allowed, on appeal from an order refusing a new trial of an issue found for Deft, and from an order dismissing the bill, and Plt succeeded in the action, and in a second action allowed at law, see Corp. Rochester v. Lee, 2 D. M. & G. 427; and see Martin v. Pycroft, Ib. 806.

Where Defts obtained an order for a new trial on their paying costs of the former one, and they did not go to trial, they were not bound to pay the costs: Lambert v. Fisher, 7 Sim. 525.

As to costs of an issue under the Inclosure Act, 8 & 9 V. c. 118, s. 56, see Hardy v. Fetherstonhaugh, L. R. 4 Q. B. 725.

SECTION II.-SPECIAL DIRECTIONS AS TO TRIAL OF ISSUES AND QUESTIONS OF FACT,

1. Directions for Special Jury.-O. xxxvI. 7 (d).

AND Let such trial be, at the request of either party, before a special jury.

For similar order reserving the costs of the application until after the trial of the issue, see Butlin v. Allibone, 13 L. J. Ch. 216.

2. Order for View by Special Jury—0. L. 5.

UPON the application of the Deft, and upon hearing the solrs for the Applicant and for the Plt, Let the sheriff of M. cause the premises known as &c. in the county of M., to be shown to six or more of the first twelve special jurors to be summoned and impannelled to try the question between the said parties, or as many more of them as he shall think fit, to take a view of the place in question, at a time to be fixed by the said sheriff. But that no evidence be then and there given to the said jurors. And that the sheriff of M. do return the names of such jurors as shall view the said place to the Associate of the Queen's Bench Division [of the X. circuit], for the purpose of their being called as special jurymen upon the trial of the said question.— Newman v. Worley, V.-C. B., at Chambers, 12 Feb. 1883, B. 194.

The order to try by a special jury may be included in this Form. For similar order in which the time to view is fixed, see March v. Bailey, Pearson, J., at Chambers, 20 July, 1885, B. 938.

NOTES.

PARTICULAR VENUE.

For order fixing particular venue, see Chapman v. Smith, 2 Ves. 516; and with directions as to special jury, Layburn v. Crisp, 1 Dec. 1837; S. C., in Exch., 4 M. & W. 320.

By O. xxxvI. 1, "there shall be no local venue for the trial of any action, except where otherwise provided by statute. Every action in every division shall, unless the Court or a Judge otherwise orders, be tried in the county or place named on the statement of claim, or (where no statement of claim has been delivered or required) by a notice in writing to be served on the Deft, or his solr, within six days after appearance. Where no place of trial is

named, the place of trial shall, unless the Court or a Judge shall otherwise order, be the county of Middlesex."

These provisions apply to every action, notwithstanding that it may have been assigned to any Judge: r. la.

O. XXXVI. 1, is precise, and a Plt is entitled under it to place the venue of his action at county assizes, although it is assigned to the Chancery Division by s. 34 of the Jud. Act, 1873, and although it has been commenced in that Division: Philips v. Beall, 26 Ch. Div. 621.

CHANGE OF VENUE.

A Plt who wishes to name some place other than in Middlesex must do so in the original statement of claim, if not the venue is in Middlesex, and once fixed must there remain unless there is an order to the contrary: Locke v. White, 33 Ch. Div. 308; and see Ridge v. R., 35 L. T. N.S. 428.

An application for change of venue made before notice of trial or issue joined was held not premature, the pleadings having disclosed the issues to be tried: Powell v. Cobb, 29 Ch. Div. 486; but an order for change of venue ought not to be made until the Judge can see what the issues are: Ibid. p. 494.

Change of venue from Cardigan was ordered, on application of Deft, in action to set aside deeds for fraud: Powell v. Cobb, sup. ; and for other cases in which the venue has been changed from country to London on the ground of convenience, see Green v. Bennett, 54 L. J. Ch. 85; 32 W. R. 848; Old Mill Co. v. Dukinfield Local Board, 54 L. J. Ch. 160; 51 L. T. N.S. 414; and that the Deft, applying for a change must show serious injury to his case if the venue is not changed, see Schroeder & Co. v. Myers, 34 W. R. 261. The influence which the reputation of a material witness may have upon jurors' minds, in affecting the relative credit to be given to him and other witnesses, is no ground for changing the venue: McGregor v. Topham, 3 Ha. 488; nor that a party whose conduct is impeached is lord lieutenant of the county: Hopwood v. E. Derby, 1 K. & J. 255.

SECTION III.-VARIOUS ISSUES.

1. Issues (alternative) as to Heirship.

1. WHETHER E. is the heir-at-law of the testatrix; in which E. is to be Plt, and the Defts L. and W. are to be Defts; 2ndly, Whether the said L. and W., or one and which of them, are or is the heirs or heirat-law of the testatrix; in which the Deft L. is to be Plt, and the Deft W. is to be Deft; But in case on the trial of the first issue the said E. shall be found to be the heir-at-law of the testatrix, then the second issue is not to be tried.-Hartopp v. Boothby, L. C., 17 Nov. 1775, A. 124.

2. Issues as to Heir-at-Law ex parte paternâ and ex parte maternâ, and Customary Heir.

1. WHETHER Plt was or was not at the time of the death of Ann F. in &c. the heir-at-law ex parte paterná of the said Ann F.; 2. Whether Plt is or is not now the heir-at-law ex parte paterná of the said Ann F.;

3 and 4, similar issues whether the Plt was the heir of Ann F., ex parte materná at her death, and is now. 5. Whether the Plt was or was not the customary heir of the said Ann F. according to the custom of any manor whereof the said Ann F. had copyholds of inheritance. 6. Whether the Plt is or is not now the customary heir of the said Ann F. as last mentioned. 7. Whether the Plt was or was not at the time of the death of Ann F. the heir-at-law of any and what ancestor ex parte paternâ of Sarah F. in the (bill) named, which ancestor was the last purchaser of any and what hereditaments which the said Ann F. died seised of by descent, or in any manner entitled to by descent from the said Sarah F., or of any and what hereditaments whatsoever which the said Ann F. died seised of or entitled to. 8. Whether the plaintiff is or is not now such heir of &c. (as above). 9. Whether the Plt is not lineally descended from the great grandfather of the said Ann. F.Kettlewell v. Barstow, V.-C. J., 30 June, 1870, A. 2440; S. C., 7 Ch. 686. As to evidence admissible in pedigree case, see Haines v. Guthrie, 13 Q. B. Div. 818; Murray v. Milner, 12 Ch. D. 845.

3. Issue as to Eldest or only Son.

WHETHER J., in the pleadings named, is the eldest or only son of M., the wife of P., by the said P. lawfully begotten.-Cooke v. Lloyd, M. R., 7 March, 1803, B. 522.

As to the evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, see Hawes v. Draeger, 23 Ch. D. 173 (evidence of non-access); Re Walker and Jackson, 53 L. T. N.S. 660; Burnaby v. Baillie, 42 Ch. D. 282 (verbal statements by paramour); Bosville v. A. G., 12 P. D. 177 (clear and conclusive evidence required); Re Aylesford Peerage, 11 App. Cas. 1 (statements by mother bastardizing child admitted as evidence of conduct); Re Perton, Pearson v. A. G., 53 L. T. N.S. 707.

The proper law for determining "kindred" under the Statute of Distributions is the international law adopted by the comity of states: In re Goodman's Trusts, 17 Ch. Div. 266 (where "ante nati" were admitted); and see Re Ullee, 53 L. T. N.S. 710; Re Bell, B. v. Kendall, W. N. (88) 48.

4. Issue as to Daughter.

WHETHER H., deceased, the late mother of the Plt, was a daughter of M., named in the will of C., the testatrix.-Wright v. Dryden, M. R., 17 Feb. 1827, B. 2089.

For issue whether a woman was ever during coverture delivered of a living child, see Gardiner v. Slater, M. R., 10 June, 1856, A. 1255.

5. As to Validity of Bond-Fraud.

1st, WHETHER the bond and warrant of attorney, &c., was obtained from the Plt by any fraudulent (or unfair) representation by the obligees, or any of them; 2ndly. Whether the same was obtained by any untrue representation; 3rdly. Whether the same was obtained by any fraudulent (or unfair) concealment, or suppression by the obligees, or either of them; 4thly. Whether the bond &c. was given to secure

any debt or liability, other than the whole or part of the balance due from P. to the firm in the pleadings mentioned.-Parker v. Morrell, V.-C. K. B., 2 May, 1846, B. 1020; 2 Ph. 457; the word "unfair" was objected to by the L. C.

6. As to Sanity, and Validity of Deed-Fraud.

1st, WHETHER M., in &c. named, at the time of the execution of the indentures dated &c. in &c. mentioned, was of sound mind, understanding, and capacity to execute the said deeds; 2ndly. Whether the said deeds were obtained from the said M. by fraud or imposition.— Smith v. Moody, M. R., 27 July, 1802, B. 1059.

For form of issue, whether a deed was ever executed by A. T.; and if so, whether she was then of sound mind &c., see Lewis v. Thomas, 3 Ha. 29. Whether Deft was on the — day of — in such a state of mind as to be able to conduct the business in partnership with the Plt according to the articles of partnership, and "whether he has since been, and now is, in such a state of mind," see Sayer v. Bennet, 1 Cox, 111.

7. As to Sanity, Validity of Deed, and Authority to buy Stock.

"1. WHETHER G. at the time he executed the four leases or underleases, dated &c., in the pleadings mentioned, was of sound mind, so as to be sufficient for the government of himself and management of his property; 2. Whether the said G., when he was of sound mind, so as &c., authorized or approved of the purchase in the names of &c. of the five sums of stock in the pleadings mentioned, or any or either of them."-Hayward v. Pursey, V.-C. K. B., 23 Ap. 1849, A. 1213.

For issue to try validity of deeds, executed by a party found lunatic, from a time prior to the execution, see Frank v. Mainwaring, 4 Beav. 37; 2 Beav. 115; Snook v. Watts, 11 Beav. 105.

And for orders for issues, see, as to deeds being fraudulent within the 13 Eliz. c. 5, and consideration being paid before sequestration issued, Empringham v. Short, 3 Ha. 471; whether power was struck out of settlement with wife's knowledge, Harbidge v. Wogan, 5 Ha. 271; as to alleged trust, Freeman v. Tatham, 5 Ha. 329, 342; whether creditor, party to creditors' deed, had taken any proceedings contrary to its provisions, Duncombe v. Levy, 5 Ha. 236; to try question of notice between judgment creditor and subsequent incumbrancer first registered, see Robinson v. Woodward, 4 D. & S. 562, 566 n., 567.

For issues as to purchase of shares alleged to have been induced by fraudulent representations in directors' reports, see W. Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 148.

8. Issues as to Right of Way.

"1st, WHETHER there is any right of way through a place called 'George Yard'; 2ndly, if there be any such right, whether it extends over the whole; 3rdly, if not, what is the extent, length, breadth, and direction of it; 4thly, whether any such right has been obstructed or disturbed by the Defts, or any of them, and if so in what manner and to what extent; 5thly, whether there is any public right (other than a right of way) over the whole; 6thly, whether such right, if any, has

been obstructed or disturbed by the Defts &c."-A. G. v. Faa, V.-C. W., 13 Nov. 1856, A. 260.

For issue to try right to fell timber, and whether ornamental, and the directions and declarations that should guard it, see Wombwell v. Bellasyse, 6 Ves. 110 a, n.

For issue as to limits of royal forest and rights of sporting, Blanchard v. Cawthorne, 6 Sim. 159.

For issue to ascertain boundaries, and jury to view, with particular directions as to jury to be returned, see Lethieullier v. L. Castlemain, 1 Dick. 46, 27 Oct. 1726, B. 196.

And for forms of issues, where the Crown claimed land as reclaimed from the sea by encroachment, Deft disputing the Crown's title to the soil between the present low and high-water mark, A. G. v. Chamberlaine, 4 K. & J. 292, 293, 298; and A. G. v. Chambers, 4 D. & J. 55, 72, where there was a further issue as to working a mine below the present or former line of high water at ordinary tides.

As to mode of pleading right of way by showing termini and general course, see Harris v. Jenkins, 22 Ch. D. 481.

9. Issues as to Damages.

ISSUES as to damage caused by injunction under the usual undertaking, action being dismissed-"1. Whether the Defts have sustained any damage by reason of the said order dated &c. (having been made); 2. And in case it shall be found that the Defts have sustained any such damage, what is the amount of such damage."-Reserve payment of the amount assessed, if any, and the costs until after the trial.-Liberty to apply.-Christie v. C., V.-C. H., Feb. 19, 1875.

Issues as to damages in a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell a vessel. 1. What (if any) damage has been sustained by the Plts by the non-delivery of the vessel, pursuant to the contract, on the day named in the agreement; 2. What &c. by any injury to the vessel between the date of the agreement and the date of the delivery.-Cory v. Thames, &c. Co., 11 W. R. 589; and see the result at law, L. R. 3 Q. B. 181.

"Whether the Plts, to the damage or injury of the Deft, prevented the Deft from completing his contract."-Plts to admit that they did so prevent, and employed their own workmen to complete.-E. Lanc. Rail. Co. v. Hattersley, 8 Ha. 95.

As to co. infringing on Plt's right to bridge tolls under Act by their steam ferry, they keeping ferry account meantime, and furnishing Plt with it before trial, verified by their secretary's affidavit, though the Act gave no right of action, but only to recover penalties, see Cory v. Yarmouth Rail. Co., 3 Ha. 593, 608.

As to deterioration of estate after reference, Ferguson v. Tadman, 1 Sim. 530; as to mines being drowned out in breach of covenant by lessee's default, and so continuing, Walker v. Jeffreys, 1 Ha. 356.

For order for issues, 1. Whether the widening and deepening of a canal basin, as widened and deepened before a stated time, did or will, to the damage or injury of the Plt, diminish the surplus water in the Plt's works; 2. Whether the further widening and deepening of it, as intended, before injunction granted, would or might do so, see Blakemore v. Glamorgan Canal, 1 M. & K. 169, 1824, A. 1891.

For order for issues in the case of an alleged nuisance of smoke and vapours from cement works, see West v. White, 7 Feb. 1877, B. 174, 4 Ch. D. 631, 636.