9. Claim Form of Successive Occupancy.-Held that a claimant of the burgh franchise who founds on successive occupation of different dwelling-houses is bound to state in his claim, not merely the house last occupied by him, but all the houses which he has occupied during the twelve months. Hill v. Collins, 1868, 7 M. 283; 41 J. 170. 10. Claim Form of Tenant Qualification Column.-In the column headed" Nature of qualification" in the form of notice of claim appended to the Burgh Voters Act, a claimant inserted the words "Tenant and occupant." Held that this was sufficient, without the addition of the words "of a dwellinghouse." Hill v. Anderson, 1868, 7 M. 282; 41 J. 169. 11. Claim Lodgment Time for.-B claiming to be enrolled as a voter for the burgh of Tain, transmitted his claim to the assessor at Inverness by posting the same at the post office, Tain, about ten o'clock in the evening of 21st September, the last day for lodging claims. The latest mail from Tain to Inverness left Tain at 5.25 a.m. The claim was delivered to the assessor on the morning of 22nd September. Held that the claim not having been posted in time to reach the assessor within the statutory period had not been timeously transmitted. Bruce v. Rose, 1868, 7 M. 286; 41 J. 172. 12. Claim-Lodgment-Time for Assessor's Duty.-A claim arrived at the town where the assessor lived by the evening post on the last day for intimating claims, too late for delivery that evening. Held that the claim was timeously intimated, as the assessor could have received it that evening by applying at the post office, which it was his duty to have done. Rose v. Farquhar, 1868, 7 M. 268; 41 J. 171. 13. Claim Lodgment-Time for.-Where notice of a claim was posted so as to reach the post office of the place where the assessor had his chief office upon the 4th of September, that day being a Sunday, but at an hour after the office was closed for delivery of letters to those applying for them, in consequence of which the assessor did not receive the notice till the morning of Monday the 5th, held that the notice sufficiently complied with the statute, and that in order to establish a uniform rule for all places the post office of the assessor's post-town must be looked upon as the place at which the assessor received the notice, at least in determining the question of timeous reception. Morton v. Reid, 1870, 9 M. 29; 43 J. 7. 14. Claim Objection.-Objections to the registration of a voter repelled, although no appearance was made for him before the appeal court. Gow v. Watson, 1865, 4 M. 115; 38 J. 71. 15. Claim -Objection-Form of Notice Title. In counties a notice of objection may be signed by a mandatary; and a mandate expressed in general terms is sufficient. voter 17. Claim Objection — Notice - Sufficiency.-A notice of objection to a remaining on the roll was posted, addressed to him at the place as tenant of which he was registered. The tenant had gone to Australia. Held that the notice was sufficient. Haldane v. Nichol, 1863, 2 M. 174; 36 J. 78. 18. Claim Objection-Notice Timeous Lodgment.-Held that a notice of objection had been duly transmitted to an assessor by being posted in time to reach the town of the assessor's residence on the last day when notice was competent, though it was not delivered on that day. Mackenzie v. Cameron, 1868, 7 M. 291; 41 J. 174. Intimation.-Held that a notice of objection 19. Claim-Objection-Notice-Timeous is timeously given to the person objected to if posted, duly addressed to him, on or before 4th September, although it may not reach its destination until after that day. M'Creath v. Smith, 1869, 8 M. 15; 42 J. 20. 20. Claim Objection Title Paid Agent.-A claimant who had been objected to, pleaded that the objector was a paid agent for one of the candidates, and therefore disqualified from objecting. The court repelled created by the Act of 1868, s. 8, was limited the plea, holding that the disqualification to voting at an election occurring within six months, and did not affect the right to object. Wilson v. Blackwood, 1868, 7 M. 290; 41 J. 173. 21. Claim Objection - Title -Voter.Held that a person enrolled as a voter for one of a group of burghs had no title to object to the enrolment of voters in other burghs of the same group. Grant v. Mackenzie, 1868, 7 M. 290; 41 J. 173. 22. Claim — Objection - Title - Voter on Assessor's List.-Held that a person whose name stands on the assessor's list of voters, but is not yet entered on the register of voters for a county, has no title to object to the name of any other person being entered on the register of voters. Mason v. Weir, 1868, 7 M. 290; 41 J. 174. Notice. A voter having lodged an objec23. Claim-Objection—Title to Insist in tion to the qualification of another voter, withdrew it after the statutory time for giving notice of objections had expired. Held that it was competent for any other voter to insist in the objection. Bruce v. Rose, 1868, 7 M. 291; 41 J. 174. 24. Claim Omission from Assessor's 30. Disqualification Non-Payment of List.—A person succeeded on 4th September | Rates.—Held that a person who had been to a subject qualifying him under the Reform exempted by the collector of poor-rates on the Act, 1832, and became entitled, under s. 7 ground that he did not consider the voter of that Act, "to be registered on the first able to pay-the collector having received no occasion of making up the lists of voters." instructions to that effect from the board,Held that the claimant was not entitled to and who had not been assessed for relief of the be registered that year, as the assessor's list poor, retained his qualification. Forbes v. includes only the names of those who are Mitchell, 1868, 6 S. L. R. 46. qualified at 25th August, and the clause in the 21st section of the Representation of the People Act, 1868, allowing claims to be lodged until 4th September applies only to claims by parties whom the assessor has erroneously omitted or struck off when making up the list, and not to claims by those who only acquire a qualification after the list has been made up. Millar v. Russell, 1868, 7 M. 283; 41 J. 170. 25. Claim Procedure Alteration of Claim - Sheriff's Power.-Observed, that it was not the function of the sheriff to alter a claim so as to admit a claimant to the roll on a qualification different from that appearing in his claim. Campbell v. Alexander, 1868, 7 M. 283; 41 J. 170. Rates.-One who has been exempted from 31. Disqualification Non-Payment of payment of poor-rates on his own application will not be heard to plead that the exemption was erroneous, even if he have paid up the rates from which he was exempted. Sutherland v. Sinclair, 1868, 7 M. 323; 41 J. 190. 32. Disqualification — Non-Payment of Poor-Rates. Exemption from payment of poor-rates on the ground of poverty for any part of the year preceding 31st July excludes the person exempted from the roll of voters for that year. Stewart v. Barnetson, 1868, 7 M. 324; 41 J. 190. 33. Disqualification Non-Payment of Rates. A person applied for and obtained exemption from payment of poor-rates in respect that he maintained his imbecile sister, who would otherwise have been a burden on the parish. Objection to his being on the register, on the ground of exemption from payment of rates, sustained. 1868, 7 M. 324; 41 J. 190. Sharp v. Smith, 26. Claim Procedure Alteration of Assessor's List.-The qualification of a minister who claimed to be admitted to the franchise appeared from the assessor's list of persons objected to as "possessor of manse and offices." The claimant moved the sheriff to correct his qualification by substituting for possessor" "liferent proprietor." The sheriff 34. Disqualification Non-Payment of refused, and rejected the claim. On appeal the Rates Owner and Occupant.-An objection court affirmed, observing that the motion was was taken to the name of a voter (enrolled as to substitute one qualification for another. owner and occupant) being continued on the roll Watt v. Miller, 1868, 7 M. 284; 41 J. 171. of voters for a burgh. It was proved that in 1858 he had been exempted from payment of 27. Claim Procedure - Failure to Pro-poor-rates as occupant on the ground of poverty, duce Title Removing Name. A person and had never been assessed as occupant since, enrolled as proprietor having been objected but that he had been assessed and had paid to, was twice cited to produce his titles, but poor-rates regularly as owner since 1858. failed to do so. Judgment of the sheriff Objection repelled. Forbes v. Ross, 1868, 7 M. ordaining his name to be removed from the 323; 41 J. 189. register affirmed. Weir v. Blackwood, 1869, 8 M. 3; 42 J. 14. 28. Disqualification Non-Payment of Rates. A party desired to be enrolled as tenant and occupant of a whole dwelling, for which he paid a yearly rent of £2, 15s. He had occupied for the statutory period, but had never been assessed for poor-rates, the assessor having received instructions to omit from assessments all tenants and occupants of subjects under £4 of yearly value. Held that the claimant was entitled to be put on the roll. Stewart v. Aird, 1868, 6 S. L. R. 43. Mackenzie v. Bain, 1868, 6 S. L. R. 33. 29. Disqualification Non-Payment of Rates. Objection to a claimant being placed on the roll in respect that he had been exempted from payment of rates on the ground of inability to pay, repelled, as the exemption had been obtained on the unauthorised application of the claimant's wife, and the rates had since been paid up. Sinclair v. Harper, 1868, 7 M. 324; 41 J. 190. 35. Disqualification Non-Payment of Rates. A tenant in the parish of Tain, where poor-rates were levied, had never been assessed in consequence of his name not appearing in the valuation roll. Held that he was not excluded from the franchise in respect of his not having paid poor-rates. Ross v. Gilchrist, 1868, 7 M. 323; 41 J. 189. 36. Disqualification Non-Payment of Taxes.-Objection to a voter originally enrolled under the 1832 Act, that he had not being a good one under the 1868 Act, which does paid assessed taxes, repelled, his qualification not require payment of assessed taxes. Gray v. Stewart, 1868, 7 M. 285; 41 J. 171. 37. Disqualification-Office.-Held that a from voting was not entitled to be put on the person holding an office which disqualified him register of burgh voters. drow, 1868, 7 M. 281; 41 J. 169. Johnstone v. M'Mul 38. Disqualification-Office-Assessor.The burgh of Selkirk being united with the county in returning a member to Parliament, sole tenant and occupant to the franchise. held that the assessor for the burgh, although Blackwood v. Moffat, 1870, 9 M. 7 ; 43 J. 2. not assessor for the county, was disqualified 47. Possession- Occupancy- Combining under s. 13 of the County Voters (Scotland) -Joint-Tenant-Value.-A person claimed Act from being on the roll of voters. Haldane the franchise as having been one of two jointv. Paton, 1863, 2 M. 177; 36 J. 84. tenants until the end of the previous March, and since that time sole tenant of subjects of the annual value of £25, 6s. Claim repelled, on the ground that the subjects were not of sufficient value to afford a qualification to jointtenants, and the period of sole tenancy was insufficient of itself to qualify. Opinion that in the Representation of the People Act, 1868, s. 13, what was contemplated was not the combination of different kinds of tenancy, but only of tenancies of different subjects. Stewart V. Scouller, 1869, 8 M. 11; 42 39. Disqualification - Office Assessor. -An assessor who had made up the roll for the current year sent in his resignation on the 11th August. This resignation was not accepted. The assessor again sent in his resignation on 24th August, but neither was this accepted. At the appeal court he did not attend, as required to do by the 10th section of the Valuation Act. Held that, until the conclusion of the appeal court, the assessor was a disqualified person. Paton v. Haldane, 1865, 3 M. 418; 37 J. 207. 42. Possession-Endurance-Title.-An unrecorded disposition of property, dated 30th January 1864, remaining in the hands of the granter's agent, who it was proved held it by the granter's instructions for the disponee, held to qualify a sufficient title in the disponee for admission to the roll of voters. Paterson v. Rutherford, 1865, 3 M. 421. son. J. 18. 48. Possession-Occupancy-Combining. It is incompetent under the Representation of the People Act, 1868, s. 13, to combine successive occupancy in the characters of proprietor and tenant in order to constitute a qualification. Moncrieff v. Dalgleish, 1868, 7 M. 315; 41 J. 186. 49. Possession-Occupancy-Combining. -Occupancy of premises in one division of a county, divided by the Representation of the People Act, 1868, ss. 11 and 12, cannot be combined with previous occupancy of premises in the other division of the same county, so as to afford a qualification. Stewart v. Allan, 1868, 7 M. 315; 41 J. 185. 50. Possession-Occupancy-Combining —Value.—Held that to constitute a valid qualification for the franchise it was competent to combine contemporaneous occupancy of differ43. Possession -- Endurance Title.-A ent subjects as joint and sole tenant, though father disponed certain subjects to his son. neither subject was itself sufficient in value, if The disposition, which was executed on 30th the united value was of the statutory amount. January, was not delivered to the son till Hilson v. Laidlaw, 1870, 9 M. 12; 43 J. 10. February. The father drew the Whitsunday rents, but on 26th September paid them to the 51. Possession-Occupancy-Combining Held that the son had a title for a suffi--Leases.-Held that it was competent to cient period to entitle him to admission to the combine contemporaneous possession of one roll of voters. Mathewson v. Rutherford, 1865, under a lease of sixty years, so as to constitute subject under an annual lease, and of another 3 M. 413; 37 J. 205. a qualification as tenant, although by the above Act "any person who shall hold under a lease for a period of not less than fifty-seven years, inclusive of breaks," is defined to be included under the term "proprietor" or "owner." Observed, that the interpretation clause only gave the tenant under a long lease the privileges of owner if he desired to have different subjects, each at a yearly rent exceed them, but did not prevent him standing upon 44. Possession Endurance Title. Subjects sold prior, with entry subsequent, to the date of claim, afford a good qualification to the seller if already on the roll. Latta v. Raeburn, 1868, 7 M. 298; 41 J. 177. 45. Possession— Occupancy Combining -Successive.-The successive occupancy of ing £50, during different portions of the statutory period of twelve months prior to the last day of July, does not give a qualification as a county voter. Young v. Lindsay, 1865, 4 M. 125; 38 J. 76. 46. Possession-Occupancy-Combining. -Held that it was competent to combine a period of sole occupancy with a period of joint-occupancy of the same subjects so as to constitute a qualification, the subjects being of value sufficient to entitle either a joint or a his own proper title. Kirk v. M'Gowan, 1870, 9 M. 11; 43 J. 11. 52. Possession-Occupancy Continuity. -A tenant letting his house furnished for two months of the year, and during the rest of it Occupying it himself, is not entitled to the franchise. Donaldson v. Graham, 1865, 4 M. 129; 38 J. 77. 53. Possession-Occupancy-Continuity. -Held that the occupation of rooms in a temperance hotel by a customer for six months 54. Possession-Occupancy Continuity. -A person enrolled as tenant was objected to on the ground that he had sublet. Held that although the subtenant retained possession only for two days, the personal occupation of the tenant necessary to afford a qualification had been interrupted. Brown v. Blackwood, 1869, 8 M. 8; 42 J. 16. 55. Possession-Occupancy Continuity -Objection to a person enrolled as tenant and occupant on the ground of temporary nonresidence repelled, the absence having been occasioned by ill-health. Stewart v. Doull, 1868, 7 M. 330; 41 J. 193. 56. Possession-Occupancy Continuity. -A fisherman claimed to be enrolled as tenant and occupant of a dwelling-house. Objection to his claim that he had been absent on work from the house for a year, two months of which fell within the statutory period, sustained. Manson v. Sinclair, 1868, 7 M. 329; 41 J. 193. 57. Possession-Occupancy-Continuity. -Held that the absence of a seaman, following his calling continuously for upwards of a year, deprived him of the character of tenant and occupant of the dwelling-house in which his wife and family resided. Stewart v. Steven, 1868, 6 S. L. R. 52. 58. Possession-Occupancy-Continuity. -A person claimed as tenant of a house of six rooms. Objection to his qualification as occupant that for four summer months he, for hire, gave the use and occupation of four of the rooms to a stranger, he himself only occupying the remaining two rooms, sustained. Donaldson v. Brodie, 1868, 7 M. 314; 41 J. 185. 59. Possession Occupancy Continuity. -A person enrolled as tenant sublet his house from 10th August to 17th September inclusive. On the latter day the Registration Court was opened, but the case did not come before the sheriff until the 19th September, when the voter was again in occupation. Objection to the voter's qualification sustained. Donaldson v. Cree, 1868, 7 M. 330; 41 J. 193. 60. Possession-Occupancy Continuity. -In April a shopkeeper gave up his shop in W, and removed to K, where he opened a shop. His wife returned to W in June, and reopened the first shop, and he himself followed in July. It had always been his intention to return. Objection to his registration as tenant of the first shop that his Occupancy was not continuous, sustained. Gray v. Swanson, 1868, 7 M. 328; 41 J. 192. 61. Possession Occupancy-Endurance. -Possession as tenant from 1st August 1864, held not to have given a qualification in September 1865. Waddell v. M'Phail, 1865, 4 M. 130; 38 J. 79. 62. Possession Occupancy-Endurance. -A person took a place of business in April 1867, stipulating that certain alterations in the fittings, etc., should be made by the landlord. The premises were not completely finished until the following September, but from and after Whitsunday 1867 they were occasionally used by the tenant. Objection to his name being continued on the roll as tenant and occupant that he had not "occupied " the premises for twelve months previous to 30th July 1868, repelled. Observed, that a distinction must be drawn between material alterations in the structure of premises which were inconsistent with " occupancy" and mere internal fittings and improvements which were not. Stewart v. Johnston, 1868, 7 M. 328; 41 J. 192. 63. Possession - Occupancy - Necessity —Lease.—The proviso at the end of the 1832 Act, s. 2, "that no subtenant or assignee to any sublease for fifty-seven or nineteen years shall be entitled to be registered, or to vote, in respect of his interest under such lease, unless he shall be in the actual occupation of the premises thereby set," applies to the case of subleases for longer periods than fifty-seven years. Kennedy v. Donaldson, 1865, 4 M. 123; 38 J. 79. 65. Possession-Successive OccupancyAssessor's List. When a qualification depends on successive occupancy of different premises, it is not necessary that the entry in the assessor's list should set forth all the premises successively occupied by the claimant. It is sufficient if the last is mentioned. Adshead v. Wright, 1868, 7 M. 283; 41 J. 170. 66. Possession Occupancy Tenant under Two Leases.-The occupancy of the same subject during the statutory period of twelve months prior to the last day of July, although under successive leases for periods short of twelve months, will confer a qualification on the tenant to entitle him to be put on the register of county voters, provided the rent in the course of the year amounts to not less than £50. Dick v. Waddell, 1865, 4 M. 127; 38 J. 77. county in returning a member to Parliament, sole tenant and occupant to the franchise. held that the assessor for the burgh, although Blackwood v. Moffat, 1870, 9 M. 7; 43 J. 2. not assessor for the county, was disqualified under s. 13 of the County Voters (Scotland) Act from being on the roll of voters. V. Haldane . Paton, 1863, 2 M. 177; 36 J. 84. 39. Disqualification - Office - Assessor. -An assessor who had made up the roll for the current year sent in his resignation on the 11th August. This resignation was not accepted. The assessor again sent in his resignation on 24th August, but neither was this accepted. At the appeal court he did not attend, as required to do by the 10th section of the Valuation Act. Held that, until the conclusion of the appeal court, the assessor was a disqualified person. Paton v. Haldane, 1865, 3 M. 418; 37 J. 207. 40. Disqualification - Women. Women are not entitled to be registered as voters. Brown v. Ingram, 1868, 7 M. 281; 41 J. 169. 41. Objection to Voter-Under Control. -Held that the onus of proving an objection that the voter is under control in the exercise of the franchise lies on the objector. Circumstances in which he failed to instruct that 47. Possession- Occupancy-Combining -Joint-Tenant-Value.-A person claimed the franchise as having been one of two jointtenants until the end of the previous March, and since that time sole tenant of subjects of the annual value of £25, 6s. Claim repelled, on the ground that the subjects were not of sufficient value to afford a qualification to jointtenants, and the period of sole tenancy was insufficient of itself to qualify. Opinion that in the Representation of the People Act, 1868, s. 13, what was contemplated was not the combination of different kinds of tenancy, but only of tenancies of different subjects. Stewart V. Scouller, 1869, 8 M. 11; 42 J. 18. 48. Possession-Occupancy-Combining. It is incompetent under the Representation of the People Act, 1868, s. 13, to combine successive occupancy in the characters of proprietor and tenant in order to constitute a qualification. Moncrieff v. Dalgleish, 1868, 7 M. 315; 41 J. 186. 49. Possession-Occupancy Combining. objection. Macfarlane v. Sharp, 1866, 5 M. 75; -Occupancy of premises in one division of a 39 J. 30. county, divided by the Representation of the People Act, 1868, ss. 11 and 12, cannot be combined with previous occupancy of premises in the other division of the same county, so as to afford a qualification. Stewart v. Allan, 1868, 7 M. 315; 41 J. 185. _Value.-Held that to constitute a valid quali50. Possession-Occupancy-Combining fication for the franchise it was competent to combine contemporaneous occupancy of different subjects as joint and sole tenant, though neither subject was itself sufficient in value, if the united value was of the statutory amount. Hilson v. Laidlaw, 1870, 9 M. 12; 43 J. 10. 43. Possession -- Endurance Title.-A father disponed certain subjects to his son. The disposition, which was executed on 30th January, was not delivered to the son till February. The father drew the Whitsunday rents, but on 26th September paid them to the son. Held that the son had a title for a suffi--Leases.-Held that it was competent to cient period to entitle him to admission to the roll of voters. Mathewson v. Rutherford, 1865, 3 M. 413; 37 J. 205. 44. Possession - Endurance - Title. Subjects sold prior, with entry subsequent, to the date of claim, afford a good qualification to the seller if already on the roll. Latta v. Raeburn, 1868, 7 M. 298; 41 J. 177. 45. Possession- Occupancy Combining -Successive.-The successive occupancy of different subjects, each at a yearly rent exceed ing £50, during different portions of the statutory period of twelve months prior to the last day of July, does not give a qualification as a county voter. Young v. Lindsay, 1865, 4 M. 125; 38 J. 76. 46. Possession-Occupancy-Combining. -Held that it was competent to combine a period of sole occupancy with a period of joint-occupancy of the same subjects so as to constitute a qualification, the subjects being of value sufficient to entitle either a joint or a 51. Possession-Occupancy-Combining combine contemporaneous possession of one under a lease of sixty years, so as to constitute subject under an annual lease, and of another a qualification as tenant, although by the above Act "any person who shall hold under a lease for a period of not less than fifty-seven years, inclusive of breaks," is defined to be included under the term "proprietor" or "owner." Observed, that the interpretation clause only gave the tenant under a long lease the privileges of owner if he desired to have them, but did not prevent him standing upon his own proper title. Kirk v. M'Gowan, 1870, 9 M. 11; 43 J. 11. 52. Possession-Occupancy-Continuity. A tenant letting his house furnished for two months of the year, and during the rest of franchise. Donaldson v. Graham, 1865, 4 M. it occupying it himself, is not entitled to the 129; 38 J. 77. 53. Possession-Occupancy-Continuity. -Held that the occupation of rooms in a temperance hotel by a customer for six months |