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5. Short title.-This Act may be cited as "The Deeds of Arrangement Amendment Act 1890."

6. Commencement.-This Act shall come into operation on the first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and ninety.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET

REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.]

COURT OF APPEAL.

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Bill of Sale-Validity-Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 9-Form in Schedule-Ambiguity. By a bill of sale dated the 6th March 1889 the plaintiffs assigned certain chattels to the defendant company to secure payment of a sum of £30, with interest at the rate of 60 per cent. per annum, and the mortgagors thereby agreed to pay the principal sum by monthly instalments as therein mentioned, and "the balance of the said principal sum on the 6th day of March 1890, and will on the said 6th day of March 1890 also pay the interest which shall have accrued at the rate aforesaid upon the said principal sum, and in case default shall be made in payment of any of the said instalments of the principal sum, the same shall until payment continue to bear interest at the rate aforesaid.' A divisional court, consisting of the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, held, that it was doubtful whether the words "the same "did not refer to the principal sum, so as to make interest payable in default of payment of any of the instalments upon the whole sum, not taking into account the instalments which might have been already paid, and that the construction being obscure the bill of sale was void as not being in accordance with the form in the schedule to the Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882. Held, on appeal, that the words "the same referred to "the instalments of the principal sum unpaid, and that the ambiguity in the construction did not render the bill of sale void, inasmuch as the true construction did not depart from the scheduled form. Goldstrom v. Tallerman (55 L. T. Rep. N. S. 866; 18 Q. B. Div. 1) followed: (Haslewood v. The Consolidated Credit Company Limited. Ct. of App. Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ. April 18 and May 3.) -Counsel: for the appellants, Sir Horace Davey, Q.C., Cock, Q.C., H. Reed, and Carrington; for the respondents, Candy, Q.C. and Russell Biggs. Solicitors: Evans and Batchelor; John Hopkins. County Council-Election of Councillors--Qualifications in two Electoral Divisions of one Administrative County-Right to vote in both Divisions. -In elections of county councillors under the Local Government Act 1888, an elector although possessing a qualification in two electoral divisions of the same administrative county, and duly registered under the County Electors Act 1888 in both, is not entitled to vote in more than one division. Judgment of the Queen's Bench Division (reported 62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 259) affirmed: (Knill v. Towse. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Fry and Lopes, L.JJ. May 2 and 3.)-Counsel for the plaintiff, Finlay, Q.C. and Russell Griffiths; for the defendant, Henn Collins, Q.C. and Austin. Solicitors: The City Solicitor; Louless and Co.

Dentists Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 33) - Dentists' Register

General

Council of Medical Education and Registration-Wrongful Erasure of Name Action for maliciously and unlawfully removing NameJudicial or ministerial Functions-Malice.-The plaintiff sued the defendants. for damages for maliciously and unlawfully removing his name from the register of dentists. While purporting to act under the Dentists Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 33), the defendants ordered the registrar under the Act to erase the plaintiff's name from the register, on the ground that the plaintiff's diploma was withdrawn by the Royal College of Surgeons, Dublin, because he had advertised in connection with his profession in breach of an undertaking given by him. The plaintiff was not given any opportunity of showing cause why his name should not be removed from the register. By the provisions of the Act the register is to be kept by the registrar, and the registrar is bound to conform to any special directions given by the general council. Power is also given to the general council to erase from the register the names of any dentists who have been convicted of crime, or been guilty of disgraceful conduct in a professional respect. In a former proceeding (Ex parte Partridge, 19 Q. B. Div. 467) the plaintiff obtained an order for a mandamus directing the defendants to restore his name to the register. At the trial before Huddleston, B. and a jury, the jury was discharged by consent, and judgment was given for the defendants, on the ground that they were exercising quasi-judicial functions, and had not acted maliciously. The plaintiff appealed. Held (affirming the judgment of Huddleston, B.), that the defendants were not liable, inamuch as they intended to exercise their powers under Act, which powers were of a judicial nature, and that they acted without malice: (Partridge v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Fry and Lopes, L.JJ. May 5.)Counsel: for the appellant, Waddy, Q.C., and Lyon; for the respondents, Reid, Q.C. and Muir Mackenzie. Solicitors: for the appellant, Calkin, Lewis, and Stokes; for the respondents, Warren, Gardner, and Murton.

Easement-Ancient Lights-Interference with-Damages or InjunctionDiscretion of Court-Mandatory Injunction-Lord Cairns' Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27). An action was brought by the owner of several cottages, which were in the occupation of tenants, claiming damages and also a mandatory injunction against the defendant for an interference with the enjoyment of ancient lights attached to the property. The access of light had been diminished by the erection of a new building, which at the time of the commencement of the action was not completed. After the action was begun the defendant continued and finished the building, and paid £50 into court as sufficient to satisfy the injury which was admitted to have been caused to the plaintiff's property. Held, that in exercising the discretion given to tho court by sect. 2 of Lord Cairns' Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27), to award damages in substitution for an injunction, in the case of a substantial interference with the plaintiff's ancient lights, the court would take into consideration all the circumstances of the case; and that, as the defendant must be taken to be acquainted with his own rights, should the building be completed after action brought he could not complain if he were subsequently ordered by the court to pull it down. Held also, that à fortiori when the

defendant admitted that he was wrong, and paid money into court by way of damages, but subsequently completed his building, he had no equity to resist a mandatory injunction: (Lawrence v. Horton. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. May 6 and 7.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Whitehorne, Q.C. and Underhill; for the defendant, Romer, Q C. and Wurtzburg. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, W. H. Underhill, agent for H. and J. E. Underhill and Lawrence, Wolverhampton; for the defendant, Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard, and Sharpe, agents for W. Horton Redfern, Birmingham.

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Landlord and Tenant-Covenant to keep "in good tenantable Repair Painting and Papering-Replacing worn-out Floor.-A covenant by a lessee that he will keep and leave the demised premises "in good tenantable repair," obliges him to keep and leave the premises in such repair as, taking into account their age, character, and locality, would make them reasonably fit for the occupation of a reasonably minded tenant of the class that would be likely to want such premises. Whether the lessee is bound, under such a covenant, to repaint and repaper the premises depends upon whether the paint and paper is in such a bad state that no reasonably minded tenant would take the premises as they are. If the floor of one of the rooms is so far worn out that it cannot be repaired, the lessee, under such a covenant, must replace it with a new one (Proudfoot v. Hart. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R. and Lopes, L.J. April 30.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Winch, Q.C., T. W. Chitty, and Pollock; for the defendant, Morton Daniel. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Proudfoot and Chaplin; for the defendant, T. R. Epps. Practice-Security for Costs of Action-Plaintiff an undischarged Bankrupt-Nominal Plaintiff-Action by Landlord against Tenant.-The plaintiff granted a lease of certain premises to the defendant. At the time the lease was granted the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt; he had not yet obtained his discharge; his discharge had been suspended until he paid his creditors 5s. in the pound, which he had not done. This action was brought to recover arrears of rent due under the lease. The defendant applied for security for costs, or that the plaintiff's trustee in bankruptcy should be joined as a plaintiff. The master made an order staying the action until security for costs was given, or the trustee in bankruptcy joined as a plaintiff. Upon appeal to the judge at chambers, he referred the matter to the court, who set aside the order of the master. The defendant appealed. Held (affirming the decision of Vaughan Williams and Lawrence, JJ.), that the fact that the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt was not a sufficient reason for ordering him to give security for costs, and that he was not a mere nominal plaintiff, and, further, that in any case the defendant in an action to recover rent under the lease was estopped (Cook from setting up the bankruptcy of the plaintiff for any purpose:

v. Whellock. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Fry and Lopes, L.JJ. May 5.)-Counsel: for the appellant, Yellerton; for the respondent, S. Lynch. Solicitors: for the appellant, G. A Hall; for the respondent, Herbert F. Oddy.

Secret Commission-Investment-Following Funds-Fiduciary PositionInjunction. The plaintiff, S. C. L., who had for many years carried on business as a dyer, had recently transferred his business to the plaintiffs, L. and Co. Limited. The defendant had been employed by both plaintiffs successively as their foreman. In the course of that employment it was his duty to purchase the materials required for the business on behalf of his principals. He had been in the habit of giving his orders for purchase to a certain firm, from whom without the knowledge of the plaintiffs he received a commission. The moneys received by way of commission, which amounted in the whole to a considerable sum, had been invested by him in the purchase of lands and houses. Held (affirming the decision of Stirling, J., ante, p. 6), that, although the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the defendant the sums received by him by way of secret commission as moneys had and received, yet they were not entitled to follow them into the investments. The defendant was not in the position of a trustee holding money belonging to a cestui que trust; for the commission received by the defendant, although the plaintiffs were entitled to recover it by action, was not the plaintiff's money, but was money belonging to the firm by whom it was paid to the defendant. An injunction to restrain the defendant from dealing or parting_with_the houses and lands was therefore refused: (Lister and Co. Limited v. Stubbs. Ct. of App.: Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ. May 3 and 5.)-Counsel: for the appellant, Crackanthorpe, Q.C., Graham Hastings, Q.C., and Ashton Cross; for the respondents, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and J. G. Wood. Solicitors: Speechley, Mumford, and Co., agents for Mumford and Johnson, Bradford; W. and J. Flower and Nussey, agents for Berry, Robertson, and Scott, Bradford.

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HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Meeting Notice of Resolution-Validity of Notice—Amendment -Decision of Chairman-Waiver.-By the provisions of the deed of settlement of a bank, notice of any extraordinary general meeting of the bank had to be advertised at least twenty-one days before the holding of such meeting, specifying the objects of the meeting. Notice of an extraordinary general meeting of the bank for the 4th April 1889 was advertised by the directors of the bank on the 7th March 1889, stating that a special resolution would be proposed for altering the deed of settlement of the bank in the following particulars : To alter the scale of voting by giving to every qualified proprietor one vote for every share.' On the first April the directors issued a circular to the proprietors stating that the full resolution to be proposed would be, That every proprietor shall have one vote for every share, provided that no proprietor shall be entitled to vote at any general meeting in respect of any share unless registered as holder of such share for at least six calendar months prior to such general meeting.' "The plaintiff,. a proprietor, attended the meeting and made a speech in which he stated that he proposed to move an amendment, but the chairman said that the resolution as it stood must be either accepted or rejected, and the plaintiff then said he would move the rejection of the resolution. The plaintiff did not put before the chairman either orally or in writing the terms of his amendment. The resolution was put and carried and was confirmed at a subsequent meeting. The plaintiff then brought an action against the company claiming a declaration that the resolution was invalid on the grounds that it was not covered by the notice convening the meeting, and also that his amendment was not put to the meeting. Held, that the notice was valid, and that, as the plaintiff had not challenged the ruling of the chairman, his contention that his amendment was rejected by the chairman was not made out, and action

dismissed with costs: (Henderson v. Bank of Australasia: Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. May 1.)-Counsel: Romer, Q.C. and John Henderson; Rigby, Q.C., Maclean, Q.C., and G. C. Hamilton.-Solicitors: Dawes and Son; Farrer and Co.

Company-Practice-Petition to wind-up by Company-Affidavit verifying
Petition by Secretary of Petitioning Company. Sufficiency. On the
19th April an order was made for winding-up the Birmingham Concert
Halls Limited upon a petition presented by another limited company.
The usual affidavit verifying the petition was made by the secretary of
the petitioning company. The registrar having raised objections to the
sufficiency of this affidavit, the matter was mentioned to the court.
Held, that the affidavit was sufficient. Re The Cakemore_ Causeway
Green, &c., Colliery Company (W. N. 1880, p. 15) followed: (Re The
Birmingham Concert Halls Limited. Ch. Div.: North, J. April 26.)
-Counsel: Theobald. Solicitors: Linklaters and Co.
Company Practice-Winding-up

Two Petitions-Second Petition

advertised first-Costs of second Petition.-In this case a company presented a petition for its own winding-up on April 2. A few days afterwards a creditor presented a petition for the same purpose. The second potition was advertised before the company's petition. It was stated at the hearing that, according to the present practice, a second petition to wind-up a company is always set down before the same judge as the first, and notice is given to the person presenting the petition that a petition has already been presented. Held, that this new practice put an end to the grounds on which priority of advertisement has been held to give priority to a petition presented after another (Re United Ports and General Assurance Company, 39 L. J. Ch. 146), and that the second petition having been persisted in after notice of the first must be dismissed with costs. If a second petitioner chooses to proceed with his petition for fear the company should let a petition drop, he must do so at his own risk: (Re Standard Portland Cement Company. Ch. Div. North, J. April 26.) - Counsel: Emden; Stallard; Dunham; Swinfen Eady. Solicitors: Chinnery, Aldridge, and Co.; Nash, Field, and Withers; C. F. Leighton. Company-Winding-up-Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 79— Suspending its Business-Just and Equitable.-A limited company was incorporated in Jan. 1883 under the name of the Mid-Northamptonshire Bank Limited. The objects clause of the memorandum of association contained fifteen provisions, of which the first stated the object of the company to be the carrying on the business of bankers in all its branches with all incidental matters and things connected therewith; and the remaining clauses, after giving the company all usual incidental powers and authorising the doing everything which could be imagined to be even remotely connected with the business of bankers or financial agents, added: "The carrying on of any other business which may seem to the bank capable of being conveniently carried on in connection with the above, or calculated to enhance the value of or render profitable any of the bank's property or rights." In April 1888 the company issued a prospectus which described the business as that of a local bank in Northamptonshire, and did not mention any other business. A certain amount of capital was subscribed, and a small banking business carried on at Rushden, Northamptonshire, from May 1888 to the end of the year, but this was not successful. In Jan. 1889 the directors issued a notice to the shareholders that, though the intention of the founders was to establish a local bank, the directors had decided to put the bank on a wider basis, so as to be able to carry on business everywhere. With this object they proposed and carried a special resolution changing the name of the company to the "Crown Bank Limited; " about the same time the premises at Rushden were given up, and offices taken on a third floor in Cheapside. After its removal to London, the company never carried on any banking business proper; but engaged in speculations on the Stock Exchange, in some speculative purchases of land, and in some business connected with floating a company in South Africa, the nature of which did not clearly appear. No balance-sheet was published till Jan. 1890. The directors then issued a balance-sheet purporting to show that the assets were equal to the liabilities, without taking into account the unpaid capital of the company. The uncalled capital, amounting nominally to £25,800, was called up before or immediately after the issue of the balance-sheet; but no calls had been paid, and no proceedings had been taken to enforce payment except against the petitioner and one other shareholder who had complained against the proceedings of the company. This petition was presented on the 29th March 1890, by a shareholder, for the winding-up of the company. The grounds alleged were, that the company was carried on under false pretences; that it had ceased to carry on its business; and that it was insolvent. In support of the last ground it was alleged that the balancesheet was fraudulent, and that £25,000 of the unpaid capital was held by a company promoted by the directors which was unable to pay calls and had no power to hold shares, so that it was not a bona fide shareholder. The petitioner had applied for and been allotted twenty £10 shares relying on the prospectus. Held, that the requirements of the Companies Act that the memorandum of association shall state the objects of the company is not satisfied by a mere general statement that the objects shall be such as the company thinks to be for the benefit of the shareholders; that therefore the wide powers given by the memorandum in this case must be construed as being subsidiary to carrying on the business of bankers; that the company itself had put this construction on the memorandum by the prospectus and were bound by that construction; that the company could not legitimately carry on any other business but banking, and as it had ceased to carry on that business it was just and equitable that the company should be woundup. Where a company which is carrying on or can carry on its proper business engages in business ultra vires, the proper remedy is an injunction to restrain the directors from using the capital of the company in such illegitimate business; but where it is impossible for the company to carry on its legitimate business, and it engages in business which it has no power to carry on, a shareholder is entitled to a winding-up order. Before the above order was drawn up an application was made by the shareholders who had opposed the petition, that the order should be varied by dismissing the petition, the applicants having agreed to take a transfer of the shares of the petitioner and all shareholders supporting him. Held, that the order not having been drawn up, the judge had jurisdiction to vary it, and the court being satisfied that all the shareholders of the company were represented and consented, and no creditor having supported the petition, no order was made on the petition except that the company pay the costs: (Re The Crown Bank Limited. Ch. Div.: North, J. April 26, 29, 30, May 1 and 6.)-Counsel: for the petitioner, Napier Higgins, Q.C. and Duke;

for shareholders supporting, Bramwell Davis; for the company, CozensHardy, Q.C. and Kirby; for shareholders opposing the petition, Everitt, Q.C. and Chadwyck Healey; for creditors opposing the petition, P. F. Wheeler. Solicitors: E. Curtis; J. Steele; Godden S. Hare; G. Lincoln.

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Company - Winding-up-Shareholder's Petition-Substratum-Impossi bility of carrying on Business-Reserve Capital-Companies Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 76), s. 5.-This was a petition by a shareholder asking for the winding-up of the company, on the ground that the bank was an absolute failure, that its substratum was gone, and that it was impossible to resusciate it. The bank was originally registered with. out articles and with a share capital of £2000, but articles were subsequently adopted, and the nominal capital was increased by the addition of £998,000 in £10 shares. By the articles not more than £5 per share was to be called up, except in accordance with the Companies Act 1879, that is, only "in the event of and for the purposes of the company being wound-up. The company had been in existence for six years, and from the last balance-sheet appeared that all the paid-up capital of the company except £337 had been exhausted. The company had never made profits so as to be able to declare a dividend, and the shares had been sold at a nominal price. The petitioner and shareholders supporting him held 1128 shares. The company, and shareholders holding 605 shares, opposed the petition. Held, that the court had jurisdiction. Held also. that the substratum was gone, and there must be the usual winding-up order: (Re The_Bristol Joint Stock Bank Limited. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J., for Kay, J. April 19 and 26.) -Counsel: Rigby, Q.C., Renshaw, Q.C. and Farwell; Marten, Q.C. and E. Ford; Haldane, Q.C. and Oswald. Solicitors: Mackrell, Maton, and Godlee, for H. C. Trapnell, Bristol; Meredith, Roberts, and Mills, for W. H. Brown, Bristol; Herbert F. Oddy. Contempt of Court-Publication tending to influence Result of pending Proceedings.-A newspaper which had for some months been publishing paragraphs calling attention to the proceedings of a certain limited company, published after the presentation of a petition for winding-up the company a paragraph headed "The - Company Letting Light in,' and containing statements that no answer had been given to former paragraphs in which they had described the company as a fraudulent concern, that a petition for winding-up the company had been dismissed in North, J.'s court, on the last Saturday, and was ordered to stand over till the next, when the chairman and one of the directors were directed to attend for the purpose of being cross-examined, and proceeded: If they are compelled to make a full statement as to the affairs of the bank, we shall have some interesting revelations." It appeared from the former paragraphs that the newspaper had derived its information direct from the petitioner. The company moved to commit the proprietor of the paper for contempt. Held, that the newspaper had departed altogether from the attitude of impartial comment or criticism and had made itself the partisan of one of the parties to the litigation, and that the paragraph complained of, in which the paper took upon itself to prophesy the result of the cross-examination, was plainly intended to influence the result, and was a gross contempt of court. The proprietor was ordered to pay a fine of £50 and the costs of the motion as between solicitor and client: (The Crown Bank Limited. Ch. Div.: North, J. May 1.)-Counsel: Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Kirby; Wurzburg. Solicitors: Godden S. Hare; Shaen, Roscoe, and Co. Discretionary Trust for Maintenance-Assignment of Interest by Beneficiary -Payments by Trustee after Notice of Assignment.-By the will of a testator a share of his property was given to trustees upon trust to pay and apply the whole or any part of the income of the share for the support, maintenance, and education of one of the testator's sons, his wife, or children, in such manner as the trustees should in their discretion think fit. The son assigned his interest by way of mortgage to the plaintiffs. Notice of the assignment was given to the trustees of the will, who, after receiving such notice, made payments out of the income of the share to, or on behalf of, the son. The plaintiffs took out an originating summons, asking for the determination of a question of construction under the will; and seeking to make the trustees liable in respect of the payments so made. Objection to the question of breach of trust being decided on originating summons was waived. The plaintiffs relied on Re Coleman; Henry v. Strong (60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 127; 39 Ch. Div. 443). The trustees of the will submitted that, consistently with the decision in the case cited, as regarded money paid without having been previously appropriated, the assignment had no operation until the payment was actually made, and therefore could not entitle the plaintiffs to recover from the trustees, but only from their assignor. Held, that the beneficial interest of the son under the will was that which he was entitled to assign; that money paid to him, or to any person on his behalf (excluding such a special case as that put by Cotton, L.J., in Re Coleman), was necessarily part of his beneficial interest; and that it must be assumed that money paid by the trustees to him, or to any person on his behalf, was his in their irrevocable determination immediately before the payment, at which period of time the trustees were affected with notice of assignment. Held, therefore, that the trustees were liable for all sums paid to or on behalf of the son, after they had received notice of assignment: (Re Neil; Hemming v. Neil. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J., for Kay, J. April 17.)Counsel for the plaintiffs, Renshaw, Q.C. and R. J. Parker; for the trustees of the will, MacSwinney. Solicitors: H. P. Richards; Seagrove, and Woods.

Executor-Retainer-Receiver.-Application to discharge an order made a week previously for the appointment of a receiver of the testator's estate. The action was a creditor's administration action against the legal personal representative and the trustee of the will, who was also named as the executor, but had not proved. The executor had not consented to the appointment of the receiver, but had not opposed it. The executor was, however, jointly with another person, trustee of a certain indenture of settlement. Part of the settlement funds consisted of a mortgage of about £120,000 on real property, forming part of the testator's estate. The security was valued at £80,000, and a sum of £40,000 was consequently due from the estate to the settlement trustees. The beneficiaries under that settlement claimed that the executor should exercise his right of retainer as to the £40,000 for their benefit, and a summons had been taken out on their behalf to have that question determined, which was not yet ripe for hearing. The applicant on that summons had, since the making of the order appointing a receiver, been joined as defendant in the action, and he now applied to have the order appointing the receiver discharged. The

ground of the application was, that the appointment of the receiver would intercept the assets from coming to the hands of the executor, and so interfere with his right of retainer, which was only exercisable with regard to assets which actually reached his hands. Held, that the order appointing a receiver should be discharged, but with liberty to bring the motion on again after the summons had been disposed of. The executor had done nothing wrong which would warrant the appointment of a receiver against him. He might no doubt, and probably would, exercise his right of retainer to the prejudice of the general creditors, but that alone was not a sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver: (Re Wells; Molondy v. Brooke. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. May, 2.)-Counsel: Sir Horace Davey, Q.C., Rigby, Q.C., and Swinfen Eady; Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Fossett Lock; Buckley, Q.C. and Onslow. Solicitors: Hasties; H. A. Dowse; Frere, Foster, and Co.

Parties-Foreclosure-Debenture-holders-Costs-15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 42 R. S. C. 1883, Order XVI., r. 9, Order LV., rr. 5a and 5b.-This was a foreclosure summons in respect of six mortgages, all executed by F. S. K. in favour of the plaintiffs. F. S. K. had become bankrupt, and the defendant H. was his trustee in bankruptcy. The mortgages Nos. 1 and 2 were insufficient securities, and H. had disclaimed the equities of redemption in them. The defendant P. had purchased the equity of redemption in mortgage No. 3. The defendants, the Billiterstreet Offices Company Limited, had purchased the equity of redemption in mortgage No. 5, and had issued debentures to a large amount, charging this and other property. Two of the debenture-holders were, under an order of the 18th Jan. 1890, made defendants, and authorised to defend on behalf of themselves and the other debenture-holders pursuant to Order XVI., r. 9. The plaintiffs now asked for a foreclosure order against the defendants P. and H. alone, and it was contended on their behalf that, if the defendant P. did not redeem, he should pay the costs of the company and the debenture-holders, on the ground that they had been made parties by reason of a claim made by him to redeem all the six mortgages. On behalf of the defendant P., it was submitted that, in the absence of the other debenture-holders, no foreclosure order could be made. The only way of working out the equities of all parties was to have all the six properties sold, and the deficiency on the sale of Nos. 1 and 2 made good out of the proceeds of sale of the others rateably. The defendant P., having never agreed to pay any of F. S. K.'s debts except mortgage No. 3, was entitled to have the surplus proceeds of Nos. 4 and 6 all applied to make good the deficiency of Nos. 1 and 2 before any contribution was made from the surplus proceeds of No. 3. The defendant P. could not obtain a sale except under sect. 25, sub-sect. 2, of the Conveyancing Act 1881, and the language of that section showed that his application would not be entertained until all persons having the right to redeem were made defendants. The added parties were not made defendants at his request, but because the plaintiffs' action was defective without them. Held, that the defendant P. ought not to be ordered to pay the costs of the added defendants, and that a foreclosure order could not be made in the absence of persons entitled to redeem. Order LV., r. 5b, provided that the persons to be served with a foreclosure summons should be such persons as under the existing practice would be defendants in an action. The debenture-holders were all persons entitled to redeem. The Act 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 42, provided that trustees should represent their cestuis que trust, but the court was enabled to order the latter to be made parties, and it had been held that in a foreclosure action a trustee did not represent the cestuis que trust. A fortiori the two debenture-holders, who were defendants in this case, not being trustees, could not represent the other debenture-holders. A foreclosure order could not be made in their absence: (Griffith v. Pound. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. April 30.)-Counsel: Hastings, Q.C. and Ingle Joyce; Swinfen Eady; Chadwyck Healey; Crossfield; Pember; and George Henderson. Solicitors: Grover and Humphreys; Stanley and Woodhouse; W. T. Crossfield; William Negus.

Practice-Company — Winding-up - Examination of Witness - Pending Action Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 115.-Sect. 115 of the Companies Act 1862 enacts that: "The court may, after it has made any order for winding-up the company, summon before it any officer of the company, or person known or suspected to have in his possession any of the estate or effects of the company, or supposed to be indebted to the company, or any person whom the court may deem capable of giving information concerning the trade, dealings, estate, or effects of the company and if any person so summoned, after being tendered a reasonable sum for his expenses, refuses to come before the court at the time appointed, having no lawful impediment (made known to the court at the time of its sitting, and allowed by it), the court may cause such person to be apprehended, and brought before the court for examination." On the 9th Aug. 1889 it was resolved that the A. company, which was incorporated on the 8th May 1887, should be wound-up voluntarily, and liquidators were duly appointed for the purposes of such winding-up. On the 7th Nov. 1889 an action was commenced, in the name of the A. company, by the voluntary liquidators against the B. company, claiming that a certain agreement was fraudu lent, and the repayment of certain moneys, and the return of certain shares. On the 11th April 1890, H., the secretary of the B. company, was sworn and examined, on behalf of the liquidators of the A. company, before one of the examiners of the court, under sect. 115 of the Companies Act 1862. A motion was subsequently made, on behalf of the liquidators of the A. company, that H. might be ordered to attend at his own expense before the examiner, at such time and place as the examiner should appoint, to be further examined on behalf of the applicants, and that H. might be ordered then and there to answer a certain question, which he had demurred or objected to answer upon his examination on the 11th April 1890. In support of the motion the authorities of Re The Metropolitan (Brush) Electric Light and Power Company Limited; Ex parte Leaver (51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 817), and Massey v. Allen (9 Ch. Div. 164) were referred to. The respondent relied upon Re The Metropolitan Bank; Heiron's case (43 L. T. Rep. N. S. 299; 15 Ch. Div. 189). Held, that the well-settled practice was, that a liquidator cf a company, which was in course of being wound-up, was entitled to examine an officer of the company, or other person, whether before or after action brought, and notwithstanding that it was deliberately with a view to assisting proceedings brought, or intended to be brought, against the company, and even although the officer of the company, or other person, might be a party to the action. Held also, that the decision in Heiron's case had not disturbed that practice, and did not affect the present case, as here the action

was brought against the company, and not against the witness, and the liquidators desired to examine the witness, not with a view to pending proceedings against him, nor with reference to any charge against him. Held, therefore, that there must be an order to answer the question as asked, the witness to pay the costs occasioned by the further examination: (Re The North Australian Territory Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J., for Kay, J. April 25.)-Counsel: for the applicants, Renshaw, Q.C. and C. E. E. Jenkins; for the respondent, Latham, Q.C. and E. H. Pollard. Solicitors for the applicants, Saunders, Hawksford, Bennett, and Co.; for the respondent, Freshfields and Williams.

Practice-Rules of Supreme Court 1883, Order XXVII., r. 1-Default of Pleading-Dismissal of Action for want of Prosecution - Adjourned Summons.-This was a summons taken out by the plaintiffs for further time within which to deliver their statement of claim. On the 26th Nov. 1889 an order was made by the chief clerk in chambers that the action should stand dismissed, unless a statement of claim was delivered within twenty-one days. On the 17th Dec. 1889 this summons was taken out. The order for dismissal had not then been taken to the registrar to be drawn up. On the 21st Dec. 1889 a statement of claim was delivered. The registrar drew up an order providing that the action should be dismissed unless a statement of claim was delivered within twenty-one days from the service of the order. The defendant objected to having the order drawn up in that form, and the consideration of the plaintiffs' summons for further time, and the proper form of the order to dismiss for want of prosecution, were adjourned to the judge in court. On behalf of the plaintiffs it was argued that an order did not take effect until it was served, and Metcalfe v. British Tea Association (46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 31) was relied on. On behalf of the defendant it was argued that the order to dismiss took effect from the time it was pronounced, and that consequently the action was dead when the statement of claim was delivered. Held, that the order to dismiss took effect from the time it was pronounced, and the action became dead on the expiration of twenty-one days from that time, and could not be set up again. The plaintiffs' summons was accordingly dismissed: (The Script Phonography Limited v. Gregg. Ch. Div.: North, J. April 23.)-Counsel: Church; Sebastian. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Wyatt Digby; for the defendant, Fallows and Rider.

Promissory Note-Renunciation after Maturity-Absolute and unconditional Renunciation-Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 61), 8. 62, sub-sect. 1, and s. 89.-A testator, who died in Aug. 1889, by his will, dated in 1887, bequeathed to his niece the sum of £6000, and by a codicil, after referring to that bequest and to the circumstance that he had lent to his niece the sum of £2000, which he wished to be considered as an advance on account of the £6000, he declared that if at his death the sum of £2000, or any part thereof or any interest thereon, should be due and owing from his niece, then all such moneys due as aforesaid should be deducted from the legacy of £6000, and he directed that in such case the legacy should be reduced accordingly in satisfaction of the moneys due. The sum of £2000 referred to by the testator was lent by him to his niece in Sept. 1886, who then gave to the testator a promissory note, promising to pay on demand to the testator or his order the sum of £2000, together with interest thereon at 4 per cent. per annum from the date thereof for value received. Interest was paid on the note up to March 1889. By the evidence of the professional nurse who was attending the testator during his last illness, it appeared that the testator when on his death-bed, and about two hours before his actual death, and being aware that he was dying, desired that the promissory note should be looked for; but it could not be found. He then told the nurse that he had lent his niece £2000, and that he wished to forgive the debt, and that he ought to have destroyed the note. He desired that she would see the note destroyed, and would testify that it was his wish that it should be destroyed as soon as found, and told her that she had better write down his wishes. Thereupon the nurse wrote a memorandum as follows: "30 Aug. 1889. It is by Mr. George's dying wish that the cheque (sic) for £2000, money lent to Mrs. Francis, be destroyed as soon as found. Mr. George is perfectly conscious and in his sound mind. Signed, Nurse T." The foregoing memorandum, the nurse stated was, with the exception of the last sentence, written at the instance of the testator. After the testator's death the note was found in a safe in his house. The questions were: (1) whether the note had or had not matured; and (2) whether under or apart from the provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 there had been a renunciation of the note. Held, (1) that a promissory note payable on demand was a present debt, and was payable without any demand, and the circumstance that interest was payable made no difference; and that in the present case the note was mature and did not fall within the exception mentioned in sect. 62. Held, (2) that, although it was not necessary to put the actual words in the document of renunciation, the renunciation must in effect be "absolute and unconditional," and the document also must not be a mere memorandum or note, but it must be in itself the record of renunciation; that in the present case there was no absolute and unconditional renunciation within the words of the statute; and that therefore any sum due under the note at the testator's death was still owing: (Re George; Francis v. Bruce. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. April 26 and May 2) -Counsel: Romer, Q.C., Upjohn, and J. Rolt; Byrne, Q.C. and Dunning. Solicitors: Edward Kershaw Francis; Bell, Brodrick, and Gray.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Building Party Wall found defective by Arbitrators under an Award— Roof-Storey-Construction of-What is a Roof and what a StoreyExternal Walls-Metropolitan Building Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 122), sect, 85 and rule 5 of 1st schedule.-Appeal from the judgment of the County Court judge of the City of London Court, setting aside the award of two out of three surveyors appointed as arbitrators under sect. 85 of the Metropolitan Building Act 1855. It appeared from the evidence that the premises of the building owner had been burned down, and that the building owner intended, if he could obtain the consent of the persons interested in preventing his raising the building, to make his building a storey higher by having a vertical instead of a sloping side to the upper storey; in other words, to raise, if possible, the wall on which the rafters had hitherto rested, in order that some machinery might be put in a room about to be built, instead of remaining in the basement. After the fire a building had been erected with an ordinary sloping roof, to comprise two stories, without any reference to these proposed alterations as to height and use of the intended building. Notices were given, and arbitrators duly appointed. The

award found (inter alia) that the party wall was not of sufficient strength for the intended building, and it was chiefly against this finding that the building owner appealed. The respondents contended that the award was right, and that the party wall was not built according to the provisions of the Act. The appellants contended that the nature of the wall depended to some extent on the way in which it was measured, and relied mainly on the 5th rule in the first schedule, and further contended that a storey must mean a flat inclosed by four walls, the respondent urging that a storey may be what is ordinarily termed an attic or a flat in the roof. The learned County Court judge, with the advice and assent of the assessors who sat with him, held that the roof began from the stonework on which the rafters of the roof rest, and that all above the flat or storey enclosed by four walls on which the rafters rested is roof, and set aside the award. Held, allowing the appeal, that the County Court judge was wrong in assuming that a storey must be within four walls: (Foot v. Hodgson. Q. B. Div.: Mathew and Grantham, JJ. May 5.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Finlay, Q.C. and Fullerton; for the defendant, Spokes. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Munns and Longden; for the defendant, Fraser and Christian.

Fishery Board-Person Fishing without Licence-Authority of Water Bailiff to prosecute-24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, s. 35; 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121, 8. 27; 36 37 Vict. c. 71, ss. 36, 62, 65 (Salmon Fishery Acts 1861 to 1873)-41 & 42 Vict. c. 39, s. 7 (Freshwater Fisheries Act 1878).-Case stated by magistrates for the county of Somerset. Upon the information and complaint of H., a duly appointed water-bailiff in the employment of the Avon, Brue, and Parret Fishery Board, A. was summoned for fishing on the 9th July 1889 within the Avon, Brue, and Parret Fishery District for trout with a rod and line without a proper licence. The board of conservators for the said district issued licences to persons fishing for trout within their district under sect. 7 of the Freshwater Fisheries Act 1878, the scale for rod and line being for the season 28. 6d., for a month 18., and for one day 6d. At the hearing of the case on the 20th July 1889, before three magistrates, at Taunton Petty Sessions, H., the water-bailiff, testified that he had received a letter from the clerk to the fishery board, directing him to institute the proceedings against A., but did not produce the letter, and did not know whether the fishery board had met and passed any resolution authorising the prosecution. It was contended on behalf of A. that H. could not prefer such information or complaint without proving a special authority from the board of conservators; that H. could only by virtue of sect. 27 (1) of (28 & 29 Vict. c. 121), as water-bailiff execute the duties specifically assigned to him by the board under the Salmon Fishery Acts 1861 to 1873, and that under sect. 27 (4) of the same Act the board of conservators were the only proper persons to take legal proceedings against A. For the prosecution it was contended that H., in his capacity as an officer of the board of conservators, and in his capacity of a constable acting within his bailiwick, required no special authority from the board to lay the information against A., and that the summons was properly issued. The magistrates overruled A.'s contention, and convicted and fined him 1s., being of opinion that H., as a water-bailiff duly appointed under the Salmon Fishery Acts 1861 to 1873, and under 36 & 37 Vict. c. 71, ss. 36 and 62, had authority to prefer the information and complaint. A. appealed. Held, that, as all penalties recovered under the Salmon and Freshwater Fishery Acts are as a consequence of sects. 62 and 65 of the Salmon Fishery Act 1873 to be paid to boards of conservators, on the authority of Reg. v. Hicks (24 L. J. N. S. 94, M. C.) and Rex v. Corden (4 Burr. 2279), the board were the only proper persons to take proceedings against A.; and that as H. did not show a distinct authority from the board to take the proceedings, he must be taken to have been unauthorised. Conviction quashed: (Anderson, app., v. Hamlin, resp. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Mathew, J. April 30.)-Counsel: for the appellant, J. A. Thorne; for the respondent, Willis Bund. Solicitors: for the appellant, W. H. E. Stone, for S. B. Cresswell, Taunton; for the respondent, Torr, Janeways, and Co., for Barham and Sons, Bridg.water.

Personal Injuries-Voluntary School-Accident to Scholar-Negligence of Teacher-Liability of Committee of Management. The plaintiff was a scholar in a voluntary school, and the defendant, the vicar of the parish, was an ex officio trustee of the school and one of the committee of management. The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted upon her by a black-board which fell from an easel and struck her upon the head. It was alleged that the board fell owing to the negligence of the teacher of the lass of which the plaintiff was a member. The staff of teachers at the school was appointed by the committee of management, but was not otherwise under its control. Held, that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury, but that, if there was, the defendant, as one of the members of the committee of management, would have been liable for the negligence of the teacher in the school: (Crisp v. Thomas. Q. B. Div.: Charles, J. May 5.)Counsel for the plaintiff, Channell, Q.C. and A. Powell; for the defendant, Moorsom, Q.C. and F. R. Y. Radcliffe. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Wolferstan and Avery; for the defendant, Crawley, Arnold, and Co.

Pilotage-Port of Chester Act (16 Geo. 3, c. 61)-Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104)-Merchant Shipping Law Amendment Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 68).-Appeal by special case stated by justices of Flint. The appellant was sued under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts for the recovery of pilotage dues which he had refused to pay, under the following circumstances:-The Norwegian timber ship Orion, bound for Rhyl, was compelled by neap tides to seek safety in certain roads which are within the ambit of the port of Chester. While going there she was boarded by a pilot, although she had exhibited no signals for one. Although the captain protested, after a few days the same pilot boarded her again, rendered his services, and took her into the river Foreth, which was her original destination. The pilot sued before justices for his dues, and recovered them. The defendant appealed, and contended, under the above-mentioned Acts, that the pilotage dues are not compulsory in such a case, that the bye-laws made under the former statute are ultra vires, that distress is the proper mode of proceeding for the recovery of any dues, and that the proper persons to take proceedings are the trustees of the port of Chester. Kimber v. Blanchard (5 Burr. 2602), and Beilby v. Shepherd (3 Ex. 40; 18 L. J. 73, Ex.) were cited in favour of the first part of the appellant's contention. Counsel for the respondent was not called upon. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the justices were right in their decision on all the points (Jones and others v. Bennett. Q. E. Div.: Coleridge,

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C.J. and Grantham, J. May 2.)-Counsel for the appellants,. Hamilton; for the respondents, Beard. Solicitors: for the appellants, Williamson, Hill and Co., for E. Roberts, Rhyl; for the respondent, Field, Roscoe, and Co., for Evan Morris and Co., Wrexham. Practice-Security for Costs-Action by undischarged Bankrupt-Cause of Action arising after Bankruptcy.-Appeal from the order of a master referred to the court by a judge at chambers. The action was brought to recover rent due from the defendant to the plaintiff. It was admitted that at the time when the agreement of tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant was entered into the plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt. Upon a summons for stay of proceedings, the master ordered a stay unless the plaintiff gave security for costs or the trustees were made a party to the action. Held, that, the cause of action arising after the plaintiff's bankruptcy, and there being no suggestion that the action was brought on behalf of his trustee in bankruptcy, the plaintiff could not be ordered to give security for costs. Appeal allowed: (Cook v. Whellock: Q. B. Div.: Grantham and Williams, JJ. April 15 and 16)-Counsel for the plaintiff, Stephen Lynch; for the defendant, Felverton. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Herbert Oddy; for the defendant, George Astell Hall. Prohibition Application after Judgment Married Woman sued as Spinster-Debtors Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict c. 62), 8. 5—Married Woman's Property Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75).-This was a motion for a writ of prohibition directed to the City of London Court to set aside the judg ment of that court. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant to recover the amount of their expenses and costs incurred as solicitors. The summons was served personally on her, and it contained full instructions as to appearance of parties concerned, and also with regard to married women. The defendant did not appear, and judgment was given against her, in the form provided against a spinster. It was now contended that the judgment was bad, and an affidavit was filed to the effect that the defendant was married before the date of the judgment, and that her husband was still living. Scott v. Morley (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 919: 20 Q. B. Div. 120); Serjeant v. Dale (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 153; 2 Q. B. Div. 558); Broad v. Perkins (60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 8; 21 Q. B. Div. 533); Mayor of London v. Cox (in H. of L. Rep. 2 E. & I. App. Cas. 239; 36 L. J. 225, Ex.); Jones v. James (in Bail Court, 19 L. J. Q. B. 257) were relied upon on the defendant's behalf, and it was argued that, as she had not appeared, she could not be bound by the judgment. The affidavit of the plaintiff's showed that the defendant had sued and been sued in several actions, and had been a party to proceedings taken in the name of Bessie Bellwood, and that she was by common report a spinster. Held, on the principle laid down in Mayor of London v. Cox (ubi sup.); Buggin v. Bennett (4 Burr. 2035), that the court could not interfere, as the defendant had "lain by," and that nothing had been brought before the learned Commissioner of the City of London Court to lead him to suppose that she was married, and the application was refused, but without costs: (Beard and Sons v. Bellwood. Q. B. Div.: Coleridge, C.J. and Grantham, J. May 2.)Counsel for the plaintiff, Bray; for the defendant, F. Watt. Solicitor-Negligence-Action commenced in County Palatine CourtCounty Court-Costs-Public Health Act 1875 (33 & 39 Vict. c. 55).The plaintiff, the law clerk of the defendants, advised them, in order to recover the amount due from a frontager for the expense of putting a road in repair under sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875, to commence an action in the Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lancaster for a charge upon the premises. The action was brought against the person who was believed to be the owner of the premises, but the Vice-Chancellor gave judgment in his favour upon the ground that the mortgagee was in possession, and that the necessary notice under the Public Health Act 1875 to do the repairs had not been served upon the mortgagee. The plaintiff sought to recover his costs from the defendants, but they denied that they were liable, and counter-claimed against him in respect of the costs which they had had to pay to the defendants in the Chancery action, upon the ground that he had been guilty of negligence in not serving the notice under the Public Health Act 1875 upon the proper person, and in commencing the action in the Chancery Court of the County Palatine instead of in the County Court. The Vice-Chancellor has no jurisdiction to inflict any penalty as to costs upon a plaintiff for bringing in the County Palatine Court an action which might have been brought in a County Court. Held, that the plaintiff had not been guilty of actionable negligence in not advising that the proceedings should be commenced in the County Court: (Barker v. Fleetwood Improvement Commissioners. Q. B. Div.: Charles, J. May 3 and 5.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Gully, Q.C. and Smyly; for the defendant, Joseph Walton and Parry. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., for Barker and Kean, Fleetwood; for the defendants, Shaw, Tremellen, and Kirkham, for Forshaw and Parker, Preston.

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION.
PROBATE BUSINESS.

Will-Cutting by Testatrix-Partial Revocation. This was a motion for probate of a will in its mutilated state. A testatrix having duly executed her will, proceeded, some time afterwards, to cut out with a pair of scissors the name of one G. P., who was named as an executor therein, wherever the said G. P.'s name appeared in the document. She stated to one or more persons that she had "cut G. P. out of her will," her alleged reason being on account of some disagreement which had arisen between the said G. P. and his wife, who was a daughter of the testatrix. Held, that the will was only partially revoked, and was entitled to probate in the state in which it was found upon the death of the testatrix. The court refused to allow G. P., to whom notice had been given by direction of the judge, any costs of this application: (In the Goods of Dinah Leach, deceased. P. & D. Div. Butt, J. May 6.) -Counsel: for the applicant, Bargrave Deane; for George Pilkington, W. E. Hawlin. Solicitors: Cree and Son, agents for Watson, Newby, and Robson, Stockton-on-Tees; Hack and Morris, agents for E. J. Thomas, Stockton-on-Tees.

ADMIRALTY BUSINESS. Collision-Lights-Vessel at Anchor-Rules for the Navigation of the River Humber.-By art. 2 of the Rules for the Navigation of the River Humber it is provided that, "all vessels as aforesaid when at anchor in the river Humber, or in any part of the river Ouse below the North Eastern Railway Bridge crossing the River Ouse, at or near Hook, or in any part of the river Trent at or below Gainsborough, shall between

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sunset and sunrise, instead of the light prescribed by art. 8 of the said regulations (i.e. the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea), exhibit from the forestay, or otherwise near the bow of the vessel, where it can best be seen, a white light in a globular lantern of eight inches in diameter, and so constructed as to show a clear uniform and unbroken light visible all round the horizon at a distance of at least one mile, and, in addition thereto, all vessels having two or more masts shall exhibit another white light at double the height of the bow light at the main or mizen peak, or the boom topping lift, or other positions near the stern where it can best be seen.' By art. 8 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea" a ship, whether a steamship or a sailing ship, when at anchor shall carry where it can best be seen, but at a height not exceeding twenty feet above the hull, a white light in a globular lantern of not less than eight inches in diameter, and so constructed as to show a clear uniform and unbroken light visible all round the horizon at a distance of at least one mile." The steam trawler M. whilst at anchor between sunset and sunrise in the Humber was ran into by another vessel. The M. carried two anchor lights, the forward light being ten feet from the deck, the after light being twenty-five feet. The other vessel being to blame on the facts, it was contended that the M. was also to blame for a breach of the Humber regulations on the ground that the after light was five feet more than double the height of the forward light. Held that, the deviation from the prescribed height was not sufficient to amount to an infringement of the regulations, and that therefore the M. was not to blame: (The Magneta. Adm. Div.: Sir James Hannen and Butt, J. April 23.)-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, J. P. Aspinall; for the defendants, Sir Walter Philli more; Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, A. M. Jackson; for the defendants, J. T. and H. Woodhouse.

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Collision-Steamship and Sailing Ship-Keeping Course-Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Arts. 17, 22 and 23.-By art. 17 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, "If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the other a steamship, are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision, the steamship shall keep out of the way of the sailing ship." By art. 22,"Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course.' By art. 23, "In obeying and construing these rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from the above rules necessary, in order to avoid immediate danger." The steamship H. was approaching the sailing ship S. for several minutes showing her red and masthead light on the starboard bow. The S. kept her course till a collision was imminent, when at the last moment she put her helm hard-a-port but the H. with her port side struck the stem and port bow of the S. The H. admitted that she was to blame, but contended that the S. was also to blame for breach of art. 23 of the Regulations in neglecting to take any steps to keep out of the way of the H. after she saw that the H. persisted in taking no steps to keep out of her way: Held, that in the circumstances the S. was right in keeping her course in obedience to art. 22, and that there is no hard-and-fast rule that where those in charge of a sailing vessel see that a steamship is persistently neglecting to keep out of their way, they are bound to manoeuvre for her, but that each case must depend upon its own circumstances. The Tasmania (60 L T. Rep. N. S. 692; 14 P. Div. 53) distinguished: (The Highgate. Adm. Div. Sir Jas. Hannen. April 23.)-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Sir Walter Phillimore and J. P. Aspinall; for the defendants, Myburgh, Q.C. and Dr. Raikes. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Thos. Cooper and Co.; for the defendants, Waltons, Bubb, and Johnson. Practice Collision County Court- Interlocutory Order - AppealCosts-County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71), s. 26-County Courts Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 120.-By sect. 26 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 " An appeal may be made to the High Court of Admiralty of England from a final decree or order of a County Court in an Admiralty cause, and by permission of the judge of the County Court from any interlocutory decree or order therein on security for costs being first given, and subject to such other provisiens as general orders shall direct." By sect. 120 of the County Courts Act 1888: "If any party in any action or matter shall be dissatisfied with the determination or direction of the judge in point of law or equity, or upon the admission or rejection of any evidence, the party aggrieved by the judgment, direction, decision, or order of the judge, may appeal from the same to the High Court in such manner, and subject to such conditions as may be for the time being provided by the rules of the Supreme Court regulating the procedure on appeals from inferior courts to the High Court." A successful plaintiff in a County Court collision case on the Admiralty side, being dissatisfied with the decision of the County Court judge affirming the registrar's taxation of costs, appealed to the Admiralty Division, but did not ask permission of the County Court judge to do so. Held, that notwithstanding the general words of sect. 120 of the County Courts Act 1888, the specific provisions of sect. 26 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 were applicable to Admiralty actions, and as leave had not been obtained for an appeal, the High Court could not hear it (The Cashmere. Adm. Div.: Sir James Hannen and Butt, J. April 28.)-Counsel: for the appellants, Sir Walter Phillimore and Nelson; for the respondents, L. Pyke Solicitors: for the appellants, Lowless and Co.; for the respondents, Ingledew, Ince, and Vachell. Salvage-American Liner-Cattlemen.-The steamship B., while on_a voyage from Boston to Liverpool, salved the steamship C. The B., which was carrying live cattle, had on board, in addition to her crew, eighteen cattlemen. These men were on the ship's articles in order to comply with the requirements of the American authorities, but took no part in the navigation of the ship, and in fact did nothing towards saving the C. They were paid a lump sum of money for the voyage, and by reason of the services it was delayed one-and-three-quarter days. The court having awarded salvage, the cattlemen by counsel applied to share in it. Held, that in fact they were not salvors, and were entitled to nothing: (The Coriolanus. Adm. Div.: Sir James Hannen. April 25.)-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, The Attorney-General, Sir Walter Phillimore, and J. P. Aspinall; for the defendants, Myburgh, Q.C. and Raikes; for the cattlemen, Manisty. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Hill, Dickinson, Dickinson, and Hill; for the defendants, Waltons, Bubb, and Johnson; for the cattlemen, Ridsdale and Co.

COUNTY COURTS, EQUITY, AND BANKRUPTCY CASES.-Published quarterly, price 4s., post free. Just published, part 118.-HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, 10, Wellington-street, Strand, W.C.-ADVT.]

LAW LIBRARY.

The Practice on the Crown Side of the Queen's Bench Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice. By FREDERICK HUGH SHORT, Chief Clerk of the Crown Office, and FRANCIS HAMILTON MELLOR, Barrister-at-Law. London: Stevens and Haynes. IN the annotated edition of the Crown Office Rules and Forms which Mr. Short produced in the year 1886 he showed to the public generally what the Profession already knew, namely, that he possessed an intimate knowledge of the Crown Office practice. Owing to the changes which had within recent years taken place in the practice, and to the extreme scarcity of Messrs. Corner's well-known work, some guide to the practice was a necessity. Mr. Short's first book proved extremely useful, but the want of something more complete has been severely felt. This want we hope has at last been supplied. With the assistance of Mr. Mellor, Mr. Short has produced a book which, upon the somewhat cursory examination we have been able to bestow upon it, appears to us to be most admirably done, and to form a very complete guide to the practice. It is founded upon Corner. Much of course has been added; as for instance the portions of the book which deal with special cases from quarter sessions and appeals from Superior Courts, and the whole has been rewritten and rearranged. The various subjects of Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari, Special cases from magistrates at quarter sessions, Indictments including those found in and those removed into the Queen's Bench Division, Criminal Informations, Informations ex officio, Informations quo warranto, Trial by Bar, Error, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Outlawry Attachment, Articles of the Peace, Contumace capiendo, Inquisitions, Scire facias, Restitution, Subpoena, Affidavits, Appeals from Superior Courts, and the Court of Appeal and Petty Bag Proceedings, are each dealt with in a separate chapter, and all necessary information appears to be given about each. The Crown Office Rules 1886 and Forms are given verbatim in appendixes A. and D. Such of the Rules of the Supreme Court as apply to Crown Practice are also given in the appendices. Some very valuable additional forms by the authors are given in appendix E. Special care has been bestowed upon the index, which appears to be very complete. We have no hesitation whatever in recommending this book to the Profession. It was one which was much wanted.

The Law of Support and Subsidence. By HARRY LUSHINGTON STEPHEN, LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworths. THE purpose of this work, as stated by the author, is "to give an account of the rights and duties of neighbours to require and give support from and to one another's property." It consists mainly of a careful examination of the decided cases in which the learning on this complex branch of the law is contained. The earlier part of the work deals with support (a) of land in its natural condition; (b) of land weighted by buildings or otherwise affected by the operations of man. Then follows a discussion of the various modes of acquiring rights of support under the heads of (a) grant and covenant, (b) prescription, (c) statute. The concluding chapter is devoted to a consideration of the rights to interfere with support arising by prescription and manorial customs. A discriminating collection of the authori ties on a subject such as this cannot fail to be of value, and pains have evidently not been spared to make the book complete and of practical utility.

The Way to Prove a Will_and_to_take out Administration. By ALMARIC RUMSEY, Barrister-at-Law. London: John Hogg. 1890.

THIS is a companion work to Will-making made Safe and Easy, by the same author, and, like the latter, is addressed to the public as well as to the Profession. It contains much useful information, arranged with a careful regard for readiness of access. A special feature is the forms, to which considerable labour has been devoted, and in many cases of ordinary occur. rence this little book offers a means of avoiding more laborious reference to larger works; but it must not be forgotten that a law book addressed to the general public, with the object of minimising expense, contains a perhaps unavoidable element of danger, however thoughtfully the design may be prepared.

The Tramways Act 1870. By GEGORGE I. PHILLIPS, Solicitor of the Supreme Court, Member of the Incorporated Law Society. Oxford Parker and Co. London: Reeves and Turner. THE object of the author is to supply, in a concise and convenient form, a practical handbook on the law relating to tramways. Under the several sections of the Act are arranged some useful notes, and references to the cases which have been decided on the sections. The introductory chapter contains a brief epitome of the principal provisions of the Act, together with some prac tical observations as to the rating of tramway undertakings. The collection of rules and forms will be found complete, and the author appears to us to have supplied a want. Appended is a schedule of all the authorised tramways in Great Britain.

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