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convinced of this by experience; this moment was the most painful of his reign.

It was the affair of France to reject the modifications under which the king had confirmed the treaty, if she did not approve them. But she avoided doing this, for the whole Prussian army was still under arms. She continued to be lavish of assurances of friendship: she fulfilled the treaty as far as it suited her; but when his majesty wished to reap the only advantage which he had proposed to himself from the late negotiations, and which was nearest to his heart, she suddenly altered her language. The modifications, added to the treaty of Vienna, were now rejected at Paris. Endeavours were made to force Prussia into the most injurious measures; and when count Haugwitz, who was at Paris, remonstrated against this, the unconditional fulfilment of the treaty was haughtily insisted on, as were the immediate cession of the three provinces, and the recal of the patent by which the occupation of Hanover was declared provisional. Prussia was required to resign a part of the advantages stipulated, and to shut the ports against the British flag, in the same manner as if the French had returned into the electorate.

The king, at length, was perfectly convinced of the true character of the friendship of the emperor of the French-a soporific draught for a power which still feels its own strength; an instrument of degradation,and finally of subjection, to every power which no longer possesses strength.

In the mean time, Napoleon was in possession of every advantage. The Prussian army had returned, his own, after some movements of

no consequence, at which deceived Germany prematurely rejoiced, on some frivolous pretences, established itself on this side the Rhine. The first conflict might produce misfortunes. War which is not, under all circumstances, the greatest of evils, might become such under those then existing. The king determined to continue the part he had hitherto acted, for some time longer. Wishing to preserve his force, now more than ever necessary to Europe, and at least to secure the tranquillity of the north, he confirmed the new treaty. Confidence, however, was now utterly lost. Prussia was convinced that, on the first opportunity to weaken her without danger, she might expect an attack from her pretended ally; convinced there is a degree of ambition which nothing can satisfy-which proceeds, without intermission, from usurpation to usurpation, sometimes without a plan, but ever intent on destruc tion; careless of the choice of means, and employing alike arms, and the pen, violence, and oaths. But even with this conviction, so great is the unfortunate superiority obtained by such policy, over those who wish only to be just, the king fulfilled all the conditions of the treaty with the punctuality of a faithful ally. It is known what the consequences were with respect to the connections of his majesty with England. France gained nothing by this; but she triumphed in secret at the thought of having disunited two courts, the union of which might have been dangerous to her; and what, in the views of France, gave the principal value to her alliance with the king was, that this alliance isolated his majesty, since it produced an opinion, that Prassia was a participator

tunes.

But not content with this, we shall soon see in what manner the politics of France, assured that she had now no enemy to fear, believing that she had annihilated Austria, forming a judgment of Russia with equal ignorance and rashness, and blinded by the apparent tranquillity of Prussia, she at length threw off the mask; and despising forms which she had hitherto sometimes respected, openly trampled on all treaties and all rights. Three months after the signing of the treaty with Prussia, all its articles were violated.

in the cause of so many misfor- to all treaties, nations have their rights; and had not France sported with the sanctity of an oath, this act of unexampled despotism would exasperate every mind. To deprive princes who had never offended France, and to render them the vassals of others, themselves the vassals of the French government; to abolish, with a stroke of the pen, a constitution of a thousand years duration which long habit, the remembrance of so many illustrious periods, and so many various and mutual relations, had rendered dear to such a number of princes— which had so often been guaranteed by all the European powers, and even by France herself to lay contributions on the cities and towns in the midst of profound peace, and leave the new possessions only an exhausted skeleton to abolish this constitution without consulting the emperor of Germany, from whom a crown was wrested, or Russia, so lately become the guarantee of the German League, or Prussia, interested intimately in that league, thus arbitrarily dissolved-No: wars and continued victories have sometimes produced great and remarkable catastrophes ;、 but such an example in time of peace was never before given to theworld.

The treaty had for its basis the status quo of the moment in which it was concluded, also the guarantee of the German empire and its states, according to the constitution then established. This truth arises not only from the nature of things; the treaty had also expressly prescribed to the two powers their duties. The relations in which the peace of Presburg had left his majesty the emperor of Austria, were guaranteed to him; consequently also the imperial crown of Germany, and the rights connected with it. The existence of Bavaria, and consequently the relations which had connected it for so many centuries to the empire, were likewise confirmed by the same common guarantee. Three months after, the confederation of the Rhine over threw the Germanic constitution, deprived the emperor of the antient ornament of his house, and placed Bavaria, and thirty other princes,' under the tutelage of France.

But is it necessary to appeal to treaties, to form a just judgment of this extraordinary event? Previous

The king commiserated the unfortunate princes, who suffered by these transactions: but he pitied not less those who had suffered themselves to be hired by the hope of gain; and he would reproach himself, should he increase their unhappiness by judging them with too great severity. Deluded by the reward of their compliance; probably, forced to obey commands which admitted of no opposition; or, if surprised into consent, suffici

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each throws a light on the whole.

ently punished by their acquisitions, his undisturbed succession to the and by being reduced to a state of states of his house. None of these vassalage, "as harsh and degrading as circumstances are unimportant; their former relations were honourable, they deserve not to be treated by Germany with the utmost rigour. Perhaps, when the magnanimous nation, to which they formerly be longed arises around them on every side to contend for their independence, they may listen to the voice of gratitude and honour, and, at least, abhor their chains, when they find they must be stained with the blood of their brethren.

It was not enough that these despotic acts were immediately injuri ous to Prussia. The emperor of France was intent on rendering them' sensible to the person of the king in all his allied states. The existence of the prince of Orange was under the common guarantee of the two powers; for the king had acknowledged the political changes in Holland only under this condition. For several years this prince had expected that the claims, secured by the mutual stipulations of Prussia and France, should be satisfied. The Batavian republic had been willing to enter into an accommoda. tion, but the emperor Napoleon forbad it. Neither the recollection of this circumstance, nor the consideration of the ties of blood which united his majesty to the prince, nor the declaration, twenty times repeated, that the king could not desert the rights of his brother-inlaw, could prevent his being added to the heap of victims. He was the first who was deprived of his paternal property. Eight days before, he had received from the emperor a letter, condoling with him, in the customary forms, on the death of his father, and wishing him joy on

Cleves had been allotted to prince Murat. Scarcely become a sove reign, he wished likewise to be a conqueror.-His troops took possession of the abbies of Essen, Werden, and Elten, under the pretext that they appertained to the duchy of Cleves, though they were entirely territories newly acquired, and there was not the shadow of a connection between them and the ceded province. Great labour was employed, in vain, to give even a colour to this outrage.

Wesel was to belong to the new duke, not to the emperor Napoleon. The king had never resolved to give up the last fortress on the Rhine into the power of France.-Without a word by way of explanation, Wesel was annexed to a French de partment.

The existing state of the Austrian monarchy, and of the Porte, had been mutually guaranteed. The emperor Napoleon certainly wished that Prussia should be bound by this guarantee; for in his hands it was an instrument which he might employ as suited his politics, a pretext for demanding sacrifices in a contest which his ambition might occasion. He himself, however, did not observe it longer than it contributed to his interest. Ragusa, though under the protection of the Porte, was taken possession of by his troops. Gradiska and Aquileia were wrested from Austria, under nearly the same pretexts which had been employed when the French seized the three abbeys.

In all political proceedings it was naturally taken for granted, that

the

the new states formed by France, were states in the proper sense of the term, and not French provinces. But it cost the cabinet of St. Cloud only a word to deprive them of their independence. The appellation, The Great Empire, was invented, and that empire was immediately surrounded with vassals.

Thus there was no trace of the treaty left, yet Prussia proceeded to shut her ports against England, and still considered herself as having obligations to fulfil.

The emperor, at length, informed his majesty that it was his pleasure to dissolve the German empire, and form a confederation of the Rhine, and he recommended to the king to establish a similar confederation in the north of Germany.-This was according to his customary policy; a policy which had long been crowned with success; at the mo ment of the birth of any new project, to throw out a lure to those courts which might occasion difficulties in the execution of such project. The king adopted the idea of such a confederation, not that the advice he received made the least impression on him, but because, in fact, it was rendered necessary by circumstances; and, because, after the succession of the princes who had acceded to the confederation of the Rhine, a close union between those of the north, became more than ever the condition of their safety. The king took measures to establish this league, but on other principles from those of the model presented to him. He made it his pride to collect the last of the Germans under his banners; but the rights of each he left unimpaired, and honour alone was the bond of the league.

But could France advise the king to any measure which should be productive of advantage to Prussia? We shall soon see what is to be expected when France makes professions of favour.

In the first place, care had been taken to introduce into the fundamental statute of the confederation of the Rhine, an article which contained the germ of all future inno. vations. It provided, that other princes should be received into this confederation, should they desire it. In this manner, all relations in Germany were left indeterminate ; and as the means were still reserved to detach and annex to this league the weaker states, either by promise or threats, it was but too probable that, in time, this confederation would be extended into the heart of the Prussian monarchy.

And, that this might no longer remain doubtful, but be manifest to every one, the first attempt was immediately made. Fortunately, it was made on a prince who knows not fear, and who considers inde. pendence as the highest object of his ambition. The French minister at Cassel invited the elector to throw himself into the arms of his master. Prussia, it was alledged, did nothing for her allies!-It is true, Napoleon knows how to manage his better; and every one sees that Spain and Holland, and the kings of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, have to thank their alliance with him for peace, independence, and honour ! Prussia did nothing for her allies. Napoleon, on the contrary, would reward the accession of the elector by an enlargement of his territory.

And this treachery was exercised towards an ally, and at the very moment when the king was advised

to form his alliance, of which Hesse was to be the first bulwark, endea. yours were made to detach from him a power, whom family connections, alliances, and relations of every kind, united in the closest manner to his majesty's person.

But even these hostile steps were not sufficient. Does any one wish to know what was the lure by which it was hoped to gain the elector of Hesse, and what was the augmentation of territory with the expectation of which he was flattered? It was the prince of Orange, the brother-in-law of the king-that prince who had been twice deceived in the most shameful manner-who was now to be robbed the third time! He still possessed the territory of Fulda; this was promised to the elector, and it would have been given, had the clector consented to accept it, and had not Prussia taken up arms.

His majesty saw the system of usurpation advance every day; he saw a circle, continually becoming narrower, drawn round him, and even the right of moving within it beginning to be disputed with him, for a sweeping resolution forbade a passage to any foreign troops, armed or not armed, through the states of the confederation. This was to cut off, contrary to the rights of nations, the connection between the detached Hessian provinces; this was to prepare pretexts on which to act; this was the first threat of punishment aimed at a magnani mous prince, who had preferred a defender to a master.

But even after this, his majesty cannot reflect on it without admiration; the king considered whether a combination might not be found, which should render this state of

things compatible with the mainte nance of peace.

The emperor Napoleon appeared to be solicitous to remove this doubt. Two negotiations were then carrying on at Paris, one with Russia, the other with the English ministry. In both these negotiations the intentions of France against Prussia were evi. dently manifested.

By the treaty which the emperor of Russia has refused to ratify, France offered, in conjunction with Russia, to prevent Prussia from depriving the king of Sweden of his German territories. Yet, for many months, the cabinet of St. Cloud had continually pressed the king to seize those states, with the threefold view,-first to revenge himself on the king of Sweden; secondly, to embroil Prussia with all other powers; and, thirdly, to purchase her silence with respect to the subversion of Southern Germany. But the king had long been aware, that such were the views of France; and his unfortunate dispute with Sweden was painful to him. He had, therefore, been careful to provide against every suspicion of self-inte rested motives, and he confided his explanations to the emperor Alex ander. The scene now again changed, and Napoleon, who had so long been the enemy of the king of Swe. den, was suddenly transformed into his protector.

It is not superfluous to remark, that, in this insidious treaty of the French emperor, in order to satisfy the honourable interest which the court of St. Petersburgh took in the maintenance of the rights of the king of Naples, he promised the latter an indemnification; engaging to prevail on the king of Spain to cede to him the Belearic islands.

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