given to the said A. previously to the transfer &c., be instead thereof given to the said B.-Searle v. Sanford, V.-C. B., at Chambers, 8 April, 1886, B. 1002.

For like orders in effect, see Wilkinson v. Stretton, V.-C. S., 3rd Dec. 1864, B. 2804; Robertson v. Wynch, M. R., in Chambers, 25 Feb. 1861, B. 382.

10. Order to stay Payment of Cheque, and Payee from receiving.

USUAL undertaking as to damages, and to accept short notice of motion to discharge this order.-Let the note or cheque for £- drawn by the paymaster in favour of M., pursuant to the order dated &c., be not delivered out until after the day of, or until further order; And Let the said M. be restrained until after the said · day of, or until further order, from receiving the said cheque.-Re How, V.-C. M., 30 Jan. 1874, A. 127.

For order to stay payment out of cheque for dividend, see Hamilton v. Marks, V.-C. W., 1 June, 1855, A. 1011.

For the like order, with the usual undertaking, upon the ex parte application of a solr who claimed a lien on the fund for his costs under 23 & 24 V. c. 127, see Gerrard v. Dawes, V.-C. S., 5 Nov. 1869, A. 2618; 18 W. R. 32.

For orders to stay payee from receiving cheques, see Courtoy v. Vincent, M. R., 15 Jan. 1852, A. 201; 15 Beav. 486; and see Ford v. Robinson, V.-C. S., 10 Jan. 1854, A. 595.

For order for production, by one of the clerks of the Acc. Gen. with whom it had been left in the office of the Acc. Gen. by the Deft's attorney, of a cheque signed by the Acc. Gen. pursuant to an order; with liberty to the sheriff, if so advised, to take the same under the writ of fieri facias issued against the goods, &c. of the Deft, see Watts v. Jefferyes, L. C., 19 Feb. 1851, B. 397; 3 Mac. & G. 422; 15 Jur. 435.

11. Stop Order on Documents deposited in Court.

"AND the applicant by his solr submitting &c., and also undertaking to pay any costs, charges, and expenses, which by reason of this order having been obtained (so far as the same relates to the deeds hereinafter mentioned) shall be occasioned to any party to this action, if this Court shall so direct" [Direction for restraint on stock in Court]; "And Let none of the deeds (shares) or other documents deposited by the Deft G. with the masters of the Supreme Court pursuant to the order dated &c. be delivered out or otherwise dealt with, without notice to the said M."-See Lang v. Griffith, M. R., at Chambers, 5 Nov. 1870, B. 2717; for like order, S. C., M. R., 11 March, 1861, B. 541.

Since Ch. Funds Ord. 16, the record and writ clerks could not, and under O. LX. 3, the masters of the Supreme Court cannot, receive negotiable securities.

12. Impounding Documents at the Hearing, and Stop Order thereon.

DIRECTIONS for dismissing action with costs.-And on the application of the Deft J. W. I. for the Plt to deposit certain documents in Court, and both sides to have leave to inspect them and have copies made at

their own expense; "And the proper officer is to attend with such documents before this Court at the request of either of the parties, at the expense of the party requiring the same; And the said documents are not to be delivered out of the custody of the masters of the Supreme Court, except upon an order to be made upon the application of the Plt or the Deft J. W. I., on notice to the other of them, or their respective solrs."-See Burns v. Irving, V.-C. H., 24 May, 1876, A. 987.

This order must now be made in open Court; O. XLII., 33a.

13. Stop Order discharged.

LET the order dated &c., whereby it was ordered that the £- New Cons. in Court to the credit of this action &c., and the interest to accrue thereon, should not be transferred, paid, or otherwise disposed of without notice to A., be discharged.

14. The Like-on Terms as to Costs of Plts' Solicitor.

WHEREAS by an order dated &c., made upon the application of Y. and R. therein named, it was ordered that the amount of the Plts' costs when taxed, as by the order dated &c., directed, should be paid to the said R., their solr, out of the money, cash, and dividends in the said order mentioned to the credit of &c., should not be paid out to the said R. until the further order of this Court, and that such further order should not be made without notice to the said Y.; Now, upon the application of the said Y. and R., and upon hearing the applicants in person, and upon reading the said orders dated &c., and the taxing master's certificate dated &c., It is ordered that the said order dated &c., be discharged; And it appearing that the Plts' costs by the said order dated &c., directed to be taxed have been taxed at £-, It is ordered that, notwithstanding the last-mentioned order, and in substitution for the direction therein contained for payment of such costs to the said R., the said costs be paid as directed in the schedule hereto [Add payment schedule directing £- part of the costs to be paid to Y., and the balance thereof to the said R.].—See Beswick v. B., V.-C. B., at Chambers, 19 May, 1876, A. 1170.

NOTES.

STOP ORDERS.

Jurisdiction to restrain by what are called "stop orders" the transfer or payment of funds or securities standing in Court in the name of the paymaster to the general credit of any cause or matter, or to the account of any person entitled in expectancy or otherwise, without notice to an assignee of the fund, or a person having a lien or charge thereon, is exercised by the Ch. Div. on the application of the assignee or incumbrancer on the fund: see O. XLVI. 12, 13. Stop orders were formerly obtained on petition; and if the assignor did not join in the petition, or consent, he must have been served: Parsons v. Groome, 4 Beav. 521; but not the other parties to the cause: Glazbrook v. Gillatt, 9 Beav. 611; and by O. XLVI. 13, service of "the petition or summons upon the parties to the cause or matter, or upon the persons interested in any part of the moneys or securities not sought to be affected by the order is not required.

Persons who have obtained stop orders upon contingent interests in a fund

which, in the event, have never vested, are not necessary parties to and need not be served with a petition for payment out of the fund: Vernon v. Croft, 36 W. R. 778.

Since 15 & 16 V. c. 86, applications for stop orders, where the assignor and assignee concur, have been by summons in Chambers: Edmondson v. Harrison, 1 W. R. 140; and see Lister v. Tidd, 15 W. R. 917; and it is now settled that, even where the assignor opposes, the application, though formerly it was by petition, may be by summons: Wrench v. Wynne, 17 W. R. 198; Walsh v. Wason, 22 W. R. 676; and the costs of a petition will not be allowed: Walsh v. Wason, sup.; and the petitioner may be ordered to pay the difference between the costs of obtaining the order in Chambers and the costs of the petition: Wellesley v. Mornington, 41 L. J. Ch. 776.

But if the fund has been paid into Court under the Trustee Relief Act, and exceeds £1,000 (see O. LV. 2 (5)), and there has been no prior application in the matter of the fund, a petition and not a summons is the proper form of application: Re Toogood's Trusts, 56 L. T. N.S. 703; Re Day's Trusts, 49 L. T. N.S. 499.

The title generally of the assignor, and the assignment, either by proving its execution in the regular way, or by the assignor's appearing and admitting it, must be shown: Wood v. Vincent, 4 Beav. 419; Quarman v. Williams, 5 Beav. 133; Lambert v. Hutchinson, 13 L. J. Ch. 336.

The stop order should express in distinct terms that it affects only the share or interest of the assignor: Macleod v. Buchanan, 4 D. J. & S. 265; 33 Beav. 234.

It will not be granted where there is neither any fund in Court, nor any order to bring a fund into Court: Wellesley v. Mornington, 11 W. R. 17; but may be where a fund of specified amount is about to be paid into Court under an order: Shaw v. Hudson, 48 L. J. Ch. 689.

It does not take effect until the original or an office copy has been lodged with the paymaster, but on notice of an intended application he will not immediately part with the fund.

It does not affect any other right or decide any question of title: Lucas v. Peacock, 9 Beav. 177; and accordingly may be made on a fund, the title to which is in dispute: Hawkesley v. Gowan, 12 W. R. 1100.

And though it is said, in Lucas v. Peacock, sup., that the order need not be made "without prejudice," the order on a fund paid into Court under the Trustee Relief Act was expressed to be without prejudice to a lien for costs claimed by the trustee: Re Blunt, 10 W. R. 379.

It may be obtained by a judgment creditor in respect of a fund in Court in the Ch. Div. without obtaining a charging order in the division where judgment was recovered: Shaw v. Hudson, 48 L. J. Ch. 689; Hopewell v. Barnes, 1 Ch. D. 630.

A stop order on a wife's reversionary chose in action assigned by husband and wife previously to 20 & 21 V. c. 57, was limited in operation to the husband's life: Moreau v. Polley, 1 D. & S. 143.

Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870 (33 & 34 V. c. 93), effect has been given by a stop order to a charge on a married woman's interest in a fund in Court, to which she was entitled for her separate use without restraint on anticipation: Sanger v. S., 11 Eq. 470.

Stop orders on funds transferred into Court in lunacy will not be granted on the application of a next of kin of the lunatic, and the assignee of his expectant interest: Re Wilkinson, 10 Ch. 73 (overruling Re Pigott, 3 Mac. & G. 268; Re Moore, 1 Mac, & G. 103).

So long as the fund charged is in the hands of the trustees, notice to them is sufficient, but when paid into Court, and therefore no longer under their control, a stop order must be obtained in order to perfect the charge: Pinnock v. Bailey, 23 Ch. D. 497; and so also where part of the fund only is in Court: Mutual Life Soc. v. Langley, 32 Ch. Div. 460.

As to inspection and delivery out of documents impounded by the Court, see O. XLII. 33a (June, 1891).

PRIORITIES.

As a general rule the priorities on a fund in Court are determined by the priorities of the respective stop orders rather than by the date or nature of

the charge: Elder v. Maclean, 3 Jur. N.S. 283; Swayne v. S., 11 Beav. 463; Greening v. Beckford, 5 Sim. 195; Thomas v. Cross, 2 Dr. & S. 423.

Accordingly an assignee who has obtained a stop order after the bankruptcy of his assignor, is entitled to priority over the trustee in bankruptcy: Stuart v. Cockerell, 8 Eq. 607; Palmer v. Locke, 18 Ch. Div. 381; or the trustees of a composition deed who have not: Birm., &c. Co. v. Carter, 20 W. R. 351.

An incumbrancer who has given due notice to the trustee before the fund was brought into Court will not be postponed to a subsequent incumbrancer who first obtains a stop order: Livesey v. Harding, 23 Beav. 141; Brearcliff v. Dorrington, 4 Dr. & S. 122; Thomas v. Cross, 2 Dr. & Sm. 423; nor can an incumbrancer, who has notice of a prior incumbrance at the time when he makes his advance, gain priority by obtaining a stop order: Re Holmes, 29 Ch. Div. 786; Mutual Life Assurance Soc. v. Langley, 32 Ch. Div. 460, 468; but the priority will not be prejudiced by notice of a prior incumbrance received after the date of the advance, and before the stop order: Mutual Life Assurance Soc. v. Langley, sup.

In Thompson v. Tomkins, 2 Dr. & S. 8, notice to the exor of a charge on the interest of a residuary legatee, after payment into Court of the fund (forming part of the estate), was held valid without a stop order, as against the legatee's subsequent assignees in bankruptcy: but see Mutual Life Assurance Soc. v. Langley, sup.

See also on this question Bartlett v. B., 1 D. & J. 127 (deciding that the assignees in bankruptcy of A., who had obtained a stop order on a reversionary interest, were entitled in priority to A.'s mortgagee of the reversionary interest who did not obtain a stop order): Grainge v. Warner, 13 W. R. 883; Day v. D., 1 D. & J. 144; 23 Beav. 391.

And see Warburton v. Hill, Kay, 470, inf. Sect. II., “CHARGING ORDERS"; and as to notice, Lloyd v. Banks, 4 Eq. 222; Brown's Trusts, 5 Eq. 88.

Where a fund has been carried over to a separate account it is released from the general questions in the cause, so that a stop order by a bona fide creditor of the person entitled to the fund may prevail over a liability of such person to the estate of the testator: Re Eyton, Bartlett v. Charles, 45 Ch. D. 458; Re Jervoise, 12 Beav. 209.

Equitable execution obtained by a receivership order does not require to be perfected by a stop order; and therefore where both A. and B., judgment creditors, had obtained receivership orders and stop orders, the priority obtained by A.'s prior equitable execution was not lost by B.'s stop order, second in date, having been the first formally lodged with the paymaster: Re Galland, W. N. (86) 96.

The priority obtained by a stop order is not affected by a subsequent distribution and carrying over the fund to a separate account: Lister v. Tidd, 4 Eq. 462; and see Fish. Mort. 609. But the restraint should be continued: see Forms, 7, 8, sup.

Such priority extends only to the charge in respect of which the stop order was obtained: Macleod v. Buchanan, 33 Beav. 234; 4 D. J. & S. 265.

A solr's lien on a fund in Court recovered by his exertions has priority over a stop order obtained by an assignee from the client: Haymes v. Cooper, 33 Beav. 431.

COSTS.

Parties are not entitled as a general rule and in all cases to the costs of obtaining a stop order: Grimsby v. Webster, 8 W. R. 725; though in that case the costs of obtaining it and of appearance were allowed.

A mortgagee is entitled to the costs of a stop order, out of the fund, where the mortgage deed authorizes him to apply to the Court, but they should be specially mentioned in the direction for taxation: Waddilove v. Taylor, 6 Ha. 307.

By O. XLVI. 12, the person by whom any order preventing the transfer or payment of money or securities without notice to the assignee of any person entitled in expectancy or otherwise is obtained, is to be liable, at the discretion of the Court or a Judge, to pay any costs, charges, and expenses which, by reason of such order having been obtained, shall be occasioned to any party to the cause or matter, or any persons interested in the particular moneys or securities.

SECTION II.-CHARGING ORDERS ON FUNDS OR SHARES, UNDER 1 & 2 V. c. 110, AND 3 & 4 V. c. 82.

1. Order Nisi to charge Funds in Court-Interim Restraint— Service on Solicitor.

LET the £ (New Cons.), in Court to the credit of &c., "The Sequestration Account," stand charged with the payment to the Petrs of the sum of £-, with interest at the rate of £4 p. c. per ann. from &c., until payment, unless the Deft W. shall, within one month after service of this order [or, on or before &c.] show unto this Court good cause to the contrary; And the Petrs by their counsel submitting to be bound by 0. XLVI. 12, Let no part of the said New Cons. be transferred, sold out, or otherwise disposed of, without notice to the Petrs, until this order shall be made absolute or (shall be) discharged; And Let service of this order upon &c., the solrs for the Deft W., be deemed good service thereof upon the said Deft.-See Westby v. W., V.-C. P., 29 April, 1852, B. 663; S. C., 5 D. & S. 516.

2. Order Absolute.

LET the order dated &c. be made absolute; And Let the £- New Cons. in Court &c. [Form 1] stand charged with the payment to the Petrs [names] of the sum of £-, with interest at the rate of £4 p. c. per ann. from &c., until payment.-See S. C., V.-C. S., 12 Feb. 1853, B. 441.

3. Order Nisi as to Cash.

UPON the application of &c. [judgment creditors]; And the applicants by their solr submitting to be bound &c. [Form 1], Let so much of the £, cash in Court to the credit of &c., as may be payable to the said H. (after payment of the amounts due to the said incumbrancers) stand charged with the payment to the applicants of the said sums of £(judgment debt) and £- (costs), payable to them by the said H. pursuant to the said judgment, and with interest thereon after the rate of £4 p. c. per ann. from the day of unless &c.; And Let no part of the said sum of cash be paid &c. (except for payment to such incumbrancers), without notice to the applicants &c., until &c.— Re Prince, Hopewell v. Barnes, V.-C. M., at Chambers, 19 Jan. 1876, B. 36; followed in Brereton v. Edwards, 21 Q. B. D. 226; 21 Q. B. Div. 488, see p. 496; Carter v. Stadden, 34 W. R. 363.

This order is made not under sect. 14 of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 (which does not apply to money), but by way of equitable execution in aid of the power given by sect. 12, to take money under fi. fa.; and having regard to S. C. F. R. 1886, r. 99, notice to the paymaster is sufficient, and a stop order is not requisite: Brereton v. Edwards, 21 Q. B. Div. 496, 498, 500.