pool firm under the title of Speltz & Co., on being requested by Speltz, agreed, on the 20th February, 1864, to open a credit in favour of Hoffmann & Co., of Calcutta, on the terms that the credit should be divided into four letters of 25,000l. each, to be issued by Speltz, and enfaced by the plaintiffs; that there should be a margin of 151. per cent. on actual cost prices of produce; and that the credits should continue in force for six months, and be issued on such days as Speltz might wish. These terms were agreed to, and the plaintiffs took and paid bills of exchange to a large amount drawn by Hoffmann & Co. upon Speltz, and indorsed by Speltz to the plaintiffs, who held them. Such bills in the aggregate amounted to 71,2247. 58. Speltz stopped payment, and the bills of lading held by the plaintiffs were insufficient to cover the liabilities. On the 31st May, 1864, the plaintiffs allowed the defendant Hoffmann to open an account with them, and they discounted bills for him to the amount of 86487. 158. 6d. The account continued open down to the end of September, 1864. On the 27th September, 1864, the plaintiff's received information that the firm of Hoffmann & Co., of Calcutta, had stopped payment, and they wrote to the defendant on the 29th September, informing him of the intelligence which they had received, and stating that they could not honour his cheques until his position in regard to the liabilities of his firm was clearly defined. In answer to their letter, the plaintiffs received the following communication:— "The General Manager, Agra and Masterman's Bank (Limited), London. "Dear Sir,-You will no doubt have heard of the failure of Messrs. Hoffmann & Co., of Calcutta. I left this firm on the 23rd March, and as my attorneys advise me, I cannot be made liable for any transactions entered into after that date. I have seen most of the creditors of Messrs. Hoffmann & Co., who have, with only one exception, agreed to give me at once a release. I have no doubt that the one house I am speaking about will be compelled to agree to the same proposal; but as they are rather of a disagreeable disposition, I would prefer to remove the possibility of their obtaining, by an attachment of my balance with you, any undue preference. As soon as I have arranged the difference in question, I shall again make a payment to your bank, and hope to continue to offer you satisfactory business. "I am, dear Sir, yours truly, "G. F. HOFFMANN." The plaintiffs alleged, that this letter was the first intimation they received of the retirement of the defendant from the Calcutta firm; and that when, in May, 1864, the defendant opened an account with them, he did not inform them of that fact; but, on the contrary, that he issued the following circular:: "York-buildings, Liverpool. "June 1, 1864. "Dear Sir,-I beg to inform you, that in connexion with my firm, Hoffmann & Co., Calcutta, I have this day established myself in Liverpool under my own name. "Your obedient servant, "G. F. HOFFMANN." The plaintiffs alleged, that on the 23rd June, 1864, they received a letter from the defendant, in which he wrote about "his Calcutta firm;" and that he was a member of that firm when it stopped payment in September, 1864. When the plaintiffs came to the resolution on the 30th September, 1864, of not honouring the defendant's cheques, the defendant's balance in their hands was 41057. 28. 9d.; and it appeared, that the day before that resolution was come to, the defendant paid in to his account upwards of 10007. It was also part of the plaintiffs' case, that several of the acceptors, and other persons, who, as well as the defendant, were liable on the bills discounted by them, were on the 30th September, 1864, in embarrassed circumstances, although they had not then actually stopped payment; and the plaintiffs apprehended and believed, that their loss on those bills would greatly exceed the defendant's balance in their hands. The plaintiffs having, on the 30th September, refused to honour the cheques of the defendant which were presented at their bank, on the 1st October the defendant had an interview with the plaintiffs, and they informed him that they could not honour his cheques, not only because his position with reference to the firm at Calcutta was not defined, but also of the large amount on which he was himself liable to them. On the 8th October the defendant commenced the action above mentioned. Notice of trial had been served for the Sittings after Michaelmas Term in London, viz. after the 8th December. On the 2nd November. 1864, one of the bills, viz. for 7871. 3s., discounted by them for the defendant, became due, and was dishonoured by the acceptor, and the defendant also refused to pay it; and it was also stated that the acceptors of bills for 2500, 1952. 10s. 9d., and 19737. 12s. 6d. had also stopped payment, and that the defendant was endeavouring to effect an arrangement with his creditors. The amount of the dishonoured bills was 72137. 16s. 3d., and it was apprehended that other bills for large sums, and in respect of which Hoffmann & Co., of Calcutta, were liable, would be dishonoured; and they submitted that they would be unable to plead such losses to the action, as the losses had not been sustained by them previously to its commencement. The bill filed on the 7th December, 1864, prayed for an account, and for an injunction. The manager of the bank deposed, that it was the ordinary practice amongst bankers to call upon a person for whom a bill of exchange had been discounted to take it up again in the event of the acceptor suspending payment, although it had not arrived at maturity. The defendant deposed, that on the 23rd May, 1864, a circular was issued announcing his retirement from the firm at Calcutta, and he believed that a copy was sent to the plaintiffs' branch bank at Calcutta, and notice of his retirement was advertised in the Calcutta Gazette. He also believed that he did inform the manager of the plaintiffs' bank at the time he opened his account that he had retired; and he stated that he was not aware until after his cheques had been dishonoured that a credit for 100,0007. had been granted by the plaintiffs to the firm of Hoffmann & Co. He also stated that the dishonouring of his cheques affected his credit, and compelled him to stop payment; and he submitted that he was entitled to damages for the injury which he had re ceived. in support of the motion, and stated the facts of the Bacon, Q. C., Malins, Q. C., and Dickinson appeared case. Greene, Q. C., and Bristowe, for the defendant, submitted that there was no custom amongst bankers which entitled them to retain the money of a customer in their hands, and to refuse to honour his cheques, on the ground that bills running would not be paid at maturity. The conduct of the plaintiffs was unprecedented, and by it they had ruined the defendant, and consequently he was entitled to have the damage which he had sustained considered by a jury. [They referred to the case of Rawson v. Samuel (Cr. & Ph. 161, 172) and the cases there cited, and to Maw v. Ulyatt (7 Jur., N. S., 1300); Blacoe v. Wilkinson (13 Ves. 454); and Field v. Beaumont (3 Mad. 102).] The established rule of the Court was, not to grant a plaintiff upon the eve of the trial of an issue, an injunction. The refusal of an injunction would be in accordance with the old authorities. All I now possible to say what those damages are. VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. BOARD OF WORKS.-Feb. 17 and 18. The Thames Embankment Act, 1862-Easement-Taken or injuriously affected-Compensation-Condition precedent. Sir J. STUART, V. C., without requiring a reply, said-I do not think that I can, as asked on behalf of the defendant, dismiss this motion. The bill of the plaintiffs states that an action has been brought against them by a customer, in which he insists that THE TEMPLE PIER COMPANY V. THE METROPOLITAN he is entitled to recover a balance of money standing in his name at their bank, upon a banking account; and the plaintiffs also state, that notwithstanding such balance, there is, on the part of the defendant, a much larger liability of the defendant to the bank, and they insist that they ought to be allowed to hold this balance until the liability of the defendant has been discharged. This is a fair question to be tried in this court. The defendant, however, insists upon his right to go on with his action, and to have the question tried at law. The plaintiffs have filed a bill in equity impeaching altogether the legal right of the defendant, and stating the peculiar nature of his liabilities, and the fact that they have not been discharged; and in this state of things, and in accordance with the practice of the Court, I think I am bound to grant an injunction in the terms which it has been asked for. To my surprise the case of Rawson v. Samuel is said to be upon all fours with this case, but I think it is just the contrary. The trial in that case had taken place, and a verdict had been recovered against the plaintiff in equity, and after that verdict he filed a bill and stated his equity, and shewed a balance upon an outstanding and unsettled account. Lord Cottenham said there was no set-off in that case; because the legal right had not been impeached by the bill. It had been settled at law; but in this case the legal right has not been settled at law. Lord Cottenham also said, in Rawson v. Samuel, that there were no cross demands; but can I assume that there are none here? The plaintiffs dispute the legal right of the defendant, and can I say that the action ought to be tried, and assume that a banker is not justified in withholding a balance until the liability of his customer is discharged? This bill docs what is pointed out by Lord Cottenham in that case, and it impeaches the right of the defendant in equity to recover at law the balance in the plaintiffs' hands. In this state of things the Court is bound to stay all proceedings at law. As to the plaintiffs coming too late, the defendant in equity is the last person who ought to complain of that. The action was commenced in October, and the bill was not filed till December. Now, what was the state of things in October? Why, there were these heavy liabilities upon these bills. The plaintiffs saw the bills would be dishonoured, but at the time that was not actually so. When the bills were dishonoured the plaintiffs came to this court, and asked that the action might be stopped; and I think that they are entitled to an injunction. It certainly seems to be a sharp thing that bankers in the position of these plaintiffs should take the money of their customer upon the day that they had made up their minds to stop the payment of his cheques. If it should hereafter be decided that these bankers were not justified in withholding the payment of the defendant's cheques, then the question of damages will have to be considered. At present it is quite im Under the powers of the above act, the temporary diversion of an existing pier, and ultimately the substitution of a new pier in its place, was contemplated. The right to the existing pier belonged to a company, under a revocable license from the Conservators of the River Thames, and it did not appear that the enjoyment of the benefit of the license would be destroyed by the intended works themselves, though they might lead to its revocation. Upon a bill to restrain the Board of Works from proceeding until they made compensation under the 84th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act-Held, that the pier company were not entitled to compensation as a condition precedent, their casement not being required to be permanently taken, and that their remedy was under the 68th section, as injuriously affected. Quare, whether a revocation of the license would, under the circumstances, have to be compensated for as part of the damages? Motion for decree. This was a suit to obtain an injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting through or removing, or otherwise interfering with, the landing pier of the plaintiffs until they should have made or secured adequate compensation to them, in the manner provided by the acts of Parliament in that behalf. The plaintiffs were the transferees of a pier or landing stage, erected about the year 1857, with the consent of the Admiralty, on the bed or shore of the River Thames at Essex-street, and called "The Temple Pier," and also of the benefit of a license to erect, maintain, and use the pier, granted by the Conservators of the River Thames, under the powers vested in them by the Thames Conservancy Act, 1857. This license was subject to determination on seven days' notice to that effect being given. The traffic on the pier became very large, and was a source of considerable revenue to the plaintiffs. The Commissioners of the Metropolitan Board of Works being about, under the Thames Embankment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 93), to remove the pier for the purpose of the embankment works, a correspondence ensued, in which the solicitors of the plaintiffs required compensation for the removal of the pier, but they were told in reply, that the board intended to substitute a new pier, and to make every temporary provision for the accommodation of the traffic, and did not, therefore, consider that the company would sustain any injury. Application was thereupon made by the plaintiffs to the Conservators, to ascertain whether, if a new pier were built as suggested, they would, under the 21st section of the Thames Embankment Act, treat the same as substituted for the existing pier, and consent to the plaintiffs retaining their privileges under the license in respect of the new pier; but this the Conservators refused to do. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed this bill, alleging an actual estate and interest in, and special privileges over, the bed and soil of the river, and that no notice to treat had been served on them, and no compensation had been paid or secured to them as provided by the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, or otherwise. The defendants stated in evidence that what had up to that time been done by them was done with reference to the construction of a sewer in connexion with the main drainage works, under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, and the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 104, and that the traffic over the pier had not been impeded, and that they intended ultimately, under the Thames Embankment Act, to construct a new pier in the place of, and in substitution for, the plaintiffs' pier. They also stated, that they had no intention of interfering with the existing pier, except by the substitution of the new one, and except probably by a temporary diversion, which would not obstruct the use and enjoyment of it. A motion for an injunction was brought on at the commencement of the long vacation, when an order was made by consent, that the defendants should be at liberty to proceed with the works, undertaking to do nothing to interfere with the traffic over the pier, except by raising or diverting it, and agreeing to be under the same liability as they would have been if the work permitted by the order had not been executed. Under this order the Commissioners twice varied the direction of the pier, at one time by raising it in the middle, and in another instance by diverting it to a considerable angle. The cause now came on for hearing. The following were the material sections of the Thames Embankment Act, 1862: 1. This section incorporates the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. 4. The several words and expressions to which, by the said Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, meanings are assigned, have in this act the same respective meanings unless excluded by the subject or context. Provided always, that for the purposes of this act the expression "the superior courts" therein, includes all courts of competent jurisdiction, and the word "lands" therein also includes easements, interests, rights, and privileges in, over, or affecting lands. 14. In and for the purpose of effecting the embankment, viaduct, or other works, and the reclaiming of land hereby respectively authorised, it shall be lawful for the board to inclose and fill up the bed and shore of the River Thames, as shewn in the said deposited plans; and also such further parts thereof as shall be required by the board for constructing any barge beds, recesses, stairs, piers, landing-places, hards, or other works, in pursuance of the powers in that behalf herein contained; and also to remove, destroy, alter, divert, stop up, or inclose such streets, streams, drains, sewers, watercourses, void ground, wharves, jetties, quays, barge beds, stairs, piers, landing-places, hards, mooring posts or rings, posts, piles, and other materials and things, or such part or parts thereof respectively as shall in the judgment of the board be necessary to be removed, destroyed, altered, diverted, stopped up, or inclosed for the purposes of this act, making compensation to all persons having any interest in any wharves, jetties, or other property taken for, or injuriously affected by, such works, or other the exercise of the powers of this act. 15. Save as herein otherwise expressly provided, it shall be lawful for the board to purchase any lands, and to purchase and extinguish, or procure the extinguishment of, any rights, interests, easements, or privileges which any person may have, possess, or claim in, to, over, or in respect of the bank, or shore, or bed of the River Thames, lying within the limits of deviation defined on the said deposited plans. 21. Whenever the board shall shut up, remove, or take away, or in any manner obstruct, the free use and enjoyment of any existing piers, public stairs, or landing-place now marked by the Watermen's Company, they shall cause some pier, public stairs, or landing-place to be erected or provided, to the satisfaction of the Conservators, in the stead of the pier, stairs, or landing-place so shut up, removed, or taken away, or the free use and enjoyment of which may be obstructed; and every such substituted pier shall, so soon as the same shall be completed, be, and hereby is, vested in the Conservators, and subject, in their hands, to all the powers and provisions applicable thereto of the Thames Conservancy Act, 1857. Daniel, Q. C., and Druce, for the plaintiffs.-We are in possession, by a lawful title, of an exclusive right to the soil of the river, through the license of the Conservators, and the Board must, therefore, purchase it, under the 14th and 15th sections of the Thames Embankment Act, and the 84th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. It is material that the compensation should be assessed while the pier is still standing. The license gives us an interest in land, having regard to the enlarged definition of that word. [They cited Macey v. The Metropolitan Board of Works (10 Jur., N. S., 333); The North London Railroy Company v. The Metropolitan Board of Works (Johns. 405; S. C., 5 Jur., N. S., 1121); and Wilson v. The West Hartlepool Railway Company (5 N. R. 288).] Rolt, Q. C., and C. Hall, for the defendants.-There is no evidence that the present pier will be interfered with more than hitherto, until the new pier is made, when the plaintiffs' interest will cease. All that we have yet done has been under the Main Drainage Acts, which give us power to do it. We are, at any rate, not within the 84th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, as there is no evidence of any interest the subject of compensation, unless it be as injuriously affected, and then the remedy is under the 68th section of that act. This is not a case for a jury, but for arbitration, under the Metropolitan Management Act, which is incorporated by the 39th section. In fact, here we cannot purchase, since there are no means of assessing the value. [They cited Lister v. Lobley (7 Ad. & El. 124).] Daniel, Q. C., in reply. Sir W. P. WOOD, V. C.-It appears to me to be sufficiently clear what is the conclusion which the Court ought to arrive at on the clauses of these acts of Parliament with regard to the particular facts now before me. [His Honor stated the facts.] I thought at one time that a rather nice question might possibly arise as to whether the Conservators would not be entitled to say-"We gave you a license to construct one pier, but not to construct this diverted pier." But as regards that part of the case, in the first place, the Conservators are not likely to raise such a question, because they could determine the matter by giving seven days' notice without raising it at all; and in the next place, regard being had to the power given by the Thames Embankment Act to alter or vary, I apprehend the reasonable construction upon such a point would be, that the license would continue, and that the seven days' notice would be necessary (because otherwise the Conservators might walk in at once) in respect of this pier which has been thus turned and altered. I think the Court would hold, that the Legislature having empowered the Conservators to give a license to erect the pier in a particular form, and they having granted that license for a consideration, and not having revoked it, and then there being a power also given by the Legislature to ano ther body to vary and alter piers, the altered piers had all the incidents of the original piers. The question then is, whether or not the Thames Embankment Commissioners were justified in making those alterations without first paying the money into court. I must assume at this moment that the alterations have not been made, because what has been done was done without prejudice; and the case must be considered as if I were now asked to restrain the defendants from altering the pier, under the 84th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, without going to a jury, and first ascertaining the value. But I must assume, upon this correspondence and the affidavits, that they are further about to alter wholly the arrangement of the pier. The pier will no longer, perhaps, be of wood, though that does not distinctly appear, but it will be of a different construction, and in substitution for the old pier. It will be a new thing erected where the old thing was; so that the existing pier will be gone, and the new one put in its place. Then the question is whether, under the 14th clause of the Thames Embankment Act, 1862, the Commissioners can do that without bringing themselves within the provisions of the 84th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, which says, that the promoters of the undertaking shall not, except by consent of the owners and occupiers, enter upon any lands which shall be required to be purchased or permanently used for the purposes, and under the powers, of that or the special act until they shall either have paid to every party having any interest in such lands, or deposited in the Bank, in the manner therein mentioned, the purchase money or compensation. If they are not about to purchase or permanently use lands, whatever that word may mean, under the Thames Embankment Act of 1862, which I have now before me, then they would fall under the 68th section, and would be liable under it to pay for any damage they occasioned, as injuriously affecting the interest of the proprietors of the pier. The Thames Embankment Act has these two clauses, the 4th and the 14th, which alone appear to be of much importance to the present question. The result of the 4th clause is, that whenever you have a question of compensation with respect to taking property, you must import easements as well as lands into this act. But when you come to the 14th clause, you find this: -His Honor stated it.] The first observation I make upon that clause is, that it is not identical with the clause which I had to consider in The North London Railway Company v. The Metropolitan Board of Works, because there the words were express, "making compensation for any damage done thereby." The power to make drains, and to run them through celLars, making compensation for damage done thereby, is not identical with these words-" making compensation to all persons having any interest in any wharves, jetties, or other property taken for, or injuriously affected by, such works." It appears to me that the last words manifestly refer to the provisions of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, and distinctly point to the two classes of cases under that act, namely, those in which land is permanently taken and used, as it is called, and that other class of cases in which the property is only injuriously affected, and which, coming under the 68th section, would have to be compensated for, but not necessarily before the Commissioners enter upon the work. Now, it was said that this easement is destroyed altogether; and taking the word "lands," in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, as applying to this case, that the plaintiffs' right to make their pier, and to obstruct that portion of the bed of the River Thames as they do, is destroyed, and must therefore be considered as an interest taken. It appears to me that there might be a good deal of force in that argument if there was a complete and total obstruction of the right of passage by passengers in getting to or from the steam-boats in the manner this has heretofore been used. But, I think, the turning and diverting of the pier cannot be considered as a taking, because it could only be so considered if it had the effect of annihilating the license granted, and thereby annihilating the easement; and I do not think it had that effect, for the reason I have given above, and so far there would be no destruction of the thing granted. Therefore, as respects the entering for the diversion, it appears to me clear that would not be unlawful. The easement might be injuriously affected, because it might be shewn that the traffic was diminished, by persons having to go up and down stairs, instead of along a straight line; and we all know what trifling things will divert traffic; but the plaintiffs would not on that account have a right to stop the works from proceeding. Then the question is, whether I can say that the property is taken. It is admitted by the defendants, for the purpose of argument, that they will want, in order to complete the Thames Embankment, to remove this pier bodily, and that another will have to be made and substituted for it; but the new one will be carried along exactly in the same course and in the same manner, and, for all practical purposes, on the same spot as the present pier, and it will be an Essexstreet pier. That appears upon the evidence, and it was thought at one time that it was about to be done under the 21st clause of the act. Now, if that clause has an effect, as contended, by which the property would be vested in the Conservators for public uses, deprived of all their powers of licensing which previously existed, then I apprehend that it cannot be applicable to a private pier of this description, but that the true construction would be, that it applied to certain piers and stairs marked by the Watermen's Company, and which are so marked as belonging to the public free from toll, and therefore it would have no effect on this controversy. If it were a private pier, then, I apprehend, the same reason which convinced me of the correctness of my conclusion in the former instance, as to the transfer of the license from the old to the new pier, would satisfy me again here; and I apprehend, that all the incidents which attach to the old pier would apply to the new and substituted pier; and the license would continue till it was revoked. So, here, it appears to me, that when the Commissioners say they mean to make a continuous pier, there is no doubt what they intend to do; and it is conceded, that they have power temporarily to stop the traffic for a week or a fortnight, under this clause, without making any compensation, except for the injurious effect thus produced. But if they bonâ fide mean to make a continuous pier for the same traffic, then it may be a misfortune to the plaintiffs, if the Conservators will not continue the license; but it appears to me, that the defendants will not have done more than injuriously affect the pier. I pronounce no opinion, whether the consequence of the license being withdrawn will be thrown into the damages, as that I have not to consider; all I have now to consider is, whether, under the 84th section, this so called land-this easement-which is included under the word "land," is permanently taken by the board. I am bound to say, it is not an easy thing to apply to easements of this description all the clauses in their exact force, which would apply reasonably and properly to land. The Legislature, in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, thinking only of land, gives you a clause very easy to construe, and very easy to under stand, because you understand what taking land is, and you understand what permanently using land is, but you do not understand so easily the taking of an easement, or the permanently using of an easement. It might have two meanings; it might mean the buying of it by the commissioners, so as to enjoy it themselves, or it might mean the total obliteration of all the means of exercising that easement; and then I think it would fall properly under the 15th clause of the act, because the total extinguishment would appear to be the subject of purchase mentioned in that section; and being the subject of purchase, the extinguishment of it would have to be dealt with as if it were equivalent to taking; and I should have thought the proper construction would be, that it would fall within the 84th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. But they are not going to do the one or the other; they are not going to buy it for themselves, they have no intention of becoming pier masters; neither are they going to obliterate or destroy it; they are going to leave it exactly as it was, subject, of course, to the unfortunate consequence that may arise to the present licensees if the license should not be continued. But my opinion is, that the license would remain in all its modifications, including the substituted pier, until it is revoked, and that I ought not to interfere with this plain and distinct power given by the 14th section, of altering, diverting, and so on, unless it be clearly made out by the other clauses of the act that the Board were not entitled to enter without making compensation before they could so enter. If I were so to hold, the consequence would not be a reasonable one, regard being had to the provisions of the act. The argument is, that when you begin to alter and divert, you are destroying the easement, and thereupon the act applies in every case of altering piers at all. Then, of course, the consequence of that would be, that you cannot make the slightest alteration without first going before a jury to compensate for the actual value, although this act contemplates that these improvements may affect the whole side of the river where all these piers are, and, therefore, in every instance they would be stopped until the bond was made, and the money paid into court; and all these words about altering and diverting would be perfectly useless, for what meaning can they have if they mean purchase? I apprehend it is clear, that what the Legislature thought of was, that there might be cases in which a wharf would be wanted, and that it might be absolutely bought and form part of the undertaking, whereas, in other instances, they would simply stop up, alter, or divert for a given period. Those several purposes are provided for, and the clauses seem to me to be much more applicable to that state of things, than to a state of things which would require me to hold that there was an absolute taking and permanently using of this right or casement, of allowing passengers to pass, by means of piers, to or from the steam boats in the river. I think I cannot, under these circumstances, give any relief. I do not suppose that anything will be said about costs in a case of this kind, and I dismiss the bill. 29 tion of stream-Damage out of district-Action-Compensation. The drainage of a district had for many years been carried into a stream (affecting the same in an inappreciable degree only), which afterwards, and beyond the limits of the district, flowed through land of the plaintiff. The population of the district subsequently much increased, and further drainage becoming necessary, the board of health for the district executed additional works, the effect of which was to cause substantial injury to the plaintiff, by reason of the pollution of the water of the stream. The Court below having held that the plein was entitled to compensation, under sect. 86 of the Metropolis Local Management Act, but had no remedy by action, the majority of the Court of Exchequer Chamber on error reversed such decision. The declaration stated that certain lands, at &c., were in the possession and occupation of certain persons, as tenants thereof to the plaintiff, the reversion thereof belonging to the plaintiff, and long before and until the grievances hereinafter mentioned, a certain stream and a certain watercourse, called the Poole river and the County Bridge stream respectively, did flow, and of right ought to flow, without being fouled and polluted, as hereinafter mentioned, near to and through the said land, and the plaintiff and his tenants were entitled to the use and benefit of the the water of the said stream or watercourse, and to have the same flow and run without being so fouled and polluted; and the defendants, well knowing the premises, wrongfully caused and permitted large quantities of soil, filth, and water to flow permanently into the said stream and watercourse, whereby the same became and were permanently fouled and polluted, and the water thereof became, and was, and always will be, impure and unfit for domestic and other necessary purposes, &c.; and the said lands became unhealthy and much les sened in value, and the plaintiff was injured, &c. The defendants pleaded-first, not guilty; secondly, not possessed; thirdly, a traverse of the plaintiff's right to have the water flow through the land without being polluted; fourthly, that the several acts, matters, and things whereof the plaintiff complains, were lawfully done, and caused and permitted to be done, ly the defendants, under or in pursuance, and in exercise, and by virtue, of the powers contained in and given to the defendants by an act of Parliament made in the session of Parliament holden in the 18 & 19 Vict., for the better local management of the metropolis. New assignment to the last plea, that the plaintiff sued, not only for the grievances therein admitted, and therein attempted to be justified, but also for grievances committed by the defendants in excess of the alleged rights and powers in that plea mentioned, and on other occasions, and for other purposes than those referred to in the same plea. Issues thereon. The cause came on for trial at the Kent Summer Assizes, when it was agreed that a verdict should be entered for the plaintiff, subject to a special case to be stated for the opinion of this Court. The following case was accordingly stated: The plaintiff is owner of the reversion of certain lands, through which flow a stream, called the Poole COURTS OF QUEEN'S BENCH AND EXCHE- river, and of a watercourse which is known by the QUER CHAMBER. CATOR V. THE BOARD OF WORKS FOR THE LEWISHAM DISTRICT.-Jan. 4 and Nov. 28, 1864. Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 86-Metropolis Local Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 58—Pollu name of the County Bridge stream. The defendants are the board of works for the Lewisham district, con The case was argued in the court below before Ceckburn, C. J., and Wightman and Blackburn, JJ.; and in the Exchequer Chamber before Erle, C. J., Pollock, C. B., Keating, J., Bramwell, B., Byles, J., and Pigott, B. |