NOTES.

SEQUESTRATION DISCHARGED.

Where the contemnor has cleared his contempt, an order for the discharge of the sequestration may be obtained on summons, or by motion, with directions for the sequestrators to withdraw from possession, and to pass their final accounts, and after retaining their costs, charges, and expenses, and any payments properly made by them, to pay the balance to the contemnor: see Rawlinson v. Stringer, sup.; Dan. 923, 925.

Where a sequestration is issued to compel payment into Court, the death of the contemnor is no ground for restraining the sequestrators from selling as previously authorized: Pratt v. Inman, 43 Ch. D. 175.

Unless by consent, upon discharge of the sequestration, the costs of the sequestrators will be allowed as between party and party, and not as between solr and client: Re Shapland, W. N. (74) 202; 23 W. R. 40; but the sequestrators are entitled to their expenses and proper allowances for executing the commission.

Where the contemnor desires to discharge the sequestration on the ground of irregularity of process, he should apply by motion on notice.

A sequestration is discharged by the appointment of a receiver in the same action: Shaw v. Wright, 3 Ves. 22; semble, the order appointing the receiver should discharge the sequestrators.

An order for sequestration will not be made where there has been any irregularity in the issue of an attachment under which the contemnor is already in prison: Martin v. Kerridge, 3 P. Wms. 241; Re Brown, 16 W. R. 962 (where the writ of sequestration was quashed).

But any irregularity in the issue of a sequestration may be waived by the consent of the contemnor, so as to prevent him from afterwards setting aside the sequestration: Const v. Barr, 2 Russ. 161 (discharging an order of V.-C., setting aside a sequestration on the ground of irregularity: S. C., 2 S. & S. 452).

Where a writ of sequestration had been registered under the Land Charges Registration and Searches Act, 1888 (51 & 52 V. c. 51), s. 5, there was no power to order such registration to be vacated: Cook v. C., 15 P. D. 116; but now by the Settled Land Act, 1890 (53 & 54 V. c. 69), s. 19, the registration of a writ or order affecting land may be vacated pursuant to an order of the High Court or any Judge thereof.

SECTION VII.-SPECIAL CONTEMPTS OF COURT.

1. Committal of the Deft, and another Person, for Obstructing the

Receiver.

UPON motion &c., by counsel for the Plts, and upon reading the judgment dated &c., an order dated &c., an affidavit of &c., filed &c., and an affidavit of service of notice of this motion on the Deft J. G.; And it appearing by the said affidavits that the Deft J. G. and W. G. her son have obstructed —, the receiver appointed in this action to receive the rents and profits of the real estates, and to collect and get in the outstanding personal estate of &c., the testator &c., pursuant to the said order dated &c., in receiving such rents and profits, and have persuaded and induced the tenants of the said estates to abstain from attorning and paying the rents of the said estates to the said as

such receiver, and have distrained for rent upon the effects of H. a tenant on part of the said estates after the date of the said order; This Court being of opinion that the Deft J. G. and the said W. G. have, by such conduct, been guilty of a contempt of this Court, doth order that the said J. G. and W. G. do stand committed to prison for their said contempt.-Marsh v. Goodall, M. R., 13 Jan. 1857, B. 288.

2. Committal of Deft and Another for Violence and abusive Language to a Person effecting Service.

UPON motion &c., by counsel for the Plts, and upon hearing counsel for the Deft H. and for C. of &c.; and upon reading an affidavit of V., filed &c., whereby it appears that the said Deft H. and C. have assaulted and imprisoned and used violence and abusive language to the said V., a clerk in the employment of the Plt's solrs, whilst serving the said Deft H. with the (Plt's bill) in this cause [insert any further evidence]; And This Court being of opinion, upon consideration of the facts disclosed by the said affidavit, that the said Deft H. and the said C. have been guilty of contempt of this Court, doth order that the said Deft H. and the said C. do respectively stand committed to prison for their said contempt.-Price v. Hutchinson, V.-C. M., 16 Dec. 1869, B. 2992; 9 Eq. 534.

3. Committal of a Newspaper Editor for publishing an Article reflecting on Witnesses.

UPON motion &c., by counsel for the Defts B. and I., that R. of &c., might stand committed to prison for a contempt of this Court in printing and publishing on the day of, in a certain newspaper called &c., an article contained therein commencing with the words &c., and concluding with the words &c., and that the said R. might be directed to pay the costs of and occasioned by this application; and upon hearing counsel for the said R., and upon reading &c.; And this Court having taken the matter into consideration, and deeming the conduct of the said R. in printing and publishing the said article in the said newspaper called &c., a contempt of this Court, doth order that the said R. do stand committed to prison for his said contempt.Felkin v. Herbert, V.-C. K., 19 Dec. 1863, A. 2359.

4. Contemnors apologising, and Plt not insisting on Committal, Contempt condoned, on payment of Costs.

UPON motion &c., by counsel for the Plt, that &c. [Recite the notice]; and upon hearing counsel for the said B. and A., and upon reading &c.; And this Court being of opinion that the said B. and A. have

committed a contempt of this Court by &c., and they now by their counsel apologising and expressing their regret for such contempt, and the Plt by his counsel not insisting on their actual committal, This Court doth order that the said B. and A. do respectively pay to the Plt J. his costs of the said motion, to be taxed &c., and doth not think fit to make any other order upon this motion.-Jackson v. Brighton Aquarium Co., V.-C. M., 8 Feb. 1872, A. 287.

For the like order, see Bigg v. Mayor of London, V.-C. B., 17 Nov. 1870, A. 2828, Chap. XXXI., "INJUNCTIONS."

In cases of contempt by breach of an injunction, an order for actual committal is not generally pressed for or directed, the more usual order being for Deft to pay the costs of the application, though not committed. And such order, being an adjudication against him upon the question of contempt, is not an order as to costs only, so as to prevent an appeal by the Deft: see Witt v. Corcoran, 2 Ch. D. 69. But an appeal by the applicant will only lie where there has been some miscarriage: Jarmain v. Chatterton, 20 Ch. Div. 493; not where the matter is trifling and fairly within the discretion of the Court below: Ashworth v. Outram (2), 5 Ch. D. 943; v. inf. Chap. XXXVI., "APPEALS."

For an order to commit a member of parliament for writing a threatening letter to the master to influence his judgment, see Lechmere Charlton's case, L. C., 25 Nov. 1836, B. 34; S. C., 2 Sand. Ord. 828; 2 My. & C. 316; and for order to commit a person for writing a letter to the L. C., enclosing money; and for his subsequent discharge on submission, asking pardon, and payment of costs, the money being applied for the relief of poor prisoners in the Fleet prison, see Re Martin, 2 Russ. & M. 674, n.

For order nisi to strike solr off the roll for writing an insulting letter to the master, see Re Keane, Chap. XL., “SOLICITORS.'

For order to commit Plt for writing a threatening letter to Deft to deter him from defending the suit, see Smith v. Lakeman, V.-C. S., 2 Jur. N. S. 1202; and for his discharge on paying full costs, and an apology: S. C., V.-C. S., 20 Nov. 1856, Reg. Min. M. T. 110.

For order to commit a member of parliament for removing his children from the custody of the person appointed to act as their guardian, see Wellesley v. D. Beaufort, L. C., 16 July, 1831, B. 1852; S. C., 2 Russ. & M. 639; and for his discharge, S. C., 20 Aug. 1831, B. 2332.

For order for serjeant-at-arms to bring infant before the Court, see Chap. XXXVIII., "INFANTS."

For order to commit a person under whose care an infant had been placed, for opposing the delivery by the officer in Court of the infant to its guardian, see Re Kimmings, V.-C. S., 11 July, 1853, A. 1118; and for his subsequent discharge, S. C., V.-C. S., 2 Nov. 1853, A. 1.

For orders to commit the husband for marrying a ward of Court, with inquiry as to abettors, and for discharge, v. inf. Chap. XXXVIII., “INFANTS."

For orders to commit for breach of an injunction, and for sequestration against a co. or public body, see Chap. XXXI., "INJUNCTIONS."

For an order for the committal of a person (native of the U. S. of America) for throwing a missile at the Judge in open Court, see Re Cosgrave, V.-C. M., 16 March, 1877, A. 450; and for the subsequent order for his discharge on his being placed on board a ship bound for New York, S. C., 22 Aug. 1877, A. 1717.

In a similar case of an assault by firing a pistol at the M. R. at the entrance to the Rolls House, the offender was given into the charge of the police, committed, tried and convicted for a criminal offence, and was afterwards detained at Her Majesty's pleasure as a lunatic: Re Dodwell, Feb. 1878.

For order that the publisher of a newspaper containing improper comments on pending proceedings should pay a fine of 507., and costs of application as between solr and client, see Re Crown Bank; Re O'Malley, 44 Ch. D. 649, 653.

NOTES.

SPECIAL CONTEMPTS.

In cases of special contempt it has been held that the order for committal should contain an adjudication of the contempt, and a declaration of the guilt of the party: see Exp. Van Sandau, 1 Ph. 445, 605; but such adjudication is not essential: S. C., et v. inf. Chap. XXXI., "INJUNCTIONS," s. xxii.

For contempt of subpoena, and assault on the party serving it, if established by two witnesses, the order to commit was absolute: if by one witness only, nisi: Elliot v. Halmarack, 1 Mer. 302; Van v. Price, 1 Dick. 91; and the course is the same where the contempt is for violence or abusive or scandalous words against the Court or the process thereof: see Re Johnson, 36 W. R. 51.

The power of the Court to commit to prison for contempt of Court is not affected by the Debtors Act, 1869: Harvey v. Hall, 11 Eq. 31; except in cases when the contempt consists in default of payment of money: Esdaile v. Visser, 13 Ch. Div. 421; Micklethwaite v. Fletcher, 27 W. R. 793; Tilney v. Stamfield, 28 W. R. 582.

To publish, with or without comments, the statement of claim, pleadings, or evidence in any pending action or matter, or any ex parte or defamatory statement tending to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties, or to prevent a fair trial, before the action, &c. is finally heard, is a contempt of Court which will be restrained by injunction (see inf. Chap. XXXI., "INJUNCTIONS," s. xi.), and may be punished by imprisonment or fine: Tichborne v. Mostyn, 7 Eq. 55, n.; Daw v. Eley, Ib. 49; Re Cheltenham and Swansea Wagon Co., 8 Eq. 580; Bowden v. Russell, W. N. (77) 55; Gen. Exch. Bk. v. Horner, W. N. (68) 259; Roach v. Garvan, 2 Dick. 794; S. C., 2 Atk. 469; Re Crown Bank, Limtd., 44 Ch. D. 649; and such a contempt is of a "criminal" nature within sect. 47 of the Jud. Act, 1873, so that there is no appeal: O'Shea v. O'Shea, 15 P. Div. 59.

Secus, pending a winding-up petition, the issue, and distribution amongst the shareholders, of a circular stating the charges against the directors on which the petition was based: Re London Flour Co., 16 W. R. 474.

So, also, it is a contempt to address public meetings, and allege that a Deft, against whom a true bill has been found, is innocent and the victim of a conspiracy: Onslow and Whalley's case, L. R. 9 Q. B. 219; or to advertise the intended delivery of a sermon "with special reference to the trial in which the town is so deeply interested": Mackett v. Herne Bay Commrs., 24 W. R. 845; or prematurely to publish reports of an examination under the Companies Act, 1862, s. 115: American Exchange v. Gillig, 58 L. J. Ch. 706.

The Court refused to commit a Deft who published an accurate account of what passed in Court, and who had undertaken not to publish trade "cautions": Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde, 29 W. R. 43.

Sending letters threatening exposure, using intimidating language, or publication of articles in a newspaper calculated to deter parties from prosecuting their action, or to prevent witnesses from coming forward to give their evidence, is also a contempt of Court: Smith v. Lakeman, 2 Jur. N.S. 1202; Exp. Chetwynd, 10 Jur. Ñ.S. 1188; Shaw v. S., 2 Sw. & Tr. 517; Re Tyrone Election Petn., I. R. 7 C. L. 242; or slander of title of the business carried on by a receiver and manager appointed by the Court: Helmore v. Smith, 35 Ch. Div. 449; or to publish an advertisement offering a reward for evidence in terms tending to prejudice and discredit a petitioner for divorce: Butler v. B., 13 P. D. 73; or denying charges in divorce petition, and offering reward for information which would lead to the conviction of their authors: Brodribb v. B., 11 P. D. 66; but to advertise for witnesses is not per se a contempt: Plating Co. v. Farquharson, 17 Ch. Div. 49 (per Jessel, M. R., questioning Pool v. Sacheverel, 1 P. Wms. 675); nor advertisements, pending appeal in a patent case, for funds, on the ground that it was of general interest to the trade, and offering reward for evidence of anticipations: S. C.

After verdict, leave having been reserved to move for a non-suit or new trial on technical grounds, an action is not still pending so as to make the publication of any comments thereon a contempt: Metzler v. Gounod, 30 L. T. N.S. 264.

Defiant disobedience of a Judge in the legitimate exercise of his jurisdiction may be punished by immediate committal: Watt v. Ligertwood, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 361; as also violent conduct and abusive language to a person engaged in serving the process of the Court: Price v. Hutchinson, 9 Eq. 534.

Addressing a contemptuous letter to a Judge reflecting upon, or tending to interfere with, the administration of justice in his Court, is a contempt, which in the case of a solr, as an officer of the Court, renders him liable to be struck off the roll, or to suspension from practice: see Re Keane, inf. Chap. XL., "SOLICITORS;" though not punishable by this extraordinary penalty if the letter is written by the practitioner not as an officer of the Court, but in his capacity as a suitor: Re Wallace, L. R. 1 P. C. 283.

An action for libel against the author of a pamphlet which was published pending a motion for new trial of an action for false imprisonment, and severely censured the proceedings and course of trial in such action, is not a bar to a motion by the Plt to commit for contempt of Court in publishing the pamphlet: Corkery v. Hickson, I. R. 10 C. L. 174.

The warrant may be for absolute committal, and not necessarily until a fine be paid: Reg. v. Jordan, W. N. (88) 152.

Though a party be in contempt, he may move to discharge an adverse order: Futvoye v. Kennard, 2 Giff. 110, 533; or may take any steps necessary for his defence: Fry v. Ernest, 12 W. R. 97; 9 Jur. N.S. 1151.

As to contempt in cases of interference, or marriage without leave of the Court, with a ward, see inf. Chap. XXXVIII., "INFANTS.”

As to the necessity of proving scienter, see Lake v. Metropolitan Music Hall Co., 58 L. J. Ch. 513, where an application for committal in respect of comments in a newspaper on the subject-matter of an action was refused, in the absence of proof that the alleged contemnor knew of the existence of the action.

For a case in which counsel was ordered to pay costs, and committed for obstructing the course of justice by conniving at a fraud on the Court, see Linwood v. Andrews, 58 L. T. N.S. 612; W. N. (88) 81.

PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST.

Although a peer or M.P. is not liable in ordinary cases to be attached or proceeded against by any civil process involving personal arrest (see D. Newcastle v. Morris, L. R. 4 H. L. 661), this privilege of Parliament is no protection against arrest for a contempt of a gross or criminal nature: Onslow and Whalley's case, L. R. 9 Q. B. 219: Wellesley v. D. Beaufort; Lechmere Charlton's case, sup. p. 406; or for breach of an order against a receiver to pay money into Court: Re Gent, Gent-Davis v. Harris, 40 Ch. D. 190.

The privilege extends for forty days before and after prorogation or dissolution of Parliament, and although, after dissolution, the member is not re-elected: Re Anglo-French Co-operative Society, 14 Ch. D. 533.

Officers and attendants upon the Court, suitors and witnesses, have privilege eundo, redeundo, morando for their necessary attendance, but not otherwise; and the arrest of any of them at such times of necessary attendance is a contempt of Court.

This privilege from arrest extends to witnesses and jurymen: see Gibbs v. Phillipson, 1 Russ. & My. 19; to parties to an action: Andrews v. Walton, 1 Mac. & G. 380; Plomer v. Macdonough, 1 D. & S. 232; to prosecutors, and also to accused persons admitted to bail and attending on their recognizances: Gilpin v. Cohen, L. R. 4 Ex. 131.

A solr is privileged from arrest in, and on his way to or from, Court or Judge's Chambers on business of his client: Dodd v. Holbrook, 11 Jur. N.S. 969; 12 Jur. N.S. 19; Re Jewitt, 33 Beav. 959; Eyre v. Barrow, 6 W. R. 767; and see Cordery, Solrs. 201-205; and a barrister is entitled to the same privilege: Anon., 1 Y. & C. Ex. 331.

But the privilege does not extend to arrest for disobedience to an order of a punitive and disciplinary character: Re Freston, 11 Q. B. Div. 545; and see Re Dudley, 12 Q. B. Div. 44.

A bankrupt is privileged from arrest under an attachment for debt issued