entitled to do so. This anticipation of the Vacation is not only illegal, but is the cause of considerable inconvenience to the public. One of the Lords Justices (having lunacy jurisdiction) is stated to have left England at the end of last week for the Continent, and orders and other proceedings were left unsigned and uncompleted. In matters which are considered urgent the documents can be forwarded for the judge's signature at the cost to the suitor of postage and registration fees, but considerable delay is occasioned, and no one is considered to have any right to complain. Judicial irregularities of this character were the subject of editorial comment in your columns at the commencement of the last Long Vacation, but the evil appears to be growing, and the public has no means of redress." The Exchequer Court of Canada held its first session in Manitoba on the 2nd June and following days, at the Court House, Winnipeg. The presence of Chief Henry Prince, of St. Peter's Reserve, arrayed in the orthodox scarlet coat with treaty medal "attachment," threw an unaccustomed glamour over the proceedings, and afforded what might be fairly termed a colourable right to the claims of his tribesman, Thomas. Several ex parte applications were made in regard to the payment of compensation moneys for lands expropriated for the Stonewall branch of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Before the court proceeded to hear the matters before it, Mr. Aikins, Q.C., as the representative of the Law Society, welcomed his Lordship to the Province, to which expression his Lordship replied in suitable terms. PARLIAMENTARY SUMMARY. HOUSE OF LORDS. Friday, Aug. 8. DIRECTORS' LIABILITY. On the order for the third reading of this Bill, Lord Herschell wished to correct some misapprehensions as to the changes made when the Bill was before the Select Committee. It seemed to be thought that the amendments then made had weakened the Bill, and had been made in the interests of directors and promoters rather than in the interests of the public. These statements proceeded from misapprehension both of the effect and intention of the amendments then made. The first exception taken was to the omission of the word "misleading; "but there were very few cases to which it would have applied which were not covered by the word "untrue," as it was always construed by the law. If the word had remained it would have included many cases which no reasonable man wished to include. Then it was said the omission of the words "reasonable extension" weakened the need for care and diligence on the part of directors. This also was a misapprehension. He was satisfied the provision, as it now stood, as it would be interpreted by the courts of law, would be just as effective as if the other words were there. Change had been made in the definition of the word "promoter," and he believed the Bill had been made a great deal more effective than when it came into their Lordships' House. He received almost every day circulars stating that there were more than twenty noble lords who were directors of four or more public companies. The only interpretation he could put upon that was that it was supposed to have influenced him in weakening the measure. He could only say that he had not been influenced by the consideration whether any noble lord was a member of four or of a thousand companies. He had only been influenced by a desire to make the Bill more effective than it was. It did not diminish any existing liability, but added to it. He regretted the alteration made by the amendment of the Lord Chancellor, relieving directors from responsibility for the reports of experts; and the more he reflected on the alteration the more he disliked it and feared it. Any man who put before the public the statement of an expert without taking means to know that the expert was a competent man was doing a discreditable and dishonourable act, because any man who read the prospectus would believe the director was putting it forward as one the public might safely rely on.-The Lord Chancellor held it was unreasonable to place on the director the burden of proof that he had no guilty knowledge in relation to the report of the expert. He disclaimed having weakened the Bill. A more ridiculous, absurd, and unworkable piece of legislation when it came up to their House he had never known before.-Lord Bramwell entirely concurred in the observations of Lord Herschell. After further remarks by the Earl of Mayo, Lord Thurlow, Viscount Bury, and other noble lords, the Bill was read a third time, and passed. HOUSE OF COMMONS. LONDON STREETS (REMOVAL OF GATES) BILL. On the consideration of the Lords' amendments to this Bill, the SolicitorGeneral expressed great surprise at the course taken by his colleague (Mr. Ritchie), and said it would be the worst possible result that the Duke of Bedford should obtain compensation and that the leaseholders should not. It was a general rule of indisputable justice and value, as embodied in the Lands Clauses Act, that where private interests were injured by what was done for the benefit of the public at large the persons injured should receive compensation. The amendment would do that which in his opinion would be absolutely unjustifiable. Although he held one of the ground leases on the estate, it was so far removed from a gate or bar that it would be idle to suppose that his case could be one for compensation. But all over the estate long leases were held by persons who had bought them under the conditions that then existed. It might be right that no compensation should be given at all, but it seemed indisputable that, if given at all, the leaseholders should be admitted to compensation as well as the Duke of Bedford. The Lords' amendments would allow all persons to assert such legal rights as they might possess.Mr. Courtney remarked that things were rather at sixes and sevens when they found the Solicitor-General differing so strongly from his colleagues. He entirely differed from the hon. and learned gentleman, and supported the amendment before the House. If the leaseholders were injured, their remedy would be against the Duke of Bedford.-Mr. H. Lawson pointed out that there was no proposal to take land or property, and therefore the argument of the Solicitor-General fell to the ground. There were no Covenants in the leases as to the maintenance of peace and quietness by means of the bars. As the Duke of Bedford did not oppose the Bill in the Upper House, it was to be presumed that he had been converted by the arguments used before the committee.-Mr. Gainsford Bruce supported the Lords' amendments, and assured Mr. Courtney that the leaseholders would have no remedy against the Duke of Bedford if the bars were removed, not by him, but under force of law. THE CREWE MURDER. On the vote for the Home Office, Mr. Pickersgill drew attention to the action of the Home Secretary in the Crewe murder case, wherein, he contended, the right hon. gentleman made a hair-splitting distinction, and exercised the Royal clemency in a direction contrary to the finding of the jury. Mr. Matthews felt some difficulty in discussing the matters now raised, for he held that these were cases in which the interference of the House of Commons was likely to be most mischievous. Macaulay once said that he would rather trust the prerogative of mercy to the worst minister who ever lived than to the best House of Commons. The prerogative as it was exercised in this country enabled a public official to take into account considerations of every kind which no other tribunal could take into consideration, and which would not be accessible to any other Court of Appeal. He had examined and sifted a vast amount of evidence in the Crewe case, including a confidential report from the judge who tried the case. The materials on which he formed his judgment were not and could not be, placed before the public. The hon. member opposite (Mr.M'Laren) had thought fit to go down to Crewe in the middle of the excitement which prevailed in order to make an electioneering speech on a murder case. He had not referred to the hon. member's conduct before, but he would now say that the last criticism to which he (Mr. Matthews) would ever sacrifice one jot or one tittle of his judgment was the criticism of an hon. member who could use a criminal case for electioneering purposes. He trusted the day would never come when a responsible Minister of the Crown advised Her Majesty to exercise her highest prerogative in order to suit some popular outcry. He felt it was not possible to produce to the House of Commons the information on which a Minister painfully and laboriously came to a conclusion with regard to the prerogative of mercy. -Mr. H. Fowler thought the discussion had shown the absolute necessity of establishing a Court of Criminal Appeal. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED. BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL Courts. HOUSE OF LORDS. Patent-Validity-Variation between Provisional and Complete Specification-Distinct. Statement of Invention claimed.-It is an essential condition of a good patent that the invention described in the provisional specification should be the same as that in the complete specification. But, if the complete specification does not end with a distinct statement of the invention claimed, the patent will not be held void on that ground. Judgment of the Court of Appeal (59 L. T. Rep. N. S. 575; 39 Ch. Div. 92) affirmed: (Vickers v. Siddell. H. of L. Aug. 7. Counsel: Moulton, Q.C., Bousfield, A. J. Ashton; Sir R. Webster, A.-G., Aston, Q.C., W. N. Lawson. Solicitors: Cottams, Jehu, and Co., for Younge, Wilson, and Co., Sheffield; Johnson, Son, and Ellis. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Ancient Lights—Lateral Obstruction-Anticipated Injury—Injunction or Damages-Lord Cairns' Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27), s. 2.-The plaintiff in the action was the owner of two houses possessing ancient lights in a narrow alley, eleven feet wide, running north and south. The defendants pulled down two old buildings at the south end of the alley, and intended erecting new buildings about double the height of the old ones, and nine feet nearer to the plaintiff's houses. An interim injunction was obtained when the new buildings had reached the height of the old ones. One of the plaintiff's houses was occupied by a trunkmaker, at a rental of £42 a year; the other by an umbrella coverer at 18s. a week. Gas had to be used in the shops for a considerable part of the day. In their building scheme the defendants had enlarged and heightened a passage leading under the two old buildings into the alley, and so improved the position of the plaintiff's houses. It was admitted that the proposed buildings would cause some diminution of the plaintiff's light, but it was argued that no substantial injury would be done to the houses, having regard to their present position and user, and that, if there was any injury, it was a case for the court, in its discretion, to grant damages in lieu of an injunction: (Holland v. Worley, 50 L. T. Rep. N. S. 526; 26 Ch. Div. 578.) Held, applying Moore v. Hall, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 419; 3 Q. B. Div. 178, that regard must be had to the use for which the shops might hereafter be put, and that an injunction, both mandatory and preventive, was the proper remedy, and must be granted: (Dicker v. Popham, Radford, and Co. Kekewich, J. Aug. 1.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Warmington, Q.C. and Vernon Smith; for the defendants, Neville, Q.C. and A. Birrell. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Torr, Janeways, Gribble, and Oddie; for the defendants, Radford and Frankland, for Whiteford and Bennett, Plymouth. Breach of Trust-Improper Investment-Claim against Estate of deceased Trustee-Parties-R. 8. C., Order XVI., r. 8-Trustee Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 59), s. 8, sub-sect. 1 (a) (b).-The three trustees of the will of a testator in 1878 invested a sum of £8000 upon the security of certain real estates, and in 1878 the two surviving trustees invested a further sum of £1800 upon the security of one of the properties formerly mortgaged. The securities proved insufficient, and in 1889 an action was commenced against C., who was the sole survivor of the three trustees, and against the representatives of the two other trustees, for the purpose of rendering them liable for the loss to the trust estate. It was alleged that a sum of £8000 was invested in the name of R., who was the executor of G., one of the trustees, and was held by him as executor and trustee of G.'s will, and that this sum was applicable to answer the plaintiff's claim against G. Held, that, having regard to Order XVI., r. 8, the beneficiaries under G.'s will were not necessary parties to the claim against R., as trustee for executor of G.'s estate. Held further, that the claim against R. did not come within the Trustee Act 1888, sect. 8, sub-sect. 1, clause (a), but that it was defeated by sect. 8, sub-sect. 1, clause (b) of that Act: (Andrew v. Cooper. Ch. Div.: Fry, L.J. Feb. 8.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Warmington, Q.C. and Methold for the defendants, S. Hall, Q.C. and E. S. Ford; R. Neville, Q.C. and T. L. Higgins; O. L. Clare. Solicitors: Rowcliffe, Rawle, and Co., agents for Claye and Sons, Manchester; Wynne, Holme, and Wynne, agents for Cooper and Sons, Manchester; H. Percy Becker, agent for Hedgcock and Ducker, Manchester. 66 Building Society-Winding-up as unregistered Company-Vesting Order -Oficial Liquidator-Practice-Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), ss. 95, 203.-It is enacted by sect. 203 of the Companies Act 1862 that: If any unregistered company has no power to sue and be sued in a common name, or if for any reason it appears expedient, the court may by the order made for winding-up such company, or by any subsequent order, direct that all such property, real and personal, including all interest, claims, and rights in, to, and out of property real and personal, and including things in action, as may belong to or be vested in the company, or to or in any person or persons on trust for or on behalf of the company, or any part of such property, is to vest in the official liquidator or official liquidators by his or their official name or names, and thereupon the same, or such part thereof as may be specified in the order, shall vest accordingly." A building society which was established under the Building Societies Act 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 32), and not subsequently incorporated under the Building Societies Act 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 42), was in course of being wound-up compulsorily as an unregistered company' "under the Companies Acts. A motion was made in the name of the official liqui dator of the society for an order under sect. 203 of the Companies Act 1862, directing that the several freehold and leasehold properties then vested in the sole surviving trustee of the society as mortgagee, and all such other property and rights in, to, and out of property real and personal, and including things in action, as belonged to or were vested in the society, or to or in any person or persons on trust for or on behalf of the society, should vest in the official liquidator by his official name; and that the official liquidator should be at liberty to exercise any of the powers conferred on him by sect. 95 of the Companies Act 1862 without the sanction or intervention of the court, and particularly to sell the real and personal property, effects, and things in action of the society, and transfer the whole thereof to any person or company, and do all acts and execute in the name of the society all deeds and other documents. The latter part of the motion, as to exercising powers without the sanction or intervention of the court, was made on the authority of Re Ebsworth and Tidy's Contract (60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 841; 42 Ch. Div. 23). The trustee appeared and raised no objection to the motion. Held, that, subject to the notice of motion being amended by making it in the name of the society instead of in that of the liquidator, the usual vesting order should be granted. But held, that the right to exercise the powers conferred by sect. 95 of the Companies Act 1862, without the sanction or intervention of the court, could not be allowed, it being improper to make the order in such general terms.: (Re The Britannia Permanent Benefit Building Society. Ch. Div.: Kay, J. Aug. 8.-Counsel: Eve; Hood. Solicitors: Pattison, Wigg, and Co., agents for Wilkinson and Marshall, Newcastle-on-Tyne; G. B. Wheeler. Company-Shareholder-Agent-Authority-Liquidation-Liability.— On the 13th May 1869, at a board meeting, 200 shares in the Britannia Fire Association Limited were allotted to Samuel Coventry. Millis Coventry, his father, was a director, and present at the meeting. Samuel Coventry lived abroad, and never applied for shares, and gave no authority to Millis to apply for the shares. On the 7th March 1881 an order was made winding-up the company. On the 4th July 1881 the liquidator of the company applied to Samuel Coventry for the payment of £600 in respect of the shares, but received no reply. On the 18th Jan. 1883, at a board meeting of the Briton Medical and General Life Association, large creditors of the Britannia Company, Millis Coventry being a director of the Briton Medical, and being present at the meeting, it was resolved that certain shareholders of the Britannia Fire Association, including Samuel Coventry, could successfully resist any calls in respect of their shares in the Britannia Association on the ground that they knew nothing about the matter. Millis Coventry died in March 1886, and Samuel Coventry died in Sept. 1889. The liquidator then put the executors of Millis Coventry on the list of contributories in respect of the 200 shares. On summons to remove the executors of Millis Coventry from the list of contributories: Held, that Millis Coventry had no authority from Samuel to apply for the shares, and that Millis Coventry was the proper contributory, therefore Millis Coventry's executors were properly put upon the list of contributories, and the summons must be refused with costs: (Re Britannia Fire Association Limited. Ch. Div.: Kay, J. Aug. 6 and 7.)-Counsel: Renshaw, Q.C. and J. W. Baines; Marten, Q.C. and Beddall. Solicitors: Watney, Tilleard, and Freeman; J. J. Nash. Company Winding-up-Contributory-Certificate settling Contributories-Time for Application to have Name removed from List of Contributories-Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 124-General Orders, Nov. 1862-Order XXX., XXXI., LXIII.—Rules of the Supreme Court 1883-Order LV., r. 70-In May 1889 A. was settled upon the list of contributories in the winding-up of a company. Notices of the various proceedings were sent to A.'s address as appearing in the share ledger, but, owing to his absence abroad, they did not, as he alleged, come into his hands. In Jan. 1890 application was made on A.'s behalf to have his name removed from the register in respect of certain shares. On an objection being taken that the application was out of time, reliance was placed upon the case of Re Elham Valley Railway Company'; Dickson's case (41 L. T. Rep. N. S. 184; 12 Ch. Div. 298). Held, that as Order LV., r. 70, of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1883 did not apply to a certificate settling a list of contributories, there was no definite limit of time for applications such as this; and that, as nobody had been injured by the delay, and no judicial decision had been given, as in Dickson's case (ubi sup.), the applicant was entitled to be heard: (Re Liverpool Household Stores Association; Ex parte Blundell. Kekewich, J. Aug. 11.)-Counsel: for the applicant, Neville, Q.C. and Lawrance; for the official liquidator, Warmington, Q.C. and T. R. Hughes. Solicitors: Tyrer, Kenion, Tyrer, and Simpson, Liverpool; Barrell, Rodway, and Co., Liverpool. County Council-Highway-" Main Road"-"Roadside Wastes"-Local Government Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), s. 11, sub-sects. 1, 6.-This action related to the rights of a county council in respect of the herbage, trees, &c., growing upon the strips of land lying on each side of the metalled portion (between that portion and the hedge on either side) of a high road or main road. The metalled portion of that part of the high road in question (running from Newark to Lincoln) which was in the district of the defendant county council was of the uniform width of twenty-two feet, the total width of the road between hedge and hedge varied from sixty-five to ninety-five feet. The unmetalled portion of the road was covered with grass, timber, and other growths. The plaintiff Curtis claimed to be tenant for life of the whole of the strips of land by the side of the highways in the parish of Swinderby. The strips were let annually by the plaintiff to the occupiers of cottages in the neighbourhood. Those tenants were joined as co-plaintiffs. The defendant county council had purported to sell the whole of the herbage on the roadside strips to a co-defendant for a year. The county council alleged that by virtue of sect. 11, sub-sect. 6, of the Local Government Act 1868, the soil of the whole width of a main road between the hedges, including the unmetalled strips, was vested in them, and that this gave them the right to the herbage. The plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting or removing the grass, trees, &c., growing upon the strips in question. The plaintiffs now moved for an interlocutory injunction. The motion was treated as the trial of the action. Held, that the strips of land were roadside wastes" within the meaning of sub-sect. 1 of sect. 11, and that they were not vested by sub-sect. 6 in the county council. An injunction was therefore granted, but without prejudice to the rights of the county council under the Act of 1888 and the Highways Acts: (Curtis v. Kesteven County Council. Ch. Div.: North, J. Aug. 1.)-Counsel: Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Ingle Joyce; R. S. Wright and Vernon R. Smith. Solicitors: Woolley; Peacock and Goddard. Duress-Execution of Deed-Stifling Prosecution.-The plaintiff's husband was the secretary and the defendants were trustees of a land society, of which the plaintiff's husband had misappropriated some of the funds, and the plaintiff had executed a mortgage of her own property to the defendants to secure the amount of her husband's default. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that the mortgage had been executed by her under illegal pressure, and as part of an arrangement for stifling criminal proceedings by the trustees against her husband. The plaintiff, who was the only witness on her own behalf, deposed that the first time she heard of the circumstances was when she was called upon to execute the mortgage at a solicitor's office in presence of her husband and one of the defendants, when the defendant told her that this was the only way to save her husband from prosecution. The defendant deposed that he had never mentioned criminal proceedings, nor had they been suggested or contemplated by the trustees, but that the plaintiff's husband, being in default and unable to pay, had told him that his wife was willing to secure the amount, and had arranged to do so. There was no evidence as to what, if anything, had passed previously between the plaintiff and her husband, the husband not being a witness. The solicitor who prepared the deed explained it to the plaintiff, but he was not told under what circumstances the debt arose. The plaintiff acknowledged the deed before a commissioner, and said she executed itvoluntarily. The Court was of opinion (1) that, although there might have been no threat used towards the plaintiff, yet that it must have been present to her mind that, unless something was done to prevent it, her husband would be at any rate liable to a criminal prosecution; (2) that this information came either from the defendant or from the plaintiff's husband as agent of the trustees; (3) that this was the motive of the plaintiff in executing the deed, and that it must be delivered up to be cancelled: (McClatchie v. Haslam. Kekewich, J. Aug. 8.)-Counsel: for plaintiff, J. G. Wood; for defendants, Warmington, Q.C. and Dundas Gardiner. Solicitors: for plaintiff, Torr and Co., for Parker Woodward, Nottingham; for defendants, Swann and Co., for E. Newcome Elborne, Nottingham. Legacy-Election-Interest.—A testator bequeathed to his wife specific articles and a sum of £1000 to be paid to her within three months after his decease. He devised and bequeathed his residuary estate to his trustees upon trust for sale, and he directed his trustees to set aside out of the proceeds of sale the sum of £2000 and invest the same and permit his wife to receive the income thereof. The will contained the following proviso: "I declare that the provision herein before made for my said wife shall be accepted by her in lieu of all her claim to dower or freebench out of my said estate." This was the further consideration of an action to administer the testator's estate, and the question was raised, from what time the widow was entitled to interest on the £2000 directed to be set apart. Held, that interest on the £2000 ran from the end of the year after the testator's death: (Re Bignold; Bignold v. Bignold. Ch. Div.: North, J. July 30.)-Counsel: CozensHardy, Q.C. and Chubb; Everitt, Q.C. and A. J. Chitty. Solicitors: Thorneycroft and Willis; Eldred and Bignold; F. A. and A. C. Doyle; Blake and Heseltine. Ch. Div.: Master and Servant-Ballet Girls - Enticement to break Contract of Service-Notice of former Contract.-The plaintiff, on the 13th May 1889, entered into separate agreements with five young ladies, whereby they agreed to perform in the ballet for the plaintiff during the following winter season at certain salaries. In Oct. 1889 B., who had at that time no notice of these agreements, engaged the same young ladies to perform in the ballet under his directions. The plaintiff, on discovering this engagement, gave notice to B. of the agreements of the 13th May 1889, but, notwithstanding this, the ladies continued to be employed by B. The plaintiff sued B. for damages for continuing to employ the ladies after notice of the agreements of the 13th May 1889, and the ladies for breach of their agreements. Held (following Blake v. Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221), that an action will lie against one who continues to employ the servant of another after notice of the contract of service, and that, in order to maintain such an action, it is not necessary that the employer and employed should stand in the strict relation of master and servant, and that the plaintiff was in the present case entitled to damages against B.: (De Francesco v. Barnum. Ch. Div.: Fry, L.J. Aug. 7 and 8.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, R. Neville, Q.C. and Kalisch; for the defendants, Warmington, Q.C. and Lemon; Stevenson. Solicitors: Brandon and Nicholson; Campbell, Reeves, and Hooper; Clinton and Co. Mortmain-Corporation of Manchester-Consolidated Stock-Charge on Land-Impure Personalty Municipal Corporations Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76), 8. 92. A testator by his will gave a sum of £4000 Corporation of Manchester Four per Cent. Consolidated Stock to a charity. The chief clerk found that this sum of stock was a charge upon land, and therefore" impure personalty," subject to the provisions of 9 Geo 2, c. 36, and incapable of being so bequeathed. The stock was created under the provisions of sect. 34 of the Manchester Corporation Waterworks and Improvement Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 31), by which power was conferred upon the Corporation of Manchester to create and issue stock bearing a fixed and perpetual dividend not exceeding 4 per cent. per annum, and it was enacted that "the stock so created and issued. shall be a charge upon the city rate, and all landed and other property vested in or belonging to the corporation or which may be acquired by them, but shall be distributable, transmissible, and transferable as, and in other respects have the incidents of, personal estate." The certificate held by the testator described him as "the registered proprietor of £4000 of the Manchester Corporation Consolidated Stock issued by the mayor, aldermen, and citizens of the city of Manchester pursuant to Act of Parliament, and entitled to a fixed and perpetual dividend or interest thereon at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, payable in equal_half-yearly portions," and had upon it the following indorsement: "I, Sir Joseph Heron, town clerk of the city of Manchester, do hereby certify that the sum secured by the within written stock certificate is a charge upon the city rate, and all landed and other property vested in or belonging to the Corporation of Manchester, or which may be acquired by them, and that the amount so secured is within the borrowing powers of the said corporation as fixed by Act of Parliament." On summons to vary the chief clerk's certificate: Held, that the stock was charged upon real estate, and could not be dealt with for the purposes of charity; the summons therefore must be dismissed with costs: (Re Holmes; Holmes v. Holmes. Ch. Div.: Kay, J. Aug. 5 and 6.)-Counsel: Haldane, Q.C. and Hornell; Bramwell Davis; Renshaw, Q.C. and Decimus Sturges. Solicitors: F. Brooke ; Meredith, Roberts, and Mills. Practice Costs-Partition Action-Incumbered Shares-Discretion of Court-Partition Act 1868, s. 10.-This was the further consideration of a partition action. The property had been sold, and the proceeds of sale paid into court. The property had been originally devised by a will to three persons in equal shares, but, at the date of the certificate, the defendants were entitled to a moiety, and the plaintiffs were entitled to one-sixth absolutely, and to the remaining two-sixths, subject to two mortgages, the first of which was to the plaintiffs themselves. The second mortgagees were served with notice of the judgment. The question was raised whether each party was entitled to costs out of the fund, or whether, as regarded an incumbered share, only one set of costs could be allowed to be shared between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, by analogy to the rule which exists as to costs in administration actions in the case of a mortgaged share. Held, that the costs of all parties, including the mortgagees, must be paid out of the fund before its division: (Belcher v. Williams. Ch. Div.: North, J. Aug. 2.)-Counsel: Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Oswald; Stewart-Smith; Yate Lee; Pochin. Solicitors: J. G. Shearman; Street and Poynder; Vertue; J. G. Shearman, jun. Practice Official Referee-Action-Trial-Accounts Inquiries-Further Consideration-Jurisdiction-Order on Referee-"Officer of the Court Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 58—Arbitration Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49), ss. 13, 14, 15-Rules of Court 1883, Order XXXVI., rr. 50, 52a.-An action was brought by the residuary legatees under a will against the executors and an agent employed by the testator in continuing a business which had since his death been sold to the agent pursuant to an agreement entered into in his lifetime, charging the defendants, the executors, with having, by collusion with the defendant, their agent, neglected to get in an amount alleged to be due from him to the testator's estate. The trial of the action was, by an order made in Aug. 1889, and expressed to be made under sect. 57 of the Judicature Act 1873, transferred to the official referee, who pronounced judgment against the defendants on the ground of wilful default, and directed inquiries and accounts to be taken before himself on that footing; and he also directed that the further consideration of the action should be taken before himself. The registrar drew up the order, directing that the inquiries and accounts only should be taken before the official referee, and reserving further consideration, but not before the official referee, and the order was entered in that shape. On a motion by the plaintiffs before the official referee to proceed with the order as drawn up and entered, he refused to proceed under it, on the was not his order," not being in the form pronounced ground that it by him. The plaintiffs then moved before Kay, J. for directions on the official referee to proceed with the order; but the motion was ordered to stand over pending an appeal by the defendants from so much of the order as directed accounts to be taken on the footing of wilful default. On that appeal the decision of the official referee on that point was affirmed; and, neither party objecting, the Court of Appeal directed that the further consideration should be taken by the official referee. The adjourned motion requiring the official referee to proceed now came on to be disposed of, the only question remaining being as to the costs of it. Some discussion, however, arose as to whether the official referee officer of the court," and therefore amenable to an order made by a judge of the High Court in any action referred by him to the official referee. Held, that an official referee was to be deemed an officer of the court" when an action went to him for "trial;" that, notwithstanding the Arbitration Act 1889, the court had the right to order the official referee to suspend proceedings; and that there would be no order on the motion either as to costs or otherwise: (Re Palmer; Polmer v. Hardwick. Ch. Div.: Kay, J. Aug.1.)-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Renshaw, Q.C. and Eastwick; for the defendants, Yate Lee. Solicitors: Sole, Turner, and Knight; Routh, Stacey, and Castle, agents for H. Thompson and Son, Grantham. was an 66 Royal Mines-Gold mixed with other Minerals-Right of Subject to work -1 Will. & M., c. 30; 5 Will. & M., c. 6–55 Geo. 3, c. 134.-This was an action by the Attorney-General against Morgan for an injunction to restrain his working a gold-mine in Wales without the licence of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests. The writ was issued on the 26th April 1889, before which date it was admitted that Morgan had worked the mine under a lease from the owner of the land, and obtained some gold. On the 4th May 1889 an interlocutory injunction was granted. On the 7th May a company was registered, under the name of the Morgan Gold Mining Company Limited, for working the mine. The prospectus of the company described the mine to be worked as a gold-mine, and nothing else, and contained statements of the workings showing reason to expect that the mine would turn out rich and profitable. Morgan granted an underlease to the company, and the owner of the land took out a licence from the Commissioners of Woods and Forests to work gold at a royalty of 1/30th. This licence was assigned to the company, who worked under it and paid the royalty. The defendant Morgan, however, denied the right of the Crown, and insisted on the action being brought to a hearing to decide the point. It was proved that the quartz which was crushed for gold contained lead, copper, iron, and zinc, but in such small quantities that the ores could not be worked profitably for any of these metals. The defendant relied on the statutes 1 Will. & M., c. 30, and 5 Will. & M., c. 6. The first of these, after reciting that since the passing of a statute of 5 Hen. 4, making it felony to multiply gold and silver, "divers persons have by their study, industry, and learning arrived at great skill and perfection in the art of melting and refining of metals, and otherwise improving them and their ores, and extracting gold and silver out of the same, but dare not exercise their said skill within this realm for fear of falling under the penalty of the said statute, but exercise the said art in foreign parts to the great loss and detriment of this realm," repeals the said statute, and enacts that "all gold and silver which should be extracted by the aforesaid art of melting and refining of metals, and otherwise improving them and their ores," should be brought to the Mint and there purchased at its full value, and that no mine of copper, tin, iron, or lead shall hereafter be adjudged, reputed, or taken to be a royal mine, although gold and silver may be extracted out of the same. The second, which is intituled "An Act to prevent disputes and controversies concerning Royal mines," after reciting that doubts and controversies had arisen upon the former statute, enacts that all subjects of the Crown of England, being owners of any mines within England and Wales wherein any ore is or shall be discovered or wrought, and in which there is copper, tin, iron, or lead, shall and may hold and enjoy the same mine or mines and ore, and continue in the possession thereof, and dig and work the same mine or mines and ore, notwithstanding that the same shall be claimed to be a Royal mine or Royal mines. The Act then reserves to the Crown a right to purchase the ore of any such mine "when washed, made clean and merchantable, at the price of £16 a ton for ore wherein is copper, £2 per ton for ore wherein there is tin or iron, and £9 per ton for ore wherein there is lead; and that in default of payment of such respective sums the owners of the said mine or mines may sell and dispose of the same to their own uses.' By the 55 Geo. 3, c. 134, the price of lead ore was raised to £25 per ton. The defendant contended that these Acts applied to auriferous quartz in which there was any quantity, however small, of the named metals, and that the only right of the Crown was to purchase the quartz rock brought to bank at the specified prices. Held, that the object of the Acts was to secure to the subject the right to work the copper, tin, iron, or lead ores in his soil, and at the same time to secure to the Crown alí the gold and silver contained in such ores if the Crown chose to take it, paying the value of the iron, tin, or lead which accompanied it; and that they did not apply at all to mines of gold ore containing the named metals in such trivial quantities as not to be worth working. The defendant was therefore ordered to pay the costs of the action: (AttorneyGeneral v. Morgan. Ch. Div.: North J. Aug. 6.)-Counsel: The Attorney-General, Napier Higgins, Q.C., and Vaughan Hawkins; Defendant in person. Solicitors: Solicitor to the Woods and Forests; Davidson and Morris. " Settled Land Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), sect. 25 (19), (20), sect. 33-Improvement-Trustees-Settlement Money in the Hands of Trustees liable to be laid out in the Purchase of Land to be made subject to the Settlement.-M. by his will gave his residuary personal estate to his executors upon trust to invest the same in freehold land, and to settle the same or cause it to be settled to the uses, upon the trusts, and under and subject to the powers, provisions, and declarations of a certain indenture of settlement therein referred to. This settlement was a legal one, and the trustees were not the same persons as the executors. This was an originating summons by the tenant for life under the settlement, asking for the approval of the court to the executors laying out a part of the moneys in their hands under this bequest in putting down powerful pumping machinery in coal-mines forming part of the settled estates. This machinery was wanted to guard against a probable influx of water from the working by other persons of certain seams of coal, the working of which had been restrained by injunction until the expiration of the lease under which a portion of the settled collieries was held. The lease expired in 1902, or on the coal being worked out, which event was expected to happen in two years. Held, that the proposed expenditure was an improvement within the definition of improvements upon which capital money arising under the Act may be expended in sub-sects. 19 and 20 of sect. 25 of the Settled Land Act; but the Court not being satisfied that the executors could be regarded as trustees within the meaning of the Act, or that the money in their hands was money "in the hands of trustees liable to be laid out in the purchase of land to be made subject to the settlement" within the meaning of sect. 33, and desiring the opinion of the Court of Appeal to be taken on the point, declined to make any order: (Re Mundy's Settled Estates and the Settled Land Act 1882. Ch. Div. North, J. Aug. 7.)-Counsel: Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Dibdin; Sydney Williams. Solicitor: H. B. Wade, for Fowler, Warwick, and Neale, Leicester. Will Construction - Annuity Die without leaving Children' 'Having had "-Vested Interest.-Testator gave an annuity to his daughter L. for life, and other annuities to another daughter A., and four grandchildren for their lives. And he directed that from and immediately after the decease of any such annuitant as aforesaid, his or her annuity should be "payable and paid half-yearly (during the existence of the lease of the premises at Cardiff thereinafter mentioned or referred to) to and amongst his or her children, as being a son or sons should attain the age of twenty-one years, or being a daughter or daughters should attain that age or marry, in equal shares and proportions, and in the event of there being but one such child, should be payable and paid to such only child; and in the event of the death of his said daughter L., or of his said daughter A., or of all his said four last-named grandchildren, without leaving any such child as last aforesaid respectively," he gave the annuity or annuities to other people. His daughter L. died without leaving any children, but she had a child who attained twenty-one, and died in her lifetime. On originating summons: Held, that the principle of the cases, where there has been a vested interest in a capital sum in children, and the word "leaving has been construed as meaning "having had," does not apply to an annuity: Held, therefore, that the representative of the deceased child of L. took nothing: (Re Hemingway; James v. Dawson. Ch. Div.: Kay, J. Aug. 6.)-Counsel: Theobald; W. H. Gover. Solicitors: Cunliffes and Davenport, for C. A. Heitzman, Cardiff; Williamson, Hill, and Co., for H. Heard, Cardiff. Will-Mortgage-Sale-Deficiency-Tenant for Life-RemaindermenApportioning Loss.-A testator, who died in 1836, by his will dated in Dec. 1835, gave his residuary estate to trustees upon trust for sale, and to pay the income of the proceeds to his widow during her widowhood; and, if she should marry again, then to pay a yearly sum to her during the remainder of her life; and after her death upon certain trusts as to the capital of the proceeds (subject to certain payments therein directed) for the absolute benefit of the testator's brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces; and the testator gave power to his trustees to postpone the sale of his residuary estate, and also to invest trust moneys on real securities. In 1845 and 1850 the trustees of the will invested sums amounting in the whole to £7535, being part of the testator's residuary estate, upon mortgage of certain freehold property bearing interest at 5 per cent. per annum. In 1862 the trustees entered into possession of this mortgaged property, and paid the rents from time to time to the testator's widow as tenant for life until her death; but (with the exception or three years in which such rents slightly exceeded the annual sum payable for interest) such rents were insufficient to keep down the interest, the total deficiency at the widow's death being nearly £3400. The widow died on the 28th April 1888, and shortly afterwards the trustees sold the mortgaged property, but the sale produced £7005 only, being less than the principal mortgage money, and it was stated that nothing could be recovered from the mortgagor. An originating summons was taken out by the trustees of the testator's will against the executors of the widow, and one of the residuary legatees, for the purpose of determining whether any and what portion of the £7005 ought to be paid to the executors of the widow, and, if so, upon what basis ought such portion to be calculated or ascertained. Held, that the executors of the tenant for life were entitled to a portion of the £7005, which the court directed to be ascertained in effect as follows: The net proceeds of sale were to be added to the income actually received from the mortgage security by the tenant for life, and that aggregate sum was to be divided between the residuary legatees and the executors of the tenant for life in the proportion which the original principal, plus interest thereon at 4 per cent. per annum from the death of the tenant for life to the date of the sale, would bear to the aggregate amount of interest (less income tax) which the tenant for life ought to have received during her life from the mortgage security had interest been regularly paid, deducting, however, from the sum so apportioned to the executors of the tenant for life the amount she actually received during her life, and then so much of the £7005 as was equal to this amount so ascertained would be payable to the executors of the tenant for life: (Re Foster; Lloyd v. Carr. Ch. Div.: Kay, J. Aug. 7.)-Counsel: for the trustees of the will, H. B. Howard; for the executors of the tenant for life, Renshaw, Q.C. and Farwell; for the residuary legatees, George Henderson. Solicitors: Murray, Hutchins, and Stirling; George J. Coldham, agent for Andrews, Canham, and Co., Sudbury, Suffolk; Turner and Hacon. Will-Will of Married Woman-Death of Husband-Subsequent Execution of Testamentary Instrument-Admission of Will and Instrument to Probate-Reference in Instrument to Will-Republication of Will.M. S. had under her marriage settlement a power of appointment over certain real estate and a sum of £2000 New Three per Cents., which were comprised in the settlement. By her will, dated in 1878 and made in the lifetime of her husband, she exercised this power, and also purported to dispose of all other property over which she had any disposing power in favour of certain beneficiaries. Her husband died in 1884, and after his death M. S. executed an instrument dated the 30th July 1885, and attested by two witnesses, in the following form: "This is a present to O. N. R. frem his aunt M. S. by the express wish of his late uncle J. S. a few weeks before his death, ten shares of £10 each in the D. Gas Company." M. S. died in 1888, and her will and the instrument were admitted to probate. Besides the property comprised in the settlement and subject to the power of appointment, and certain separate property, M. S. possessed other property to which she was absolutely entitled, and which consisted (inter alia) of the ten gas shares mentioned in the instrument of the 30th July 1885. The question was now raised whether the instrument operated as a republication by M. S., after she had a complete power of disposition, of the will made while she had only a limited power of disposition, so as to make that will speak from the time of republication, and pass the property which belonged to her absolutely at her death. Held, that, although it was not necessary that the instrument should express a particular intention to republish the will, there ought nevertheless to be a reference of some sort to the will expressing the testator's intention that the will should be considered as of a subsequent date, and that, applying that test to the present case, there was not enough in the instrument from which such an inference could be drawn. Held, therefore, that the instrument did not amount to a republication of the will: (Re Maria Smith; Bilke v. Roper. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. July 13. Aug. 7.)-Counsel: Crawley; Waggett; H. Robertson; Vernon R. Smith. Solicitors: Guscotte, Wadham, and Daw; Paterson, Snow, Bloxham, and Kinder, for E. Holmes, Braintree; H. S. Clutton, for Andrews, Son, and Huxtable, Weymouth. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Injunction-Carrying on Business in a manner calculated to deceive the Public-Dentists Act 1878-Sufficiency of Registration-Ex turpi causá non oritur actio.-The plaintiff's business, as a dentist, had been established for some years under the name of Rogers and Davis." It was originally established by the plaintiff's father, and, after his death, was carried on by the plaintiff and his brother, who added the name of Rogers to his former name of Davis, the name of Rogers being, it was said, familiar to the public in that locality in connection with dentistry. The defendants had recently put a man named Rogers into premises almost immediately opposite to those occupied by the plaintiff, to which they affixed conspicuous notices, in the following words: Rogers, the old-established dentist," and at the same time advertised the business in the newspapers as "established forty years.' plaintiff had himself assumed the name of Rogers, because of the renown which he had previously obtained, and he had registered under the Dentists Act only the name of Davis. He had also issued advertisements in which there were several misstatements. Held, that the registration was sufficient, and that, although the plaintiff could hardly be said to come into court with clean hands, the matters relied upon to establish his turpitude were too remote and collateral to afford a complete reason for refusing the relief which he sought, and that an injunction ought to be granted to restrain the defendants from placing the name of Rogers on their place of business, it being found as a fact that their object in so doing was to mislead the public: (Davis v. Rogers and Mallam. Q. B. Div.: Lopes, L.J. Aug. 4.)-Counsel: for The the plaintiff, Herbert Reed; for the defendants, H. Kisch. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, S. C. Sydney; for the defendants, Joseph Davis. Innkeeper-Lien-Separate property of Wife-Husband and Wife staying together at Hotel-Lien of Hotel-keeper for Hotel Bill on Goods, the separate Property of Wife.-Action tried before Lopes, L.J. without a jury. The action was brought by Messrs. Gordon and Hollands, proprietors of the Hôtel Métropole, to recover a sum of £340 48. 1d., being the balance of an hotel bill for board and lodging supplied between the months of June and August 1889. The defendant, Mr. Martin Silber, and his wife, Lady Lucy Silber, had stayed at the plaintiffs' hotel at various times from May to Sept. 1889, and had incurred an hotel bill, the balance of which was now sued for The defendant, Martin Silber, had become insolvent, whence the present action seeking to render his wife's goods and luggage liable for the payment of the bill. Before May 1889, Mr. Martin Silber had been staying at the Hôtel Métropole by himself, and had incurred expenses which he had paid. In May he was joined by his wife; she subsequently left for a fortnight, and then again joined her husband at the hotel. He met her at the station, and they came to the Hôtel Métropole with a large quantity of luggage and were received there, occupying the same rooms they had previously occupied. They continued to live there together until the 27th Aug., when Mr. Martin Silber left, Lady Lucy Silber remaining there until the 4th Sept., when she left. Mr. Martin Silber had made payments on account. The plaintiffs claimed the balance of the bill from Lady Lucy Silber, and sought to make her separate property liable, but the learned judge was of opinion that their claim in that respect could not be sustained against Lady Lucy Silber, on the ground that Mr. Martin Silber was the contracting party to whom credit, as Mr. Holland the proprietor candidly admitted, had been given. But the separate property of Lady Lucy Silber, in the shape of trunks, boxes, and their contents, had been detained by the plaintiffs as and for their lien in respect of the unpaid balance, the return of which property was claimed by Lady Lucy in her counter-claim. The question, therefore, was whether the plaintiffs, the hotel-keepers, were entitled to retain these last-mentioned goods of Lady Lucy. They were her separate property, but were brought into the hotel, and there received by the plaintiffs at the time when Mr. Martin Silber with his wife, Lady Lucy, became the guests of the plaintiffs. For Lady Lucy Silber it was contended that the innkeeper's lien only extended to the goods of the person contracting with the innkeeper, and brought to the inn as his own; for the plaintiffs it was contended that they had a lien on the goods of both, inasmuch as they were bound to receive both as guests and to keep safely and securely the goods of both. Held, that, as the plaintiffs, as im keepers, were bound to receive both as guests and to keep safely and securely the goods of both, whether they belonged to the wife as her separate property or not, the lien should be commensurate with the liability, and that therefore the plaintiffs had a lien upon all the goods which the defendants brought with them to the hotel, whether such goods were the separate property of the wife or not: (Gordon and Hollands v. Silber and another. Q. B. Div.: Lopes, L.J. July 28. Aug. 9.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, J. E. Bankes and Lewis Thomas; for the defendant, Lady Lucy Silber, J. R. Paget. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Ingram, Harrison, and Ingram; for the defendant, Arnold and Henry White. Practice Setting aside Judgment-Service of Writ on Manager of Partnership-Subsequent Service on alleged Partner-Judgment signed against Firm before Expiration of Eight Days from Service on PartnerRight of Partner to set aside Judgment-Orders IX., r. 6; XII, r. 15; XLII., r. 10.-Appeal from an order made by Day, J. at chambers, affirming an order of a master, setting aside a judgment which had been entered against the firm of H. Beckley and Co. An action Lad been brought by the plaintiff against the firm of H. Beckley and Co. on cer tain bills of exchange. The writ of summons in the action was issued in May 1890, and on the 29th May service of the writ was effected on the manager of the firm of H. Beckley and Co. On the 3rd June service of the writ was also effected on one H. J. Denison, who was alleged to be a partner in the firm of Beckley and Co., and who was sued as a partner, though his position was that he said he was not a partner. After the expiration of eight days from the service on the firm on the 29th May, judgment was signed against the firm of H. Beckley and Co. on the 6th June. H. Beckley and Co. do not defend the action, and no defence was put in by them. Execution having issued against the firm on the 9th June, Denison entered his appearance within eight days from the time of service on him, and he entered his appearance in the following form, "Enter an appearance for F. J. Denison," without any reason being assigned, and without any qualification or statement that he was or was not a partner. Judgment having thus been signed against the firm on the 6th June, Denison applied to a master to set aside that judg ment, on the ground that it was prematurely signed, as by Order XLII., r. 10, judgment having been signed against the firm, execution might issue without leave against any person who had been served as a partner and has failed to appear, or against any person who has appeared in his own name under Order XII., r. 15, and he contended that, although the firm had been served on the 29th May, he had not been served until the 3rd June, and that no judgment to affect him personally could be signed until the expiration of the eight days after the service on him, that is, until eight days after the 3rd June, and as the judgment against the firm had been signed on the 6th June, and as that judgment might affect him personally by execution issuing against his goods, that judgment was wrongly signed, and was premature, and ought to be set aside. In accordance with this contention, the master held that the judgment against the firm of H. Beckley and Co. was premature, and he ordered it to be set aside. Day, J. affirmed the order of the master, holding that the plaintiff, having served the alleged partner Denison, as well as the manager of the firm, could not sign judgment until eight days after the last service. The plaintiff appealed. Order IX., r. 6, provides for service on partners, and says that, where persons are sued as partners in the firm's name, service may be effected on one or more of the partners or on the manager of the partnership business. Order XII., r. 15, provides that where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, they shall appear individually in their own names. For the plaintiff it was now contended that there are different ways of serving partners: service may be on one of the partners, or on the manager as here; that the judgment against the firm on the 6th June was rightly and properly obtained, signed until eight days after service on the firm, and that it ought not to be set aside. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the judgment against the firm was prematurely signed on the 6th June, and that it was pro. as it was not perly set aside: (Alden v. H. Beckley and Co. Q. B. Div.: Pollock, B. and Grantham, J. Aug. 8.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, A. Powell; for the defendant, Gore. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, Herbert Toomer; for the defendant, Snell, Son, and Greenip. Vestry-Election of Vestryman Quo Warranto-Applicability of, to question Election of Vestryman-Qualification-Occupation of Club Premises as Secretary-Sufficiency of Metropolis Local Management Act 1855, sect. 6.-Rule calling on Francis William Soutter to show cause why an information in the nature of a quo warranto should not be exhibited against him to show by what authority he claims to exercise the office or franchise of a vestryman for Ward No. 4, in the parish of St. Mary Magdalene, Bermondsey, in the county of Surrey, upon the ground that the said Francis William Soutter is not qualified to act as vestryman for the said ward, as he is not rated or assessed to the relief of the poor of the said parish upon a rental of not less than £25 per annum of premises of which he is the bona fide occupier. The qualification for a vestryman is laid down in sect. 6 of the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855, where it is provided that "the vestry elected under this Act in any parish shall consist of persons rated or assessed to the relief of the poor upon a rental of not less than £40 per annum (under the circumstances of the present case £25 per annum), and no person shall be capable of acting or being elected as one of such vestry for any parish unless he is the occupier of a house, lands, tenements, or hereditaments in such parish, and be rated or assessed as aforesaid upon such rental within such parish: provided that the joint occupa tion of any such premises as aforesaid, and a joint rating in respect thereof, shall be sufficient to qualify each joint occupier in case the amount of rental on which all such occupiers are jointly rated will, when divided by the number of occupiers, give for each such occupier a sum not less than the amount herein before required." On the 14th May 1890 an election took place to fill three vacancies in the vestry there were six candidates, and Mr. Soutter was returned at the head of the poll, and Mr. Shand, at whose instance this rule was obtained, was the first unsuccessful candidate. Mr. Shand sought to have it declared that Mr. Soutter was not properly elected, as he was not duly qualified to act as a vestryman by reason of not having an occupation of £25 per annum, as required by sect. 6 of the statute. Mr. Shand also claimed the seat for himself. Mr. Soutter was rated as the occupier of the house in which he lived to the value of £19 per annum; he was also rated jointly with another person in respect of premises used as a club, the rating being £55 per annum. It was in reference to this latter Occupation or rating that the present question arose. With regard to this, the entry in the rate-book was as to the name of the occupier, the Southwark Club by its nominees Henry Quelch and Francis W. Soutter, and in his affidavit Mr. Soutter said that he was the secretary of the club, and that he had for his exclusive use the ground floor and first floor of the club premises; that he used these for his business as a coal merchant from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., and he claimed that that was a sufficient occupation to bring him within the section. In showing cause against the rule, the objection was taken that the proceedings by quo warranto would not lie in the case of a vestry, as it was not a public body created by statute (Darley v. The Queen, 12 Cl. & F. 520), but a mere common law institution, and it was also contended that Mr. Soutter's occupation of the club premises was a sufficient occupation within the section. In support of the rule it was urged that a vestry was no longer a common law institution, that it was now created by and regulated by statute, and that quo warranto was the proper mode for questioning the validity of the election of a vestryman; moreover that Mr. Soutter was not an occupier "of the club premises, but was a mere licensee, and not an occupier within the meaning of the section. Held, that, as the vestry was a public body elected under the provisions of an Act of Parliament, the procedure by quo warranto was the proper procedure for questioning the election of a vestryman. Held also, that Mr. Soutter's occupation of the club premises was not an occupation to qualify him within the section, as he occupied merely as the secretary and licensee of the club. Rule absolute: (Reg. v. Soutter. Q. B. Div.: Pollock, B. and Grantham, J. Aug. 7.)-Counsel: Cluer; Lynden Bell. Solicitors: Henry N. Philcox; R. H. Ward. 66 IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy Application to commit-Order to pay Interest-Order to pay Costs-Disobedience to-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 74. sub-sect. 6. Sect. 74, sub-sect. 6, of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 authorises the Board of Trade to charge a trustee, who retains for more than ten days a sum exceeding £50, with interest on the excess so retained at the rate of 20 per cent. A trustee having failed to comply with an order of the Board of Trade to pay interest under the above section, and also having failed to pay the costs of two motions successfully brought against him by the Board of Trade to pay over certain moneys, application was made to commit him. On behalf of the trustee it was contended that the court had no power to commit either for nonpayment of the interest or the costs, but in any event it ought first to be shown that the trustee had means of paying, and had not done so. The Court held, that there was jurisdiction to commit for disobedience to the order as to the interest, but not as to the costs on this application. That the most convenient course to pursue under the circumstances was for the Board of Trade to take out a debtor's summons, and then to apply for an order of committal under it: (Re Nicholson; Ex parte The Board of Trade. Q. B. Div. in Bank. : Cave, J. Aug. 8.)— Counsel for the Board of Trade, Muir Mackenzie; for the trustee, F. C. Willis. Solicitors: for the Board of Trade, The Solicitor to the Board of Trade; for the trustee, M. Bennett. Bankruptcy-Application to commit-Substituted Service of NoticeLeave to serve-Application to Registrar-Bankruptcy Rules 1886, rule 86.-Rule 86 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1886, enacts that, Subject to the provisions of the Act and rules, upon the filing of an application to commit, the registrar shall fix a time and place for the court to hear the application, &c. Provided that in any case in which the court may think fit, the court may allow substituted service of the notice by advertisement or otherwise. An ex parte application was made under the above rule for leave to effect substituted service of the notice of an application to commit the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor. On behalf of the applicant it was contended that the trustee could not be served personally, and that service could be effected by letter. It was also argued that the application could not be made to the registrar, but must be made to the judge according to the practice under the Act of 1869. The Court, without expressing any definite opinion as to whether or not such an application could be " made at all. Held, that, in any event, it ought to have been made to the registrar: (Re Calderwood; Ex parte Board of Trade. Q. B. Div. in Bank.: Cave, J. Aug. 7.)-Counsel: for the applicant, Muir Mackenzie. Solicitor: for the applicant, The Solicitor to the Board of Trade. Bankruptcy Execution Creditor Garnishee Order Completion of Attachment-What is Receipt of Debt - Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), 8. 45.-T. was entitled to certain sums of money from the Ealing Local Board, in respect of contracts entered into between him and the board. On July 22, 1889, F. obtained judgment against T. for £128 198. 6d., of which £78 198. 6d. remained unpaid, when on Aug. 6 F. obtained a garnishee order nisi to attach the moneys owing by the board to T. The board were not sitting, as it was vacation. The clerk then entered into an arrangement with F. that the money should be paid on the following 3rd Oct., and allowed the garnishee order to be made absolute, F. undertaking not to enforce the order in the meantime. On the 6th Sept. T., the judgment debtor, became bankrupt, and subsequent to the bankruptcy the local board paid the money to F. The trustees in bankruptcy of T. claimed the money and contended that there had been no completion of the attachment of the debt by payment before receiving order according to the provisions of sect. 45 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883. On the other hand, for the local board, it was urged that payment was unnecessary, as sect. 45 required merely receipt of the debt before receiving order, which had taken place in this case. The Court held that the case was governed by the decision of Manisty, J. in Butler v. Wearing (18 Q. B. Div. 182), and that therefore the trustee and not the judgment creditor was entitled to the money: (Re Trehearne; Ex parte Chief Official Receiver v. Ealing Local Board. Q.B. Div. in Bank.: Cave, J. April 28, Aug. 6 and 11.) Counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy, Muir Mackenzie; for the local board, E. Clayton. Solicitors: for the trustee in bankruptcy, The Solicitor to the Board of Trade; for the local board, E. Pilley. : PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. ADMIRALTY BUSINESS. Carriage of Goods-Charter-party-Commencement of Voyage-Excepted Perils Negligence General Average. By a charter-party made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the defendants' steamship C. P. being tight, staunch, and strong, was to proceed to N. F., and there load from the factors of the plaintiffs a cargo of sugar, and deliver the same to the plaintiffs at Greenock. By a term in the charter-party any act, neglect, or default whatsoever of the pilot, master, or crew, or other servants of the shipowner, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and steam navigation, of what nature and kind soever during the said voyage, always excepted. After the vessel arrived at N. F., and whilst the cargo was being taken in, it was damaged by water which got into the hold through a valve in the engine-room being left open by the negligence of one of the engineers. The plaintiffs claimed to recover for the damage. The defendants counter-claimed for general average contribution in respect of expenses incurred in regard to the ship and cargo in consequence of the entry of the water. Held, that the defendants were entitled to judgment on the claim and counter-claim, as the damage was occasioned by the negligence of one of the crew during the voyage within the meaning of the charter-party: (The Carron Park. Adm. Div.: Right Hon. Sir James Hannen. Aug. 5.)-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, L. Batten; for the defendants, Barnes, Q.C. and Walton. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Waltons, Johnston, and Bubb; for the defendants, W. A. Crump and Son. Collision-Tug and Tow-Negligence-Liability.—Where tug and tow, or either of them, come into collision with another vessel, it is a question in such case whether the tug or tow is responsible for the navigation; and hence, where a barge in tow of a tug was towed into collision with another barge, the tow was held free from blame, on the ground that the governing power was solely in the tug: (The Quickstep. Adm. Div.: Right Hon. Sir James Hannen and Butt, J. Aug. 5.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Bucknill, Q.C. and Pyke; for the defendants, Barnes, Q.C. and Robson; Raikes and Lennard. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Clarkson, Greenwells, and Co.; for the defendants, T. Cooper and Co.; and Hollams, Sons, Coward, and Hawksley. LAW LIBRARY. The Principles of Rating. By EDWARD BOYLE and GEORGE HUMPHREYS DAVIES. Estates Gazette Office, London. 1890. THIS is a good book. Messrs. Boyle and Davies have accomplished the difficult task of combining a treatise upon general principles, such as a student will study, with a work of reference in a high degree useful to the practitioner. Theories and definitions culled from McCulloch and Adam Smith, are succeeded by notes on the most recent cases; but, as to the latter, it is regrettable that the authors have not been able to avoid the temptation to swell their book by the insertion occasionally at least of long judgments reported verbatim. To be really useful, an author should give the effect of a judgment and spare the reader a mere repetition of what anyone can find by turning to the Law Reports. The book ends with an admirable digest, in the style of Fisher, of every case bearing upon rating. As far as we know, the insertion of such a digest is an innovation, and, in cases where the authorities are not of necessity too numerous, one highly to be commended. Supplement to Saint's Registration Cases. By J. J. HEATH SAINT, Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworths, 7, Fleet-street. THIS is a handy little book, and will be welcome at this period of the year, as bringing Mr. Saint's Digest of Registration Cases up to date. The registration appeals decided since the publication (in 1887) of the second edition of the author's Digest of Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Cases, although not |