her consent, be varied for others, by which a larger amount of income might be realised. Baggallay, Q. C., and G. Simpson, for the widow, cited Cope v. Wilmot (1 Coll. 396, note; Amb. 704); Thompson v. Thompson (1 Coll. 395); Hill v. Potts (8 Jur., N. S., 555); and Green v. Spicer (1 Russ. & M. 395). Hobhouse, Q. C., and E. G. White, for the defendants, contended that the trustees were vested with a discretion. [They cited French v. Davidson (3 Mad. 396); Pink v. De Thuisey (2 Mad. 157); Re Sanderson's Trusts (3 Kay & J. 497); and Rudland v. Crozier (2 De G. & J. 143).] Dec. 10.-Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-There may be some question whether the words "at their or his uncontrolled discretion," refer to the amount to be paid to the widow, or to the mode of application. The widow is clearly entitled to be paid something out of the testator's estate. I adopt the observations of Sir W. P. Wood, V. C., in Re Sanderson's Trusts. I think the widow is entitled to have her income made up to 5007. a year, and I will answer the first part of the question accordingly. By consent, the alternative of the question was not answered. Note for reference-Lewin on Trusts, 538. VICE-CHANCELLOR KINDERSLEY'S COURT. BRANDON V. BRANDON.-Nov. 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24, and Dec. 20. Railway company-Jury-Title-Jurisdiction-Costs. A jury summoned under the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act to determine the amount of compensation money, has no jurisdiction to try whether the claimant is entitled to the interest he claims, but only to assess the value of the interest claimed. Where money is paid into court to the account of certain classes of persons, and one of those classes of persons petitions for payment out, the Court cannot, without the consent of all parties, send the question, whether the claimants have the right they claim, to be tried by a jury or an arbitrator, but is bound to decide the question by its own machinery. Where, in such a case, the claimant can only establish his title to a lesser interest than that represented by the money paid in, the Court will determine the value of such interest, pay that sum to the claimant, and repay the rest of the money to the party who paid it in. Where there is an existing suit, in which parties in the same interest have always appeared by separate counsel, the Court will not, upon an application for the payment out of purchase money, refuse to order the railway company to pay the costs of the separate appearance of such parties, merely because they are very numerous. This was a petition by the trustees of the will of Samuel Brandon, deceased, praying that the compensation moneys for certain lands taken by the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, which had been paid into court by the company to an account intitled "Ex parte the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company; the account of W. Pennington, H. E. A. Dalbiac, and C. S. Paris, as trustees of the will of S. Brandon, deceased; the said W. Pennington, M. J. Sowton, and H. Parker, as mortgagees; and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England and Wales, as representing the Dean and Chapter of the cathedral and metropolitical Church of Christ, Canterbury," might be carried to the account of the said trustees, invested in stock, and the dividends thereof paid to the receiver of the Brandon estates. The lands in question were part of the Walworth Manor estate, which formerly belonged to the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury, but was transferred to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England in August, 1852. Of the greater portion of these lands the Dean and Chapter had granted certain building leases, which became vested in Samuel Brandon, the testator, in the suit of Brandon v. Brandon, in 1805, and the trustees of his will were the present lessees, and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners the reversioners, thereof. The company, requiring a portion of these lands for the purposes of their undertaking, on the 18th February, 1861, served the petitioners with the usual notice to treat, demanding the particulars of their estate and interest in the lands in question; and negotiations between the surveyors of the trustees and the company ensued, in the course of which the trustees sent in certain claims, in which they referred to the documents constituting their title. While these negotiations were pending, the company, finding it necessary to take possession, resorted to the compulsory powers of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, and on the 6th January, 1862, entered into bonds, and paying a deposit into court, took possession of the lands. The negotiations for settling the amount of compensation between the company and the petitioners were continued, the various proceedings being from time to time submitted to the chief clerk; an abstract of the petitioners' title was delivered to the company's solicitors on the 23rd April, 1862; and in May, 1862, the petitioners and the company each appointed an arbitrator, who in June appointed an umpire. A voluminous correspondence between the parties then ensued, in which the petitioners, as lessees, claimed the right of perpetual renewal; and in April, on the petitioners' title. Further correspondence took 1863, the company's solicitors sent their requisitions place, and the umpire made his award on the 16th January, 1864, fixing the amount of the purchase money and compensation to be paid by the company to the trustees for their interest in a portion of the land taken, at 27301. 4s. An agreement was entered into on the 2nd March, 1864, between the petitioners and the company, by which the petitioners agreed to accept 2201. as the ascertained value of their interest in another portion of the said lands. The company, however, still feeling doubts as to whether the trustees had the right of perpetual renewal of the leaseholds or not, on the 1st July, 1864, paid into court the sum of 31631., which was composed of the 27307. 48. and the 2207. above mentioned, and certain other sums which had been offered and accepted in respect of the remaining portions of the land taken. This sum they paid in to the account of the petitioners, the trustees, and of the mortgagees, and of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the reversioners; and on the 8th July they executed a deed-poll, under the 77th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, conveying to themselves the property in question. The trustees then presented this petition, submitting that they were, subject to the claims of their mortgagees, entitled to the whole sum paid in; that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had no claim thereto; and that the fund ought not to have been paid in under the 76th section. The petition was served upon the company, the mortgagees, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and all parties to the suit of Brandon v. Brandon. J. H. Palmer, Q. C., and Hardy, for the petitioners, the trustees. Faber, for the mortgagees. Langworthy, for the plaintiff, and various defendants in the suit of Brandon v. Brandon. Glasse, Q. C., and Cracknall, for the defendant James Glover, an incumbrancer. Druce, for the defendant George Ware. Anderson, Q. C., and Walford, for the defendant Sir Samuel Bignold. J. T. Humphry, for the defendants Whitter and Sudlow; and Elderton, for Messrs. Peebles, Torr, and other defendants in the same interest, supported the petition, and argued that the sum paid in represented the purchase money of whatever interest the trustees had to sell, and that the petitioners were entitled to the whole of it. Baily, Q. C., and Kekewich, for the company, con- | get the commissioners to fight the battle here, we must tended that the money was paid in on the assumption do so. We say, after all that has passed, that you that the trustees had the interest they claimed, and have not the right of perpetual renewal; and although that if they had not the whole interest they claimed, your interest is worth something, it is not worth all the company were entitled to be repaid so much of the money we have paid into court, and part of it the money paid in as represented the difference be- belongs to us." tween the interest possessed and the interest claimed. Lindley, for the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, declined to argue the question whether the trustees had the right of perpetual renewal or not. The following authorities were cited in the course of the argument:-Ex parte Grainger (3 Y. & C. 62); Ez parte Issauchand (Id. 721); Reg. v. London (3 El. & ❘ BL 443); Horrocks v. Metropolitan (4 B. & S. 315); Chaboty. Lord Morpeth (15 Q. B. 446); Douglas v. North London (3 Kay & J. 173); Brandon v. Brandon (9 Jur., N. S. 11); Re Long's Trust (10 Jur., N. S., 417); and Ez parte Styan (Johns. 387). Sir R. T. KINDERSLEY, V. C., after reviewing the facts of the case, and coming to the conclusion that the whole course of dealing between the company and the trustees shewed that the money paid into court was paid in as the price of the interest which the trustees had in the lands taken, whatever that interest was, proceeded-The company paid the money into court to the account of the trustees, and of the mortgagees, and of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. Now, the effect of paying it in to the account of those different classes of persons is to render it necessary, upon any application to have the money paid out, that every one of those persons should be before the Court, either as petitioners or respondents; and the reason for naming the Ecclesiastical Commissioners (as representing the Dean and Chapter) avowedly was thisThe company were still in doubt whether they might not be obliged to pay to the reversioners, the Dean and Chapter, some amount, upon the supposition that the right to perpetual renewal did not exist; in which case they might, to some extent, be paying twice over. True, they had settled with the trustees, and it is immaterial whether that settlement was upon the footing that there was the right to perpetual renewal, or that it was matter of doubt; but when they came to deal with the reversioners, who might establish that there was no right of perpetual renewal (in which case the reversion would, of course, be much more valuable), they determined to treat the case as one in which the trustees had not made out a good title, and they named the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in the account, in order to bring them in whether they liked it or not, and whether the trustees liked it or not, to discuss, inter se, the question of the right to perpetual renewal. It is the same thing as if a purchaser of a limited interest of this kind were to say to the vendor, "You have not got the interest which you claim-i. e. the right of perpetual renewal; therefore, I file a bill against you, and will bring in the reversioners to contest your right." It is a principle on which they have no right to proceed. They have no right to compel the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to come here and fight their battle with the lessees; and, accordingly, the counsel for the commissioners, with great discretion, declined to claim a farthing of the money, and to fight, for the convenience of the company, a battle which they never intended to fight, at all events in this shape. This I think an extremely wise course. The money, then, is now standing to this account, and amongst the persons named as having an interest in it are the trustees. Well, the trustees, by the concession of the parties who pay in the money, have a right to come here and have it dealt with. They do come here and ask that it may be carried to their account, and that the interest may be paid to them. The company, on the other hand, say, "If we cannot Now, if it were necessary to determine what would be the course to be taken if this represented more than the actual interest of the trustees, with respect to that question there would be no great difficulty. When you look at the Lands Clauses Act, where you ought to find directions, and a course of proceeding pointed out, you find nothing on the subject. This is a matter left entirely undisposed of and unprovided for. There is provision made for the case of lessees, and the effect of that provision is, that the company may at any time, after giving notice to treat, call for the lease under which the lessee claims, but they are bound to deal independently with the lessee and the reversioner. The lessee has a right to say, "Deal with me;" and so the reversioner has a right to say, with respect to his interest, "I have nothing to do with the lease; mine is a reversion expectant on the expiration of the lease." Suppose this question arose; suppose, upon the language and construction of the lease, it was a doubtful question whether the term for which the lessee was entitled to hold was twenty or fifty years; what is to be done in that case? If it was clearly a lease for twenty years, and the doubt was, whether that lease belonged to the claimant, or belonged partly to him and partly to some other persons, then there would be no difficulty, because the money would be paid into court. The company would say, "No part of this money belongs to us; there is a doubt whether the claimants are the owners of this lease; we will pay the money into court, and then let the parties claiming the lease discuss the question." But if there is a question, whether there is any such lease as a lease for twenty years; whether there is a lease for twenty, thirty, or fifty years. If that is a question, then there comes this difficulty; it is true, there is a claim for a lease for fifty years, but there is a doubt whether there is a right to such a lease, or only a lease for twenty years. What course is to be taken? It is clear, that if it went before a jury, or, I think, before an arbitrator, without any agreement between the parties, but they had gone on at arm's length to have the value assessed, and the claimant had said, "I claim a lease for fifty years," and it had gone before a jury, I apprehend that, according to the authorities (though they are not very distinct and pointed as to the matter, I think they are sufficiently so to lead me to a conclusion), the jury would have no power to do more than to assess the value of the interest so claimed; they would have no jurisdiction to try whether the claimant had such an interest as that which he claimed to have; and where there is an arbitrator, so far as the arbitrator is acting under the strict powers of the act, and under none others, I should say (though I am not aware of any decision upon the subject), that the arbitrator would not have any more than a jury would, the right or jurisdiction to determine whether the claimant had the interest which he claimed to have. He could only, I apprehend, like a jury, assess the value of the interest claimed. If, then, the present trustees were now in this position, if they had claimed simply a lease with a perpetual right of renewal, and there had been no investigation of title, no discussion on the subject, and no agreement between the parties, and they had gone before a jury upon that, then the difficulties would have arisen as to the money that a jury had assessed as the value. It is questionable what is the true construction of the instrument under which the lease was granted; triment; but the difficulty I feel, and have in many it is difficult to say how that is to be dealt with, but cases felt, is this:-Where there is a suit in which two I should think it must be dealt with in some such way or three sets of defendants, though in the same inas this: here is money in court to the account of A., terest, appear by different counsel, and the propriety B., and C., that is, to the account of certain classes of of their so appearing has always been assumed; when persons, and one of those persons comes and says, a question is raised whether, on an application like deal with that money." Then the Court, I appre- this, there is a right in these parties to appear sepahend, is bound to deal with the question; the claim-rately, creating separate amounts of costs on each seants have a right to have it dealt with; and the Court, parate appearance, how can I say, as to any one of though it might not have before it the reversioner to them, that he ought not to have his own counsel or contest the question, would be bound, as in a case be- solicitor, but ought to have put his case into the hands tween vendor and purchaser, in the absence of a per- of the solicitor and counsel for A. B.? son interested, to determine whether the vendor had such an interest as he purported to sell; would be bound to decide the question on the construction of the act of Parliament; and if it determined that there was not the right of perpetual renewal, then, there being money in court which represents a lease with a right of perpetual renewal, and the claimant having a lease without such a right, quoad a certain portion of the property, I think the Court could not send the question to a jury or an arbitrator, without the consent of all parties, and in the absence of any arrangement, would have no resource but to apply its own machinery to find out the value of the interest which did belong to the claimant; to give that to him, and the rest of the money to the party who has paid it in. But in this case what has been paid in has been paid in by the agreement of the parties, as representing the right which the trustees had, and I am of opinion that the trustees are entitled to the whole of that money. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to decide what is the construction of the act of Geo. 3, as to the right of perpetual renewal, or what was the precise interest of the trustees, or what course would have to be taken if I had decided adversely to them. I think that the effect of all that has taken place is, that the sum which is now in court is the agreed amount to be considered as money payable by the company to the trustees; and, therefore, that the latter have a right to have the prayer of their petition granted. Then the only question is as to the costs. Now, primâ facie, of course subject to any special reason to the contrary, the Court must pay the costs of the application for carrying the money to a proper account, and for the investment and division of it among the parties entitled. It has been said, however, that in this case there should be an exception, and one suggestion is, that this petition is unnecessarily long. Now, I have gone through it more than once, and so far from its being redundant, I was much struck with the remarkably clear and perspicuous way in which it is drawn. Nothing is either omitted or unnecessarily inserted in it. A more material question is, as to the number (with which one could not help being struck) of parties who have appeared upon the petition; but when it is considered who those parties are, the large number at first apparent shrinks very considerably, and I am unable to say that the number of bands of defendants who have appeared separately is unnecessarily large. The mortgagees who are named in the account very properly appeared separately. Mr. Glover, being in the position of an incumbrancer, could not be held bound to appear by the same counsel as the plaintiffs and the defendants, upon whose shares he had his incumbrance. Then there are the plaintiffs and the defendants, who are cestuis que trust, claiming directly or indirectly under Brandon's will. I understand that they are appearing here exactly as they appeared in the suit, and that there is no different cast of parties, nor any affected severance. No doubt, they might all have appeared by one set of counsel without any de But then a suggestion of some weight is made, that the parties ought to have gone before the judge in chambers to get authority either for the trustees to appear separately, or for some of the cestuis que trust to appear for all. But who is to pay for the expense of this proceeding in chambers, and for whose benefit is it? It is for the benefit of the company, and I cannot say that these persons are bound to incur, for the benefit of the company, an expense, the repayment of which they never would have a right to demand from the company. I cannot, therefore, because the parties happen to be numerous—an evil which applies to every step in Brandon v. Brandon, and now affects the company-say to any one of these parties, "You shall not have your costs, but such a one shall have his," or, "I will give one set of costs amongst you." There is no authority for such a proceeding; the authorities go to this—if there is really what amounts to an affected severance -a severance not justified, and which does not arise out of the continuous proceedings under which the parties have appeared in different lots-that may be done. But though the parties here are very numerous, that rule does not apply, and the company must pay the costs. Minute.-The Ecclesiastical Commissioners disclaiming any interest in the fund, dismiss the petition as against them, with costs, to be paid by the petitioners. Order as prayed; the company to pay the costs of all parties, including the costs of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to be paid to them by the petitioners. Notes for reference-Hodges on Railways; Morgan's Ch. Acts, 44. mages. · Future contract-Da VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. CHINNOCK v. THE MARCHIONESS OF ELY.-Nov. 23 and Dec. 13. Specific performance — Letters · Where in a correspondence between an intending purchaser and the agents of the vendor, the price and subject-matter and the other terms were fixed, the letters were held to constitute a binding contract, of which specific performance was decreed, although they alluded to the preDamages at the suit of a purchaser will only be awarded paration of a future and more formal contract. in addition to specific performance where special damage has been incurred, and they will not be given in respect of mere lapse of time. Motion for decree.-This was a suit for the specific performance of a contract, alleged to be contained in certain correspondence, for the sale of a house, being No. 9, Princes-gate, Westminster, and the stabling appurtenant thereto, in Ennismore-mews, of which premises the defendant was the owner in fee-simple. In the month of November, 1863, the defendant instructed her solicitors, Messrs. Lethbridge & Mackrell, to sell the premises for the sum of 10,000l., subject to |