think I may say has now become a very common pro- | place, as it must, I apprehend, in all cases, take place, vision in the case of sales by auction upon conditions. before the actual comparison of the abstract with the There is nothing special in it-it is well understood; deeds themselves, which they purport to abstract. I and I apprehend there is no reason why such a condi- cannot say that I feel the smallest doubt upon it, and tion is not a good condition. If the condition is not I think Mr. Smith has very fairly said, "My view of it observed, if an abstract is not delivered within the is this-you must have an offer to produce the deeds;" time specified, the purchaser has a right to say, "The and he very fairly said that that offer is implied in vendor has not performed the conditions, and there- the sending of the document; and no doubt that is fore I repudiate the purchase." On the other hand, really the truth of the case. The vendor sends that if the vendor has performed the condition of deliver- which purports to be an abstract of documents upon ing the abstract within the specified time, or if he which his title depends. By sending that he anhas not, if the abstract were accepted, and that condi- nounces to the purchaser that those are the documents tion waived by the purchaser, then if the purchaser which he is ready to shew him at any time, whenever does not deliver his objections, or if he does deliver he wishes to see them, either at his own place of buhis objections, if there be any objection not contained siness, or any place of business that may be arranged. in what are so sent in, but afterwards thought of, Therefore, consider that when, on the 18th June, such objection shall be considered as waived, and the what is called the abstract, in common parlance, was title to that extent accepted. It appears to me there sent to Messrs. Nelson, that was a delivery of the abis no doubt that this Court would consider, as I think stract according to the conditions of sale; and the it might with great advantage consider in a great twenty-eight days within which the purchaser was to many more cases than it does, that parties ought to send in his objections or requisitions, are to date from be allowed to make their own bargains without con- that 18th June, 1863. cealment, trick, or contrivance; there is no reason why this Court should relieve them from the effect of their bargains. Certainly it has in a great many instances interfered where I think, if the matter were res integra, it would be very little disposed now to interfere to relieve them from their bargains; but it has never been doubted, that by such a condition as this, according to the common expression, time is made of the essence of the contract; that is to say, the objection must be sent in within the time, if the purchaser means to avail himself of such an objection, and if he does not, the vendor has a full right to avail himself of the conditions, and to say, "You have accepted the title to the extent of that objection, and therefore I am entitled to a decree." It does not signify what the objection is. It does not signify whether the objection is an objection on any general rule of law, or arising out of any particular question of the construction of a particular instrument. Whatever may be the nature of the objection, if it be not sent in within the time, the vendor has a right to avail himself of the condition. It has been suggested that there occurs in this condition the word "deduce," and a case has been referred to with reference to that word "deduce." Now, if we are to examine the word critically, it is quite clear when you speak of deducing a title, as meaning to express either the delivery of the abstract or the shewing of the deeds; whichever it may be applied to, it is not altogether an appropriate expression, or strictly correct. The deducing the title-the appropriate use of that expression would be this:-I deduce my title from my great grandfather; I do not deduce my title by sending you a document; nor do I deduce my title by shewing you the deeds. By sending you his abstract and shewing you the deeds, I show you I deduce my title; but according to the strict meaning of the words "deducing the title," it is stating from whom, or from what source the party draw forth his title. He deduces it; he derives his title from such a source; and, therefore, the expression, either in the case which has been cited, or here, is not strictly and accurately accurate. But what is meant by it here? It is perfectly plain what is meant by it. Take it Now, I have stated what is the effect of this con- in connexion with the context:-"The vendors shall, dition, and the construction of it is undoubted; and within fourteen days after the day sale, deliver to the the only question which arises upon it is, has the con- purchaser or his solicitor an abstract of the title to dition been performed? The plaintiffs say it has not the property" (shall deliver an abstract of his title), been performed by the purchaser-he has not sent in" and the purchaser or his solicitor shall, within his requisitions within the time; that is the objection twenty-eight days after the delivery of the abstract, which is now the question raised with regard to the send or deliver in writing to the vendor's solicitors title. The question whether the condition has been all objections and requisitions, if any, which the performed depends on this-what is meant by deli- purchaser may have to make in respect of the title vering an abstract of title, because the language of deduced." What is meant by that? Of the title the condition is, that if within twenty-eight days which that abstract shews. Clearly, that is the plain after the delivery of the abstract, the objections or meaning of it, if you take it in connexion with the requisitions are not sent in, they are not to be of context; and I do not think that any special conany avail? The contention is, that the mere send- struction can be put on this condition by reason of ng what is commonly called an abstract, which is that word "deduced" occurring. a number of sheets of paper, purporting to set out, Then we come to this:-Supposing that the deLot verbatim, every document, but purporting to set livery of the abstract was the sending in that docuout every document, or at least every material docu- ment which is commonly called the abstract, which I ment, sufficiently to shew what the effect of that conceive it clearly is. Supposing that to be so, it is document is-this is not enough, but it is in addition said, and said with perfect justice and good foundato that, if not an actual comparison of that abstract tion, the abstract so sent must be a complete abstract, with the deeds themselves; at all events, an offer by the because, if it be not a complete abstract, it in point vendor to shew those deeds whenever they are wished of fact is not the delivery of an abstract. That is for. Now, I apprehend, that an abstract is delivered perfectly well founded. Then it is said this was not whenever a number of sheets of paper, call it what a complete abstract, for this special reason. It puryou will, whenever a document is delivered to the pur-ported to abstract the will of Mr. Oakden, under which chaser, which contains, with sufficient clearness and will the vendors deduce their title, or have their title. sufficient fullness the effect of every instrument which It purported to abstract that, and that was a necesconstitutes part of the title of the vendor, and that sary instrument to be abstracted, which unquestionthat is a delivery of the abstract, even though it takes ably it was. It did not abstract that will as it ought to have done, for the purpose of enabling the purchaser to judge whether a good title was made by it or not, and therefore it was not a full abstract, and therefore the vendor has not performed his condition, and therefore he has not delivered the abstract, and therefore the twenty-eight days cannot count from that time (the 18th June I think it was) when that document, called the abstract, was delivered. Now, the question really seems to me to resolve itself into this-was that abstract a complete abstract, so far as it purported to abstract the will of Mr. Oakden? It appears to me that it was a complete abstract. The ground upon which it is contended that it was not a complete abstract is this-it did not set out the residuary clause; that is, a clause by which the testator devised all the residue of his estate to Mr. Oakden, the father, one of the vendors. Now, if the title of the vendors depended upon that residuary devisee, unquestionably it was an incomplete abstract. It has been argued on the part of the vendors, that they can make a good title in that way, if they fail upon the other part of the will. But that is not the question which I am now considering. The question which I am now considering is, whether, for the purpose of the objection to the title which is now made, that will did contain a complete abstract, although it omitted to set out the residuary clause. The question now raised, I should say, is a question upon the construction of that part of the testator's will by which he purports, according to the vendors' contention, to give an estate for life to Mr. Oakden, the father, with a vested estate tail in his eldest son, Mr. Oakden the younger, the other vendor. That is the contention of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no right, for this purpose, to resort to the other ground of title, namely, that which arises under the residuary devise; because clearly as to that there was no sufficient abstract; but the question was, whether there was a sufficient abstract, with reference to the contention of the plaintiff that Mr. Oakden the younger, the eldest son of Mr. Oakden the elder, had when he executed the disentailing deed, a vested estate tail in remainder dependent upon his father's life estate. Now, then, it comes to this-what possible difference can I make in the construction of this will, which gives this life estate to Mr. Oakden, the father, with either a vested or a contingent estate tail to Mr. Oakden the younger, his son-what difference does it make whether there was a residuary devise or not in the will? It appears to me none. I took the liberty of urging upon the counsel for the defendant to press upon me reasons why I should consider that necessary to enable the purchaser to judge whether the will made a good title, so far as relates to the claim of an estate tail upon the part of Mr. Oakden the younger; and I must say it appears to me that the question would stand precisely the same whether there was a residuary devise in favour of Mr. Oakden the elder, or a residuary devise in favour of a perfect stranger, or no residuary devise at all; that it could not make the smallest difference in the construction of the will. I quite admit, that if it could assist in the slightest I do not care how minute the connexion might be, if it could assist the purchaser in the smallest way, or could by any possibility assist the purchaser in judging of the question-whether the will gave a good estate for life to the father, and a good vested estate tail to the son-if it could have the least bearing on that, I should say there was not a complete abstract; but, I confess, after turning it over in every way, and soliciting the arguments and assistance of the learned counsel for the defendant, to enable me to see how it could, I have failed to see how it could have the slightest effect. Of course, it is not way, contended on the part of the defendant that it is necessary, in order to make a complete abstract of a will, that every word and every part of that will should be set out. It is admitted that all that has no bearing upon the devise under which the title is said to exist, need not be set out, and it appears to me that that is exactly applicable to this residuary devise. It had no more to do with this question than any other clause in the will by which a legacy of 50%. is given to a servant-not any more connexion than that. That being the case, it appears to me that a good and complete abstract was delivered on the 18th June. Then the requisitions were sent in within the time, not raising any doubt or question with regard to this question of the construction of the will, and not saggesting any difficulty upon the subject. Then comes the other question, whether the plaintiffs, the vendors, have waived the condition? No doubt if, after the time specified, objections or requisitions are sent in, and the vendor, upon the receipt of those requisitions and objections deals with them, and negotiates upon them, and does not avail himself of the condition, or insist upon the benefit of it, then, indeed, he has waived the condition; and the question is, whether that is the case here? It is contended that he has done it by the letter of the 31st July, 1863. That is an answer to a letter by which the purchaser's solicitor had sent the vendors' solicitors a case which they had submitted to a very eminent conveyancer upon the subject, and his opinion thereon. In answer to the purchaser's solicitor, Mr. Hinds sends this letter:: of Mr. Joshua Williams, for which I am obliged. "Dear Sir, I received copy of case and opinion My clients were advised that they should execute a disentailing deed, and then sell. Their power to do this seems to be questioned by Mr. Williams. That question must, of course, be set at rest; and I apprehend the only way this can be done, is to file a bill for specific performance, unless you can find any way of settling the point." better If it had stopped there, I apprehend it would have been a waiver of the condition, that is to say, that it would have been a negotiation upon the terms of the objection, and what the effect of the objection was; and if it had stopped there, I think I should have entirely agreed with the defendant's counsel, that the condition was waived; but when the letter goes on to say what I am about to read, I do not see how it is possible to say that this letter waived the conditions. It goes on to say, "Of course none of the conditions of sale are waived." Now, how can I, upon the strength. of a letter which expressly says that they do not waive the conditions of sale-how is it possible for me to say, that by this very letter they do waive the conditions of sale? I am of opinion, therefore, there is no waiver of the condition of sale. That being the case, I think it comes to this-that whether the objection be a good objection or a bad objection, here is an objection sent to the title after the time prescribed by the conditions of sale, and that condition is not waived by the vendors. It is not disputed in such a case, that the vendor would have s right to insist that the title would have been accepted. that is, that the objection has been waived. In that view of the case, it appears to me quite unnecessary, of course, to go into the other question, on the sup position that the objection had been sent in time, or that, when sent, the condition as to time had been waived. If that had been the case, it would have been necessary for me to have considered the ques tion of the construction of the will, and seen whether there was such a clear and good title as that I could 26 force it upon a purchaser who hesitated to take it. I think it is unnecessary to express any opinion on that point, except to this extent, which I will take the liberty of doing, if it is any satisfaction to the purchaser at all events, it is a satisfaction to myself to say, that I confess I entertain a very strong opinion in favour of the goodness of the title. I will say no more upon it than that. Whether it be such a title as I could force on an unwilling purchaser, I do not decide, because it is unnecessary for this case. I decide the case solely upon the ground, that the objection taken is not in time, and the condition not waived. There must be, therefore, a decree for specific performance. VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. BARRS v. FEWKES.-July 5. evidence. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to rebut a presump- Cause. The bill was filed by the heir-at-law of Charles Barrs, the testator in the cause, for a declaration that the residue of his real and personal estate was devised and bequeathed to the defendant Thomas Fewkes, as trustee for the purposes of the will, and that, subject thereto, the residue of the real estate had in equity descended to, and was vested in, the plaintiff, as heir-at-law of the testator; and for administration of the personal estate, and a conveyance to the plaintiff by the defendant of the real estate, and payment of the rents and profits received. The defendant put in a demurrer to the bill, but this was overruled by his Honor, who held, that, upon the construction of the will, the defendant was a trustee merely. The case is reported on demurrer, 10 Jur., N. S., 466, where the will is fully set out. The suit was now brought to a hearing. After it had been opened on behalf of the plaintiff, Sir H. Cairns, Q. C., and Cracknall, for the defendant, contended that he should be allowed to adduce extrinsic evidence to prove his title, on the ground that it was by a presumption of law that he was deprived of the beneficial interest, and that he was, therefore, entitled to rebut it by evidence. [They cited Docksey v. Docksey (3 Bro. P. C. 39); Mallabar v. Mallabar (Cas. t. Talb. 78); Langham v. Sandford (17 Ves. 435; 19 Ves. 641; 2 Mer. 6); Wigram on Extrinsic Evidence in Wills, 100, 4th ed.; Buckley v. Littlebury (3 Bro. P. C. 43); The Duchess of Beaufort v. Lady Granville (Id. 37); Gladding v. Yapp (5 Mad. 56); Gainsborough v. Gainsborough (2 Vern. 252); North v. Crompton (1 Ch. Cas. 196); Lynn v. Beaver (Turn. & R. 63); Clennell v. Lewthwaite (2 Ves. 465); Hall v. Hill (1 Dru. & W. 94); and Briggs v. Penny (3 Mac. & G. 546).] Willcock, Q. C., Hayes, Serjt., and A. Smith, for the heir-at-law, referred to Ellcock v. Mapp (3 H. L. C. 492); Coote v. Boyd (2 Bro. C. C. 521); Rachfield v. Careless (2 P. Wms. 157); Wallace v. Pomfret (11 Ves. 542); and Ackroyd v. Smithson (1 Wh. & Tud. L. C. 557; 1 Bro. C. C. 503). Cracknall, in reply, cited Brown v. Selwin (Cas. t. Talb. 240). Sir W. P. WOOD, V. C.-The rule applicable to this case is accurately laid down in Coote v. Boyd, where Lord Thurlow said-" The question whether, by giving two legacies, the testator did not intend the legatee to take both, is a question of presumption donec probetur in contrarium, and will let in all sorts of evidence. Where the presumption arises from the construction of words simply, quâ words, no evidence can be admitted." Where presumptions are raised inconsistent with the words of the will, such as presumptions against double portions, and the like, the Court will allow extrinsic evidence to rebut them. The cases of Docksey v. Docksey and Mallabar v. Mallabar, which seem to raise a difficulty, were decided when there was a confusion of ideas as to the effect of a gift of a mixed fund of real and personal estate to an executor, in trust to sell and to pay debts and legacies, but no disposition was made of the surplus. The old notion was, that the whole fund became personal esof a legacy to him raised a presumption against his tate, and as such went to the executor; but a gift taking the fund. And then parol evidence was permitted to be adduced to rebut that presumption. After Ackroyd v. Smithson, however, it became settled as a rule of construction, and not as a mere implication, that where the trusts did not exhaust the whole of the realty, the residue was to be deemed in equity as undisposed of, and resulted to the heir, though the executor had the legal estate. Before this was established, it is easy to understand, that when an implication was raised in equity in certain cases against the executor taking the property beneficially, parol evidence was admitted to rebut that presumption; as was held by Powis, J., in the early case of Rachfield v. Careless. Then came the decision of Lord Thurlow, that you cannot admit the evidence for the purpose of rebutting a presumption arising from words simply, quâ words. Since the case of Ackroyd v. Smithson, the question of presumption does not arise-a rule of construction having been established. I must, therefore, refuse to admit the evidence in the present case. The hearing of the cause was then proceeded with; and at the conclusion of the arguments on the construction of the will, Sir W. P. WOOD, V. C., said-I had occasion to consider this question very maturely on a former occasion, and there is nothing fresh now except the case which has been cited of North v. Crompton, and the analogous cases cited on the other point; and I do not think there is anything to induce me to arrive at a different conclusion. Lord Eldon said, in his argument in the case of Ackroyd v. Smithson, "It is admitted, and cannot be denied, that where a testator directs real estate to be sold for special purposes, if any of those purposes become incapable of taking effect, the heir-at-law shall take, because there is an end of the disposition when there is an end of the purpose for which it was made." That seems to be the principle which he established by that very able argument. He comments on Mallabar v. Mallabar, by saying, "The question was, whether there was a resulting trust for the heir as to the money arising from the sale of the real estate, after payment of the debts, and the several sums of 5001. The Court held, that the testator had made all his property personal, or rather it inferred, from the purpose of the testator, as far as that could be collected from the will, that the testator meant by the residuary clause to describe, not only money strictly personal estate, but the money claimed by the heir likewise;" and, as one of the reasons for this conclusion, he comments upon the fact of the heir-at-law having a legacy, which at present would have no effect whatever. Here the heir does take a legacy, but that has never been held, since Ackroyd v. Smithson, to prevent him taking such property as is not disposed of. The whole principle of the decision in that case proceeds upon the absence of the testator's intention to give it to any one else. Of course, there is no intention to give it to the heir; but the only question is, has he sufficiently expressed his intention to give it to anybody else, so as to take it away from the heir. It really comes back to that construction which I had to express upon the former occasion, and I do not think I can express it any differently now. I find these words:-"Then, as to the rest and residue of all my real and personal estates, I give, devise, and bequeath the same unto the beforenamed Thomas Fewkes." That is given after apparently exhausting all the purposes he intended; but what does he give it for? Why, "to enable him to carry into effect the purposes of this my will and testament." It is impossible to come to the conclusion, that the residue is not to come to him until all the purposes are satisfied. The only thing to be provided for, then, would be the costs and expenses, and I do not think that it would be a sound construction to hold that the residue is given for that purpose. I felt on the former occasion that the case was one that required consideration. I then came to the conclusion, which I still entertain, that the trust was created by these words, and that I was not able to go behind the will. Note for reference-Wigram's Evid. on Wills, 100, 4th ed. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. [Before COCKBURN, C. J., BLACKBURN and MELLOR, FREWER V. THE LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH OF HAST INGS.-May 8. Local board of health-Purchase of Land-Provisional order of Secretary of State-11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 73 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, 88. 75-77. Lush, Q. C. (J. Browne and Hance with him) shewed cause against the rule.-Sect. 73 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63 (Public Health Act, 1848), enables a local board to purchase by agreement premises, for the purpose of widening and otherwise improving any street. By sect. 75 of the Local Government Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 98) (the provisions of which act, and the Public Health Act, 1848, are to be construed together), the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, is incorporated therewith, and in addition to their original powers a local board is authorised to acquire land in the manner therein provided. They are to publish notices descriptive of the undertaking for which the land is required, which are to be served upon owners, and to petition a Secretary of State upon the matters therein stated. who is to direct an inquiry, and thereupon, if he think fit, make a provisional order, empowering the local board to put in force with reference to the land mentioned in such order, the powers of the Lands Clause Consolidation Act, with respect to the purchase and taking of land, otherwise than by agreement. But by clause 6 of the section, "No provisional order so made, is to be of any validity unless confirmed by ac of Parliament; and it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State, as soon as conveniently may be, to obta such confirmation, and the act confirming such order shall be deemed to be a public general act of Parlia ment." The order then, until confirmed by act of Parliament, is of no effect, and cannot be made the subject of a certiorari. [Field, Q. C., contra, referred to sect. 81 of the Local Government Act, 1858, which makes all orders of the Secretary of State, in pursuance of the act, binding, in respect of the matters to which they refer]. Under sect. 77 (clause 6), the Secretary of State, as soon as conveniently may be, is to take all necessary steps for the confirmation of such order, by act of Parliament; but previously to such confirmation it shall not be of any validity whatever. [He was then stopped.] Field, Q. C., and A. Wills, in support of the ruleThe Secretary of State is here exercising judicial fuc tions, as appears by sect. 81; and if, as in this case, i order be invalid, the proprietor of the required lands ought not to be deprived of his remedy. When order is made by the Secretary of State, he is further directed to obtain its confirmation by an act of Parliament, which is to be deemed a public and genea one. Parliament would almost as a matter of cons A provisional order of a Secretary of State empowering a local board of health to put in force the powers of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, with re-adopt the order of the Secretary of State as valid; the spect to the purchase of lands otherwise than by agreement, is nothing more than a substitution for proceedings before a standing orders committee, and has no force or validity until confirmed by act of Parliament; and cannot be brought up by certiorari for the purpose of being quashed. Rule calling upon the Hastings local board to shew cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to remove into this court the provisional order of the Secretary of State, and all proceedings connected therewith, empowering the Hastings local board to put in force the powers of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, with respect to the purchase of land otherwise than by agreement, as to certain lands of Charles Hay Frewen, as having been made without jurisdiction; first, because for purposes not authorised by the act; secondly, because made as to lands which were not sufficiently or properly defined, and the description and quantities of which in the said order mentioned, agreed neither with those mentioned in the advertisements, nor with those mentioned in the notice to the said Charles Hay Frewen, and because the said order was bad, inasmuch as it was impossible to say how much, or what land, was intended to be taken. The statute entitles Court should, therefore, interfere to prevent injustice COCKBURN, C. J.-This is not a case for our inter position. The proceedings before the Secretary State are intended to assist the Legislature in deter mining whether the proposed measure shall become law, and they have this further object, viz. the sub stitution of a cheap and easy process for the expen sive one of going before a select committee in cas where a heavy outlay would be undesirable and im proper. Such an order as the present has no effect or validity until confirmed by act of Parliament; and we should be usurping functions which do not belong to us if we interposed ourselves between the Secretary of State and the will and pleasure of Parliament. BLACKBURN, J.-I am of the same opinion. What has been done amounts to nothing more than a substitution of a cheaper mode of proceeding for the older and more expensive one in the case of a private bill and clearly has no validity whatever until confirmed by Parliament. If the Secretary of State should make such provisional order as should appear to be improper, Parliament, no doubt, would decline to confirm it, but this Court, at all events, has not the power of interference. MELLOR, J.-I am also of opinion that this is not a case for our interference. The proceedings in question have been instituted by the Legislature as a subtitute for proceedings before a standing orders comnittee, and as such are beyond our supervision and control.-Rule discharged. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. tour, and endeavour to find another specimen of humanity like unto himself, as it is a pity two places should be troubled with such a man. Let him (meaning the plaintiff) remain until we send for him again. "JOHN R. MALTBY." "To the Editor.-Our vicar (meaning the plaintiff) has committed a slight mistake in turning the churchwarden out of his own pew last Sunday morning. I may be wrong, but I think he (meaning the plaintiff) did. I can hardly reconcile his practice with his profession. He (meaning the plaintiff) professes to be a follower of the great apostle's example, and a successor of his apostles in a direct line, but I think there have been a link broken in the chain which con Before ERLE, C. J., BYLES, KEATING, and SMITH, JJ.] nects our divine (meaning the plaintiff) with our WALKER V. BROGDEN.—May 5. Libel-Newspaper-Bonâ fide comment. 1 letter in a newspaper, after stating that the conduct of the plaintiff (a clerk in orders) was ungentlemanly and ridiculous," concluded, “Surely there is some law to prevent such conduct to a churchwarden, or I shall use my best endeavours to obtain a sufficient sum of money to present him with something if he will resign, or, at any rate, make a tour, and endeavour to find another specimen of humanity like unto himself, as it is a pity too places should be troubled with such a man. Let him remain until we send for him again:”—Held, that these remarks were not libellous. I newspaper may not publish a letter containing libellous charges, and then publish another letter containing the same or other libellous charges, and then plead that the second letter is a bonâ fide comment on the first letter. Declaration. For that the defendant, falsely and aliciously, printed and published of the plaintiff, and of him as the vicar of Bradney (which he then was); na public newspaper called the "Lincoln Gazette," he words following; that is to say— 6 "Bradney. "To the Editor.-On Sunday morning last, accomanied by a few friends, who were visiting with us, I ttended our parish church. When I entered there rere only some eight or ten persons present, and after aving got comfortably seated, I saw our worthy diine (meaning the plaintiff) escorting the mistress f Southrey up the aisle. After passing some twenty mpty pews, his reverence (meaning the plaintiff) alted at the one he had appropriated to my use, in onsequence of some dispute which had occurred welve months ago. I immediately rose, and requested im to shew the lady into another pew, explaining to im that there were plenty of empty pews, and that ad we another introduced into our pew we should be aconveniently full. Shure,' says he (meaning the laintiff) get in now; ye'll get in here,' at the samo ime giving me a slight push. I remonstrated with him meaning the plaintiff), telling him not to assault me n the church. Shure,' says he (meaning the plainiff) I'll assault ye immediately. I, not wishing for ny disturbance with the gentleman (meaning the laintiff) retired; but before I had got three yards rom the pew, he (meaning the plaintiff) had laid his hands upon one young lady, and pushed her completely out of one particular corner, although there was ample room where I had been sitting, after I had left the pew. So thoroughly disgusted was I with his (meaning the plaintiff's) ungentlemanly and ridiculous conduct that I left the church, as also did my friends. Surely there is some law to prevent such conduct to a churchwarden, or I shall use my best endeavours to obtain a sufficient sum of money to present him with something if he will resign, or, at any rate, make a apostle. He (meaning the plaintiff) professes to be moved by the Holy Ghost to preach the gospel; and there can be no doubt that he (meaning the plaintiff) warden and turned him out of his place in a towering was moved by the spirit when he came to the churchIs not the inconsistent conduct of the professed folpassion. Strange preparation for that solemn service! lowers of Christ enough to make infidels of us all? The Church in all ages has suffered most from her professed friends. What is the use of a bishop if he cannot stop the vagaries of a divine? Pleas. First, not guilty. "CHURCHMAN." Secondly, down to and inclusive of the words and letter " John R. Maltby," the defendant says, that before he did what is therein complained of, viz. on the Sunday morning in the said libel mentioned, to wit, Sunday, the 19th June, A. D. 1864, one John R. Maltby, accompanied by a few friends, who were visiting him, attended his parish church, being the church of the yet is, vicar, and whereof the said Maltby then was parish of Bradney, whereof the plaintiff then was, and churchwarden, as the plaintiff well knew; and that when the said Maltby entered there were only some eight or ten persons present, and that after having got comfortably seated the said Maltby saw the plaintiff escorting the schoolmistress of Southrey up the aisle, and that, after passing some twenty empty pews, the plaintiff halted at the one he had appropriated to the said Maltby, in consequence of a dispute which had occurred some twelve months before the said time, &c.; and that the said Maltby immediately rose and requested the plaintiff to shew the lady into another pew, explaining to the plaintiff that there were plenty of empty pews; and further explaining to the plaintiff that, had the said Maltby and his said friends another person introduced into the pew, they would be inconveniently full; and that thereupon the plaintiff addressed to the said lady the words following, that is to say, "Shure, get in now: ye'll get in here," and at the same time gave the said Maltby a slight push, and that the said Maltby remonstrated with the plaintiff, telling him not to assault him, the said Maltby, in the church; and that thereupon the plaintiff addressed to the said Maltby the words following, that is to say, "Shure I'll assault ye immediately;" and that the said Maltby, not wishing for any disturbance with the plaintiff, retired; and that before the said Maltby had got three yards from the pew, the plaintiff laid his hands on a young lady, and pushed her completely out of one particular corner in the said pew in which the said Maltby had been seated as aforesaid, although there was ample room where the said Maltby had been sitting, after the said Maltby left the pew; and that the said Maltby was so thoroughly disgusted with the plaintiff's aforesaid conduct, which the defendant alleges to have been ungentlemanly and ridiculous conduct, that the said Maltby left the |