numerous, are some of them at least-of sufficient importance to justify, especially in view of the approaching period of revision, the publication of a Supplement comprising the cases decided on appeal from the Revision Courts in 1887, 1888, and 1889. The Registration of Voters Acts having been extended to county electors by the legislation of 1888, there seems to be an additional reason for issuing a Supplement to the Digest. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES. A POINT which would have given rise to a very interesting discussion before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, had the jury not acquitted the prisoner, arose before Mr. Justice Charles, during the assizes now being held at Leeds, upon the prosecution of a prisoner under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 14, for attempting, by drawing the trigger of certain loaded arms, to wit, a revolver loaded with three leaden bullets, to discharge the same at the prosecutor with intent to kill and murder him. The evidence for the prosecution was that the prisoner had presented a revolver at the prosecutor and drawn the trigger, which act had caused the hammer to rise and fall so as to strike one of the chambers of the revolver; that such chamber contained an empty cartridge case, but that in three of the other chambers were loaded cartridges, which would have been exploded had the trigger been pulled often enough, so as to cause the chambers to revolve and bring them into position for firing. Upon such evidence objection was taken on behalf of the prisoner that, as the revolver could not have been discharged by the drawing of the trigger once, and as the prisoner had only been shown to have pulled it once, he could not be convicted of attempting to discharge a loaded arm within the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 14. Mr. Justice Charles, however, overruled the objection, and directed the jury, in summing the case up to them, that in law a revolver loaded in three of its chambers with ball cartridges was a loaded arm within the meaning of the section, although the particular chamber which the prisoner had attempted to discharge was not loaded. We do not intend to question his Lordship's ruling, but merely to refer to the previous decisions which bear upon this point. The first of these was the case of Rex v. Carr (Russ. & Ryan, 377), decided in 1819, in which it was held that, in order to constitute the offence of attempting to discharge a loaded firearm within the meaning of 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, the weapon must be so loaded as to be capable of doing the mischief intended, and the objection in the present case was, therefore, that, as the chamber of the revolver which the prisoner attempted to discharge was not loaded, the revolver could not be said to be loaded so as to be capable of doing the mischief intended. In Rex v. Carr the jury had found the prisoner guilty, but at the same time had added that the blunderbuss, which the prisoner was charged with attempting to discharge, was not primed at the time when the prisoner drew the trigger; and a majority of the judges considered such verdict as equivalent to a finding that the blunderbuss was not so loaded as to be capable of doing mischief by having the trigger drawn, and that it was therefore not loaded within the meeting of the statute. Again, in 1831, Patteson, J., in Rex v. Harris (5 C. & P. 159), told the jury that he did not think a pistol, of which the touch-hole was so plugged up that it could not possibly do any mischief, ought to be considered as loaded arms within the meaning of 1 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 11. The next case was decided in 1840, under 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 3, the words of which were the same as those in the present enactment (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 14), namely: "Whosoever shall shoot at any person, or shall, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person with intent to commit murder," shall be guilty of a felony whether any bodily injury be inflicted or not. The case was that of Reg. v. St. George (9 C. & P. 483), in which Baron Parke held that, where a person intending to shoot another put his finger on the trigger of a loaded pistol, but was prevented from pulling the trigger, he could not be convicted of an attempt to discharge loaded arms by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, within 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 3. reference to the words" in any other manner," the learned Baron said: "It seems to me that the object of this Act was to punish proximate attemptsthat is, those attempts which immediately lead to the discharge of loaded arms. Therefore, if a person drew the trigger, and the gun was loaded, in that case the offence would be complete, though the gun did not go off, and though it did not happen to strike the percussion cap; and the Act also provides for the case of firearms which do not go off with the ordinary lock." To the same effect were the decisions in Reg. v. Lewis (9 C. & P. 523), Reg. v. Oxford (Id. 525), and Blake v. Barnard (Id. 626); and in Reg. v. Baker (1 C. & K. 254), Baron Rolfe, on the trial of an indictment in 1843 under 1 Viot. c. 85, s. 3, in summing up to the jury, said to them: "You must consider whether the pistol was in such a state of loading that, under ordinary circumstances, it would have gone off, but that from some accidental cause, the nature of which we cannot discover, it in fact did not go off. The question for your consideration is, was the priming and loading of the pistol such that, in the natural and ordinary course of things, it would have gone off?" In Reg. v. James (1 C. & K. 530), decided in the following year, Chief Justice Tindal left a case to the jury with a similar ruling. But in Reg. v. Brown (48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 270; 15 Cox C. C. 199; 10 Q. B. Div. 381) the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in 1883 expressed considerable doubts as to the correctness of the ruling of the learned judges in Reg. v. George and Reg. v. Lewis. In the two last-mentioned cases, and also in the case of Reg. v. Brown, however, the weapon was capable of being discharged had the trigger been drawn, whereas the ruling of the learned judges in the earlier With cases was based upon the incapability of the weapons being discharged, and the doubt which has been thrown upon Reg. v. George and Reg. v. Lewis may not extend to the earlier cases. At the same time the inten. tion of the prisoner must have been the same in each of the cases, and, so far as the prisoner's intention is concerned, the attempt to discharge the weapon is none the less an attempt because it is frustrated by the prisoner being prevented from discharging a weapon capable of being discharged instead of its being frustrated by the particular weapon being incapable of being discharged. However this might be, it would still be an open question whether, under the circumstances of the case at Leeds, Mr. Justice Charles was not right in leaving the case to the jury. CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT-INDICTMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER-PLEA OF AUTREFOIS CONVICT. ON the Northern Circuit, before Williams, J., Mary Friel was indicted for the manslaughter of William Carr at Liverpool on the 3rd May last. H. H. Swift appeared for the prosecution, and Commins for the prisoner. On behalf of the prisoner the objection was taken that, as she had been convicted summarily for assaulting Carr, and it was admitted by the prosecution that it was the same assault which it was alleged had caused Carr's death, she could not be tried a second time in respect of the same assault, and she pleaded autrefois convict. Williams, J. held that this plea was bad, but said that, if on looking into the authorities he found that there was any doubt upon the point, he would reserve the question for the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. The prisoner then pleaded Not guilty, and was tried and convicted. The following judgment was subsequently delivered by WILLIAMS, J.I do not think I ought to state a case. The prisoner has pleaded in bar a special plea of autrefois convict, relying upon a conviction for assault before justices under the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, and relied upon the provision contained in sub-sect. 3 of sect. 27 of that Act, which enacts that a conviction for an offence under that Act shall be of the same effect as a conviction for the offence on indictment. Thereupon counsel for the prosecution, although he did not dispute that the manslaughter charged in the indictment was based on the same facts as those which constituted the offence dealt with under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, objected that the plea was bad in law. After argument I thought that such a plea was no answer in law to an indictment for manslaughter, and determined and thereupon proceeded to hear the facts of the case, on the plea of not guilty pleaded by the prisoner, stating, however, that, if on consideration I should think it right to do so, I would reserve the point raised by the plea of autrefois convict for the consideration of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. The jury found the prisoner guilty. I have looked at the authorities, and I think that it is plain on the authorities that a conviction or acquittal on an indictment for an assault cannot be pleaded in bar to a subsequent indictment for murder or manslaughter. This proposition is expressly laid down by Byles, J. in delivering the judgment of himself and Keating, J. in Reg. v. Morris (16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 636; L. Rep., C. C. R. 90). It is true that Kelly, C.B. dissented, and that in that case the question to be decided was the construction and effect of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 44, 45, but not the question of the effect of a previous conviction on an indict ment; but the decision has always, I believe, been recognised as a decision on the common law question, and is so treated by Hawkins, J. in the recent case of Rey v. Miles (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 572; 24 Q. B. Div. 423), where he says: It could hardly be contended that a previous conviction for a common assault could be pleaded in bar to an indictment for murder, though to prove the murder it might be essential to prove the assault adjudicated upon. For the offence of murder consists in the felonious killing; so also of manslaughter:" (see Reg. v. Morris, ubi sup.) This seems to be in accordance with principle. The indictment for manslaughter is not a charge in a new form based on the facts supporting the former charge, nor is it the former charge with the addition of matters of aggravation or of newly alleged consequences. It is a charge based upon new facts and the circumstance that some of those facts have been made the basis of a former charge of a different class is immaterial. The difference is not of degree merely. The characteristic new fact here is the death. That death is a new fact, and not a mere matter of aggravation or a mere consequence, is plain from the consideration that in cases of manslaughter, where the charge is based on death resulting from culpable negligence, there is no criminal offence unless death ensues and gives rise to a charge of manslaughter. I wish to add that this view of the law, that a prior conviction for assault cannot be pleaded to a subsequent indictment for murder or manslaughter, is confirmed by the great authority of Stephen, J. in his book on Criminal Law Procedure, p. 173. Although that learned judge does not mention manslaughter, yet he lays down the principle and gives an indictment for murder after a previous conviction for unlawful wounding as an illus tration, and no reason has been suggested to me, nor I believe could be suggested, why the doctrine thus illustrated should not include manslaughter as much as murder. PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS. Information intended for publication under the above heading should reach us not later than Thursday morning in each week, as publication is otherwise delayed. Mr. EDGAR MORRIS, of 81, Park-street, Grosvenor-square, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. J. GIBSON YOULL was, on the 6th inst., unanimously elected Clerk of the Peace for the city and county of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in the place of the late Mr. John Clayton, who held the appointment for about sixtysix years. Mr. Youll was admitted in Aug. 1866, and is the surviving member of the firm of Chartres and Youll. STAMMERERS should read a book by a gentleman who cured himself after suffering nearly forty years. Price 13 stamps. B. Beasley, Brampton Park, near Huntingdon. Advt.] BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE. Two cases were reported recently in our Reports, both of which will be found, we venture to think, to be of considerable interest to the Profession. The first of these cases, i.e., Re Dodds; Ex parte Executors of Vaughan; Re Dodds; Ex parte Same (reported 62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 837), raised a somewhat curious question as to the estimate to be put upon the value of an annuity when the annuitant seeks to prove against the estate of the person or persons who have covenanted to pay it. A lady of the name of Vaughan became entitled under a certain deed, dated the 2nd Jan. 1885, to receive during her widowhood an annuity of £1440 per annum by equal monthly instalments of £120 each. The deed was a kind of arrangement entered into in order to avoid litigation between Mrs. Vaughan and two gentlemen of the name of Dodds, who jointly and severally covenanted, amongst other things, to pay Mrs. Vaughan during her widowhood the annuity above mentioned, the first payment to be made on Feb. 18, 1885. For some time things seem to have gone on tolerably smoothly, when on the 7th March 1889 a receiving order was made against M. B. Dodds, and on the 22nd March a receiving order was made against J. Dodds. Two instalments of the annuity, due respectively on the 1st Feb. and the 1st March 1889, were not paid, and on the 22nd May of the same year Mrs. Vaughan put in her proof against M. B. Dodds' estate, having previously in April put in her proof against the estate of Joseph Dodds. The proofs were identical in both cases, and by them Mrs. Vaughan claimed first of all £240 for the two instalments of the annuity overdue and unpaid; and, secondly, £7000 "being the value of an annuity of £1440, payable to me by the same monthly instalments during the residue of my natural life." At this time Mrs. Vaughan had completed her seventy-fourth year. On the 13th May the trustee of Joseph Dodds' estate wrote by the direction of his committee of inspection for further evidence in support of Mrs. Vaughan's proof, and was referred to the deed and other documents connected with the matter. On the 20th Sept. Mrs. Vaughan died. The trustee in bankruptcy thereupon at once pointed out that the basis upon which the proofs were made had been altered by Mrs. Vaughan's death, and asked for amended proofs to be put in, but his request not being complied with on the 7th Jan. 1890, he rejected both the proofs to the extent of £5920. The executors of Mrs. Vaughan accordingly at once took these proceedings to compel the trustee in bankruptcy of the two estates to admit the proofs for the amount at which the deceased had estimated them, i.e., £7000. In order to do this several interesting questions were raised. It will be remembered that sect. 37 of the Bankruptcy Act allows all debts and liabilities certain or contingent to be proved in bankruptcy, and then goes on to provide that, where there is a debt or liability which, by reason of its being subject to any contingency does not bear a certain value, the trustee is to put an estimate upon it, against which estimate there is a power to appeal. But then comes rule 228, which says that, unless the court extends the time, the trustee must accept or reject a proof within twenty-eight days. In the present case the trustee had rejected the proofs as to part, but a considerable time after the expiration of twenty-eight days, and the first suggestion made was that, inasmuch as he had not rejected the proofs within twenty-eight days, he must be tak n to have accepted them altogether. Now the Act provides that the assessment of the amount of a contingent liability shall be by the trustee himself, and until that assessment has been made by the trustee, it was argued on behalf of the trustee that the twenty-eight days could not begin to run. The creditor had here put her own estimate on the liability, and the trustee and not the creditor is the proper person under the Act to fix the liability. So that, within the meaning of the sect. 87, no value had been placed upon the liability at all. Under these circumstances rule 228, which requires the acceptance or rejection of the proof within twenty-eight days, would seem not to apply. "No doubt," said Mr. Justice Cave, "it may be contended, and I think fairly contended, though I do not propose to decide it now, that as to so much of Mrs. Vaughan's claim as consists of matters of fact, the trustee, is bound to admit or reject or require further evidence in support of those matters of fact within one month after receiving the proof, and is not at liberty to hold them over and call for proof of them after an indefinite period; but I cannot see that this applies to an estimate of a contingent liability which she has no means of knowing, and the putting off the ascertainment of which does not impose a hardship or do harm." This seems, if we may say so, sound reasoning; matters of fact, of which proof can be got at the moment, may become very difficult to prove, if the trustee were allowed to put off the acceptance or rejection of the proof which is based upon them until an indefinite period, when the persons who could once speak to the facts may have died or left the country. In cases like that, then, it seems right that the trustee should be obliged to make up his mind within a certain time. With regard, however, to proofs which are based more or less upon mere speculation, little or no harm can come if a delay in admitting or rejecting them takes place. In the present case the delay had given the trustee the exact means for ascertaining the value of Mrs. Vaughan's proof, for by her death the proof which originally had been for a contingent liability could now be reduced to a matter of certainty. It was said, however, as a last resort, that in any event, whatever might be the general rule, the facts in this case showed that the trustee had assented to the creditor's estimate. No doubt there may be an assent to a creditor's value of his liability by a trustee, but the most that could be said here was, that the trustee's silence must be taken to amount to an assent, as there was no direct evidence of assent at all; and Mr. Justice Cave, looking broadly at the merits of the case, refused to recognise any assent such as was suggested, and adopted the trustee's calculation as to the amount for which the executors were entitled to prove. The result is, that Mrs. Vaughan's executors will stand precisely in the same position as other persons who happen to be creditors of these estates, and will receive their dividend with the rest. On the other hand, if the view were adopted that her estimate was correct, and that there was an assent binding upon the trustee, it is obvious that her executors would receive more than their share. THE second case above referred to, i.e., Re Scott and Mitchell; Ex parte Scott (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 840), raised a short point of practice. The question which the court was asked to give its opinion upon was as to what was to be done with a sum of £20 which had been paid into court under rule 131 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1886 as security for costs of an appeal. In Aug. 1889 a motion was launched against a Mrs. Scott by a trustee in bankruptcy in the County Court of Dorset, and on that motion an order was made that a certain business, and the stock and goodwill of the same, &c., was not at the date of the receiving order part of the separate estate of Mrs. Scott, and Mrs. Scott was ordered to pay £10 38. 6d., the costs of the motion. On Sept. 9 Mrs. Scott gave notice of appeal, and accordingly, under the provisions of the above rule, lodged £20 in the High Court. The rule says : "At or before the time of entering an appeal the party intending to appeal shall lodge in the High Court the sum of £20, to satisfy, in so far as the same may extend, any costs that the appellant may be ordered to pay. Provided that the Court of Appeal may in any special case increase or diminish the amount of such security or dispense therewith." In the margin to the rule is the following note: "Security for costs of appeal." Mrs. Scott ultimately decided not to proceed with her appeal, which was accordingly abandoned, and the costs arising out of it paid. She then applied to the County Court to have her case reheard, but this application was refused, with costs. These costs were also paid. There remained, however, still unpaid the costs of the original motion in the County Court, amounting to £10 3s. 6d., and on Mrs. Scott applying at the proper office of the High Court to have her £20 paid out to her, the officials declined to hand over the money without the consent of the trustee. The trustee, it seems, claimed to have the costs of the original motion paid to him out of the £20 in court, and Mrs. Scott applied to the court to have the money paid out to her intact. The question which naturally suggests itself is, what was the object of this payment into court? And the answer is to be found in the marginal note to rule 131, i.e., as security for costs of appeal. Mrs. Scott had, however, abandoned her appeal and paid the costs of it, so that the object for which the payment into court was made was gone, and Mrs. Scott was entitled to have her money back. It is clear then that, to have given the trustee the costs of the County Court motion out of this deposit would have been to devote the money to a purpose which it never was intended by the rule that the money should be devoted. Under these circumstances Mr. Justice Cave ordered that the money should be paid out to Mrs. Scott, and refused the application with costs. COUNTY COURTS. SITTINGS OF THE COURTS. FOR THE WEEK ENDING Saturday, Aug. 23. Aberayron. Tuesday Barnsley, Tuesday, at 11.30; Thursday. Basingstoke, Monday, at 10 Brighton, Friday, at 10; Thursday (before Bristol, Monday and Tuesday, at 10 Derby, Thursday (if necessary), at 10 Durham, Monday and Tuesday, at 10 Marlborough, Tuesday, at 10 Newbury, Wednesday Newcastle-in-Emlyn, Wednesday Newport (Mon.), Thursday and Friday, at 10 Newport (Salop),* Monday, at 10 Pontefract, Monday and Friday, at 10.30 St. Albans, Friday, at 10 St. Columb, Tuesday, at 10 St. Helens, Wednesday Salford, Thursday, at 9.30; Friday, at 10 Sheerness, Tuesday, at 10.30 Sittingbourne, Thursday, at 10 Southampton, Tuesday, at 10 Southport, Tuesday, at 10 Gateshead, Tuesday and Thursday, at 10 Stockton-on-Tees, Tuesday, at 9.30 Edmonton, Friday, at 11 Gravesend, Tuesday, at 9 Holbeach, Tuesday, at 9.30 Hay, Tuesday, at 10 Howden, Wednesday, at 10.15 Hull, Monday, at 10 Leicester, Tuesday, at 10 Liskeard, Monday, at 10 Liverpool, Tuesday and Thursday, at 10 Manchester, Tuesday, at 9.30; Wednes- Sunderland, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (Bankruptcy), at 10 Swansea, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Tamworth, Tuesday, at 10 Temple Cloud, Saturday, at 10.30 Towcester, Wednesday, at 11 Tredegar, Tuesday, at 10 Trowbridge, Friday, at 10 Waltham Abbey, Wednesday, at 11 Wareham, Friday, at 10 Warrington, Thursday Watford, Monday, at 10 Westbury, Thursday, at 10 Widnes, Friday Wimborne, Thursday, at 10 Wirksworth, Monday, at 11.30 Woodstock, Friday, at 12 Worthing, Monday. * Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined by an expert from the Sanitary Engineering and Ventilation Company, 65, Victoria-street, Westminster opposite Town Hall [Established 1875], who also undertake the Ventilation of Offices, &c.—[ADVT.] GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING THE PROFESSION. IN the Chancery Division (Ireland), on the 2nd inst., before Lord Ashbourne, C., in Re A. B., an apprentice, Walker Craig, Q.C. (instructed by W. G. Murphy, solicitor) moved for an order that the applicant, an apprentice, might be at liberty to present himself for final examination for solicitors' apprentices in October next, and upon passing same be admitted a solicitor. Counsel moved on the affidavit of applicant, which stated that he attended a year's law lectures from 1884-85 in one of the Queen's Colleges, and passed the examination at end of same; that he passed the preliminary examination for intending solicitors' apprentices in May 1887, and was bound to a solicitor on the 18th July 1887, for a period of five years, with a clause that his apprenticeship should terminate in four years in case he kept a second year's lectures at the Queen's College during his apprenticeship, pursuant to sect. 9 of 29 & 30 Vict. c. 84, which condition he fulfilled in 1889, consequently his apprenticeship would expire on the 18th July 1891. Applicant attended the common law lectures for apprentices from 1887-88, passed the intermediate examination July 1888, and attended the equity lectures for apprentices from 1888-89. He had been for nine years an assistant to a firm of solicitors before he was bound an apprentice, and he now sought to be allowed to shorten his period of service by eight months. R. W. Shekleton, Q.C. (instructed by William George Wakely, solicitor) opposed the application on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, and pointed out that the applicant was now twenty-seven years of age, and consequently he was only fifteen years of age when he went into the firm of solicitors as assistant, and at that age he could not be considered to come within the meaning of a bona fide clerk in sect. 10 of 29 & 30 Vict. c. 84. Counsel further stated that the Incorporated Law Society were of opinion that there were no special grounds in this case for granting the application, especially having regard to the fact that under sect. 9 of the Act applicant's period of service was already reduced by one year. Lord ASHBOURNE, C., said that, having regard to the opposition of the Incorporated Law Society, and to the fact that the granting of this application would lead to innumerable similar ones, he would refuse the motion. Order accordingly. CONCERNING COSTS. MR. JUSTICE CHITTY'S practice in joking is extensive, and his "latest" concerns costs. He had made cross-orders as to the costs of certain issues in an action for administration, arising out of a family dispute, whereupon the plaintiff's counsel asked that his costs, payable out of the estate, should be taxed as between solicitor and client. Chitty, J.: "That is a matter for agreement. What does the defendant say " "I am afraid, my Lord," said his counsel, that the brotherly love between the parties is such that- Oh! I see," interjaculated the learned humourist: "brothers and sisters love one another as between party and party, and not as between solicitor and client." But, passing from this obiter dictum, the two latest reported cases on the books, concerning costs, remain to be brought under_notice, namely, Re The Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Association, and Re Palmer, appearing respectively in the August issue of the Law Journal and in last Saturday's Law Times. In the former case Grieb had recovered judgment against the association on an application to have his name removed from the list of shareholders, by reason of fraudulent misrepresentation. So had Thursby, whose like application had been previously heard on the same day, before the same judge-the same counsel and solicitor appearing for both. Each applicant was awarded costs. But, on taxation of Grieb's costs, a number of items were disallowed on the ground that they were duplicates of what had been allowed already in Thursby's bill. And so Grieb filed objections to the taxing master's certificate, in which he stated that his action was quite distinct from Thursby's, and based on different grounds; that he could not use Thursby's documents, which belonged to the latter; that it was only an accident that the same counsel and solicitor appeared for both, and that no agreement of any kind had been made between him and Thursby. 'I regard the question from the client's point of view," said Kekewich, J. "Grieb sued the company for rescission of contract. He said that he had been induced to take shares by fraudulent misrepresentations. When he retained a solicitor, Grieb was entitled to say to him: 'I will have my case taken into court in the best possible way. The briefs and the proofs and the documentary evidence shall be complete: counsel must be instructed; you must go in to win.' If the solicitor had said that he was engaged in another case of a similar character, and that it would save expense if he only made one copy of the documents, and treated the two actions as one action-if he had said that--Grieb might have said, and if a sensible man he would have said: "I have nothing to do with that action, but I am entitled to the full benefit of your experience, and I ask you to use it for me, and put my case fully before the court.' If that is a proper view for the client to take, the solicitor must be entitled to be paid for carrying out those instructions; and if he does the same thing for another client, he is entitled to be paid by him too. It is said that the cases were so much alike that the decision in one must cover the other. But this is a case of fraud, and it does not follow that what was conclusive in one case must be conclusive in the other; and if so, the defendants ought to have said: Let us try one case, and we will then submit to a similar decision in the other.' In my opinion the solicitor is entitled to be remunerated as if Grieb's case had been the only case.' But, of course, the application of this very proper principle should receive a reasonable limitation, so that, as held in Oppenshaw v. Whitehead (9 Ex. 384), now followed, if, for instance, the solicitor had to serve a subpoena on the same person in both actions, or make a journey, or other matters of a like character, he should not be permitted to make the full charge against both clients. The taxing master, however, had rendered a far more drastic decision, even cutting down counsel's fees also on the ground that the cases were similar and came on together, ignoring the juster views maintained in Robb v. Connor (9 Ir. L. T. Rep. 115; Ir. Rep. 9 Eq. 373), which was cited before Kekewich, J. The learned judge was rightly of opinion that the taxing master was wrong: "counsel ought to have proper briefs in every case." And accordingly, he referred the whole bill back for taxation, with the direction that, except as regards attendances or other matters, which were, or ought to have been, done at one and the same time in both. actions, the plaintiff's solicitor was entitled to charge in this action as if he had not been engaged in Thursby's action. In Palmer's case it appeared that Slater had applied to Palmer, a solicitor, to obtain him a loan on a reversionary interest, and on the 21st June 1884 signed the following letter: "I hereby request and instruct you to raise for me the sum of £300 at 10 per cent. per annum, on the security of all my estate and interest under the will and in the estate of Thomas Symons, doceased, and I hereby undertake to pay your costs which I agree at £20, exclusive of money out of pocket incurred and to be incurred in and about doing what is necessary in your opinion for the purpose of carrying out these instructions." Slater had already mortgaged his interest, and the first mortgagee had to be paid out of the sum to be raised. Palmer raised the sum of £300, and the agreed sum for costs was paid thereout. On the 7th Jan. 1890 Slater took out a summons for an order that Palmer should deliver a bill of these costs, and that the costs might be taxed on the grounds (a) that the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 44), s. 8, only authorises an agreement between solicitor and client, and that there was nothing outside the agreement to show that Slater and Palmer stood in that relation, and some of the costs were mortgagee's costs which Slater as mortgagor was not liable to pay to Palmer; (b) that the court had jurisdiction under sect. 8 (4) of the Act to order the taxation or moderation of the costs, notwithstanding the agreement. But it was held by North, J., that the agreement contained in the letters amounted to a retainer, and created the relation of solicitor and client, and that for the purpose of bringing an agreement within the Act the relation of solicitor and client need not exist before and apart from the agreement, and the agreement was not made invalid by the inclusion of the mortgagee's costs, and that sect. 8 (4) of the Act gives no jurisdiction to order agreed costs to be taxed, but only to vary or cancel an agreement which is brought forward and disputed in the course of taxation. Slater having appealed, Cotton, L.J., in reference to the argument that the agreement was not within the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, on the ground that the parties did not stand in the relation of solicitor and client, said: "I think the construction of the 3rd subsection of the 1st section is against that contention. According to the definition contained in that sub-section 'client' includes any person who has power, express or implied, to retain or employ, and retains or employs, a solicitor. To my mind the appellant has done that. It is very true the remuneration agreed to was with reference to matters in which the solicitor was not engaged as solicitor for the appellant; but he was engaged to do business for him as solicitor, and therefore I am of opinion that the relation of solicitor and client was created within the meaning of this clause and within the meaning of the Act." But the Court of Appeal, while holding that such an agreement could be referred to the taxing master under sect. 8, sub-sect. 4, further laid it down very reasonably that, in the absence of evidence impeaching the agreement there ought not to be any such reference. "The appellant," observed Cotton, L.J., "has not filed any affidavit that this charge is unfair or unreasonable, and although the 4th sub-section does, in my opinion, give the court power where an agreement is so impeached to refer it to the taxing master to consider whether it is a fair and reasonable charge, here the foundation for such an order has not been made. Counsel has argued that this is a very unreasonable charge; I do not think he said it is unfair. I do not think the court ought, upon such an argument by counsel alone, unsupported by any affidavits or facts which lead to that conclusion, to refer such an agreement to the taxing master to exercise the power given by the 4th sub-section of the 8th section." The appeal failed-it ought never to have been taken.-Irish Law Times. COMPANIES WINDING-UP BILL. MR. J. MORRIS, writing to the Times from 6, Old Jewry, points out that the main object of this Bill is to put the winding-up of companies into the hands of Board of Trade officials, just as is now done in bankruptcies. There are two classes of liquidations-(1) under the court, and (2) voluntary. Under the existing law voluntary liquidations can invoke the aid of the court, and they are then called “liquidations under the supervision of the court." As the Bill was framed it applied not only to pure court liquidations, but also to those under supervision. On its being discussed in the Grand Committee of the Commons, it was, however, decided to confine it to the former on the ground that the latter were merely ancillary to voluntary liquidations. In the Committee of the House of Lords, but without any real discussion, the Bill was restored to the state in which it was brought in. It may be wise or unwise, to hamper voluntary liquidations by put ting them under the Board of Trade officials, but, if done at all, it should be after the public are made acquainted with it in all its bearings. In the voluntary liquidations of important companies it often becomes essential to have the aid of the court for many purposes purely adminis trative, without which it would be impossible to work them. Under the Bill as amended in the Lords' Committee that could no longer be done without subjecting the liquidation to the interposition of the Board of Trade officials. There is a reason for it in official or court liquidations, because it relieves the court of the difficulty of appointing a liquidator but the same reason does not apply to voluntary liquidations, in which the parties interested appoint their own liquidator, not necessarily & professional man. That has worked well both in England and Scotland, where nearly all the large liquidations since 1862 have been so dealt with, notably the great failures in 1866, the City of Glasgow Bank failure, &c. Why, then, should it be now changed? There has been no popular demand for it. And, above all, why should it be changed because one noble lord suggested it in committee, when the serious considerations involved were not even alluded to, still less discussed ? As already said, there was practically no discussion on it. The members of the House of Lords-even the Law Lords can have had little or no practical experience of the working of voluntary liquidations, and were probably led away by the name liquidations under the supervision of the court, which, as already explained, have nothing in common with pure court liquidations. The Bill so amended in such a vitally important part now comes again before the House of Commons at the fag end of the session. It is right to add that it is confined to England and Wales, but how can it possibly receive the consideration its importance demands? 66 the number of failures in England and Wales gazetted during the week COMMERCIAL FAILURES.-According to Kemp's Mercantile Gazette ending Aug. 9 was 60. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 68, showing a decrease of 8, being a net decrease in 1890, to date, of 368. UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months from the date given, unless some other claimants sooner appear.? GILLETT (Joseph Francis), Stock Exchange, London, deceased, and GILLETT (Francis Joseph), a minor, of age June 12, 1888. £128 178. 9d. £2 15s. per Cent. Consolidated Stock, late Consolidated Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said F. J. Gillett, Ang. 8. HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. BROWN (James). The children of Charles Brown, the brother of the said J. Brown the testator, or the legal personal representatives of such children living at the death of the said J. Brown on May 18, 1882, and the children living at the death of Sarah Brown, the testator's widow (who died in 1887), of the said Charles Brown's children, who died in the lifetime of the said testator, and the legal personal representatives of any such last-mentioned children who have since died, to come in, by Oct. 27, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice North. Nov. 6, at twelve o'clock, at the said chambers, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. LUSH (William), who, many years ago, resided at Southsea, or his legal personal representa. tives, may hear of something to his or their advantage on applying to Mr. H. Norris, solicitor, Surrey-house, Victoria Embankment. ROBSON (Margaret), formerly of 18, Town-street, Gateshead-on-Tyne, is requested to apply for her share of a relative's estate to Mr. F. Emley, solicitor, County-chambers, Newcastle-uponTyne. SIMMONS (Henry), Plymouth, Devonshire, manager of grease works. His next of kin living at the time of his death, on or about Oct. 7, 1889, or the legal personal representatives of such of them (if any) as have since died, to come in, by Oct. 31, and enter their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Stirling. Nov. 7, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. VALE (Hannah), Corn-square, Leominster, spinster, who died on Nov. 20, 1887. Her heir-at-law to apply to Messrs. Lloyd and Son, solicitors, Leominster. WILLIAMS (Hannah), late of Plyinouth, Devon, who died about Feb. 21, 1837, formerly the wife of Thomas Amphlett Williams, surgeon, of Plymouth. Next of kin, or their legal personal representatives, to come in, by Oct. 31, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Stirling. Nov. 12, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. EUREKA REFRIGERATING COMPANY LIMITED.-Mr. Justice Chitty has fixed Aug. 22, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of the Vacation Judge, for the appointment of an official liquidator. FRASER, GRANT, AND CO. LIMITED.-Order for continuation of voluntary winding-up made by Mr. Justice North on June 19. W. J. Myatt, 23, Abchurch-lane, solicitor for the petitioner.Creditors to send in, by Sept. 28, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. B. B. Smith. 47 and 48, King William-street, the liquidator of the company. Irvine, Hodges, and Borrowman, solicitors for the liquidator. INTERNATIONAL CABLE COMPANY LIMITED.-Mr. Justice Stirling has fixed Aug. 21, at twelve o'clock, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator. IPSWICH AND SUFFOLK LICENSED VICTUALLERS' CO-OPERATIVE GROCERY AND PROVISION COMPANY LIMITED.-Order for continuation of voluntary winding.np made by Mr. Justice Kay on Aug. 2. R. Edridge, 11, Gray's-inn-square, agent for J. Mills, 26, Museum-street, Ipswich, solicitor for the company and liquidator. MADRAS PRESIDENCY DIAMOND FIELDS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Nov. 7, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. C. D. N. Grant, 1 and 2, Great Winchester-street, the liquidator of the company. NEWCASTLE, NORTHUMBERLAND, AND DURHAM PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY. -Mr. Justice Chitty has fixed Aug. 21, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of Mr. Justice Stirling, for the appointment of an official liquidator. SCHANSCHIEFF ELECTRIC BATTERY SYNDICATE LIMITED. Creditors to send in, by Aug. 19, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, to Mr. R. Rabbidge, 32, Poultry, the liquidator. TRAFALGAR COMPANY LIMITED.-Mr. Justice Chitty has fixed Aug. 19, at twelve o'clock, at the chambers of the Vacation Judge, for the appointment of an official liquidator. TAMARUGAL NITRATE COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Sept. 25, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. F. H. Evans, 70, Gracechurch-street, the liquidator of the company. Bircham and Co, 50, Old Broad-street, solicitors for the liquidator. WESTON'S MUSIC HALL COMPANY LIMITED.-Order for continuation of voluntary winding-up made by Mr. Justice North on July 26. C. S. Gover, solicitor for petitioner. YORKSHIRE AERATED BREAD AND RESTAURANT COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding. up to be heard Aug. 20, before Mr. Justice Lawrance, the Vacation Judge. R. Bartram, St. Stephen's-chambers, Telegraph-street, solicitor for the petitioner. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. DUFFEY (Edward), the trustee of an indenture of settlement of June 23, 1880, in respect of the business of a retail oyster dealer, carried on by him at 78A, Lime-street, Liverpool. Aug. 25; the Registrars of the Lancashire County Court, Victoria-street, Liverpool. Aug. 29; T. Bellringer, Registrar, at the said chambers, at three o'clock. FLETCHER (Stephenson), sen., Shaftoe Leazes, Hepham, Northumberland, gentleman; and FLETCHER (Stephenson), Jun., South Shields, tallow chandler. Aug. 30; W. A. Hedwith, solicitor, Salem-street, South Shields. Sept. 5; the Registrar of the Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of Durham, 19, Elvet Bridge, Durham, at three o'clock. MORRIS (Sir Evan), Roseneath, Wrexham, Denbighshire, knight. Oct. 1; F. H. Hawkins, solicitor, The Priory, Wrexham. Nov. 5; Mr. Justice Stirling, at twelve o'clock. BEAD (Arabella), Grove House, Woodlands, Isleworth, spinster. Sept. 12; H. H. H. Barrs, solicitor, 12, Clement's-inn, Strand. Oct. 24; Mr. Justice Chitty, at eleven o'clock. WOOD (William), formerly of Kelsey House, st. John's Park, Blackheath, late of Moss Chase, Walsall, Staffordshire. Sept. 12; G. Rhodes, solicitor, 77, Chancery-lane. Oct. 24; Mr. Justice Chitty, at eleven o'clock. WILLIAMS (James), Stafford-row, Panteg, Monmouthshire, chemist. Sept. 16; W. K. Morgan, solicitor, Bridge-street, Newport, Monmouthshire. Oct. 31; Mr. Justice Stirling, at twelve o'clock. Darlaston. OREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VIOT., 0. 35. Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. BRIGGS (Thomas), Martin-by-Timberland, Lincolnshire, machine owner. Sept. 1; Tweed, BROWN (John), Morpeth, Northumberland, innkeeper. Sept.); G. and F. Brumell, solicitors, BROWNE (Katherine Elspa). King William's Houses, Penge, Surrey, and of Eastbourne, Sussex, spinster. Sept. 20; 8. F. Miller, Vardon, and Miller, solicitors, 12, Savile-row. BOWMAN (Robert), Crown hotel, Longsight, Manchester, Lancashire. Sept. 11; Slater, Heelis, and Co., solicitors, 71, Princess-street, Manchester. BEARD (Robert James), Newark-upon-Trent, Nottinghamshire, bank manager. Sept. 29; Maples and McCraith, solicitors, 22, Low-pavement, Nottingham. BURROUGHS (Rowland Kidson), 80, Victoria-street, Littleborough, Lancashire, and of 15, Waterstreet, Todmorden, Yorkshire, watchmaker. Nov. 1; Rawnsley and Peacock, solicitors, 14, Darley-street, Bradford. CARNAC (Henrietta Rivett), Colfe Lodge, Lewisham, Kent, spinster. Sept. 10; Meynell and Pemberton, solicitors, 20, Whitehall-place. CLAY (Richard), Avenue House, Muswell Hill, Hornsey, and of Bread-street-hill, Lordon, and Bungay, Suffolk, printer. Aug. 31; Munton and Morris, solicitors, 95A, Queen Victoriastreet. CLINCH, alias GORDON (Henry Richard Stringer), 64, Santley-street, Brixton, Surrey, professional singer. Sept. 10; Eardley-Holt and Hulbert, solicitors, 28, Charles-street, St. James's. CARTER (Henry), Bolton, Lancashire, beerseller. Aug. 20; J. N. Mather, solicitor, 24, Acresfield, Bolton. CLEGG (Hannah), 2, Cluny street, Cheetham, Manchester, widow. Sept. 8; Gaunt and Lingard, solicitors, Queen's-chambers, John Dalton-street, Manchester. CHESSHIRE (Anne), 196, Hagley-road, Edgbaston, Birmingham, widow. Sept. 10; Smith, Pinsett, and Co., solicitors, 39, Waterloo-street, Birmingham. DUTTON (Samuel), Bostock Green, Cheshire, blacksmith. Sept. 15; A. and J. E. Fletcher, Bolicitors, Northwich, Cheshire. ELLIS (William), Great Freeman-street, Nottingham, builder. Sept. 30; Martin and Sons, solicitors, 7, Low-pavement, Nottingham. EITE (Thomas), Nottingham, butcher. Sept. 30; Martin and Sons, solicitors, 7, Low-pavement, Nottingham. ELY (The Most Hon. Jane, Dowager Marchioness of), 22, Wilton-place, Knightsbridge, widow, Sept. 12; Lethbridge and Prior, solicitors, 25, Abingdon-street, Westminster. FORKS (Isaiah), Woods Bank, Darlaston, Staffordshire. Oct. 11; J. Corbett, solicitor, Darlaston. FLEAR (Elizabeth Wigley). Poet's Corner hotel, Kirke White-street, Nottingham, widow. Sept. 30; Martin and Sons, solicitors, 7, Low-pavement, Nottingham. FLETCHER (Thomas Keddey), Dancer's Hill House, Potter's Bar, and of Union Dock, Limehouse, gentleman. Sept. 29; A. Howard, solicitor, 4, Finsbury-circus. FITZPATRICK (Maria), Rose Cottage, South Ealing-road, formerly St. Mary's-road, Ealing, spinster. Sept. 13; Satchell and Chapple, solicitors, 6, Queen-street, Cheapside. GREENFIELD (William), Hewitt-street, Nottingham, gentleman. Sept. 30; Martin and Sons, solicitors, 7, Low-pavement, Nottingham. GLEADALL (Bev. John William), M.A., late Fellow of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, and morning preacher of the Foundling Hospital, London, and of 44, Gayton-road, Hampstead. Sept. 12; Marshalls, solicitors. East Retford. GROCOTT (Henry), 21, Newcastle-road, Shelton, china painter and gilder. Aug. 81; Hand and Co., solicitors, Hanley. HOWISON (Elizabeth Eleanor), 1, Fern-bank, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, spinster. Sept. 1; HOWELL, otherwise HOWELLS (Elizabeth). Red House, Aberavon, Glamorganshire, widow. HOWES (William), 12, Whitmore-road, Small Heath, Aston-Juxta-Birmingham, Warwickshire, JENKINS (Elizabeth), formerly of 62, St. James's-place, Plumstead, Kent, late of the Darenth JONES (Lucretia Ellen), The Elms, near Warrington, Cheshire, spinster. Sept. 30; Slater, Heelis, and Co., solicitors, 71, Princess-street, Manchester. KEYNES (Sarah), Warwick House, Grange-terrace, Radipole, Dorsetshire, widow. Sept. 8; H. S. and S. Watts, solicitors, Yeovil, Somerset. LOWE (Robert Hornbuckle), Claypole, Lincolnshire, gentleman. Sept. 30; Martin and Sons, solicitors, 7, Low-pavement. Nottingham. LANCASTER (John), Oak Lawn, Castlenau, Barnes, Surrey, gentleman. Sept. 19; Whites and Co., solicitors, 28, Budge-row, Cannon-street. MCGEORGE (Amelia), Mount Pleasant, Liverpool, Lancashire, spinster. Sept. 30; W. F. Morecroft and Co., solicitors, British and Foreign-chambers, 5, Castle-street, Liverpool. MCGEORGE (Elizabeth), Mount Pleasant, Liverpool, Lancashire, spinster. Sept. 30; W. F. Morecroft and Co., solicitors, British and Foreign-chambers, 5, Castle-street, Liverpool. MITCHELL (Joshua), formerly of East Saugh Shields, Stanhope, late of 33, Old Sunniside, near Towlaw, both in Durham, gentleman. Sept. 6; G. W. Hodgson, solicitor, Stanhope via Darlington. MARTIN (Emily), Black's Head, Broad Marsh, Nottingham, widow. Sept. 13; Martin and Sons, solicitors, 7, Low-pavement, Nottingham. MUDDYMAN (George Edwin), formerly of Derwent Tavern, Langdale-road, Peckham, Surrey, MIMPRISS (Elizabeth Mary), 32, Davies-street, Berkeley-square, spinster, jeweller. Sept. 15; NETHERCOTE (Charlotte Frances), Moulton Grange, Northamptonshire, widow. Sept. 5; J. F. Griffith, solicitor, 4, Old Serjeants'-inn, W.C. NORMANTON (George), West Vale, Greetland, and Savile Green, Halifax, both in Yorkshire, wool and waste dealer. Sept. 30: C. T. Rhodes, solicitor, Commercial-street, Halifax. NEWCOMBE (William Legge), Okehampton, Devonshire, retired currier. Aug. 23; J. Wellington, jun., solicitor, Crediton Devon. Sept. 30; PYATT (George Hopkinson), St. James-street, Nottingham, veterinary surgeon. PIRKIS (George Ignatius). Penlee, Marshgate-road, Richmond, Surrey, retired commissarygeneral Ordnance Department. Sept. 10; Tathams and Pym, solicitors, 3, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry. PARK (Catherine), 36, College-street, Islington, widow. Sept. 10; C. Robinson and Co., solicitors, 4, New-inn. ROBERTS (Anne), 8, South Mount-street, Beeston Hill, Leeds, Yorkshire, widow. Sept. 13; Simpson and Denham, solicitors, 47, Albion-street, Leeds. ROGERSON (Elizabeth), King's End House, Bicester, Oxfordshire, widow. Oct. 20; W. W. Robinson, solicitor, 14, New-road, Oxford. STEPHENSON (James), 3, Back Eldon-street, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, brewer's traveller, formerly an innkeeper. Sept. 19; Joel and Parsons, solicitors, 1, Newgate-street, Newcastle-uponTyne. SEARLE (Jacob), 16, Cobden-road, Worthing, Sussex, retired brewer. Sept. 15; W. F. Verrall, solicitor, 55, Chapel-road, Worthing. STOCK (Susan), Murvagh College-road, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, widow. Aug. 31; Bubb and Co., solicitors, 21, Clarence-street, Cheltenham. STUBBS (William Henry), Manchester, and of Kersal House, Higher Broughton, Lancashire, civil engineer. Sept. 30; A. Unsworth, solicitor, 18, Acresfield, Bolton.1 SPENCER (Henry John), Peachey-street, Nottingham, gentleman. Sept. 30; Martin and Sons, 7, Low-pavement, Nottingham. SEARGEANT (Edwin Collins), Stafford, banker. Sept. 30; Hand and Co., solicitors, Stafford. SPOONER (Charles Easton), Bronygarth, Portmadoo, Carnarvonshire, gentleman. Sept. 20; Bloxham, Smythe, and Etches, solicitors, 6, Bennett's-hill, Birmingham. SCRUTON (John Richard), Middleton Wold, near Pocklington, Yorkshire, farmer. Sept. 1; SCOTT (Elizabeth), Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, spinster. Sept. 4; N. Meroer, solicitor, TURPIN (John Edward Finley), High-street, Wivenhoe, Essex. Aug. 23; Pope, Marshall, and THORNS (Robert), 4. Duke-street, Norwich, gentleman. Sept. 12; H. Goodchild, solicitor, 27, Castle-meadow, Norwich. WATKINS (Mary Jane), Milton Abbot, Devonshire, widow. Aug. 28; White, Dingley, and White, solicitors, Launceston, Cornwall. WING (Jane), 4, St. Mark's-crescent, Sheffield, Yorkshire, widow. Sept. 30; Wake and Son, solicitors, 25, Bank-street, Sheffield. WATSON (James), formerly of 22, Crayford-road, Holloway, late of 25, Alexandra-road, Finsbury Park. Sept. 8; H. A. Watts, solicitor, 11, Queen Victoria-street. WEIR (John), 19, Devonshire-road, Greenwich, Kent, and of 54, South-street, Greenwich, Scotch draper's manager. Sept. 12; Boote and Edgar, solicitors, 18 and 20, Booth-street, Manchester. BILLS OF SALE.-The number of bills of sale in England and Wales, registered at the Queen's Bench for the week ending Aug. 9 was 117. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 136, and the corresponding weeks for the three previous years 187, 189, and 209. THE PROBATE AND DIVORCE REGISTRIES.-The following are the arrangements for transacting business in the probate and divorce registries during the Long Vacation. The registrars of the probate and divorce registries will not tax any bill of costs or proceed upon any petition for alimony between the present time and the 23rd Oct., except under special circumstances, to be stated in a written application addressed to them. On Wednesday next and every succeeding Wednesday until the 22nd Oct. inclusive one of the registrars will attend at the principal probate registry, Somerset House, at 11.30, to hear summonses; and on Wednesday the 3rd and 17th Sept., and 1st, 15th, and 22nd Oct., one of the registrars will sit there at 12.30 to hear motions. All papers for motions are to be left with the clerk of the papers or the chief clerk of the divorce registry before 2 o'clock on the preceding Saturday. From the 12th Aug. until the 23rd Oct. inclusive, the offices of the probate and divorce registries will be open to the publio on Saturday at 10 o'clock and closed at 2, and on every other day they will be opened at 11 and closed at 3. The department for literary inquiry will be entirely closed until the 13th Sept. LAW SOCIETIES. SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. THE usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, the 13th inst., Mr. G. Burrow Gregory in the chair. The other directors present were Messrs. W. Beriah Brook, Samuel Harris (Leicester), J. H. Kays, R. Pennington, R. Pidcock (Woolwich), Sidney Smith, F. T. Woolbert, and J. T. Scott (secretary). A sum of £659 was distributed in grants of relief; twenty-two new members were admitted to the associa tion, and other general business was transacted. SAUNDERS'S TREATISE ON WARRANTIES, &c.-A Treatise on the Law of Warranties and Representations upon the Sale of Personal Chattels. By Thomas W. Saunders, Esq., Police Magistrate. Price 68.-HORACE Cox, "Law Times" Office, 10, Wellington-street, Strand, London, W.C. Advertisement.] CORRESPONDENCE. This Department being open to free discussion on all Professional topics, the Editor does not hold himself responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it. HONOURS EXAMINATIONS.-Will you allow me a short space in your columns to draw attention to the curious results of the various Honours examinations. The vagaries of this examination are really a burning grievance to candidates. The recent figures are: 25. INTERPLEADER-HIGH BAILIFF'S COSTS-TAXATION. Can any of your readers give me any information on the following points of County Court practice: Execution levied with instructions to high bailiff to interplead at once if any claim is made. Interpleader tried and decided in favour of claimant. High bailiff claims from execution creditors for possession money, five days at 5s. 6d., and seven days at 38.6d., as the claimant did not give security for twelve days. Is the execution creditor liable for more than the five days' possession money? The high bailiff was in possession under two executions; is each execution creditor to pay half the possession money? I am informed that the high balliff charges each party in full, and pockets the profit. On the hearing of the two interpleaders one was disposed of, the other adjourned. The same witnesses were engaged in both cases, but on taxation the registrar allowed them their full fees. I submit that the witnesses should only have been allowed half their expenses in the case disposed of, as they were engaged in the adjourned interpleader also. Any opinions and authorities on the above points will oblige. JUVENUS From this it will be seen that in January last, out of eighty-four candidates, six were good enough for first classes and twelve for seconds, while in June and November 1889 and April and June 1890 out of an aggregate of 396 candidates there have been only two firsts and eighteen seconds. I have not gone back further, as the universal opinion is that the standards were suddenly raised for June 1889, and if that is so there can, of course, be no fair comparison. How can anyone believe that out of the 396 candidates for the four examinations I have classed together above, only two were as learned as the six who, out of eighty-four, obtained prizes in January? and it will be seen that the number of "seconds" (eighteen out of 396 and twelve out of eighty-four) is also disproportionate. No, Sir, the difference lies with the requirements of the examiners, as any "coach" will tell you. I am not a coach, but I could point out to you, as could many another recently admitted man, men who have failed to obtain honours, or have only obtained third classes, who were, to my own personal knowledge, infinitely cleverer and better read than men who, having the good luck to sit in April 1889 or January 1890, obtained firsts or seconds. It may be difficult for an examiner to set questions which shall always present exactly the same amount of difficulty; but if the questions must vary, why should the standard be of cast-iron? Would it not be fairer, if, as in June, not one out of 117 men can score the (say) 80 per cent. which six out of eighty-four succeeded in scoring in January, to attribute it in some degree to the increased difficulty of the questions, and award prizes to a few of the best men? When at one examination a dozen questions are set on leading cases, and at the next only two or three, the balance being made up by questions on obscure cases, how can the same results be expected ? D. O. T. JUDGMENT SUMMONSES IN COUNTY COURTS.-The unsatisfactory state of the law in regard to these summonses is notorious to all, but the way in which the existing law (bad as it is) is carried out is still more unsatisfactory. Service being at present necessarily personal, and only to be effected at first by an officer of the court, is undoubtedly in some cases difficult to effect, and if the defendant, by the judicious use of a few shillings, can avoid the service of a committal summons for a few pounds, he gladly does it. That this is one reason for the large proportion of judgment summonses returned unserved is certain, though quite incapable of proof. But being unserved at least five clear days before the return day, the plaintiff, or his solicitor, is entitled at once to have notice. Of four judgment summonses the writer had for hearing on one day at a County Court in London three were unserved (75 per cent.-a not uncommon ratio). Of these three only one notice of non-service had been received up to or on the day of the hearing. The one notice sent was received only the day before the hearing. That the other two were unserved was only discovered on attending to pay the hearing fee. Of these two only one was even marked on the list as unserved. The two plaintiffs and the writer being exceedingly annoyed, the matter was not allowed to pass without further investigation, and after being referred from one clerk to another it appeared that on the post-book of the court one of these two notices was entered as having been posted on the previous evening, and the lad who was responsible for the posting said the time of posting was twenty-five minutes to seven, and it was purely by chance he found these letters. Notwithstanding this statement of the lad (and surely the letters should be posted earlier and be seen to by some responsible clerk), the notice never reached the plaintiff or his solicitor, and the question remains whether the post-office or the lad made default, and considering the slipshod practice disclosed probabilities are distinctly against the court and in favour of the post-office. Excuse was made that several were away on holiday, and that notice of non-service had only been received from the suburban court to which one of the summonses had been sent on the day previous to the hearing. This shows a defect in the suburban court practice also which is equally reprehensible. There is no end either to this process of shifting responsibility instituted in the days of Adam. The writer had no desire to fasten the blame on any one person, but the incident shows that the system is entirely bad, and that the rules that there are, are not adhered to. When will the proposed amendments suggested by the committee for inquiring into the procedure and rules of the County Courts come into effect? For that time all County Court practitioners must ever long, and particularly THE AGGRIEVED PLAINTIFF'S SOLICITOR. NOTES AND QUERIES. None are inserted unless the name and address of the writer are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of bona fides. 23. CASE WANTED.-Will any one of your numerous subscribers tell me where in the Law Reports I can find the case which decides that, where a new trial is granted, and nothing is said about the costs of the first trial, each party pays their own, following the old 54th Rule of the R. G. of Hilary Term 1853. S. B. C. 24. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-A. owes B. £50. B. dies intestate in 1875, leaving a widow and two daughters him surviving. The widow takes out letters ofadministration after her husband B., but during her lifetime A. pays her neither principal nor interest. In 1882 the widow dies, having previously made a will appointing S. her executrix. It appears that, though A. never paid B.'s widow and administratrix anything, he nevertheless paid one of B.'s daughters (without the widow's assent) her distributive share of the £50. This was less than six years ago. Would this be a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt to entitle S. to recover the balance due? Authorities would oblige. JOHN. LEGAL OBITUARY. This department is contributed by EDWARD WALFORD, M.A., formerly Scholar of Balliol Coll, Oxford, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society of Great Britain; and as it is desired to make it as perfect a record as possible, the families and friends of deceased members of the Profession will oblige us by forwarding to the LAW TIMES Office any dates and materials required for a biographical notice. J. C. HEATH, Esq.-The late John Carlen Heath, Esq., Barrister-atlaw, of the Inner Temple, who died at his residence in Westbournecrescent, Paddington, on the 28th June last, in the eightieth year of his age, was the third son of the late Henry Fearon Heath, Esq., formerly of Westoe, South Shields, in the county of Durham. He was born in the year 1810, and was educated at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, where he graduated in 1841 as Bachelor of Arts, and proceeded M.A. in due course. He was entered as a student of the Inner Temple in Nov. 1832, and called to the bar by that society in Michaelmas Term 1843. He for many years practised as a special pleader, and then joined the Northern Circuit, attending the Durham, Northumberland, and Newcastle Sessions; but he had retired from active work on the approach of old age. He married, in 1861, Mary Jane, youngest daughter of the Rev. Henry Evans, rector of Lyng, Norfolk. A. WADDILOVE, ESQ. The late Alfred Waddilove, D.C.L., Esq., Barrister-at-law, of Trinity College, Oxford, official of the Archdeacon of Middlesex, who died at Longcot, Bedford Park, Chiswick, on the 8th July, in the eighty-fifth year of his age, was the fourth son of the late John Waddilove, Esq., of Thorpe, in the county of York. He was born in the year 1812, and was educated at Trinity College, Oxford, where he took the usual degrees. He was entered as a student of the Inner Temple Jan. 1836, and called to the bar there in Michaelmas Term 1841. He was also admitted an advocate of Doctors'-commons in Nov. 1839. His name was especially well known in the Ecclesiastical Courts, in which, for many years, he enjoyed a first-rate practice. To the Profession he was widely known as the author of two works, a "Digest of Ecclesiastical Cases," and the "Laws of Marriage and Divorce," &c. THE GAZETTES. Professional Partnerships Dissolved. Gazette, Aug. 8. WRIGLEY, HENRY; CLAYDON, GEORGE SPARK; and MAYNARD, JOHN ALFRED, solicitors Oldham. Aug. 1. Bankrupts. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 1883. RECEIVING ORDERS. Gazette, Aug. 8. To surrender at the High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. ALLEN, RICHARD, Mansfield-pl, Kentish Town, bronze powder manufacturer. Pet. Aug. 1. Order, HART, WILLIAM TIBBETTS, Moorgate-st, solicitor. Pet. July 18. Order, Aug. 1 To surrender at their respective District Courts. BENSON, JOSEPH HALL, Morley, grocer. Ct. Dewsbury. Pet. Aug. 5. Order, Aug, 5. BARTON, FREDERICK CHARLES, Staines, grocer. Ct. Kingston, Surrey. Pet. Aug. 1. Order, Ang. 1 BROOKE, WILLIAM, Ripple, assistant overseer of the poor. Ct. Worcester. Pet. July 29. Order, July 29. CLOUGH, JOSEPH, Bradford, bread baker. Ct. Bradford. Pet. Aug. 6. Order, Aug. &. Order Aug. 5. EAYRS, WILLIAM, Birmingham, boot dealer. Ct. Birmingham. Pet. July 16. Order, July 30. ELLIS, ROBERT, late Great Massingham, miller. Ct. Norwich. Pet. Aug. 6. Order, Aug. 6 EDWARDS, GEORGE, jun., Tunbridge Wells, builder. Ct. Tunbridge Wells. Pet. Aug. 2 Order, HART, HENRY JAMES, Birmingham, livery-stable keeper. Ct. Birmingham. Pet. Aug. 6. Order, HUMBERSTONE, ELIZABETH, late Green-lanes, innkeeper. Ct. Chelmsford. Pet. Aug. 5. Order, Aug. 2. Aug. 6. MILLAR, JAMES, Wrexham, draper. Ct. Wrexham. Pet. Aug. 5. Order, Aug. 5. Order, July 31. POINTER, FREDERICK, Margate, house furnisher. Ct. Canterbury. Pet. Aug. 6 |