this subject during the present session, a committee was appointed to report upon the whole matter. Meanwhile, however, there was a proposal, emanating from some unknown quarter, to make the consert of the committing magistrates a condition precedent to the employment of their clerks in conducting prosecutions. Thereupon the council passed a resolution that they saw no objection to that proposal, and communicated their opinion to the ATTORNEY-GENERAL. We cannot help regarding this as an inconsequent proceeding. Either it is desirable, or undesirable, on broad general grounds of public policy, that clerks to justices should be allowed to have a professional interest in cases in which they advise the committing magistrates. If it be undesirable, then the objection would not be removed by the clerk obtaining from the justice his sanction to his acting as solicitor for the prosecution. The justice cannot be the best judge of what is fitting in such circumstances. He is necessarily in the habit of acting upon the legal advice of the clerk, and if the clerk suggests to the magistrate that he would like to take charge of the prosecution in which he has just advised a committal, the magistrate would find it extremely difficult and invidious to withhold a consent from that course. In truth, this proposal for meeting the objection to the existing system in counties is in the nature of a feeble, not to say mischievous, compromise. The fact is, that the council of the chief Law Society have circularised the provincial law societies and have ascertained that there are differences of opinion as to the remedy which it would be expedient to apply to the grievance complained of—a divergence of views appears to have been considered a sufficient justification for shelving the whole business. This, we think, is a mistake. It was to be expected that the chief Law Society would have a voice, and know how to express it, on a subject of so much interest and importance, and it is to be hoped that, before the time comes (probably not until next session) for dealing with the matter in Parliament, the council will have arrived at a firm opinion, and that steps will be taken to give it logical effect.

THERE certainly should be written over the offices of any married woman engaged in trade the words Caveat emptor, or, at least, a general caution. To the extent of her separate property she is liable to the bankruptcy laws, provided that she carries on trade separately from her husband (Married Women's Property Act 1882, s. 1 (5), and to the same extent she can make contracts which will bind all after-acquired separate property, provided that she has some at the time at which she enters into the conbract. In Eddowes v. Argentine Loan and Mercantile Agency Company (noted ante, p. 156) a company contracted with a business firm to indemnify them against a particular claimant. The company were to be allowed to use the firm's name, and the firm were to give all the assistance they could. An action had been commenced by that claimant against the firm when the indemnity was given. Judgment was given against the firm, and it appeared that the surviving partner was a married woman living in South America without any property in this country. No execution had been issued under the judgment, but the married woman brought this action against the company claiming an indemnity. If the married woman had been in any impending danger in consequence of the judgment, presumably her action would have been justified, for "in equity a contract to indemnify can be specifically enforced before there has been any such breach of the contract as would sustain an action at law. In equity the plaintiff need not pay, and perhaps ruin himself before seeking relief. He is entitled to be relieved from liability: (per Lindley, L.J. in Johnston and others v. The Salvage Associa tion and McKiver (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 218; 19 Q. B. Div. 458). The Court of Appeal decided that, though from her trading it must be presumed that she had separate estate, unless the contrary were shown, still, as she had no property in this country, and no steps had been taken in South America to enforce the judgment, she was not damnified by that judgment, and could not claim any relief from the company under their indemnity.

RETAINERS TO COUNSEL.

IN the LAW TIMES of last week there appeared certain "Rules of Practice relating to the Retainers of Counsel" which are in some respects open to exception. We need not do more than make a passing observation on the fact that these rules of practice are published by the Incorporated Law Society, nor anticipate the difficulty which the society, or rather their branch of the Profession, will encounter in securing the general adoption of these rules despite the approval which the AttorneyGeneral has given to them. It is rather in the interest of the suitor than of the Legal Profession that the suggested rules should be criticised.

General Retainers.

Rule I. lays down: "A general retainer applies, unless otherwise expressed, to all courts or tribunals, including the House of Lords and the Privy Council; but a separate general retainer must be given to cover business before parliamentary committees of either House." This at ance attacks the privilege of the suitor by providing that a retainer to

counsel shall apply to "all courts or tribunals including the House of Lords." This is a hardship on the suitor and a departure from the wholesome practice which has hitherto reserved to the litigant the right to drop all or any of the retained counsel when his case reaches an appellate court (other than a divisional court). It was in the days before the Judicature Acts-and we are not aware of any alteration in later years -the privilege of the suitor to brief counsel other than those retained for the trial, on the argument of a special case, in the court of error, or on final appeal. It may, moreover, be a doubtful benefit to the suitor to be tied to counsel if the litigant is fighting in a "tribunal "other than the ordinary courts. It is not long since that an eminent counsel was only relieved from the painful necessity of speaking against his political con. victions by the fact that a general retainer did not hold him before a "tribunal" which was not an ordinary court of law. The old, or rather the recognised rule is, that a retainer is only binding in the courts in which the counsel retained ordinarily practises, and we are inclined to think that this is the safe and equitable rule.

Rule V. is in these terms: "Where a general retainer has been given, and a brief is not delivered to the retained counsel in any action or other proceeding in which the party giving the general retainer is concerned, and to which it applies, the general retainer is forfeited; provided that the holding of a general retainer does not entitle a Queen's Counsel to the delivery of a brief on occasions when it is usual to instruct a junior counsel only." The latter part of this rule is vague. We would ask when it is "usual to instruct a junior counsel only ?" The answer manifestly is, "At judges' chambers."

Special Retainers.

Rule IX. under this heading is as follows: "The retained counsel is entitled to a brief on every occasion in which the case is brought before the court, except on occasions in which it it usual to instruct one junior counsel only." Why should these rules assume that junior counsel are never retained? Are retainers the privilege of Queen's Counsel alone?

Circuit Retainers.

Rules X. to XIII. are devoted to circuit business, and are noticeable only because they bind counsel to every assize town on the circuit. This may be to the suitor's advantage if the counsel be willing to travel, say, from York to Newcastle in pursuit of a case in which he is retained for York, but which has been adjourned to Newcastle.

Appeals.

Rule XIV. is concerned with appeals, and runs as follows: "Counsel in the original action cannot accept a retainer or brief on appeal from the opposite party without affording the client in such original action the opportunity of giving such retainer." The rule seems unnecessary if Rule I. stands. It has always been the privilege of the litigant to seek fresh counsel if he pleases on appeal.

Opinions and Pleadings.

Rule XV. provides: "Where counsel has advised or drawn pleadings in contemplation or during the progress of an action or suit, a retainer cannot be accepted from, or pleadings drawn for, or advice given to, the opponent, without notice to the first client." We fear that the effect of this will be that counsel will demand retainers immediately they are instructed. Moreover, it is distinctly a disadvantage to a litigant to be tied to a counsel who may be a very good adviser in chambers, but an indifferent advocate in court. We would further point out that, if this rule stands, counsel will be tied while the suitor will be free. The rule would make instructions to advise or draw pleadings in an action a retainer binding on counsel, but not binding on the client. There should be reciprocity in these matters.

Promotion of Counsel.

Rule XVI. is: "The retainer of a counsel does not cease upon his being promoted to a higher rank at the bar." This is not an improvement in the existing rule, which gives, as we understand it, a discretion to the client to hold or to abandon his retainer on his counsel taking rank. A client is entitled to say that Mr. A. is the man whom he likes to employ as a junior, but that he thinks Mr. A. as a "silk" will not suit his purpose So well as Mr. B.

the sessions.

We have pointed out some objections to these retainer rules in detail. Our objection to them in principle is, that they are conceived more in the interests of the branch of the Profession from which they emanate than in the interests of the suitor or of the Bar.

Let us give the suitor as free a hand as may be, but let us not be unreasonably hard in fettering counsel who are much in request. It is conceivable that the ultimate client may not unreasonably be disappointed with the way in which his case is conducted in court. He is free to change his solicitor at any moment. Why should he not be free to change his counsel also?

It seems that the Council of the Incorporated Law Society have submitted these rules to the Attorney-General, and that they have obtained his approval of them. The rules were adopted by the Council on June 13 last, and were approved by the Attorney-General on June 17. Now the Attorney-General cannot bind the whole body of the Bar in this matter. Let us quote a few lines from an

opinion which

was given upon a question of this character by a high authority: "The Attorney-General has no power whatever to bind the Bar or to lay down any principle for its future guidance in the matter of retainers or anything else. He is simply the head of the Bar to declare what its usages are, and not what they ought to be, and in doubtful or unprovided-for cases it is his duty to call the Profession together, and take and be governed by their opinion, even if that should be entirely opposed to his own." We submit that this is a correct statement of the functions of an Attorney-General in this province. His opinion is taken upon a case of difficulty or a point of first impression, and he declares what the custom, the unwritten law, of the Bar is. But further than this he cannot go. He cannot bind the other members of the Bar by any general rules which he lays down or approves. Provided always that a barrister does not offend against the rules of the Bar as interpreted by his Inn of Court, and provided that he treats all applicants for his services impartially, he is free to lay down such terms as he pleases with regard to retainers.

We regret the appearance of these retainer rules. The law of retainers has hitherto remained unwritten, save only in the opinions given by one Attorney-General after another upon the points submitted to them. This unwritten law has been established by long practice, and it is, we urge, very unsafe to dis-establish it by any code of rules, such as that which we have criticised.

REFUSAL OF DISCOVERY.-I.

THE "quality of mercy" is displayed by our courts in regard to persons who have by their behaviour subjected themselves to penal actions, and the person attempting to enforce the penalty cannot be permitted to avail himself of the "discovery" which is usually at the service of litigants. By stat. 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 3, any person wilfully and knowingly assisting any tenant or lessee in fraudulently conveying away or carrying off any part of his goods or chattels, or in concealing the same, shall forfeit and pay to the landlord or lessor from whose estate they were carried off double the value of the goods. In J. W. Hobbs and Co. v. Hudson (noted ante, p. 156) an action was brought against a warehouseman for double the value of goods which he had assisted a lessee to carry off to prevent their being distrained for arrears of rent. The Court of Appeal refused the plaintiff leave to administer interrogatories, on the ground that the action was a penal one. In doing so, their Lord. ships expressed approval of Jones v. Jones (60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 421; 22 Q. B. Div. 425). That was an action under the stat. 2 Will. & M. c. 5, sect. 4, which gives treble damages to the person "grieved" by any pound-breach or rescue of goods or chattels distrained for rent, to be recovered from the offender or the owner of the goods distrained if they "be afterwards found to have come to his use or possession." A divisional court (consisting of Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Hawkins) refused to allow the plaintiff discovery of the defendant's documents. The Lord Chief Justice, after stating that "the cases in equity appear to show that it was a fixed principle to refuse a bill of discovery in aid of a penal action unless the plaintiff waived the penalty or forfeiture," said that the rules of equity as regards discovery had even long before the Judicature Acts prevailed in the courts of common law. A common informer may be regarded in two lights by the law: that is, either as a public benefactor putting in force what the Legislature has decreed as right; or as one seeking, like the Roman "relatores," to gain something from the misdeeds of his fellow

men.

It seems to be more in the second light that the courts regard him when he seeks to obtain discovery. Martin v. Treacher (54 L. T. Rep. N. S. 7; 16 Q. B. Div. 507) is an authority on this point. Under the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. o. 55), sched. 2, cl 70, a penalty of £50 attaches to a person acting as a member of a local board when he has not complied with the provisions of the Act, "which may be recovered by any person, with full costs of suit." The plaintiff, having brought an action to recover penalties from a man who had acted as a member of a local board without being duly qualified, applied for leave to administer interrogatories. The case went to the Court of Appeal, who held that leave should not be given. The Master of the Rolls said: "The object of the action is to recover a penalty, and it would be monstrous tyranny to enable a common informer to bring such an action, and allow bim, while admitting that he had no evidence to support his case, to ask the defendant to supply him with the evidence he required. Such a course of proceeding would be most unjust and oppressive." Lord Justice Lindley, in delivering his judgment, drew a distinction between those cases where the court should refuse leave to administer interrogatories, and those where objection should be taken in the answer that the interrogatory sought to make the person to whom it was administered incriminate himself, in the following words: "Where a penalty is imposed by statute, and an action is brought to recover such penalty, the court may and ought to refuse leave to administer interrogatories; but where the action is brought for some other object than to recover a penalty, but the answers to interrogatories would tend to make the defendants liable to a penalty, the court may disallow the interrogatories in the exercise of its discretion, or may allow them and leave the defendant to object to answer." In former days, where courts of equity were called on to assist a plaintiff in a common law action by granting him the right of discovery against the defendant, they would not do so in the exercise of their auxiliary jurisdiction, if the defendant pleaded purchase for value without notice. If, however, the courts of equity were called upon to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the common law courts, that defence was no bar to discovery. It was owing to the division of jurisdiction that the plea was allowed to be set up, and now that that division has been abolished, purchasers for value withont notice cannot successfully object to production of documents on the ground of their want of notice: (Ind, Coope, and Co. v. Emmerson, 56 L. T. Rep. N. S. 778; 12 App. Cas. 300.) With regard to deeds and

documents of title, the defendant is still privileged against production of them, if he swears that they relate solely to his own title and do not in any way assist the plaintiff's title: (see Ib. per Lord Selborne.)

BUSINESS IN THE LAND REGISTRY.

AN official memorandum on the subject of the Land Registry states that

"Under the Land Transfer Rules 1889,' which came into operation on the 1st Feb. in that year, many additional facilities were given both for the first registration of titles and for the registration of subsequent transactions. An outline of the present practice on both these heads will be found in the accompanying 'general instructions.'

"A map department, in connection with the Ordnance Survey Office, has been recently established at the Registry, and has been found to work efficiently and economically.

"Since these changes were made the number of applications to register has increased fourfold, which encourages the belief that when the advan-tages of the system are more widely known the increase will be even more marked.

"Simultaneously with the above changes, the office has been placed on a self-supporting footing with regard to fees, and (as appears in the accompanying return, part 5), in place of an annual deficit, which four years ago amounted to over £4400, there was, last year, a surplus slightly exceeding £450."

MR. E. H. MONNIER, a student of the Middle Temple, sends us the following excellent commentary on two recent cases which have attracted much attention :

(1) HARRIS-GASTRELL v. HARRIS-GASTRell.

This case will be found to be of special interest to students of private international law. It raised several points of very great importance in connection with the recognition of a foreign divorce in England-issues which involve considerable difficulty, and the solution of which would have tended towards placing the international law of divorce in a satis factory state.

The first question in the case was the plaintiff's domicile at the period of the German divorce. The plaintiff had an English domicile of origin, but it was alleged that prior to the foreign divorce he had acquired a domicile at Wiesbaden. It would appear that the jury answered the question in the negative. The propriety of this finding cannot be discussed here; but it might be said that there are some circumstances: pointing the other way. The plaintiff went to Germany with the express purpose of acquiring a domicile of choice. This the wife admitted, though she alleged fraudulent motives; and, further, the foreign court acted upon the basis of a change of domicile-a fact which alone by the law of Germany would found jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage in their courts: (Scott v. Attorney-General, 1886, 11 P. Div. 128; vide also Ex parte Langworthy, 1887, 3 Times L. Rep. 341.)

The second point, and a very important one, is the consideration of the question whether a foreign Christian court can dissolve an English marriage of English subjects where the parties had their matrimonial domicile in England, and were married in England, but where the husband had gained a voluntary domicile in the country, a court of which has granted a decree of divorce. This point has never been expressly decided in an English court. In Harvey v. Farnie (1882, 48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 279; 8 App. Cas. 43) the Scotch court dissolved a marriage cele brated in England between a domiciled Scotchman and an Englishwoman in a case where the matrimonial domicile in Scotland continued to the date of the divorce. Nor was the above the exact question settled in Scots v. Attorney-General. There two Irish people, having their matrimonial domicile in Ireland, went to Cape Colony and acquired an African domicile, which the husband preserved at the time of the Cape Colony divorce. There have certainly been a large number of cases in which the marriage of two English persons was dissolved by a foreign court (the most recent being Briggs v. Briggs, 1880, 5 P. Div. 163; D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen, 1888, 13 P. Div. 132), but in every one of them the husband was, at the time of the divorce proceedings, domiciled in England, and hence the foreign sentences were not recognised here. The present case of Gastrell v. Gastrell must now, after the finding of the jury that the parties were of English domicile at the date of the suit before the court at Nassau, be classed with the above-mentioned decisions, but it is extremely satisfactory to note that the learned judge has laid down the law which would have governed even if the parties had a bona fide domicile at Wiesbaden. The question of jurisdiction in the German court to entertain the plaintiff's petition depended on the question of the plaintiff's domicile at the time when he instituted the proceedings and obtained the divorce. It might be assumed for the purposes of this case that it was not the law that a contract of marriage could only be dissolved according to the law of the country in which the contract was made. It might be dissolved according to the law of the country in which the parties were domiciled at the time when the proceedings were instituted." This statement of the law as to the validity of a foreign divorce of English subjects having acquired a foreign domicile at the date of the suit, is in perfect unison with the current of dicta of eminent judges: (Wilson v. Wilson, 1872, 14 L. T. Rep. N. S, 674; L. Rep. 2 P. & D. 435; Niboyet v. Niboyet, 1878, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 486; 4 P. Div. 1, per Brett, L.J.; Briggs v. Briggs; Harvey v. Farnie; Scott v. Attorney-General; D'Etchegoyen v D'Etchegoyen.) It may therefore be now regarded as beyond doubt that the domicile is the true test of the validity of a foreign divorce of English parties, and that the jurisdiction of that court to decree a dissolution of the marriage cannot be questioned in an English court if the husband has acquired in the foreign country a bona fide domicile of choice, notwithstanding that the marriage has taken place in England. It is true that in Briggs v. Briggs, 1880, and in Harvey v. Farnie, 1880, a doctrine has been suggested that a foreign decree will sometimes be valid here, though the parties are domiciled in England, if the sentence be for a cause which would be sufficient to dissolve a marriage in England. But, with due respect to the learned judge who decided these two cases in the

Divisional Court, it is submitted that this theory is not only not supported by any authority, but is even contrary to the general tenor of English decisions. It will also be noticed in Gastrell v. Gastrell that the learned judge considered the fact of the marriage being celebrated in England as immaterial in arriving at the conclusion whether or not the court at Nassau had jurisdiction. This is correct law: (Niboyet v. Niboyet, per Brett, L.J.; Harvey v. Farnie; Scott_ v. Attorney-General; D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen; Turner v. Thompson, 1888; 13 P. Div. 37.) During the argument the Solicitor-General seems to have depended partly on the fact that the wife had never been brought within the jurisdiction of the court at Nassau. But this circumstance is immaterial as a general rule; for, by construction of law, the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, and it is not necessary to bring her personally within the foreign jurisdiction (Wilson) v. Wilson; Niboyet v. Niboyet; Briggs v. Briggs, 1880); the husband's domicile being sufficient to give the foreign court jurisdiction over the suit.

The general rule then being that the jurisdiction of a foreign court to dissolve a marriage depends on the domicile of the husband at the date of the proceedings, it may next be questioned whether a fraudulent change of domicile to obtain a divorce on grounds unknown to English law will vitiate a foreign divorce otherwise valid. In the present case fraud was strongly alleged by the wife, but the verdict of the jury prevented a settlement of this point. No case has ever been decided in an English court in which a change of domicile for the purpose of facilitating a divorce alone, without other circumstances, has been held to deprive a foreign_judgment or decree unimpeachable in other respects of its effects here. In Lolly's case (1812, R. & Ry. 237) there was a fraudulent resort to Scotland; but the parties were domiciled in England, and hence the Scotch divorce was of no avail: (Harvey v. Farnie.) But it has been laid down by high authorities that such a change of domicile will annul the effect of a foreign decree (Shaw v. Gould, 1868, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 833; L. Rep. 3 H. of L. 55; Dolphin v. Robins, 1859, 7 H. of L. Cas.; Briggs v. Briggs, 1880; Harvey v. Farnie, 1880); and perhaps it may now be held that fraud or collusion in effecting an acquisition of a new domicile will be fatal to the recognition of a foreign sentence of divorce, though the parties be actually domiciled in that foreign country, and its courts have proper jurisdiction. In Gastrell v. Gastrell there was attempted a fraudulent acquisition of domicile at Wiesbaden, which by itself may have rendered the German decree null, even if the jury had come to the conclusion that the husband had established a de facto domicile in Germany.

The ground of dissolution of the marriage was malicious desertion-a circumstance which would not be sufficient in England to annul marriage. This is a point of law which has not received much development in England, and notwithstanding isolated opinions to the contrary, there seems to be no reason why our courts should refuse to recognise a foreign divorce if the parties are there domiciled merely because it is based on a course not known here. The admirable argument of the Lords Justices in Harvey v. Farnie tending to show that the grounds of a divorce are incidents of status to be determined by the law of the domicile, and not by the lex loci celebrationis, establish the proposition that the circumstances on which a divorce is granted must be regulated by the domiciliary law; and this also appears to be the view of Mr. Justice Mathew, who is reported to have said: "The grounds of the dissolution of the contract was not a ground on which its dissolution could have been obtained in England; but, if the plaintiff had changed his domicile to Wiesbaden at the time when he instituted the proceedings, he would be entitled to institute those proceedings, and the court would have jurisdiction." The last point to be considered in connection with the case is the alleged suppression of certain facts and documents when it was before the court at Nassau. Is this circumstance by itself sufficient to prevent the recognition of the foreign divorce in England if the parties are bona fide domiciled in the foreign country? The subject has been raised but never definitely settled. When Ingham v. Sachs (1886) was before the Court of Appeal, their Lordships inquired as to what evidence of domicile was laid before the Berlin court; and in Gastrell v. Gastrell the learned judge asked the jury whether the facts were fully disclosed to the court at Nassau, so as to enable it to come to a right decision. The answer seems to have been in the affirmative, and thus an express opinion on this interesting question became unnecessary. But the consideration of it in Ingham v. Sachs and by the Court of Appeal, and also in the present case, may perhaps be some argument in favour of regarding it as an element in connection with the recognition of a foreign sentence otherwise valid. If the suppression was fraudulent and with a purpose to deceive the court abroad by reserving from it important facts as to domicile, and in other circumstances, it may be that the English court would ignore the foreign divorce, either on the analogy of foreign judgments in personam (Ochsenbein v. Papelier, 1873, 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 459; L. Rep. 8 Ch. 695; Abouloff v. Oppenheimer, 1882, 47 L. T. Rep. N. S. 702; 10 Q. B. Div. 295; Manger v. Rodrigues, 1889, 5 Times L. Rep. 271), or on the ground of inconsistency with natural justice. But with respect to the last phrase it must be admitted that it is extremely vague, and when mentioned in connection with foreign divorces merely implies an absence of proper notice: (Shaw v. Attorney-General, 1870; Briggs v. Briggs, 1880.) If, however, there is no fraudulent suppression of material circumstances before the foreign court having jurisdiction there is no reason whatever to repudiate the foreign decree which is based on the insufficient facts (Bank of Australasia v. Nias, 1851; 20 L. J. 284, Q. B.; De Cosse; Brissac v. Rathbone, 1861, 30 L. J. 238, Ex.; Re Trufort, 1887, 30 Ch. Div. 600), for the English courts do not sit to hear appeals from foreign tribunals, and if the judgment of the latter proceeds on the incomplete evidence, there is a means of testing it in a Superior Court of the same country: (De Cosse; Brissac v. Rathbone, 1861; Re Trufort, 1887; Messina v. Petrococchino, 1872, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 561; L. Rep. 4 P. C. 144.) Perhaps the best course with respect to this point is to regard it as still an open question to be determined upon future consideration.

(2.) WIEDMANN v. WALPOLE.

This case involves the question as to the validity of a promise of marriage made abroad between parties of different domiciles. Unfortunately the jury disagreed as to whether or not the promise the breach of which formed the subject of this action had been given by the defendant, and an investigation as to the international law on the point must proceed on an assumption of the fact of a promise having been made.

This point never seems to have arisen directly in any English case before, and it is to be regretted, in the interest of private international law, that the question was not fully and finally settled in the present case. A., having a domicile of origin in England, which remained continously both

at the time of the promise given abroad and at the date of the suit, offered marriage to B. (a domiciled German) in Turkey, and again in France. B., alleging breach of promise, sued A. in an English court. By what law must the case be governed? Although no express decision exists on such a point, the solution of the question is perhaps not difficult if we apply the general principles of the law of contract to this particular species, and there is no reason whatever why the same rules which hold in the case of other contracts should not avail in the case of a promise of marriage. The general rule regulating the essential validity of a contract is beyond doubt. The law which the parties intended, as gathered from all the cir cumstances of the case, is the law which governs the substance of their agreement (Robinson v. Bland, 1760, 1 W. Bl. 258; P. and O. Company v. Sand, 1865, 12 L. T. Rep. 808; 3 Mo. P. C. N. S. 291; Lloyd v. Guibert, 1865, 10 L. T. Rep. 570; L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 115; The Gaetano and Maria, 1882, 46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 835; 7 P. Div. 137; Chartered Bank of India v. N. I. S. N. Company, 1883, 48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 546; 10 Q. B. Div. 521; Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 1884, 49 L. T. Rep. N. S. 39; 12 Q. B. Div. 589; Ex parte Dever, 1887, 18 Q. B. Div. 660; The Missouri Steamship Company, 1889, 5 T. L. Rep. 438, et alia.) The lex loci contractus governs the contract only when the parties have either expressed their intention with reference to it, or when the surrounding circumstances of the case point to it as the intended contractual law, and where the court in the absence of reliable and sufficient indication of intent presumes that it was in the contemplation of the contracting parties: (P. & O. Company v. Shand, 1865; Lloyd v. Guibert, 1865; Chartered Bank of India v. N. I. S. N. Co. 1883; Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 1884.) The lex loci consequently does not apply when the facts disclose that the contractors intended to adopt another law (De Cleremont v. Brasch, 1885; Times L. Rep. 370; Re Missouri Steamship Company 1889.) The lex loci solutionis determines the validity of the contract also only when the parties intend it expressly or im pliedly (Lee v. Abdy, 1886; 17 Q. B. Div. 309; Cooper v. Cooper, 1888; 13 App. Cas. 88, per Lords Halsbury and Watson.) These well-known principles have been applied to the various species of contracts which have come before the courts: e.g., Bottomry bond (Lloyd v. Guibert, 1865; The Gaetano and Maria, 1882); General average (Harris v. Scaramanga, 1872, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 797; L. Rep. 7 C. P. 481); Bill of lading (Chartered Bank of India v. N. I. S. N. Company, 1883); Affreightment (Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 1884); Carriage (P. and O. Company v. Sand). Where the law of the flag stands in the place of the lex loci: Service (De Cleremont v. Brasch, 1885); Charter-party (Re Missouri Steamship Company, 1889); Marriage contract (Chamberlain v. Napier, 1880; 15 Ch. Div. 614; Re Hermoindo, 1884; 27 Ch. Div. 284; Barnard v. White, 1887; 56 L. T. Rep. N. S. 9; Ex parte Dever, 1887). To these general rules are recognised several exceptions, the nature of which class it is not necessary to examine here, as the case of Wiedmann v. Walpole does not fall within any of them.

:

The decision of this case then, it may be submitted, would depend on the application of the law intended by the parties to regulate their contract, and the facts that A. was domiciled in England at the time, and that it would be their matrimonial home, and further that under the lex loci no cause of action would arise (vide Re Missouri Steamship Company, 1889, C.A.), are of the utmost significance in determining the intention.

Whether or not the case will ever be retried, I am not in a position to state; but, if the question comes before the courts again, students and practitioners interested in the subject of Private International Law will no doubt watch the case with a considerable amount of attention.

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

Lord Morris has been elected a Bencher of Lincoln's-inn. The Lord Chancelior mentioned in the House of Lords this week, a fact not generally known, that he himself is not exempt from going circuit. Lord Herschell will, it is expected, take charge of the Directors' Liability Bill in the House of Lords.

The new Rules issued by the Incorporated Law Society relating to retainers of counsel have received the approval of the Attorney-General. The death has been announced at Brisbane of Mr. C. S. Mein, puisne judge of the Supreme Court.

The Bankruptcy Bill finally passed the Standing Committee on Trade on Monday last and was ordered to be reported to the House.

Mr. Justice and Lady Denman were present at a reception held by the Lady Mayoress, at the Mansion House on Tuesday last.

Sir James Hannen has been appointed by the University of Oxford a Governor of St. Paul's School.

Sir Frederick Pollock is about to bring out a volume of essays, some of which have already appeared in various reviews and magazines.

The new offices for the Mayor's Court are now complete. They are directly opposite the City of London Court.

Mr. Francis Goodschall Johnson, Chief Justice of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec, has received the honour of knighthood. Lord Coleridge did not sit on Friday, Saturday, or Monday last. The Balliol dinner was on Saturday.

The memorial stone of the new Courts of Justice to be erected in Clifford-street, York, will be laid by the Duke of Clarence.

The Attorney-General has been elected a Director of the Law Life Assurance Society, in the room of Mr. J. J. Johnson, Q.C., resigned.

The Supreme Court of Judicature (Procedure) Bill passed through the Committee of the House of Commons on the 27th ult., and was read a third time on Wednesday last.

At Windsor on the 30th ult. the Queen conferred the honour of Knighthood on Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, Mr. Justice Lawrance, and His Honour Judge Horatio Lloyd.

It is reported that negotiations between the City Lands Committee and the Home Office, with respect to the rebuilding of the Central Criminal Court and the gaol at Newgate, are approaching completion.

The opponents of the Directors' Liability Bill, undeterred by their decisive defeat in the House of Commons, intend, it is said, to use every effort to get the Bill thrown out in the House of Lords.

Mr. Arthur Newton, solicitor, who was imprisoned on a charge of attempting to defeat the course of justice in connection with the Cleveland-street scandals, was released from prison on Monday last.

A Bill has been introduced into the House of Commons to give a wife a divorce for the adultery or desertion for four years, and a husband a divorce for desertion for four years.

On Thursday last week, at a Congregation of the University of Oxford, Mr. Frederick W. Ensor, solicitor, of Cardiff, was admitted to the degrees of B.C.L. and M.A.

An article appears in the current number of Cassell's Family Magazine from the pen of Mr. E. Goaby, entitled "The Lord Chancellor's Work." Among other sketches good portraits appear of Lord Halsbury and Lord Herschell.

The Attorney-General was among the company at the seventeenth annual conversazione of the Royal Colonial Institute on the 24th ult. He was also present with Miss Webster at the State concert at Buckingham Palace on the following evening.

Mr. Serjeant Madden has, it is said, informed the Government that he wishes, to keep his seat on the Treasury Bench, certainly for the remainder of the session, and probably will continue in his present official position till the Land Purchase Bill has passed next session.

Lord Shand, who has been a judge of the Scotch Court of Session for nearly eighteen years, will resign his office at the close of the summer session on the 19th inst. He was called to the bar in 1853 and appointed a judge in 1872.

The Master and Fellows of Balliol College, Oxford, entertained at dinner in their hall last Saturday, those members of the Legal Profession who are Balliol men. Among those present were the Lord Chief Justice, Lords Justices Bowen and Lopes, Mr. Justice Chitty, and Mr. Justice Kekewich.

The order of business in the Queen's Bench and Divisional Courts during the circuits will be as follows:-On and after Monday next a Divisional Court will sit on Mondays to take ex parte and opposed motions on the Civil side, and on Thursdays to take ex parte motions on the Crown side and Crown Paper.

On Tuesday last Mr. George R. Gallaher, member of the Institute of Bankers, delivered an address on the "Scarcity of Commercial Literature, with some notes upon the Law and Custom relating to Documents of Title to Goods," in the council room of the London Chamber of Commerce, Sir Albert K. Rollit, LL.D., M.P. (chairman of the council), presiding.

At the Somerset Quarter Sessions, at Taunton, on Wednesday, the Earl of Cork, Lord-Lieutenant of the county, presented to Sir Richard Paget, M.P., Chairman of Quarter Sessions, a portrait of himself, painted by Mr. Herkomer, R.A., in recognition of the services he has rendered to the county during the past nineteen years.

The Attorney-General and Sir William Harcourt do not appear to be on very satisfactory terms. Some correspondence has been published with reference to an incident in the House of Commons, in which Sir William writes: "Dear Attorney-General;" the Attorney-General replies: 'Sir," and signs himself "Your obedient servant." Sir Richard Webster has probably neither forgotten nor forgiven Sir William Harcourt's violent personal attack in connection with the Parnell Commission.

Mr. David Dudley Field has, at the age of eighty-four, once more crossed the Atlantic to represent the judicature and jurists of the United States at the forthcoming Conference of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, which takes place at Liverpool on the 26th Aug. He also proposes to attend the Universal Peace Congress, which meets in London on the 15th inst., and the meeting of the Institute of International Law, if they hold one.

We understand that it is the opinion of the majority of managing common law clerks and junior counsel in the habit of practising at judges' chambers that it would be much more convenient to take masters counsel's summonses at 1.30 instead of one o'clock, as at present. At 1.30 counsel are usually free, as the courts have risen for lunch. At present it often happens that the parties attend punctually at one to find a pencil note on the lists that counsel will be taken at 1.30.

Mr. Beaumont Shepheard, solicitor, of the firm of Shepheards, 31 and 32, Finsbury Circus, E.C., and Shepheards and Bird, of 1, King-street, Kensington, W., has been appointed Senior Under Sheriff for the City of London for the years 1890-91, by Mr. William Farmer, Senior Sheriff elect. Mr. B. Shepheard served the office of Under Sheriff in the year 1882-3, to Mr. Alderman Savory, who was then Sheriff, and is now next in rotation for Lord Mayor.

An order in the Gazette of Tuesday last fixes the number of Revising Barristers to be appointed. The schedule is as follows:-For the county of Middlesex, and for the city of London and boroughs of such portion of the county of London as is situate north of the Thames, 7; for the counties, cities, boroughs, and places-Within the Northern Circuit, 11; within the North-Eastern Circuit, 13; within the Midland Circuit, 13; within the South-Eastern Circuit, including the county of Surrey, and such portion of the county of London as is situate south of the Thames, 18; within the Oxford Circuit, 11; within the Western Circuit, 13; within the North Wales Division of the North and South Wales Circuit, 6; within the South Wales Division of the North and South Wales Circuit, 5: total 97.

The practice of appending to a review the name of the writer tends, no doubt, by increasing the sense of personal responsibility, to secure accuracy and impartiality. On the other hand, if the name of the writer is disclosed, it is of the utmost importance that he should be a person to whom no suspicion of prejudice can possibly attach. We should hardly think, for instance, that the author of a recent work on a special subject would be the best reviewer which could be chosen for a subsequent book on the same subject which might possibly interfere with the success of his own. We do not suppose that this would be disputed by the Law Quarterly Review, and it must be by some unaccountable oversight that in the last number of that journal the review of a recent work on the subject of Charities is signed with the name of a gentleman well known as the author of a book on the same subject published a few months previously.

In the course of a case heard before Baron Huddleston last week a witness mentioned that he had applied for an off-licence for a publichouse by counsel. The judge asked who it was and also who the attorney was. The witness said he had only one attorney, mentioning the counsel. Baron Huddleston said: "So the counsel was the attorney, and he is a member of Parliament." We understand it to be the practice at some sessions for barristers to take instructions for licensing applications from the client direct without any solicitor being instructed, and that the counsel in question was doing nothing which the sessions there would have condemned; but Baron Huddleston was very much surprised, for this sort of thing was quite unknown when he was at the bar, and we think it is a pity that the practice has been allowed to spring up in any sessions.

Lord Coleridge, sitting with Mr. Justice Wills in the Divisional Court last week, refused an application to restore a case to the list which had been heard and decided the previous day, in the absence of counsel on one side, the excuse being that the solicitor thought that the case would not come on so soon. His Lordship said that the court had been working hard to reduce the arrears of cases on the paper, and all the cases remaining to be heard were now on the paper for to-day. While there were any arrears the complaint was of delay; and now the arrears were gone the solicitors complained because their cases came on earlier than expected! There was no reason given why the solicitor should not have known that the case was to come on; and the case was not one for any indulgence, as the point raised was purely technical. It was a case of a bill of sale given for money borrowed, and which by the deed, which was executed in March, was to be paid on a day "in July"; and the objection taken to it was that this might mean July in the year 2000! That was the point to be argued, and which the court, after looking at the deed and hearing the case argued by counsel in support of it, overruled. That was not a case which, without any reasonable excuse for default in the appearance of the other party, ought to be reinstated in the list to be reargued. It is highly satisfactory to learn that the Divisional Court is abreast of its work. It would be still more satisfactory to know that the same happy result had been achieved at Nisi Prius.

A curious instance of the conflict of the judicial mind with that of the advocate concerning the conduct of a solicitor appears to have taken place in the case of Williamson v. Savill, heard for several days before Baron Huddleston and a special jury. Counsel for the plaintiff severely reflected upon the solicitor for the defendant for not sending the plaintiff a copy of a mortgage deed, and it was suggested that he had not read over the mortgage deed to the plaintiff, or explained it to him. The plaintiff alleged that he knew nothing about what he was signing, and that he supposed he was executing an ordinary brewer's mortgage. The action was brought to recover a sum of money paid for a breach of a covenant in the mortgage deed, the defendants being the mortgagees. The strongest possible language was used about the solicitor-he was not an honourable member of an honourable profession, he had done what was unusual, he had enticed the fly into the web of the spider, and he had committed perjury in the witness-box. All this was vehemently enforced in order to induce the jury to convict the defendant and the solicitor of a very gross fraud. When the learned judge came to sum up we read that he expressed himself shocked by the attack made upon the solicitor, who, his Lordship declared, had acted honourably and properly in the discharge of the duty which he owed to his client; and the charge of perjury and fraud was negatived by the jury, who promptly found a verdict for the defendant.

PARLIAMENTARY SUMMARY.

HOUSE OF LORDS. Thursday, June 26.

THE ANGLESEY ASSIZES AND QUARTER SESSIONS BILL. Lord Kensington moved the second reading of this Bill. He said the object of this Bill, which had passed the House of Commons, was simply to put the authorities in the county of Anglesey in a position to select the most convenient places for holding assizes and quarter sessions.— The Bill was read a second time.

BILLS ADVANCED.

The Court of Chancery of Lancaster Bill, Trustees Appointment Bill, and Foreign Jurisdiction (Consolidation) Bill, passed through committee and were reported to the House.

Monday, June 30.

THE ANGLESEY ASSIZES AND QUARTER SESSIONS BILL. This Bill passed through committee.

THE TRUSTEES APPOINTMENT BILL. This Bill was read a third time and passed.

Tuesday, July 1.

THE SHERIFFS (ASSIZES EXPENSES) BILL,

The Earl of Camperdown, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said that it dealt with one point only, but that was an important matter. It was found that great anomalies existed in regard to the election or nomination of high sheriffs, and the duties which they had to perform. A Select Committee of that House was appointed some two years ago, and the evidence taken pointed in one direction-that something should be done in regard to the expenses to which high sheriffs were put, and the duties which they had to perform, and that they should be relieved of some of them. He hoped that the Government might be able to deal with the whole of the report. This Bill merely proposed that the joint committees, with the justices of the peace in England and Wales and the grand juries in Ireland, should, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, make arrangements as to how the judges should be received at the assizes in the respective counties. The committee recommended that the expenses of javelinmen-who were unnecessary-and other expenses should be discontinued. He contended that the regulations, which would be submitted to the Lord Chancellor, would be satisfactory, and that nothing would be done which would interfere with the proper and dignified reception at the assizes of Her Majesty's judges, and he also contended that when an office of this sort was thrust upon a man Parliament should state what arrangements should be made for the payment of the expenses of it. The measure was a moderate one, and he hoped it would be read a second time.-Lord Coleridge was sorry to be obliged to move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months. In the first place, the Bill should have been brought in in the House of Commons, as it imposed a charge upon the rates in England and Wales, but that objection could probably be got rid of. He submitted that the expenses to be allowed should not be left to the county councils, or to the grand juries in Ireland. But it was said that the regulations were to be submitted to the Lord Chancellor. Some Lord Chancellors, however, never went circuit, and knew nothing of what arrangements were necessary. He had been seventeen years on the bench, and he never had the smallest difficulty with any high sheriff, and so far as he knew the expenses of the office were small. This was a small piece of legislation, which it would be much

better to leave alone.-Lord Esher and Lord Denman rose together, and both remained standing, there being calls for the former noble lord.-The Marquis of Salisbury moved that Lord Esher be heard, and the motion was at once put and agreed to.-Lord Esher, who also objected to the Bill, said the chief point of it was to get rid of the expenses to which sheriffs were put, but to do that the Bill would have to be altered in every line. The regulations to be made would probably differ in every county, and if the Lord Chancellor should not agree with the county council the law as at present would remain in force. He believed that in nine counties out of ten the expenses of sheriffs were not heavy. The office was never imposed upon a man who could not bear the expense of it. At any rate, the Bill would be unworkable, and should be rejected.Viscount Cranbrook did not take the same view of the expenses to which high sheriffs were put as his noble and learned friend behind him. He contended that there was a real grievance to be dealt with, as since agricultural depression set in men had not the same margin of income which they once had. The country called upon men to serve the office and to perform certain duties of it, and it should pay the expenses of the office. He hoped that the House would read the Bill a second time, and let it be dealt with by a committee.-Lord Morris pointed out that, so far as Ireland was concerned, the Bill would be unworkable, as there was no local Government Act in force there, and the Act of 1888 passed for England and Wales was inapplicable; besides, the expenses of the judges in Ireland were paid by the Treasury, and this Bill would throw them upon the baronies. He quite agreed with the Lord President that something ought to be done. In Ireland the average costs of the reception of judges was about £10 an assize. There the chief expense was in the payment to the sub-sheriff, who, for a consideration, indemnified the high sheriff against all costs of actions and suits brought against him.— Lord Belper declared that there was a very strong feeling in the country that the time had now come when a public duty should no longer be placed upon a private individual who, in most cases, was not in a position to spend money on what did not concern him. The Bill did not go far enough, for in his own county less than two-fifths of the sheriff's expenses went in the reception of the judges.-The Earl of Kimberley supported the views of the last speaker, and advocated abolition of the pageantry which now accompanied the judge each day to the court. The kind of remarks made by educated men in the country on this practice was obviously unknown to the opponents of the Bill. It was proper that the sheriff should receive the judge on his arrival in the town, but he ought not to have to dance attendance on him for the whole time of his stay. The Earl of Camperdown, in replying on the discussion, expressed his willingness to accept any amendment as to details.-The Lord Chancellor said that a good many of the objections which had been urged to the Bill were matters for committee. His own experience had convinced him that there was a great subject of grievance on the part of high sheriffs and persons liable to be called upon to fill that office, which demanded their Lordships' consideration-and he hoped his noble and learned friend would not divide the House against the Bill.-Lord Coleridge having withdrawn his amendment, the Bill was read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on general Bills.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON Law.

This Committee met under the presidency of Lord Herschell, and passed the Partnership Bill and the Deeds of Arrangement Bill with some amendments.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. Thursday, June 26.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (PROCEDURE) BILL. After clauses 1 to 4 had been agreed to, Dr. Tanner moved to report progress. Mr. Bryce appealed to the hon. gentleman not to press the motion.-Dr. Tanner persisting, Mr. Sexton made a personal appeal to the hon. member, and pointed out that this Bill was a non-contentious one, and had the support of hon. members on all sides of the House.-Dr. Tanner then withdrew his motion. and the remaining clause of the Bill having been agreed to, the Bill passed through committee and the House resumed.

Friday, June 27.

MR. MONTAGU WILLIAMS.

Mr. MacNeill asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his attention had been directed to the following observation, reported in the Dublin Daily Express of the 25th inst., to have been made by Mr. Montagu Williams at the Thames Police-court the previous day, and characterised in that journal as a piece of silly impertinence: i expect there are a good many strangers from Ireland in this country; for my part I wish they could all be sent back;" and would he call the attention of the Lord Chancellor to the language alleged to have been used by Mr. Williams.-Mr. Matthews: I am informed by the learned magistrate that he made use of no such language as is imputed to him by the Dublin Daily Express. A man applied to the magistrate for money to pay his journey to his own country, stating that he was an Irishman. The magistrate replied to the effect that he had no funds for such a purpose; that a large fund would be necessary if all foreigners in London were to be sent home; but that an Irishman was not a foreigner, and was in his own country here.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (PROCEDURE) BILL.

The consideration of this Bill in committee was resumed at clause 5, and the Bill, with the addition of some new clauses, passed through committee.

NEW BILL.

Mr. Hunter obtained leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law of divorce in England.

THIRD READINGS.

The Court of Chancery of Lancaster Bill, and the Foreign Jurisdiction (Consolidation) Bill were read a third time, and passed.

Monday, June 30.

LUNATICS.

In answer to Mr. Rankin, Mr. Matthews said: I am informed by the Lord Chancellor that it is frequently the case that near relatives of persons found lunatic by inquisition are appointed acting committee; they are in most cases the best appointments that can be made, and not seldom the only possible committees. The masters in lunacy and the judges who exercise jurisdiction in such matters are well aware of the difficulties naturally inherent in the selection of these committees, and they are most careful in making the appointments. It would not be

desirable, having regard to the delicate personal considerations involved in these cases, to make such a return as is proposed, but if any particular case should give occasion to doubts in the mind of my hon. friend as to the welfare of any particular person, full inquiry will at once be made.

Wednesday, July 2.

DIRECTORS' LIABILITY BILL.

After considerable discussion this Bill was read a third time.
STATUTE LAW REVISION BILL.

The House went into committee on this Bill, Mr. Courtney in the chair, and progress was immediately reported.

SUPREME COURT of JudicaTURE (PROCEDURE) BILL. This Bill, as amended, was considered, and, on the motion of Mr. Finlay, read a third time.

BILLS IN PARLIAMENT.

SHERIFFS (ASSIZES EXPENSES).

A Bill intituled an Act respecting the expenses of High Sheriffs in con nection with Assizes. -[Prepared and brought in by the Earl of Camperdown.]

Whereas it is expedient to amend the law with regard to the expenses incurred by high sheriffs in connection with assizes:

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. Short title. This Act may be cited as "The Sheriffs (Assizes Expenses) Act 1890.'

2. Payment of sheriff's expenses out of county rate.-The expenses of the high sheriff of a county in receiving and protecting the judges, and in providing them with the necessary accommodation, and in keeping order in and within the precincts of the court of assize (which expenses are in this Act referred to as assizes expenses of the sheriff), shall, so far as they are not expenses which have before the passing of this Act been customarily defrayed by the Treasury or out of the county rate, be defrayed out of the county rate of the county in like manner as the expenses of maintaining and providing judges' lodgings may by law be defrayed, and shall be included in the costs of assizes within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1888.

3. Regulations as to assizes expenses of sheriff.-The joint committee of the county council and of the justices of the peace in each county in England and Wales, and the grand jury in each county in Ireland, shall, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, make regulations as to the mode in which, in their respective counties, the judges are to be received at the assizes, and otherwise as to the character and extent of the duties to be discharged by the high sheriff with reference to the judges and assizes, and such regulations shall be duly observed.

The amount of expenses claimed by any sheriff out of a county rate shall be submitted to the Treasury, together with his accounts under the Sheriffs Act 1887, and shall be examined and audited in like manner as those accounts, and the amount certified by the auditing officer shall be the amount payable out of the county rate; and the decision of the Treasury as to whether any sum claimed by the sheriff is payable out of the county rate shall be final.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET

REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL. Contract-Governed by English or French Law-Liquidation in FranceDischarge in France whether plea in bar in English Action-DomicileStay of Proceedings.-In Nov. 1888, and from time to time subsequently, the defendants, a French company, entered into contracts with the plaintiffs, an English financial house, for the purchase from them of several quantities of copper. The plaintiffs had agents, Messrs. Henry Bath and Sons, who were metal brokers in London, whose agents again in Paris were the firm of Dupin and Ehret. Dupin and Ehret were also agents for the defendant company, of which M. Seoretan was chairman and managing director, and they from time to time obtained a limit price from him, which they communicated to Bath and Sons, who in turn transmitted it to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs thereupon agreeing to supply copper within the limits, the contracts were drawn up by Bath and Sons, who forwarded the "sold" notes to the plaintiffs, and the "bought" notes to Dupin and Ehret, together with a confirmation note in each case, to which the signature of the defendant company was obtained. The notes were all in the same form, and on the face of them stated that the contracts were "subject to the rules of the London Metal Exchange indorsed hereon," and provided that delivery was to be taken in Liverpool on certain dates in Liverpool, and warrants were to be delivered to buyers against cash payments in London. The contracts further provided that, if the buyers failed to take delivery on the prompt days, the sellers might sell against them, and if the sellers failed to deliver the buyers might buy in against them. The defendants made default in taking delivery under the contracts sued upon, and on the 15th April 1889 they were judicially declared in liquidation by the Tribunal de Commerce in France, and a judicial liquidator was appointed. The consequence of this was, that by French law all creditors who held contracts to sell goods to defendants were bound either to deliver the goods to the liquidator and prove under the liquidation for the price, or if they chose to retain the goods their claim for damages under the contracts was extinguished. The total claim of the plaintiffs amounted to some 10,736. Of this amount about £19,000 was in respect of breaches which had arisen before the decree of liquidation, and for which by French law the plaintiffs could prove as a debt. But the remainder of their claim, amounting to about £20,000, arose on account of breaches since the decree, and as the plaintiffs declined to deliver the copper the