trine mean any such thing. He and we mean this, that the witness of our pardon must precede the exercise of the grace received in regeneration-must precede the fruits of regeneration. But here the sense of terms is confused by the New (metaphysics of) Divinity.* As in that system there is no soul, but only spiritual operations, and no basis of religious feeling, but certain passing voluntary exercisesas regeneration on that system consists in this or that exercise-of necessity, perhaps, when we speak of the fruits of regeneration, you understand regeneration itself.

It is to be lamented that the differences between the churches of Christ have latterly assumed such a character as to involve the very unseen elements of thought, and almost to preclude the possibility of mutual conviction by this, that each one, under the influence of some peculiar philosophic theory, attaches to terms certain almost invisible and yet important shades of meaning for which the other can make no allowance. This is a state of things for which there is no remedy, save in'a rigorous adherence to Scripture terms, and to the Scripture sense of terms.

Let the conclusion of this observation be, that though you begin with Mr. Wesley, yet, lest you should refute nobody, you end with Mr. Watson, whom you refute only by misunderstanding him.

I remark, secondly, on the manner of your argumentation, that it is tortuous in the extreme.

What I mean is about this: Suppose that in your former piece you had (not affirmed, but) implied false philosophy, which is exposed by the respondents. How do you mend it in your second? I will tell you: By answering that false philosophy, as though it had been advanced by us. Is that a trick of the trade? or a slip of the pen? Is it a misrepresentation of us, or a misrepresentation of yourself?

Of this gyratory movement I will give you a specimen. In your former article you remarked-" Regeneration, the change wrought, evidences itself. It is a matter of consciousness. If regeneration takes place in our hearts, we are capable of perceiving it, just as we perceive any other change of character." "To talk of its evidences as something apart and distinct from its nature, is to use language without precision." See Christian Spectator, vol. viii, p. 358. This implies that the soul is a subject of direct inspection; so that its state and moral character, and any change in them, may be observed by the eye of consciousness. Now this is false philosophy, as was distinctly pointed out in the Methodist Magazine for 1836, page 283. Read then the following extracts from your own writings, and see how coolly you can, when permitted, beat people over the head with their own walking sticks. "The mind, the spiritual substance we call the soul, does not come under the cognizance of the senses, and it cannot be directly contemplated by consciousness. Therefore we cannot so inspect it as to perceive and be conscious of such an impression on the soul as Mr. Wesley describes." You here misrepresent all parties-Mr. Wesley,

*The above is the proper sense of Neology. The piece under examination abounds in error, resting upon a concealed substratum of metaphysics. It would be a service to the public if some competent hand would digest for it the three following points:-1. New Divinity theologically. 2. The Metaphysics of New Divinity. 3. Anti-New-Divinity Metaphysics.

yourself, us. For an unravelling of the snarl which you twine about that word, "impression," see below. It is a more gross resort to the same kind of proceeding when you say, vol. ix, p. 174: "This knowledge is gained, not by such direct inspection of the soul as must be possible and actually takes place upon Methodist principles, but by the best possible means, viz., consciousness-consciousness of having the fruits of the Spirit."

Besides this, you, in one instance at least, attach to the language of the opposite party more than that language will warrant, Of this I have time and disposition to give you but one instance. On page 177. you say, "If a sinner has such faith, even the Methodist Quarterly admits that he knows it by the best possible means, viz., consciousness.' "Do they reflect that forgiveness is already promised to him who has such faith in Christ as turns him from sin to righteousness, and therefore to know we have such faith is to know we are forgiven?"

In the first place, observe that little word such. How important it is! and how easily intruded where it has no business! Now I did admit that a man might know himself to possess faith; but I did not admit that he might know himself to possess such faith. A man may indeed be assured by consciousness that he has faith in Christ; but that he has justifying faith, or such as turns from sin to righteousness ―he can know only by the fact that it does justify, and does turn from sin to righteousness.

5. We now approach the borders of the subject itself to which let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having our consciences sprinkled from dead works to serve the living God. At the outset you undertook to tell us what is not the question. "The question at issue," say you, "is not whether a Christian may know that he is converted, although Dr. B. shifts his ground and endeavors to make this the question, and that, too, while he professes strong belief in the genuine doctrine of Methodism, which he well knows is a very different thing. According to Dr. B.'s own showing, (for which he will accept our thanks,) it is admitted on all hands that it is a Christian's privilege, not merely to hope, but to know that he has passed from death unto life." Vol. ix, p. 174. Your thanks are superfluous. Dr. B., not having shown any such thing, claims nothing for it. He does not even thank you for the compliment in the former sentence seeing it so much exceeds the modesty of his demands. What we are thankful for is, that you are of the all by whom it is admitted that a Christian may know that he has passed from death unto life. You proceed, "The question is not whether the Holy Spirit has an agency in producing holy affections." Certainly. You are correct. But when you add, "Wesleyan Methodism maintains it to be a fact of experience, that we actually perceive the Holy Ghost operating upon the soul to inform us of our adoption and to produce this joy,"-you are totally incorrect.

By and by, I shall state the question more fully; but for the present let me remark, that our doctrine of the witness is divisible into two propositions, viz.,

1. That the believer knows his adoption into the Divine family. 2. That he knows it by the testimony of the Divine Spirit-that he has a superhuman attestation of the fact. Upon the first of

these there is no dispute between you and us. We divide upon the

second.

Now in defence of that second proposition, I might say many things. As for instance, if he is not to know it by divine attestation, how else can he know it? You will answer, By the fruits of regeneration.* I would reply, that those fruits are incompatible even with settled uncertainty on the subject, which uncertainty of course must exist, on your system, until the fruits are produced.

However, what I wish now to observe is, that we conclude the source of this assurance to be the Holy Ghost, not by any means because we perceive the Holy Ghost operating, but for the following reasons: 1. The Scriptures represent the Holy Ghost as thus operating. 2. The nature of the case requires such an operation on the part of the Holy Ghost. 3. The nature and circumstances of the assurance which believers have determine it to be from God. I will not now establish these points at length; but thus much may suffice to end that dream of yours, about believers, beholding the Holy Ghost operating upon the soul.

6. Previously to entering upon the subject itself, I wish to make some remarks upon the various terms which have been employed in designating the subject-matter of our discussion; as it is upon the terms which the poverty of language compels us to employ that cavilers are enabled to hang their objections. I trust, indeed, that all which precedes has been carefully examined. Nevertheless, whatever is made of the past, if the reader is anxious to know what we have to say on the point at issue, let him attend thoughtfully to what follows. I would say prayerfully too, not because of the importance of our remarks, but because of the importance of the subject, and of the reader's own deep concern in it.

In reference to the language necessarily employed on such a subject, there are a few considerations which, to a candid mind, will appear to be of great consequence. The perfection of metaphysical language, said one who understood himself, consists in its freedom from any necessary allusion to objects of sense-in its not suggesting any picture or figment of material things, by which our conception may be obscured or ever made false. But this perfection cannot be fully attained. Those expressions-to retain in memory-to comprehend-to imagine-do all contain, more or less distinctly, an allusion to certain operations of sense, from their analogy to which the use of them did originate.

But if this perfection of language cannot be attained in our day, much less could it in the days of Mr. Wesley. If it could not be attained in the description of things intellectual, much less could it in describing the things which are eternal. We are under a necessity, in both cases, of using language which must prop up itself by the support of external things.

Such being the case, how easy for a captious person to pass by

* I have before noticed the confusion in the sense of the terms, "regeneration" and "fruits of regeneration," arising from very discernible causes. I now observe that we probably have very different ideas even of the fruits of regeneration. For instance, they would mean, by love to God, a principle of action; we, a certain condition of the sentient part of the soul, if I may so speak. However, we approximate near enough to justify the argument.

the essential meaning, and to play with the image! The easiness, however, with which it can be done does away any obligation to give credit to the sophist for wisdom or penetration, even though his effort to darken counsel should prove successful.

The terms employed by Mr. Wesley, in his elucidation of our subject, partake necessarily of the defective character which has been mentioned, though there is an additional consideration in his case which, to the candid, will appear of some weight. It is, that

he wrote for those whose honesty and love of truth would induce them to search out his real meaning from under the veil of obscuring imagery in which the poverty of language compelled him to envelope it.

The two prominent terms to be noticed are-" voice of God"—and, "impression on the soul." It is upon these that the friendly Spectator fastens his observing eye, and in them can see naught but deformity. These he understands as though they were meant to convey the notion of a visible impersonation of the invisible God; some sense of him operating and of ourselves operated upon. They are to be explained, however, into a very consistent sense:-1. By the nature of the subject. Of whose voice do we speak? Is it not the voice of God? And is it not well known that, literally, he has no voice? One would suppose candor might think of this. When one mạn communicates his mind to another, he does it by voice. Hence, by a very easy figure of speech, when God communicates to any being, in any way, we say he speaks-it is his voice. Who is it that hears? Manifestly, the soul of man, which hath neither eyes nor ears. As, by God's speaking, we mean his making communication, so, by our hearing, we mean simply our receiving the communication.

The other term-" impression"—is to be explained in the same way. Every body knows what is meant by it, in sensible operations; every body may know its meaning in the things of the Spirit. It is simply the being brought to a new state of mind or feeling.

Figurative terms are, of course, liable to some variety in signification. If there is any thing not already accounted for in Mr. Wesley's use of these phrases, it may be readily explained by a very common figure of speech. The Spectator knows well that we very frequently use a word which denotes an act to signify the result of that act. It is in that way these expressions may be sometimes used-the voice of God, signifying not God speaking, but the thing spoken; and yet not the thing, as spoken, but the mere thing;-impression denoting not the act of changing the mind, but the new state of assurance into which it is brought.

Weigh these things, and you will see that there is no ground for several of your objections. As, for instance, that we pretend by our doctrine to explain the method of the Spirit's operation, whereas we mean simply the result of it, in producing a certain assurance. Neither is there any ground for your supposing we represent the human soul, as matter of direct contemplation. We do not: but only that it is aware of the thing communicated-of the truth impressed upon it.

7. Perhaps, by all these remarks, we are prepared the more profitably to examine the doctrine itself.

We have, for our side of the question, two great points :-I. The attestation and the nature of it. II. The relation which that attestation bears to the testimony of our own conscience.

By reason of the peculiar character of the subject, it being about spiritual things, and that experience of the believer which is most emphatically sui generis, which, indeed, the world knows nothing of, it is very easy even for one who comprehends to misstate it, and even to appear a dunce to one who shares not in his experience. The attestation of which we speak is, all its circumstances considered, most exclusively solitary in its kind. Yet there are experiences-mental phenomena-which somewhat resemble it, and it is by that resemblance that I propose to illustrate the subject; only cautioning the reader that he is not to fancy me authorizing the supposition of any resemblance beyond that which I specify.

As far as I understand the subject, I have already conveyed as accurate a notion as is possible to me in the following paragraph:"This is the spirit of adoption by which he cries: it is the spirit of Christ itself crying-in many cases, doubtless, a simple state of mind, like the child's conviction of his own identity. Ask him (the child) if he is conscious of his own identity-he does not comprehend you. Perhaps, if you persist in explaining terms and asking proofs, you will make him doubt, at last, whether he be the same-the very same he was yesterday. Nevertheless, he acts (not thinks, nor feels) he acts that he is the same. So with the babe in Christ. He acts out, with his very heart, in his inmost soul, that God is his Father." Meth. Mag., vol. xvii, p. 279.

The similarity above intimated between this experience and the primary laws of belief, I believe to hold good, and to form a very proper basis of illustration. Fix your mind upon any one of those laws, and you will perceive in them the following characteristics. They are not propositions believed, or reduced to shape as ideas in the mind, but they are truths acted upon. Suppose a man, who is perfect master of all his thoughts and feelings and actions, convinced by argument of his personal identity; this man would think and feel in all things as though he were unvaryingly one. Now, we are all so constituted by nature, that we think and feel just as such a man would; nature supplying the place of argumentative conviction. This is, if I may so speak, the frame-work of the soul. It is as though, having pre-existed, we had finished our former career by fixing in the mind this one proposition of our identity; nay, not by fixing in the mind the conviction that we are such, but the habit of acting and feeling as though it were so; which habit is all that remains, at present, of our pre-existent state. This is what I affirm to be the character of the Spirit's witness. It is woven, as it were, into the very texture of the believer's soul, that he is a child of God. Observe, it is not a proposition in his mind, I am a child of God. Perhaps the meaning of those words he does not understand; perhaps, if he did, he would be ashamed to apply them to himself. Nevertheless, watch his emotions; listen to his words; study his conduct; and you will perceive there is concealed under them the conviction that he is of God's family. The idea of a pre-existent state can be very appropriately brought in here. The finale of the man's sinful career has been the casting of him into this new mould