treaty of neutrality between France and Naples had been concluded at Paris on the 21st of September, by Talleyrand and the marquis di Gal. lo; and ratified at Portici by the king of Naples on the 8th of October. By this treaty, the French agreed to withdraw their troops from the Neapolitan territory, where they had been stationed, without any justifiable pretence, since the commencement of the war with England; and the king of Naples engaged, in return, to remain neutral in the war between France and the allies, and to repel by force, every encroachment on his neutrality. He more particularly became bound not to permit the troops of any belligerent power to eater his territories; not to conáde the command of his armies or defence of his strong places to any Russian or Austrian officer, or French emigrant, or subject of any belligerent; and not to admit any belligerent squadron into his ports. But hardly had six weeks elapsed after the ratification of this treaty, when every one of its stipulations was violated by the court of Naples. On the 20th of November a squadron of English and Russian ships of war appeared in the bay of Naples, and landed a body of forces in that city and its vicinity. It is still doubtful, whether this expedition was undertaken by the allies in concert with the Neapolitan government; but, whether proviously consulted or not, by not opposing the landing of the troops, nor even remonstrating against it, the latter made itself a party to the transaction, and forfeited the neutrality secured to it by the treaty recently concluded. Such at least

was the interpretation of its conduct by the French ambassador at Na. ples, who instantly took down the arms of France from over the gate of his hotel, and demanded pass. ports, to enable him to leave the kingdom. Had the court of Naples been able to justify itself from a participation in the counsels that led to these proceedings, or been still desirous of maintaining its newtrality in the war between France and the allies, this was the moment for explanation. But, instead of keeping open the door for accommodation, it suffered the French ambassador to depart, without even attempting a vindication of its conduct; and contented itself with issuing a decree, in which, after slightly alluding to the late transactions, but without even conde. scending to say, that the neutrality of its territory had been violated against its will, it promised to foreign merchants, subjects of the allies of France, and resident in the Neapolitan dominions, who might otherwise be alarmed at the depar. ture of the French ambassador, protection for their property, and permission to pursue their com merce.-The appearance of such a decree, at such a juncture, was regarded by France as an unequivocal declaration, that the late proceedings of the allies at Naples, if not undertaken at the request of the Neapolitan government, were a greeable to its wishes; and if any doubts had remained of its inten tion to disregard the treaty of Por. tici, and connect itself with the allies, its subsequent conduct would have soon removed them.

The Russians, who were in num, ber about 14,000 men, under geK 3 лега!

neral Lasey, landed at Naples, and were quartered in that city and its neighbourhood. The English, amounting to about 10,000, disembarked at Castell-a-mare, and were cantoned at that place, at Torre del Greco and in the vicinity. Sir James Craig was commander in chief of the English forces, and sir John Stuart second in command. No sooner were the troops on shore, than preparations for active hostilities were begun by the government of Naples. Le vies of Neapolitans were ordered. Horses and waggons, necessary for the advance of the army, were provided. Magazines were collected, and every demonstration was given by the court of Naples, that, if not consulted before the expedition was undertaken, the plan of operations, whatever it was, had now its hearty approbation and support.

It is impossible in reviewing these transactions, not to be struck with the blindness of the Neapolitan government, as well as with the want of any rational or intelligible object in the measures of the allies.For what purpose, we naturally ask, were troops landed at Naples? Were the English and Russians so ill-informed of what was passing in that kingdom, as not to know, that the French garrisons were already withdrawn from it? Is it true, as the Russians have asserted*, that this expedition was undertaken with the aim of producing a diversion in favour of the Austrians in Lombardy? But is it credible, that the authors of the expedition could seriously believe, that by landing an army at Naples, they would check

the operations of Massena on the Adige? Was it not pro bable, that the fate of the campaign in Lombardy would be decided, before the allied army would advance from Naples to the Po, though it should experience no opposition or obstacle in its march? If the purpose of the expedition had been to serve the Austrians and promote the common cause of the alliance, would not that object have been more effectually accomplished by sending troops to Venice, than by landing them at Naples? Were the allies so intoxicated with dreams of success, when the court of Petersburg gave orders for this expedition, that it was thought necessary, thus early in the war, to take measures for securing to Russia a preponderating influence in the south of Italy? Was it not distrust in the modera. tion of Austria, should her armies prove successful in Lombardy, ra ther than the project of assisting her, while contending for victory, that suggested this step to her associate? But, if the views of the allies are difficult of explanation, the conduct of the court of Naples could proceed only from the violence and imprudence of passion. Naples was already freed from the burthen of supporting a French army.

If the allies were successful, she was secure from its return, Any assistance she could render the general cause, was so utterly insignificant, that if she had not been bound by treaty to be neutral, her inability to give any effectual aid to the allies, ought to have been a sufficient reason for their wishing her to remain so. But, while Na

ples

and property should be respected. Having passed the frontiers of the kingdom, the French advanced in three divisions. The right commanded by Regnier, marched to Gaeta without opposition, and summoned the prince of Hesse Philipsthadt, the governor of that place to surrender, offering him honourable terms of capitulation, and warning him of the inefficacy of resistance. The answer of the prince of Hesse was a determinate refusal to capitulate; on which the French attacked and carried the redoubt of St. André, defended by ten pieces of cannon, but lost in the attack general Gigny, an excellent officer, much lamented by their army. The centre division, under the command of Massena, met with no resistance in its march to Naples. Capua surrendered on the 12th of February, and on the 15th, Joseph Bonaparte entered Naples, the garrison left in that city and in the neighbouring forts having previously capitulated. Next day, he went publicly to mass, which was celebrated by cardinal Ruffo, archbishop of Naples; and to display his devotion in a manner more gratifying to the populace, he presented a diamond necklace, as an offering to Saint Januarius, the tutelary saint of Naples.

The unfortunate king of Naples had left his capital on the 23d of January, to seek refuge, a second time, at Palermo; and the queen had followed his example. Part of the Neapolitan army accompanied the king and queen in their flight, and a number of persons, connect ed with the court, or obnoxious to the French, made their escape along with them. Though the king had been always a favourite with the

populace, no effort was made to detain him, nor disposition shewn, as on a former occasion, to arm in his defence. The queen was detested by all ranks of people, and no sentiment, but exultation, attended her flight. Her meddling, intriguing, character must ever have prevented her from acquiring popularity; but to have drawn upon her the universal abhorrence of her subjects, it was necessary that she should have displayed such a vindictive temper, and shed such a profusion of blood, as had marked her return from her former exile. There was hardly a noble or respectable family in Naples, which had not to lament some victim sacrificed on that occasion to her resentment; and such was the impression left in their minds, of her cruel, unrelenting character, that, when she sailed from Naples, there was but one wish in the city, that she might never return to it.

The duke of Calabria, heir apparent of Naples, to whom the king his father, before his departure, had delegated the regency of the kingdom, during his own absence, remained at Naples till the 7th of February. But, having tried in vain to open a negociation with the French, he abandoned the city on their approach, and retired, with a body of troops, to Calabria, where general Damas, a French emigrant in the Neapolitan service, was at the head of a considerable force, endeavouring to organize a levy en masse, for the defence of that part of the kingdom. The activity of the French, however, left the Neapolitan generals but a short time to complete their preparations. General Regnier was called from before Gaeta, and sent after the fugitives with part of the army

which had entered Naples. No stand seems to have been made by the Neapolitan generals, till they reached the frontiers of Calabria; but having taken a strong position at Lago Negro, they determined to wait there the approach of the enemy. An action ensued, in which the Neapolitans, after attempting in vain to defend the passage of a small rivulet, were driven with great loss from their position. This action, which seems to have been obstinately disputed on the part of the Neapolitans, was fought on the 6th of March. On the two follow ing days Regnier continued to advance, driving small parties of the Neapolitans before him, and on the 9th he attacked their army in its entrenched position at Campo Te nese. According to the French accounts, the Neapolitans behaved most shamefully on this occasion. They are said to have fled at the first onset, abandoning their cannon and baggage, and about 2000 prisoners to the enemy; and to have dispersed after the battle so completely, that general Damas was unable, in his flight, to collect together more than 900 infantry and 50 horse. This account of the action at Campo Tenese, we have no particular grounds for calling in question; but we have understood, in general, that the disasters of the Neapolitan army in Calabria, were owing more to the want of skill and courage in their leaders, than to any misconduct in the troops. The battle of Campo Tenese, if it deserves the name, put an end for the present to the war in Calabria. Regnier advanced to Neggis at the extremity of the peninsula, and placed a French garrison in the fort of Scylla. Another division

of the French army marched, without opposition, to Tarento, and took possession of that important city, the most conveniently situated of any in the kingdom, for menacing at once both Sicily and Greece.

But, though

The whole kingdom of Naples had now submitted to the French arms, except Gaeta and Civitelle del Tranto, in the farther Abruzzo.— Gaeta, which is situated on the point of a rocky promontory, washed on three sides by the sea, and on the fourth joined to the continent by a narrow isthmus, strongly fortified, was still held by the prince of Hesse-Philipsthal; and such was the strength of the place and resolution of the governor, that the French had no chance of becoming masters of it, without a regular siege ; which, for want of battering cannon, they were unable for some time to commence. no enemy appeared against them in the field, the country they had subdued was far from being tranquil. Assassinations, robberies, and other disorders, inseparable from a dissolution of government, broke out at Naples and in other parts of the kingdom, and required for their suppression, the most rigorous and vigilant police. These disorders, which filled the better sort of Neapolitans with the most dismal apprehensions, were fomented by the partizans and emissaries of the old government, who thought to distress the French, by exciting dis. turbances in the country. But, such wretched policy had no other effect than to alienate still farther from the exiled family, all persons of rank, property, or consideration at Naples, and to attach them more firmly to the French interest, from the predominance of which