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five in the afternoon, at the Plt's place of business at P-, and to deliver to the Deft, who is to be at liberty to be present during the opening of such letters, any letter intended for him.-Deft to pay costs.-Loog v. Bean, C. A., 12 March, 1884, B. 467; 26 Ch. Div. 306.

6. Enjoining the Return of Documents.

LET the Deft H., be restrained by injunction from detaining and keeping possession of the books, deeds, documents, and papers removed by him the said Deft, or by his order, from the chambers occupied by the Plts, for retaining which no written authority has been produced by the Deft, as mentioned in the Plts' affidavit of &c., or any or either of them, except the five boxes not claimed by the Plts, and from permitting the same, or any or either of them, except the five boxes, to remain away from the office of the Plts, or from parting with the books &c. removed by the Deft, or by his order, from the chambers occupied by the Plts, or any or either of them, except the said five boxes, to any person or persons other than the Plts, and from destroying, mutilating, or obliterating the said books &c., or any or either of them, except as aforesaid, or any parts or part thereof respectively, or any entries or entry therein, and from making any alteration, interlineation, or erasure in the same, or any of them; until &c.-Whittaker v. Howe, M. R., 25 Feb. 1841, B. 336.

For an order for return of books, documents and extracts which had come into Deft's possession in the course of a confidential employment, and restraining him from taking and retaining any copies and extracts, and from communicating the particulars or the contents thereof or any of the information therein contained, see Evitt v. Price, 1 Sim. 483.

7. Injunction against opening Letters of another Firm, or supplying the Orders therein contained.

LET the Defts B. &c., their agents &c., be restrained by injunction from receiving, retaining, or opening any letters or letter addressed "C. Schiele," or "Schule" and Co. &c., or otherwise addressed to the Plt Christian Schiele, or to the Plt's said firm of C. Schiele and Co., as in the (bill) mentioned, and from taking advantage or making use of the communications or information, and from supplying the orders or any of them contained in any such letters, and from in any manner availing themselves of or using the contents of any such letters; until &c.-Schiele v. Brakell, V.-C. S., 29 May, 1863, B. 1169; S. C., 11 W. R. 796.

For a similar order, after dissolution of partnership and sale by Deft of the business to Plt, with the goodwill and the right to use the trade name and trade marks of the firm, see Witt v. Corcoran, V.-C. B., inf. Sect. XII., Form 5.

For an undertaking by the Defts until the hearing not to open, except in the presence of the Plt or his agents, any letter addressed to him at No. 190, R. St., unless it should appear either on the outside or by some other indication than the address No. 190, R. St., that the same was intended for the Defts, see Stapleton v. For. Vin. Assoc., V.-C. W., 13 June, 1864, B. 1526; 12 W, R. 976.

NOTES.

The receiver's right of property in letters is at most joint with that of the writer: see Pope v. Curll, 2 Atk. 342; and is qualified by the right of the latter to restrain their publication without his consent, on the ground of breach of contract or of confidence; and also, where the publication is intended for purposes of profit, on the ground of infringement of the exclusive copyright of the writer therein, see Copinger, Copyright, 43; Kerr, 498; Story, Eq. Jur., ss. 944-947.

For the application and qualification of this rule, see Lytton v. Devey, 54 L. J. Ch. 293; Hopkinson v. L. Burghley, 2 Ch. 447; Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 462; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan. 403; Thompson v. Stanhope, Amb. 739; Oliver v. O., 10 W. R. 18; Bishop of Exeter v. Shutte, sup. Form 1 (and see 7 Sol. Journ. 485), in which case an injunction was obtained restraining the alleged threatened publication in "Life and Times of the Bishop of Exeter," of private correspondence of the Bishop, extending over forty years, which had been placed in the Deft's hands as material for his work. The bill, it seems, was on the 23rd April, 1863, dismissed, on the denial of the Deft that he ever intended to publish the letters unless the Bishop's consent had been obtained, but without costs.

In Pollard v. The Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345, v. sup. Form 11, p. 576, a photographer was restrained from selling or exhibiting or dealing with copies of a photograph of the Plt, which he had taken for her in the way of his business. And see P. Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. & G. 25; 2 D. & S. 652; Phillips, Copyright, 7, where publication of a catalogue of private etchings, not intended by the author for publication, was restrained.

The Court will restrain the publication of information obtained in a confidential capacity: Evitt v. Price, 1 Sim. 483; or derived from production of documents: Williams v. P. Wales Co., 23 Beav. 338.

And where the Deft has surreptitiously obtained access to the Plt's accounts, books, and other documents, he will be restrained from printing or otherwise copying, and from distributing or parting with any copies, or otherwise in any way publishing such accounts, &c.: Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Ha. 383; Marshall v. Watson, 25 Beav. 501; and also from making any use of trade secrets, the knowledge of which has been surreptitiously acquired: Morison v. Moat, 9 Ha. 241.

A person will also be restrained from opening letters addressed to, and thus obtaining orders or custom intended for, another: Edginton v. E., 11 L. T. N.S. 299; Schiele v. Brakell, 11 W. R. 796, sup. Form 7.

The Postmaster General will not be restrained from delivering business letters, directed to Plt at the address of his former employers, otherwise than at his present place of business (in the same street and under a very similar firm): Stapleton v. Foreign Vin. Asssoc., 12 W. R. 976.

SECTION X.-Libel.

1. Injunction against Libelling Plt's Trade by Circular containing erroneous Quotation from a Judgment.

UPON motion for judgment &c., by counsel for the Plt, and upon hearing counsel for the Defts, Let the Defts, A., B., and C., be perpetually restrained from issuing or distributing, or permitting to be issued or distributed, the circular which at the date of the issue of the writ in this action was being distributed by them at the International Exhibition of Navigation and Commerce, at Liverpool, purporting to contain a quotation from the judgment of Mr. Justice North, in Hayward v. H., 1885, H. 566, or any other circular or advertisement containing an

unfair report of the said judgment to the prejudice of the Plt.Hayward v. H., North, J., 22 Nov. 1886, A. 1614. S. C., 34 Ch. D. 198.

2. Injunction against Slander and Libel on the Plts' Trade by Spurious Experiments.

UPON motion &c., Let the Deft, his agents, servants, travellers, and representatives, be perpetually restrained from representing or stating in any way, either verbally or in writing, and in particular either by circular or spurious experiment or otherwise, that the Plt co.'s process does not contain meat or extract of meat, or any other ingredient stated by the Plt co. to be contained therein, or otherwise slandering or libelling the Plt co. in their trade, or otherwise representing, or suggesting, or doing anything calculated to represent or suggest, that the Plt co.'s preparation is spurious or not genuine.-Liberty to apply.— Coleman & Co. v. Pearson, Chitty, J., 25 Jan. 1889, A. 91.

Plts carefully eliminated albumen from their preparation. Deft furnished his travellers with tannic acid, which is a test for albumen, and instructed them to pour it into the Plts' preparation, and represent the absence of any resulting precipitation as a proof of the absence of meat.

NOTES.

Though it was formerly settled that the Court had no jurisdiction to restrain publication of a libel, or of any letter, advertisement or other document which was injurious to the property, either in money or reputation, of another (see Prudential Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. 142, overruling Dixon v. Holdin, 7 Eq. 493; Springhead Co. v. Riley, 6 Eq. 551), the effect of the Jud. Act, 1873, s. 25 (8), is to enlarge the jurisdiction so that injunctions to restrain libellous statements injurious to property or trade, as well as damages, may now be granted without the necessity of proving actual damage, and without the finding of a jury where the action has been tried by a Judge alone: Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; Thorley, &c. Co. v. Massam, 14 Ch. Div. 763; Hill v. Hart-Davies, 21 Ch. D. 798 (and see Thorley, &c. Co. v. Massam, 6 Ch. D. 582; Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339); and there is jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction: Bonnard v. Perryman, W. N. (91) 75; 39 W. R. 506; but such an order will not be made except under very special circumstances: Bonnard v. Perryman, sup.; as where any jury would say the matter complained of was libellous, and if they found otherwise their verdict would be set aside as unreasonable; S. C.; Liverpool Household Assoc. v. Smith, 37 Ch. Div. 170; Quartz Hill Co. v. Beall, 20 Ch. Div. 501; especially where a claim of privilege is set up: S. C.; but see Punch v. Boyd, 16 L. R. Ir. 476; nor where the statements, however injurious, are not shown to have been made malâ fide or in breach of any contract: Société Anonyme des Glaces v. Tilghman, 25 Ch. Div. 1; nor where injury to person or property is not shown, even though the libels are calculated to cause extreme annoyance, are wholly unjustifiable, and of a gross character, and the Plts have previously obtained a verdict against Defts for substantial damages in respect of similar libels: Salomons v. Knight, 39 W. R. 506.

Oral as well as written statements, if slanderous and calculated to injure the business of another, will be restrained: Hermann Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306.

And that the Court is reluctant to grant an injunction restraining the publication of future libels, as involving the trial of the question of libel or no libel in a very unsatisfactory way on motion to commit, see Liverpool Household Assoc. v. Smith, sup., where also a doubt was intimated whether, in Hill v. Hart-Davies, sup., the Court was right in granting an interlocutory injunction with the words "or any other circular or letter containing false or inaccurate representations as to the credit or financial condition of the said society."

An action of libel, even if involving injury to trade, is determined by the death of the Plt, unless it is in the nature of an action of slander of title, e.g., alleges publication impugning Plt's right to use his trade mark: Hatchard v. Mege, 18 Q. B. D. 771.

Where the injury proved was trifling, and the action not brought until three months after the Plt knew of the publication of the libel, the Court gave only £5 damages: Hayward v. H., 34 Ch. D. 198; and a circular containing an erroneous statement of a judgment in an action, viz., that the Deft had been ordered to undertake not to represent his firm to be that of the Pits, whereas in fact such undertaking had been voluntarily given, was held to be a libel injurious to Deft's trade: S. C.

Upon the question whether words could be deemed libellous as imputing insolvency, see Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 App. Cas. 741; and upon the question of privilege, see Allbutt v. General Council of Medical Education, 23 Q. B. Div. 400 (publication of minutes of the Deft Council); Davis v. Shepstone, 11 App. Cas. 187 (reports of statements made to proprietors of newspapers); Proctor v. Webster, 16 Q. B. D. 112 (letter to lords of Privy Council); Hill v. Hart-Davies, 21 Ch. D. 798 (circular to members of friendly society); Waller v. Loch, 7 Q. B. Div. 619 (report of Secretary of Charity Organization Society); Macdougall v. Knight, 14 App. Cas. 194; 17 Q. B. Div. 636 (reports of proceedings in Courts of Justice); Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. Div. 588 (protection of advocate absolute); Hayward v. H., 34 Ch. D. 198 (privilege not lost unless communication shown to be untrue to the knowledge of the person making it); Jenowre v. Delmege, (1891) A. (P. C.) 73 (the occasion rebuts the inference of mala fides of Deft, so that the onus probandi is cast on the Plt).

And that a corporation cannot sue for libel affecting personal reputation only, and not property, see Corporation of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 94.

SECTION XI.-COMMENTS ON PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

1. Injunction restraining the Delivery of a Sermon with Special Reference to Pending Proceedings.

USUAL undertaking.-Let the Deft B. be restrained by injunction from preaching or delivering any sermon or address with special or other reference to the trial of this cause, and from publishing or distributing, or being in any way instrumental in publishing or distributing, the printed handbill or placard being the exhibit &c., or any like handbill or placard or notice, and from otherwise prejudicing and interfering with the trial of this cause, or the persons to be examined as witnesses at the hearing thereof.—Mackett v. Herne Bay Commrs., V.-C. B., 24 June, 1876, B. 1026; S. C., 24 W. R. 845.

For an order that the printers and publishers of the "S. Independent" do, within three weeks, publish in three successive papers apologies for their offence (in publishing the bill and depositions taken in a suit still pending, and commenting thereon in a manner calculated to prejudice the case of the Deft) in as legible a type and conspicuous a manner as the extracts and articles complained of; and do also pay the costs of the motion; otherwise that they stand committed for contempt, see General Exchange Bank v. Horner, M. R., 12 Nov. 1868, A. 2668.

For similar orders for submission and payment of costs by the printers and publishers of newspapers, see Tichborne v. Mostyn, V.-C. W., 18 July, 1867, B. 2073, 2076; Robson v. Dodds, V.-C. M., 27 May, 1869, B. 1317; S. C., 17 W. R. 782.

2. Ex parte Order restraining Publication of Matter tending to

prejudice Trial of Action.

UPON motion &c. by counsel for the Plts, Let A. B., the printer and publisher of the C. D. newspaper, his servants and agents, be restrained until &c., from printing or publishing, or reprinting or republishing, or causing or permitting to be written, printed, or published, or rewritten, or reprinted, or republished, an article or paragraph entitled "The Harsop Estate Claimant-After a Missing Will," or any copy of or extract from such paragraph or article, or any statement therein, or to the like effect; And from writing, or printing, or publishing, or causing or permitting to be written, or printed, or published, with or without comment, any pleading or evidence in this action, or any defamatory statement tending to prejudice the minds of the public or to prevent a fair trial of this action.-Leslie v. Cave, Pearson, J., 14 May, 1885, B. 548.

And for case in which an interlocutory injunction was granted to restrain a threatened publication by the Deft of circulars abusive of the Plt, and tending to prejudice the fair trial of the action, see Kitcat v. Sharp, 52 L. J. Ch. 134.

NOTES.

The publication by persons interested of ex parte statements of pending proceedings (Coleman v. W. Hartlepool Ry. Co., 8 W. R. 734; Brook v. Evans, Ib. 688), or of comments, in anticipation of a trial, calculated to prejudice the public mind and obstruct the course of justice (Tichborne v. Mostyn, 7 Eq. 55, n.; Daw v. Eley, Ib. 49; Mackett v. Herne Bay Commrs., Form 1, sup.); or, with or without comment, of the pleadings, evidence, petition, or any ex parte statement in any pending cause or matter, will be restrained and punished as a contempt of Court: Re Cheltenham and Swansea Can. Co., 8 Eq. 580; Felkin v. Herbert, 12 W. R. 241; Kitcat v. Sharp, 31 W. R. 227; 52 L. J. Ch. 134; and an apology must be made and published as the condition of not committing (in the case of a newspaper) the publishers and printers General Exchange Bank v. Horner, W. N. (68) 259; Robson v. Dodds, 17 W. R. 782; and as to contempt of Court generally, v. sup. Chap. XXVII., EXECUTION," p. 404.

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SECTION XII.-PARTNERS.

1. Injunction against acting as Partner.

LET the Deft B., his agents and servants, be restrained by injunction until &c. from entering into any contract or contracts, and from accepting, drawing, indorsing, or negotiating any bills or bill of exchange, notes or note, or written securities or security, in the name of the partnership firm of D. and B.; and from contracting any debts or debt, and buying and selling any goods, and from making or entering into any verbal or written promise, agreement, or undertaking, and

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