Applications for injunctions ex parte are strictly dealt with: there must have been uberrima fides; the case must be fully and fairly stated; and the suppression or misrepresentation of any material fact will disentitle Plt to relief, or at least make him liable for costs at the hearing: Dalglish v. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G. 231; A.-G. v. Liverpool Corp., 1 My. & Cr. 171; Maclaren v. Stainton, 16 Beav. 279; Edelsten v. E., 1 D. J. & S. 185; Fuller v. Taylor, 11 W. R. 532; Harbottle v. Pooley, 20 L. T. N.S. 436; Holden v. Waterlow, 15 W. R. 139; Wimbledon L. Board v. Croydon Sanitary Authority, 32 Ch. Div. 421. If the Deft has appeared the Court ought to be informed of the fact: Mexican Co. v. Maldonado, W. N. (90) 8.

But the Plt so applying is not bound to state facts supposed to raise some point of law in reality untenable: Weston v. Arnold, 8 Ch. 1084. And see Kerr, 634.

A motion to discharge an ex parte order for an injunction, on the ground of its having been obtained by misrepresentation, is proper, though the injunction is about to expire: Wimbledon L. Board v. Croydon Sanitary Authority, 32 Ch. Div. 421; distinguishing Bolton v. London School Board, 7 Ch. D. 766.

Delay and acquiescence are very material (especially in patent cases: Bovill v. Crate, 1 Eq. 388; Bacon v. Jones, 4 M. & C. 439); and will more easily than at the hearing bar Plt's right to summary relief: Hogg v. Scott, 18 Eq. 444; Johnson v. Wyatt, 2 D. J. & S. 18; Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. N.S. 163; Gordon v. Cheltenham Ry. Co., 5 Beav. 233; Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., 3 D. & J. 212; Wintle v. Bristol and S. W. Ry. Co., 10 W. R. 210; Salisbury v. Met. Ry. Co., 18 W. R. 484; Isaacson v. Thompson, 41 L. J. Ch. 101; but mere delay short of the statutory period of limitations will not affect the right to an injunction in aid of a legal right: Fullwood v. F., 9 Ch. D. 176.

And see, upon the equitable doctrine of acquiescence as applied to injunctions, Kerr, 18-21, 189; Wilmott v. Barber, 15 Ch. D. 96.

The balance of convenience and inconvenience from granting or refusing the order is also very material on interlocutory applications, especially where it is sought to stop carrying on a trade: Plimpton v. Spiller, 4 Ch. D. 286; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 15 Q. B. D. 476; A.-G. v. Charles, 11 W. R. 253; or a public undertaking: Shrewsbury and Chester Ry. v. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Ry., 1 Sim. N.S. 410; Greenhalgh v. Manchester Ry. Co., 3 M. & Cr. 784; Hadley v. London, &c. Bank, 3 D. J. & S. 63; or to stop the working of a mine: Hilton v. Granville, C. & Ph. 297; or to restrain interference with light: Newson v. Pender, 27 Ch. Div. 43; McManus v. Cooke, 35 Ch. D. 681; or alleged infringement of trade mark: Mitchell v. Henry, 15 Ch. Div. 181;

-as also the power of the Court completely to enforce its order, e.g., by compelling a Plt to carry out the contract an interference with which he seeks to restrain: Garrett v. Banstead Ry. Co., 4 D. J. & S. 462; Munro v. Wivenhoe Ry. Co., 4 D. J. & S. 723 ;

-as also the fact that the Plt can be adequately and more conveniently compensated by an inquiry as to damages-and these considerations are also applicable to relief by injunction at the hearing, and to cases of specific performance: see Elwes v. Payne, 12 Ch. Div. 468; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 15 Q. B. D. 476; McManus v. Cooke, 35 Ch. D. 681; Holland v. Worley, 26 Ch. D. 578; Isenberg v. E. I. Ho. Co., 3 D. J. & S. 263; Jackson v. D. Newcastle, Ib. 275; Eastwood v. Lever, 4 D. J. & S. 114; Senior v. Pawson, 3 Eq. 330; Master v. Hansard, 34 L. T. N.S. 719; Wilson v. Northampton and Banbury Ry. Co., 9 Ch. 279.

The interlocutory order does not conclude the right; the object and effect being merely to keep things in statu quo where the Plt shows a prima facie case for relief at the hearing, so that the relief shall not be ineffectual: see Preston v. Luck, 27 Ch. D. 506, 508. In very special cases only will any positive act be enforced by interlocutory injunction: G. W. Ry. v. Birm., &c. Ry., 2 Ph. 597; Blakemore v. Glamorgan Canal, 1 M. & K. 154; Shrewsbury and Chester Ry. v. Shrewsbury aud Birmingham Ry., 1 Sim. N.S. 410; Kerr, 12.

And, generally, this summary relief will not be granted where there is a

serious question to be tried: e.g., the construction of a doubtful clause in an Act of Parliament: Dover Harbour v. L. C. & D. Ry., 3 D. F. & J. 559; -alleged interference with a franchise in respect of market tolls: Elwes v. Payne, 12 Ch. Div. 468;

-the validity of a patent: Plimpton v. Malcolmson, 20 Eq. 37;

-where the Plt claims as c. q. tr., but the trust is not admitted, and the right to the money or property in question is matter to be decided at the hearing: Bank of Turkey v. Ottoman Bank, 2 Eq. 366;

-or upon a mere quia timet where there is no sufficient threatened or intended legal injury: L. Cowley v. Byas, 5 Ch. D. 944; Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688; A. G. v. Vestry of Bermondsey, 23 Ch. Div. 60; Newton v. N., 11 P. D. 11; secus, where the subject-matter of litigation is in danger of being parted with or destroyed: London and County Bg. Co. v. Lewis, 21 Ch. D. 490; Brand v. Mitson, 24 W. R. 524; or to restrain shipowners from conspiring to drive ships of other traders off a certain line of trade, unless a case of irreparable damage is made out: Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 15 Q. B. D. 476.

The usual course in such cases is to order the motion to stand until the trial, Deft undertaking to keep accounts, or being put upon terms: see Coleman v. West Hartlepool Ry., 3 L. T. N.S. 847; Kerr, 626; Elwes v. Payne, 12 Ch. Div. 468; Mitchell v. Henry, 15 Ch. Div. 181.

It is not unusual, by consent of parties, to treat the motion for an injunction as a motion for judgment, or to treat the hearing of the interlocutory application as the trial of the action.

The right to an injunction at the hearing is not lost by an interlocutory motion not having been made: Davies v. Marshall, 1 Dr. & Sm. 557.

Under the old practice injunctions have been granted at the hearing under special circumstances, though not prayed by the bill: Blomfield v. Eyre; Goodman v. Kine, 8 Beav. 250, 379; Reynell v. Sprye, 1 D. M. & G. 660.

And see inf., Chap. XXXII., "RECEIVERS," for decisions in the analogous case of an application for a receiver not claimed by the writ.

Under the present practice, and the large powers of amendment at any stage of the proceedings (see O. XXVIII.), although where an injunction (or the appointment of a receiver) is a substantial object of the action the writ should be so indorsed, an interim order, though not claimed by the writ, may be obtained on amending the indorsement: Colebourne v. C., V.-C. H., 15 Jan. 1876, A. 19; 1 Ch. D. 690; or without such amendment if incidental to the principal relief claimed.

Injunctions have been granted at the instance of one Deft against his co-Deft: Edgcumbe v. Carpenter, 1 Beav. 171; but not, it seems, upon interlocutory application before decree: Russel! v. L. C. D. Ry., 4 Giff. 403.

But under O. L. 6, a Deft may before judgment apply for an injunction (and receiver), and in a proper case the Court has jurisdiction to make the order: Sargant v. Read, 1 Ch. D. 600.

It has been said that an interim order, if nothing is said to the contrary, remains in force until the case is disposed of: see Carrow v. Ferrier, 3 Ch. 719; but in practice such orders are invariably expressed to be granted until after or over a day fixed: see Form 2, p. 452; and if necessary may be continued until a further day, or until judgment: see Form 4, p. 453; and if an interim injunction has been obtained on notice, until a certain day, the Plt is not entitled, after the period for which it was granted has expired, to obtain ex parte a further injunction: Graham v. Campbell, 7 Ch. D. 491.

The pendency of a motion for an injunction did not prevent Plt from obtaining an order to dismiss his own bill: Markwick v. Pawson, 33 L. J. Ch. 703.

INJUNCTIONS MANDATORY-DAMAGES IN LIEU OF INJUNCTION.

The jurisdiction to grant a mandatory injunction, that is, to compel the Deft not only to desist from unlawful acts for the future, but to restore matters to their original position, is exercised, like that of specific performance, in cases where the injury to the Plt, active or passive, cannot be estimated and sufficiently compensated by damages, and has not been condoned by acquiescence.

By an interlocutory injunction the continuance of the act complained of is stopped until the right is tried between the parties; by a perpetual injunction such act, when decided to be unlawful, is permanently restrained; and by a mandatory injunction the Deft is ordered to undo the wrong he has done, and give the Plt complete relief by putting him in the position in which he was before the injury was committed."

A mandatory injunction is seldom granted until the Plt has completely established his right: Child v. Douglas, Kay, 578; Gale v. Abbot, 10 W. R. 748; unless

-the injury will be irreparable if allowed to continue until the hearing; e.g., the flow of water into a mine caused by removing the barrier of an adjoining working: Westminster Brymbo Co. v. Clayton, 36 L. J. Ch. 476;

-or the Deft, after express notice or pending litigation, seeks to anticipate the action of the Court by hurrying on an obstructive building: Daniel v. Ferguson, (1891) 2 Ch. (C. A.) 27; Beadel v. Perry, 3 Eq. 465; Staight v. Burn, 5 Ch. 163; Morris v. Grant, 24 W. R. 55; and see Smith v. Day, 13 Ch. D. 651.

Delay and acquiescence are most material: Gaskin v. Balls, 13 Ch. Div. 324 (five years' acquiescence held fatal); Wicks v. Hunt, Joh. 373; especially in cases of obstructive building: Mott v. Shoolbred, 20 Eq. 22; unless there has been clear violation of an express agreement entered into by Deft after notice that the act will not be sanctioned: Morris v. Grant, 24 W. R. 55; or the buildings were such as could be easily altered, and their effect on Plt could not be known till they were finished: Baxter v. Bower, 23 W. R. 805. The power to grant a mandatory injunction was not taken away by Lord Cairns Act (21 & 22 V. c. 27), providing relief in damages in addition to, or in substitution for, relief by injunction (since repealed, 46 & 47 V. c. 49), and was exercised where the Court was satisfied that a wrong, i.e., substantial annoyance or injury (Bowes v. Law, L. R. 9 Eq. 636), had been wilfully done, and that there had been neither delay nor acquiescence on the part of Plt: Smith v. S., L. R. 20 Eq. 500; although the obstruction was completed before writ issued: Lawrence v. Horton, 38 W. R. 555; 59 L. J. Ch. 440; and that the repeal of Lord Cairns' Act has not affected the jurisdiction of either division to grant an injunction or damages, or both, see Sayers v. Collyer, 28 Ch. Div. 103; and, therefore, damages in lieu of injunction could be granted though notice of action under the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 264, had not been given: Chapman v. Auckland Union, 23 Q. B. Div. 299, 300.

But there is no jurisdiction to award damages where no wrongful act has been committed by the person against whom an injunction is sought: Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co., 42 Ch. D. 66; S. C., on appeal, 43 Ch. Div. 316 (q. v. as to the principles to be adopted in working out an inquiry as to damages by unlawful detention, where the judgment is varied, but the inquiry allowed to stand).

The Palatine Court now has jurisdiction to give damages in lieu of an injunction under the Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1890 (53 & 54 V. c. 23), s. 3, which it had not previously: Proctor v. Bayley, 59 L. J. Ch. 12, 16.

Where the injury is such that if it is not stopped the Plt's property will be rendered useless, the Court will not compel the Plt to sell his property to the Deft, i.e., to accept damages in lieu of a perpetual injunction; but where the injury is less serious, and may be compensated by money, then the discretion given by the Act may be exercised: Holland v. Worley, 26 Ch. D. 578; and see Donnell v. Bennett, 22 Ch. D. 835.

For the principles on which mandatory injunctions are granted or refused, and the right to relief in damages, see also Durell v. Pritchard, 1 Ch. 24; Isenberg v. E. I. Ho. Co., 3 D. J. & S. 263; Curriers' Co. v. Corbet, 2 Dr. & Sm. 355; 4 D. J. & S. 764; A. G. v. Mid-Kent Co., 3 Ch. 100; Kelk v. Pearson, 6 Ch. 809; Baxter v. Bower, 23 W. R. 805; City of London Brewery Co. v. Tennant; Goodson v. Richardson, 9 Ch. 212, 221; L. Stanley v. E. Shrewsbury, 19 Eq. 616; Kilbey v. Haviland, 19 W. R. 698; Musgrave v. Horner, 23 W. R. 125; Rock Portland Cement Co. v. Wilson, 52 L. J. Ch. 214; 31 W. R. 193; and that where there is jurisdiction to grant an injunction, damages may be given in lieu thereof, not only for injury commenced before, and continued after, writ issued, and ceased before trial, but also for injury

which has occurred since the commencement of the action, see Fritz v. Hobson, 14 Ch. D. 542; Chapman v. Auckland Union, 23 Q. B. Div. 294, 298; and see Warwick and Birmingham Canal v. Burman, 63 L. T. N.S. 670; and that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona does not apply to the equitable remedy by mandatory injunction to prevent obstruction of light, see Jones v. Simes, 43 Ch. D. 607.

As the Court has power to award damages in an action for an injunction, a consent order in such an action is a bar to an action for damages in respect of the same cause: Serrao v. Noel, 15 Q. B. D. 549. The right to damages for detention of property is not lost by the appointment of a receiver, or any other mode of placing the property in medio: Dreyfus v. Peruvian Quano Co., 42 Ch. D. 66; 43 Ch. Div. 316.

The result of the cases appears to be that where the Plt, though entitled to relief, has not sustained serious or (pecuniarily) immeasurable injury; or where on other grounds, including that of the balance of convenience or inconvenience, the Court declines to grant him the extreme and summary relief of a mandatory injunction, an inquiry as to damages may be granted though not claimed.

The following are instances of mandatory injunctions:

(a) Against allowing obstructive buildings to remain, and in effect ordering their removal: Smith v. S., L. R. 20 Eq. 500; Merchant Taylors' Co. v. Truscott, 3 D. J. & S. 271; Jessel v. Chaplin, 4 W. R. 610; Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Sim. 16; Great Northern Railway v. Clarence Railway, 1 Coll. 517; Gaskin v. Balls, 13 Ch. Div. 324; Sellors v. Matlock Bath L. Board, 14 Q. B. D. 928 (public urinal erected under authority of Public Health Act, 1875); Myers v. Catterson, 43 Ch. Div. 470 (hoarding obstructing light coming through railway arch); McManus v. Cooke, 35 Ch. D. 681 (mutual agreement as to erection of skylights).

(b) Compelling the removal of obstructions, as in Hervey v. Smith, 1 K. & J. 389; 22 Beav. 299 (to the use of flues); Bickett v. Morris, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 47; Robinson v. Ld. Byron, 1 Bro. C. C. 588 (to the flow of water); Lane v. Newdigate, 10 Ves. 192 (to the right of navigating a canal); Neath Canal Co. v. Ynisarwed Co., 10 Ch. 450 (to the use of an accommodation bridge); Clegg v. Castleford L. B., W. N. (74) 229 (to the use of a drain); Cannon v. Villars, 8 Ch. D. 415 (to a right of way through a gateway and across a yard). And see A. G. v. Furniss Ry. Co., 26 W. R. 650, for an order compelling a railway co. to construct a bridge of height and width prescribed by Railways Clauses Act, 1845, s. 49.

(c) Compelling the restitution of mining barriers: E. Mexborough v. Bower, 7 Beav. 129; Westminster Brymbo Co. v. Clayton, 36 L. J. Ch. 476. (d) Compelling railway co. to restore junction between their line and a siding: Woodruff v. Brecon Ry. Co., 28 Ch. Div. 190.

(e) Compelling the erection and maintenance of fences: Bidwell v. Holden, 63 L. T. N.S. 104.

(f) Against allowing pipes to remain on Plt's land, though under a highway: Goodson v. Richardson, 9 Ch. 221.

(g) Against allowing a colliery to be flooded by ceasing to pump out the water: Strelley v. Pearson, 15 Ch. D. 113.

(h) Compelling removal from an upper floor of lithographic stones causing danger by excessive weight to the premises: Cohen v. Poland, W. N. (87)

159.

(i) Compelling the return of letters and other documents: Evitt v. Price, 1 Sim. 483; Whittaker v. Howe (R.), 25 Feb. 1841, B. 336.

(k) Compelling the withdrawal of a notice by a dismissed agent to the post office to forward all letters to his private address (thereby enabling him to obtain letters intended for his former employers): Hermann Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. Div. 306.

SECTION II.-BREACH OF CONTRACT.

1. Injunction against practising in a Profession within specified

Limits.

LET the Deft W. be restrained by injunction from carrying on, either alone or in copartnership with any other person or persons whomsoever, the practice and profession of a solicitor, in W. or M., in the county of D., or at any place within fifty miles thereof respectively; and from continuing to describe himself by any public inscription on his premises at W. aforesaid as a solicitor.-Deft W. to pay the Plt's costs of suit to be taxed.-See Howard v. Woodward, V.-C. W., 8 Nov. 1864, A. 2082.

For injunction against practising in the London Court of Bankruptcy in breach of a covenant not directly or indirectly to practise the business of a solr within the city of London or the counties of Middlesex or Essex, see May v. O'Neill, 44 L. J. Ch. 660.

For injunction to restrain the Deft from carrying on or exercising the profession or business of a surgeon and apothecary or surgeon, or from acting as a physician in the town of in the county of, or within the radius or compass of five miles thereof, until the hearing, &c., see Giles v. Hart, V.-C. S., 2 Dec. 1859, A. 224; 5 Jur. N.S. 1381.

For the like order, see Gravely v. Barnard, 18 Eq. 518; and see London and Yorkshire Bank v. Pritt, 56 L. J. Ch. 987; 26 W. R. 135; where a condition in a bond was held to be evidence of an agreement by a bank manager, that he would not, after quitting the employ of the bank, enter into similar employ within a specified time and distance.

From practising as a dentist in Chester, or within sixteen miles by the nearest road from Chester Cross, or in any place within the boundaries of Birkenhead, see Bullin v. Teece, V.-C. G., 19 June, 1868, A. 1481.

2. Injunction against exercising a Trade, with Account. LET the Deft E., the elder, be restrained by injunction from directly or indirectly setting up, exercising, or carrying on the trade or business of a gas-meter manufacturer and gas engineer, and matters connected therewith, including in particular the department of gas fitting as carried on on the Plt's premises in &c., and also from directly or indirectly setting up, exercising, or carrying on the trade or business of a gas-meter manufacturer and gas engineer, or matters connected therewith, within twenty miles of G-Street, W., until the further order of this Court."-So much of the Plt's (bill) as relates to the said Deft carrying on the business of a gas fitter within the twenty miles dismissed without costs, without prejudice to any action, in the name of himself and E., the younger, the Plt giving an indemnity to the said E., the younger, to be settled by the Judge.-1. Account of all moneys received by Deft E., the elder, belonging to the copartnership between the Plt and the Deft E., the younger, not already paid over or accounted for.-2. Account of what is due to the Deft E., the elder, from the copartnership in respect of salary or remuneration.