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[BOOK VI. Sequestra the person prosecuting such judgment or order shall, at the expiration of the time limited for the performance thereof, be entitled, without obtaining any order for that purpose, to issue a writ of sequestration against the estate and effects of such disobedient person. Such writ of sequestration, the rules go on to say, "shall have the same effect as a writ of sequestration in Chancery had before the commencement of the principal Act, and the proceeds of such sequestration may be dealt with in the same manner as the proceeds of writs of sequestration were before the same date dealt with by the Court of Chancery." The effect of the writ (by reference to the law in the Court of Chancery with regard to which we are thus thrown back) was that the commissioners appointed under it by the Court enter on the debtor's real estate and receive the rents and profits and sequests his personal property until the judgment is satisfied (1). No sequestration to enforce payment of costs can however be issued without the leave of the Court.

Garnishee order.

Charging order.

The next mode of enforcing execution is by what is called a garnishee order, which is an order under which debts "owing or accruing" due from third persons, called the "garnishees," to the judgment debtor are directed to be paid to the judgment creditor. The order is obtained upon an ex parte application, supported by an affidavit made either by the creditor or his solicitor shewing that judgment has been recovered and is still unsatisfied, and the debtor may be previously examined orally as to what debts are owing to him.

It must be borne in mind that only debts can be attached by the garnishee process. The debt attached must be a debt owing by the garnishee—a debt of which the judgment debtor could have compelled payment, if he had desired to do so, and the payment of which can be effectually enforced (2). Only such property of the debtor can be attached as the debtor could deal with properly, and without violation of the rights of other persons (3).

If the debtor's property consists of money in the funds, or

(1) R. S. C., 1883, Order XLIII., r. 6; see further Daniell's Chancery Practice, p. 908, et seq.; Seton on Decrees, p. 157, et seq.; and see as to order for sale dispensing with inquiries Re Bithray, 38 W. R. 60, and cases there cited. See Pratt v. Inman, 43 Ch. D. 175; Cook v. Cook, 15 P. D. 116.

(2) R. S. C., 1883, Order XLV., and see cases collected in the Annual

Practice, and, in particular, Hamer v.
Giles, 11 Ch. D. 942; Chatterton v.
Watney, 16 Ch. D. 383; Rogers v.
Whiteley, 23 Q. B. D. 236; and see
Prout v. Gregory, 24 Q. B. D. 281; Re
Combined Weighing and Advertising
Machine Co., 43 Ch. D. 99; Holtby v.
Hodgson, 24 Q. B. D. 103; Davis v.
Freethy, 24 Q. B. D. 519.

(3) Badeley v. Consolidated Bank, 38 Ch. D. 238.

1

stocks, or shares, the only mode in which it can be reached by the execution creditor is by means of a charging order under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82. The order may be made by any Divisional Court or any judge (1).

In connection with the subject of charging orders we may Distringas. briefly notice the process of distringas and stop orders. The writ of distringas is now abolished, but the same effect is produced by a person interested in stock standing in the books of any company serving a notice on the company, supported by an affidavit, setting forth the facts. The effect is that the fund cannot be dealt with unless information be given to the person serving the notice (2).

A stop order is a somewhat analogous process, applicable Stop order. when the fund is in Court.

The rules provide that when any moneys or securities are in Court to the general credit of any cause or matter, or to the account of any class of persons, and an order is made to prevent the transfer or payment of such moneys or securities, or any part thereof, without notice to the assignee of any person entitled in expectancy or otherwise to any share or portion of such moneys or securities, the person by whom any such order shall be obtained on the shares of such moneys or securities affected by such order shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court or a judge, to pay any costs, charges, and expenses which, by reason of any such order having been obtained, shall be occasioned to any party to the cause or matter, or any persons interested in any such moneys or securities (3).

A writ of possession is employed to enforce a judgment or Writ of order "that a party do recover possession of land," and directs possession. the sheriff to enter, and without delay cause the judgment creditor to have possession of the lands and premises with

their appurtenances (*).

A writ of delivery is used to enforce the recovery of any Writ of property other than land or money, and empowers the Court to delivery. insist on the defendant delivering up the specific thing itself, without the option of paying its value (5).

(1) R. S. C., 1883, Order XLVI., r. 1; Re Onslow, 20 Eq. 677; Widgery v. Tepper, 6 Ch. D. 364; Bagnall v. Carlton, 6 Ch. D. 130; South Western Loan and Discount v. Robertson, 8 Q. B. D. 17; Leggott v. Western, 12 Q. B. D. 287.

(2) R. S. C., 1883, Order XLVI., rr. 2, 11; Re Blaksley, 23 Ch. D. 549. (3) R. S. C., 1883, Order XLVI.,

r. 12, see as to stop order: Palmer v.
Locke, 18 Ch. D. 381; Pinnock v.
Bailey, 23 Ch. D. 497; Mutual Life
Assurance Society v. Langley, 32
Ch. D. 460. The order is made on
summons.

(4) R. S. C., Order XLVII.; Knight
v. Clarke, 15 Q. B. D. 294.

(5) R. S. C., Order XLVIII., see Ex parte Scarth, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 234.

Attachment and committal.

Passing on now from remedies against the property to remedies against the person, we come to attachment and committal. The distinction between these two is now practically abolished (1), though the writ of attachment still issues to the sheriff, while the order for committal is executed by the tip-staff of the Court. Moreover, a person committed by the Court is unable to be bailed out; but under a writ of attachment the sheriff may accept bail. A motion to release a prisoner from committal being in favour of the liberty of the subject is entitled to precedence over all other business (2).

No writ of attachment can be issued without the leave of the Court or a judge, to be applied for on notice to the party against whom the attachment is to be issued. It is important to observe that any notice of attachment must state in general terms the grounds of the application, and that when the notice is founded on evidence by affidavit, a copy of any affidavit intended to be issued must be served with the notice of motion (3).

An attachment for contempt is a criminal and not a civil process (4), and the officer charged with its execution may break open the outer door of the house of the person sought to be attached in order to execute process (5). The maxim of the law laid down in Semayne's Case that a man's house is his castle is subject to an exception, which was stated as follows: "When attachment is mere process, privilege exists; when it is punitive or disciplinary, privilege does not exist."

(1) See Odgers on Libel and Slander, 2nd ed. p. 499; Buist v. Bridge, 43 L. T. 432.

(2) Ashton v. Shorrock, 29 W. R. 117.

(3) R. S. C., 1883, Order XLIV., r. 2; Order LII., r. 4; Litchfield v. Jones, 25 Ch. D. 64; Hampden v. Wallis 26 Ch. D. 746; Treherne v. Dale, 27 Ch. D. 66; Petty v. Daniel,

34 Ch. D. 172.

(') Re Freston, 11 Q. B. D. 545; Re Dudley, 12 Q. B. D. 44; Re Strong, 32 Ch. D. 342.

(5) Harvey v. Harvey, 26 Ch. D. 644, where the authorities are reviewed; Reg. v. County Court Judge of Lambeth and Jonas, 36 W. R. 475; and see notes to Semayne's Case, Smith's Leading Cases, vol. i.

CHAPTER XIII.

BUSINESS AT CHAMBERS.

Many and important are the classes of business which are delegated to the officials at chambers. In some cases applications have to be made to a master or chief clerk in chambers arising out of or connected with proceedings previously commenced by writ or petition or otherwise. In other cases the Originating application originates in chambers, and is commenced by the summons. issue of what is called an "originating summons."

In all cases of applications originating in chambers, the summons must be prepared by the applicant or his solicitor. The summons is then sealed in the Central Office, or in Admiralty actions in the Admiralty Registry, and when so sealed is said to be "issued." The person obtaining a summons must leave at the Central Office or Admiralty Registry, as the case may be, a copy thereof, which must be filed, and stamped in the manner required by law.

An originating summons is "an action" within the meaning of the Judicature Acts and Rules (1).

The parties served with the summons must before they are heard in chambers enter appearances in the central office and give notice thereof (2).

A master in the Queen's Bench Division, and a registrar in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division may, with certain specified exceptions, transact all business and exercise all authority and jurisdiction which may be transacted or exercised by a judge at chambers (3).

(1) Galland v. Burton, 30 Ch. D. 231; Re Vardon's Trusts, 55 L. J. Ch. 259.

(2) Order Lv., r. 22.

(3) The excepted business with which masters of the Queen's Bench Division and registrars of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, may not deal (R. S. C., 1883, Order LIV., r. 12), is as follows:

(a) All matters relating to criminal proceedings or to the liberty of the subject:

(b) Granting leave for service out

of the jurisdiction of a writ,
or notice of a writ, of sum-

mons:

(c) The removal of actions from
one Division or judge to
another Division or judge:
(d) The settlement of issues, ex-
cept by consent:

(e) Inspection and other orders
under Order L. rules 1 to 5.
(f) Appeals from district regis-

trars.

Powers of masters

and registrars.

Judge in chambers.

Adjourn

ment to

judge.

Chief clerks.

All orders made in the chambers of the Chancery Division are considered to be made by the judge himself, and, consequently, the judge in chambers is always accessible to any of the parties engaged in proceedings there who wish to see him, and it is the invariable practice to give any party, suggesting that he wishes to see the judge personally, the opportunity of doing so directly.

Of course, as was pointed out by Sir George Jessel, if a solicitor took an adjournment before the judge of every item in an account no business could be transacted. In theory there is a right to do this, but in practice it is found impossible that it should be done. The practice is to wait until the taking of the account is completed, and then to take an adjournment once for all to the judge (1).

An adjournment to the judge will not be granted unless an application is made to the chief clerk at the time when the summons is heard by him, either for an adjournment or for time to consider whether an adjournment shall be asked for. Otherwise the order can only be altered by motion to the Court to discharge it (2).

An adjournment from the chief clerk to the judge is not an appeal so as to subject the party who asked for the adjournment to costs if he fail (3).

In the Chancery Division the business in chambers of the judges to whom chambers are attached is carried on in conjunction with their Court business (4).

In any proceeding before the judge in chambers any party may, if he please, be represented by counsel.

In the Chancery Division a great part of the work in chambers is done by the chief clerks, of whom each Chancery judge (to whom chambers are attached) has three, in addition to

Prohibitions:

Injunctions and other orders

under sub-sect. 8 of sect. 25
of the principal Act:

(i) Awarding of costs, other than
the costs of or relating to
any proceeding before a
master, or registrar, and
other than any costs which
by these rules, or by

order of the Court or a judge,
he is authorized to award:
(k) Reviewing taxation of costs:
(1) Orders absolute for charging
stocks, funds, annuities, or
share of dividends, or annual
proceeds thereof:

(m) Acknowledgments of married

women.

(1) Per Jessel, M.R., in Upton v. Brown, 20 Ch. D (C.A.) 731. (2) W. N. (1884) 218.

(3) Hayward v. Hayward, Kay Ap. 31; Upton v. Brown, 20 Ch. D. 731; Re Watts, 22 Ch. D. 1, 5.

(4) There are at present four Judges of the Chancery Division to whom chambers are attached, viz.: Mr. Justice Chitty, Mr. Justice North, Mr. Justice Stirling, and Mr. Justice Kekewich; the fifth Chancery Judge, Mr. Justice Romer, sits in Court

ly, and has no chambers or staff of c.ief clerks attached to him.

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