THE late Right Hon. John Naish, formerly Lord Chancellor of Ireland, who died suddenly at Ems, in Germany, on the 17th Aug., in the fiftieth year of his age, was the son of the late Carrol Naish, Esq., of Bally. callen, in the county of Limerick. He was born in the year 1841, and was educated at Clongowes Wood College and at Trinity Coliege, Dublin, where he took his degree as Bachelor of Arts in 1863. He was called to the bar in Ireland in 1865, and became a Q.C. in 1880. He was law adviser to the Government of Ireland from 1880 to 1883, when he was appointed Solicitor-General for Ireland, and in the same year was promoted to the Attorney-Generalship. In 1885 he was for a time Lord Chancellor of Ireland, going out with Mr. Gladstone's Government in July of that year. He was again Lord Chancellor of Ireland for about six months in 1886, but again retired with his party. He married, in 1884, Maud, daughter of the late James Arthur Deane, Esq., of Turbotston, oo. Meath. T. ATKINSON, Esq.-The late Mr. Thomas Atkinson, solicitor, who died suddenly on the 3rd Aug., was, at the time of his death, town clerk of Doncaster, coroner for the borough, clerk to the Urban Sanitary Authority and School Attendance Committee, clerk to the Doncaster Cemetery Commissioners, and steward of the Manor of Barnby Dun. He was admitted a solicitor in 1857, and for upwards of twenty-five years he carried on practice in partnership with the preceding town clerk of Doncaster, but left that gentleman in the early part of 1884, and was shortly afterwards joined in partnership by his son with whom he has since carried on the practice. The deceased gentleman was appointed town clerk on the retirement of his former partner in 1886, and he had for somo years previously acted as borough coroner. He was also a trustee of the Doncaster Savings Bank, a governor of the Local Infirmary, and of the Royal Albert Asylum, and was appointed, in 1880, one of the trustees of the Doncaster Charities. He is succeeded in the practice by his eldest son, Mr. Ernest Atkinson. T. COPPOCK, Esq.-The late Theodore Coppock, Esq., barrister-at-law, of the Inner Temple, who was accidentally drowned in the Hardanger Fjord, Norway, on the 26th Aug., in the thirty-third year of his age, was the fifth son of the late Henry Coppock, Esq., solicitor, of Stockport, in the county of Cheshire, and was born in the year 1858. He was educated at the London University, and afterwards at St. John's College, Cambridge, where he graduated successively as Bachelor and Master of Arts in 1880 and 1884, and as LL.B. in 1882. He was entered as a student of the Inner Temple in May 1881, and was called to the bar there in Hilary Term of 1884, when he joined the Northern Circuit. W. S. PARRY CROOKE, ESQ.-The late Walter Samuel Parry Crooke, Esq., barrister-at-law, of Lincoln's-inn, and 45, Palace-gardens, Kensing ton, who died at Haslemere, Surrey, on the 30th Aug., in the fifty-sixth year of his age, was the second son of the late John Parry Crooke, Esq., late of Boldre, near Lymington, Hampshire. He was born in the year 1835, and was educated at Trinity College. Cambridge. He was entered as a student of Lincoln's-inn in June 1862, and called to the bar by that society in Michaelmas Term 1865. He married, in 1867, Charlotte Vere Antonia Tyndale, eldest daughter of John Nash Tyndale, Esq., M.A., of the Middle Temple, barrister-at-law. C. M. FARQUHARSON, ESQ.-The late Charles Miller Farquharson, Esq., late judge of the Supreme Court in Jamaica, who died at Fortlands, Tralee, Ireland, on the 6th Aug. last, in the seventy-sixth year of his age, was the eldest son of the late Charles Farquharson, Esq., of Jamaica, and was born in the year 1815. He was entered as a student of the Middle Temple in 1833, and called to the bar by that society in Michaelmas Term of 1838, where he joined, on account of his family connections, the local Bar, and practised for many years as a counsel, obtaining a very good practice. He had retired from the post of a district judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Jamaica, several years back. Soon after his call he went out to the West Indies. J.J. H. HUMPHREYS, ESQ.-The late John James Hamilton Humphreys, Esq., barrister-at-law, of the Inner Temple, who died at his residence in Kensington in April last, in the seventy-fourth year of his age, was the eldest son of the late John Humphreys, Esq., of Milltown House, Strabane, in the county of Tyrone, by Elizabeth Frances his wife. He was born in the year 1817, and was educated at the Charterhouse School, under Dr. Russell, and at Exeter College, Oxford, where he graduated Bachelor of Arts in 1839. He was entered as a student of the Inner Temple in June 1886, and called to the bar there in Michaelmas Term 1842. He practised for many years as a conveyancer and equity draftsman. He married, in 1850, Elizabeth, fourth daughter of Charles Style, Esq., of Glenmore, co. Donegal, by whom he has left issue. A. MACNAMARA, ESQ.-The late Arthur Macnamara, Esq., barristerat-law, of Lincoln's-inn, who died from an accident in the Maderanerthal, in Switzerland, on the 18th Aug., before he had passed his thirtieth year, was the eldest son of John Macnamara, Esq. He was educated at Harrow School under Dr. Butler, where he will long be remembered for the number of prizes that he carried off, and his career was scarcely less brilliant at Cambridge. He was entered as a student of Lincoln's-inn in due course, and was called to the bar there in Trinity Term of 1886. He had no time to show his talents in the profession of his choice, having been cut off so suddenly, for a slip of his foot on an Alpine height at once cut short a career which, in the opinion of his friends, promised much success and distinction. To surrender at their respective District Courts. ADAMS, FREDERICK WILLIAM, Wath-upon-Dearne, corn miller. Ct. Sheffield. Pet. Sept. 1. Order, Sept. 1. BINNS, JOHN, St. Helens, rent collector. Ct. Liverpool. Pet. Aug. 22. Order, Sept. 3. BIRCH, GEORGE, Burton-on-Trent, clothier. Ct. Wolverhampton. Pet. Aug. 19. Order, Sept. 2. CLAYPOLE, CHARLES SAMUEL, Nottingham, publican. Ct. Nottingham. Pet. Sept. 3. Order, Sept. 3. DALE, WILLIAM, late Macclesfield, solicitor's clerk. Ct. Hanley, Burslem, and Tunstall. Pet. Sept. 3. Order, Sept. 3. DANN, GEORGE, Hanley, tailor. Ct. Hanley. Burslem, and Tunstall. Pet. Aug. 20. Order, Sept. 3. DENSTON, C. H. W., Streatham. Ct. Wandsworth. Pet. Aug. 12. Order, Sept. 2. HOLMES, JOHN, jun., Wainfleet All Saints, joiner. Ct. Boston. Pet. Sept. 1. Order, Sept. 1. MILLYARD, HEDLEY (trading as the London and County Printing and Publishing Company), Order, SMITH, JOHN HOPKIN, Cottenham, farmer. Ct. Cambridge. Pet. Sept. 1. Order, Sept. 1. WALDOCK. ERNEST EDWIN, late Roundhay, tailor. Ct. Leeds. Pet. Aug. 12. Order, Sept. 1. Gazette, Sept. 9. To surrender at the High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. BONNER, EMMA, late Cambridge-grdns, Notting Hill, packing-case maker. Pet. Aug. 18. Order, To surrender at their respective District Courts. BALL, WILLIAM, jun., Dover, butcher. Ct. Canterbury. Pet. Sept. 6. Order, Sept. 6. BUSBY, BENJAMIN GEORGE, Wolverton, butcher. Ct. Northampton. Pet. Sept. 4. Order, COYLE, WILLIAM GEORGE, Bath, stationer. Ct. Bath. Pet. Sept. 4. Order, Sept. 4. EYRE, JOHN VILLIERS, Brighouse, mineral-water manufacturer. Ct. Halifax. Pet. Sept. 5, FEAVER, WILLIAM HENRY, Kingston, grocer. Ot. Portsmouth. Pet. Sept. 4. Order, Sept. 4. Order, Sept. 3. Order, Sept. 5. Pet. Sept. 5. Order, HEPWORTH, JOSEPH, Sheffield, general dealer. Ct Sheffield. Pet. Sept. 4. Order, Sept. 4. Pet. Sept. 6. Order, STONE, WILLIAM THOMAS, Margate, baker. Ct. Canterbury. Pet. Sept. 5. Order, Sept. 5. FIRST MEETINGS AND PUBLIC EXAMINATION3. BOOTY, WILLIAM, late Pentonville-rd, wholesale boot manufacturer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting. Sept. 12, at noon. at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. Oct. 15, at 12.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. CONI, HARRY ALEXANDER, Highbury-quadrant, Highbury New Park. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting. Sept. 12, at 1, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. Oct. 15, at 12.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. CODD, ROWLAND HARRISON RUSSELL (lately carrying on business as Merry and Co.), late Angel-ct, Throgmorton-st, commission agent. Ct. Tunbridge Wells. Meeting, Sept. 12, at 11, at 24, Railway-approach, London Bridge. Exam. Oct. 16, at 2.30, at the Townhall, Tunbridge Wells. Order sum. adm. Sept. 1. FAGGE, FREDERIC WILLIAM, London-wall, stockdealer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy Meeting, Sept. 16, at noon, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. Oct. 7, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's. inn-fids. Order sum. adm. Sept. 2. FORD, JAMES WILLIAM, Cheltenham, licensed victualler. Ct. Cheltenham. Meeting, Sept. 16, at 3.30, at the County Court-bldngs, Cheltenham. Exam. Oct. 2, at noon, at the County Court, Cheltenham. FOLEY, JOHN, Wednesbury, grocer. Ct. Walsall. Meeting, Sept. 24, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Walsall. Exam. Sept. 24, at noon, at the Court house, Walsall. Order sum, adm. Sept. 1. GILES, JOHN WILLIAMS, sen., Porthcawl, ship carpenter. Ct. Cardiff. Meeting, Sept. 19, at noon, at office of Off. Rec. Cardiff. Exam. Oct. 11, at 10, at the Townhall, Cardiff. Order sum. adm. Aug. 25. HYDE, WILLIAM, Birmingham, fruiterer. Ct. Birmingham. Meeting, Sept. 16, at 11, at 25, Colemore-row, Birmingham. Exam, Sept. 29, at 2, at the County Court, Birmingham. Order sum. adm. Aug. 9. KEATING, MARY, Liverpool, tobacconist. Ct. Liverpool. Meeting, Sept. 18, at 3, at office of Off. Rec. Liverpool. Exam. Sept. 18, at 11, at the Court-house, Liverpool. Order sum. adm. Aug. 29. LEVI, RACHEL, Leeds, boot manufacturer. Ct. Leeds. Meeting, Sept. 15, at 11, at office of Off. Reo. Leeds. Meeting, Sept. 23, at 11, at the County Court-house, Leeds. Order sum. adm. Aug. 21. MILLS, JOSEPH, Gloucester, cycle manufacturer. Ct. Gloucester. Meeting. Sept. 13, at 3, at office of Off. Rec. Gloucester. Exam. Oct. 7, at noon, at the Shirehall, G oucester. Order sum. adm. Sept. 2. PICKLES, THOMAS, Grassington, farmer, Ct. Bradford. Meeting, Sept. 18, at 11, at office of Or, Rec. Bradford. Exam. Öot. 17, at 10, at the County Court, Bradford. RIDEWOOD, CLAUDE THOMAS, Dartford, stationer. Ct. Rochester. Meeting, Sept. 15, at 11.30, TRIGG, SAMUEL, Ogmore, beerhouse-keeper. Ct. Cardiff. Meeting, Sept. 19, at 2, at office of Off. ALDRIDGE, EDWARD, Lisson-grove, zinc worker. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. DAWSON, ALFRED THOMAS, Great Grimsby, manure merchant. Ct. Great Grimsby. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 1.30, at office of Off. Rec. Great Grimsby. Exam. Oct. 1, at 11, at the Townhall, Great Grimsby. Order sum. adm. Aug. 28. DALE, WILLIAM, late Macoles field, solicitor's olerk, Ct. Hanley, Burslem, and Tunstall, Meeting, Sept. 16, at 11.15, at office of Off. Rec. Newcastle-under-Lyme. Exam. Sept. 16, at 2.30, at the Townhall, Hanley. DANN, GEORGE, Hanley, tailor. Ct. Hanley, Burslem, and Tunstall. Meeting, Sept. 16, at noon, at office of Off. Rec. Newcastle-under-Lyme. Exam. Sept. 16, at 2.30, at the Townhall, Hanley. EYRE, JOHN VILLIERS, Brighouse, mineral-water manufacturer. Ct. Halifax. Meeting, Sept. 18, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Halifax. Exam. Oct. 6, at 11, at the County Court-house, Halifax. Order sum. adm. Sept. 5. FIRTH, GEORGE, Leeds, late dyer. Ct. Leeds. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Leeds. Exam. Sept. 23, at 11, at the County Court-house, Leeds. Order sum. adm. Aug. 22. FEAVER, WILLIAM HENRY, Kingston, grocer. Ct. Portsmouth. Meeting, Sept. 22, at 3.30, at 166, Queen-st, Portsea. Exam. Sept. 22, at noon, at the Court-house, Portsmouth, Order sum. adm. Sept. 4. FANCETT, JOHN B., Rochester, late auctioneer. Ct. Rochester. Meeting, Sept. 29, at 11.30, at office of Off. Rec. Rochester. Exam, Sept. 29, at 2, at the Court-house, Rochester. Order sum. adm. Sept. 5. GEDGE, HARRY JOHN, Paternoster-row, solicitor. Ct. High Court of Justice, in_Bankruptcy. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 11, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. Oct. 7, at 11 30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-flds. Order sum. adm. Aug. 28. Meeting, Sept. 17, at noon, GILLESPIE, JOHN, Great Grimsby, sailmaker. Ct. Great Grimsby. at office of Off. Rec. Great Grimsby. Exam. Oct. 1, at 11, at the Townhall, Great Grimsby. Order sum. adm. Aug. 22. HARRISON, THOMAS, Holderness, farmer. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Meeting, Sept. 16, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Hull. Exam. Oct. 13, at 2, at the Court-house, Hull. JESSUP, WILLIAM, Grimsby, auctioneer. Ct. Great Grimsby. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Great Grimsby. Exam. Oct. 1, at 11, at the Townhall, Great Grimsby. Order sum. adm. Aug. 22. KITCHENER, JAMES, Muriel-st, Islington, builder, Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy Meeting, Sept. 17, at noon, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. Sept. 30, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's inn-fids. Order sum. adm. Aug. 21, KLENCK, JOHN MATTHEW, late Bishopsgate-st Without, auctioneer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, Sept. 18, at noon, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. Oct. 16, at 11, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-filds. KUNSTMANN, JOSEPH NATHAN, Great Grimsby, tailor. Ct. Great Grimsby. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 1, at office of Off. Rec. Great Grimsby. Exam. Oot. 1, at 11, at the Townhall, Great Grimsby. Order sum, adm. Aug. 19. KING, JAMES, Leicester, grocer. Ct. Leicester. Meeting, Sept. 22, at 3, at office of Off. Reo. EGGE, WILLIAM HENRY, Cheltenham, bootmaker. Ot. Cheltenham. Meeting, Sept. 16, at 4.30, NOSOTTI, CHARLES, Oxford-st, upholsterer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, PAYNE, ALEXANDER, Exeter-st, Strand, wine merchant. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bank- RAE, CHARLES MARSHAM, late Upper Gloucester-pl. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 11, at Bankruptoy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Linooln's-inn. Exam. Oct. 16, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's-iun-flds. ROGERS, GEORGE, Carmarthen, plumber. Ct. Carmarthen. Meeting, Sept. 17, at 11, at office of BWANN, GEORGE MORGAN CLIFFORD, late Cambridge Henth-rd, provision merchant. WRAGG, THOMAS, Huntington, market gardener. Ct. York. Meeting, Sept. 19, at 11.30, at office of off. Rec. York. Exam. Oct. 10, at 11, at the Guildhall, York. Order sum. adm. Sept. 5, NOTICE OF DAY APPOINTED FOR PROCEEDING WITH PUBLIO DAVIES, JAMES, Portmadoo, master mariner. Ct. Portmadoc and Blaenau Festiniog. Bram. ADJUDICATIONS. Gazette, Sept. 5. ANDERSON, FRANOIS, Greenwich, solicitor. Ot, Greenwich. Order, Aug. 28. Fet. July 2 CONI, HARRY ALEXANDER, Highbury-quadrant, Highbury New Park, no occupation. Ot. High FITTON, ROBERT, Huddersfield, chemist. Ct. Huddersfield. Order, Sept. 2. Pet. Aug. 18. GOSS, HENRY CHARLES, Well-ot, Queen-st, manufacturer's agent. Ct. High Court of Justice, in HILL, WILLIAM, Goswell-rd, auctioneer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, HOLMES, JOHN, Jun., Wainfleet All Saints, joiner. Ct. Boston. Order, Sept. 1. Pet. Sept. 1. KEATING, MARY, Liverpool, tobacconist. Ct. Liverpool. Order, Sept. 3. Pet. Aug. 7. MCARTHUR, WILLIAM, Gracechurch-st, commission agent. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, Sept. 3. Pet. March 20. MANN, FREDERICK, Leamington, butcher. Ot. Warwick. Order, Sept. 3. Pet. July 10. PIKE, FREDERICK HENRY, Salisbury, bootmaker. Ct. Salisbury. Order, Sept. 1. Pet. Aug. 26. SMITH, JOHN HOPKIN, Cottenham, farmer. Ct. Cambridge. Order, Sept. 1. Pet. Sept. 1. Ot. High Court of Justice, BOOTY, WILLIAM, late Pentonville-rd, wholesale boot manufacturer. BIRCH, GEORGE, Burton-on-Trent, clothier. Ct. Wolverhampton. Order, Sept. 6. Pet. Aug. 18. Pet. DUNMAN, WILLIAM HILL, Dorchester, late relieving officer. Ct. Dorchester. EYRE, JOHN VILLIERS, Brighouse, mineral-water manufacturer, Ct, Halifax, Order, Sept. 5. Pet. Sept. 4. FEAVER, WILLIAM HENRY, Kingston, grocer. Ct. Portsmouth. Order, Sept. 4. HAMAND, ARTHUR SAMUEL, late Palace-ohmbrs, Bridge-st, Westminster, civil engineer. Ot. Sept. 3. BIRTH. AND DEATHS. NEALE.-On the 10th inst., at North Dulwich, the wife of Edward Neale, Sollaltor, 59 and 60, FIELDER-WALKER.-On the 2nd inst., at All Saints' Church, Notting Hill, Charles Percy Fielder, of 58, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Solicitor, second son of John Roberts Fielder, of Titchfield, Hampshire, to Esther Mary Phyllis, daughter of the late Rev. 8. Edmund Walker, D.D., rector of St. Columb-Major, Cornwall. LUCAS GIBSON.-On the 30th July, at St. Saviour's Cathedral, Maritzburg, Edward Lucas, of Durban, Solicitor, son of Arthur Lucas, of Darlington, to Caroline Theresa, daughter of the late R. T. Gibson, of Maritzburg, PRALL-NORTON.-On the 30th ult., at West Malling, Kent, John Henniker, second son of John Thomas Prall, Solicitor, of Eastgate, Rochester, to Lucy, eldest daughter of W. South Norton, Solicitor, West Malling. SHAW-CLARK,-On the 3rd inst., at St. Mark's, Hamilton-terrace, N.W., Patrick Galway Costello Shaw, Solicitor, second son of F. G. Shaw, Esq., of Heathburn Hall, co. Cork, and Ootacamund, Madras, to Alice Louisa, youngest daughter of the late Frederick James Clark, Esq., of Oak Lodge, Kilburn. SKELTON-HART.-On the 30th ult., at Capel Curig, North Wales, 8. Gissing Skelton, of Lincoln'sinn-fields and Glencairn, New Barnet, eldest son of Samuel Skelton, of Wembley Orchard, near Harrow, to Constance Oliver, eldest daughter of the late Lemon Hart, of Winchesterroad, Hampstead. WEAVER-BRIDGMAN-TYRWHITT-DRAKE-On the 3rd inst., at Victoria, British Columbia, Arthur John Weaver-Bridgman, of Victoria, to Maud Lillan, second daughter of the Hon. Mr. Justice Montague William Tyrwhitt-Drake, Judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. WILLOUGHBY-CLARKSON.-On the 4th inst., at St. Mark's, Surbiton, George Philip Willoughby, of 4, Bedford-square, Bloomsbury, to Flora Mary, eldest daughter of the late Major-Gen. James Price Clarkson, of Chapeltown House, Surbiton. DEATHS. BULLEN.-On the 4th ult., at Queenstown, South Africa, Robert Francis Bullen, C.E., third son of the late Edward Bullen, Esq., of the Middle Temple, Special Pleader, aged 49. CHAMBERLAIN.-On the 20th ult., at Longhope, Pelham-road, Southsea, Anna Maria, widow of the late Ayling Chamberlain, Solicitor, and daughter of the late James Elliott, Deputy Inspector-General of Army Hospitals. CREERY.-On the 2nd inst,, at Folkestone, Leslie Creery, of Ashford, Kent, Solicitor, aged 59 years. CROOKE.-On the 30th ulc., at Haslemere, Surrey, Walter Samuel Parry Crooke, Barrister-at-law, Lincoln's-inn, of 45, Palace-gardens-terrace, Kensington. GENN. On the 7th inst., at 18, Woodlane-terrace, Falmouth, William James Genn, Solicitor, in his 79th year. JONES.-On the 7th inst., at No. 2, Moorland road, Leeds, Hvan Miller Jones, Solicitor, in the 63rd year of his age. PRIDEAUX, On the 3rd inst., at St. Leonards-on-Sea, Catharine Ann, the beloved wife of C. G. Prideaux, Q.0., Recorder of Bristol, in the 73rd year of her age. WHEATSTONE.-On the 4th inst., at 8, Alma-square, St. John's Wood, N.W., Sophia Ann, sister of the late Sir Charles Wheatstone, D.C.L, F.R.S., in her 91st year, YEOMAN. On the 80th ult., at 2. Wimbledon-park-road, after a long illness, James Yeoman, Solicitor, formerly of Huddersfield, aged 84. THE attitude assumed by the licensing justices in various parts of the country already serves to emphasise the consequences of the much-discussed decision of the Court of Appeal in Sharpe v. Wakefield and others (60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 130). It is not surprising that the manifest reluctance of the justices to grant renewals in so many cases should be exercising the minds of the brewers and those who have cognate interests. It may be remembered, however, that the MASTER of the ROLLS and Lord Justice FRY fully recognised the possible outcome of their interpretation of the law. "It appears to me to be clear," said Lord ESHER, "that very large interests are involved in this question, and it is equally clear that the nature of those interests is that of a money or business interest, and that, therefore, one ought to attend to them carefully and see clearly what the law is before jeopardising them or bringing them into peril." Nevertheless, in the result it appeared to their Lordships that the law had conferred upon justices a far wider discretion than had been generally supposed to exist. it may not be inopportune to recall another part of Lord ESHER'S judgment, which said plainly that, the law notwithstanding, justices might do irreparable injury if they neglected to exercise the greatest care in putting their powers of refusal into operation. It should be remembered, too, that the decision of the Court of Appeal has not yet been submitted to the House of Lords for affirmation or rescission. Vol. LXXXIX.-No. 2477. But WE recently referred to the policy of the law which holds all compromises of criminal proceedings to be illegal, and the case of McClatchie v. Haslam takes us a step further (see ante, p. 290). There a wife executed a mortgage of her own property to the trustees of a land society, whose funds had been misappropriated by her husband, to secure the amount of his default. On the evidence Mr. Justice KEKEWICH held that the liability of her husband to criminal proceedings, unless something was done to prevent them, must have been present in the wife's mind when she executed the deed, and as that was her motive in executing it, his Lordship ordered it to be delivered up to be cancelled. In Mr. JOSIAH SMITH'S Manual of Equity Jurisprudence (14th edit. p. 506 et seq.), it is said that the courts exercise this jurisdiction on the quia timet principle, that is, for fear that the documents may be vexatiously or injuriously used, when the evidence to impeach them may be lost or diminished, but where the illegality appears on the face of the document, they will not do In McClatchie v. Haslam nothing on the face of the mortgage would presumably have suggested that the compromise of a criminal prosecution was the true motive; hence, if the deed had not been cancelled, and the land society had transferred their security to some third party for valuable consideration without notice, there might have been trouble in the future, when the evidence might have been much diminished. So. 66 "FIRST Come, first served," would be a free though popular rendering of the well-known legal maxim, Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure, and the decision of Mr. Justice NORTH in Re Standard Portland Cement Company (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 822) certainly seems a just one. The Cement Company presented a petition for its own winding-up. Two days after a creditor presented a second petition for the same purpose, and this petition was advertised in the Gazette before the first one. In Re United Ports and General Insurance Company (39 L. J. 146, Ch.) ViceChancellor JAMES made the order on the petition which was presented third, but advertised first. "In these cases," said the Vice-Chancellor, as that is the mode of service upon everybody except the company-is the mode of service on the world-Ï shall always consider the advertisement as testing the priority of the proceedings." It was urged on behalf of the cement company that the reason of the rule so stated by the ViceChancellor is done away with, as both petitions are now set down before the same judge, and the person presenting the second petition is informed that the first has been presented. Mr. Justice NORTH seems to have agreed with this reasoning, as he dismissed the second petition with costs as against the company, and made the common order for a compulsory windingup on the first petition. He admitted that the creditor was entitled to persevere in his petition to guard against the chance of the company's dropping theirs, but held that it must be at his own risk. It should be noted that, in Re London and Australian Agency Corporation (29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 417), Sir G. JESSEL made one order for continuing the winding-up under the supervision of the court on three petitions, allowed the costs of all three, but gave the carriage of the order to the petitioner who had presented his petition first, but had not advertised it until after one of the others. THE different attempts made to secure uniformity in the principles of bankruptcy, and those that govern the administration of the estate of a person who has died insolvent, have naturally in some cases led to fruitful litigation. The 10th section of the Judicature Act 1875 enacted that, "in the administration by the court of the assets of any person who may die after the commencement of this Act, and whose estate may prove to be insufficient for the payment in full of his debts and liabilities, the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and as to debts and liabilities provable, and as to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities respectively, as may be in force for the time being under the law of bankruptcy with respect to the estates of persons adjudged bankrupt." The section did not provide that the principles of bankruptcy were to apply to the administration of the estates of all deceased insolvents, but only in certain well-defined cases, and as between certain defined persons. The 125th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 has gone further, and provides that any creditor who could have presented a bankruptcy petition if the debtor had been alive, may petition the court for the administration of the estate of the deceased debtor according to the law of bankruptcy, and the court may thereupon make an order for the administration in bankruptcy of that estate. In Re Baker; Nicholls v. Baker (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 817; 44 Ch. Div. 262), the Court of Appeal refused to hold that a judge could be compelled to make the transfer, whenever an insolvent estate was being_administered, but that he had a discretion in the matter. Mr. Justice CHITTY had refused, in that case, to exercise his discretion to order a transfer, though the creditor's counsel pressed upon his Lordship the fact that, if the transfer were made, the general creditors would be benefited, as the executors would lose their right of retainer, and the Statute of Limitations, which the executors did not intend to plead, would bar a debt due to some other creditors. "In my opinion," said Lord Justice COTTON, the mere existence of a right which would be recognised in the Chancery Division, and not in the Court of Bankruptcy, is not necessarily a ground for saying that it is imperative to order a transfer." ONCE again the question of an administratrix's right of retainer has come before the courts, and has been decided in her favour. The case to which we refer is Re May; Crawford v. May (noted ante, p. 274), where a married woman, F. M., living apart from her husband, lent to him in the year 1885 £143 for the purposes of his business. He died without having repaid the money, and letters of administration were granted to his widow F. M. The estate was insolvent, and F. M. claimed to retain the £143 out of the personal estate come to her hands, to which a creditor, who had taken out a summons for administration on behalf of himself and all other creditors, objected. The 10th section of the Judicature Act 1875 provides that, in the administration by the court of the assets of any person who may die after the commencement of the Act, and whose estate may prove to be insufficient for the payment in full of his debts and liabilities, the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and as to debts and liabilities provable, &c., as may be in force for the time being under the law of Lankruptcy with respect to the estates of persons adjudged bankrupt. In 1879 it was decided by the Court of Appeal that the section did not apply to an executor's right of retainer: (Lee v. Nuttall (2), 41 L. T. Rep. N. S. 363; 12 Ch. Div. 61.) "The Legislature," said Lord Justice JAMES, never intended to treat an executor having a right of retainer as a secured creditor. The sole object of the section, as it appears to me, was to get rid of the rule in Chancery under which a secured creditor could prove for the full amount of his debt, and realise his security afterwards." The creditor contended that the widow could not retain her debt in Re May, as she could not prove against her husband's estate until the other creditors had been paid in full by virtue of the 3rd section of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, which provides that any money or other estate of the wife lent or intrusted by her to her husband for the purpose of any trade or business carried on by him, or otherwise, shall be treated as assets of her husband's estate in case of his bankruptcy, under reservation of the wife's claim to a dividend as a creditor for the amount or value of such money or other estate after, but not before, all claims of the other creditors of the husband for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied." On behalf of the widow it was contended that she was not claiming to prove against the estate, but only to exercise her right of retainer, and Mr. Justice NORTH held that she was entitled to retain. 66 Ir is certainly advisable for young conveyancers to follow the general phraseology of the common forms in their drafts, unless there is some good reasons for changing it. These forms have received the sanction of many generations of draftsmen, and their meaning may often have received judicial interpretation. Further, if any words should by any accident be omitted from the instrument, when engrossed, the court can supply the missing words from the familiar precedents. Such was the work which Mr. Justice CHITTY had to do in Re Hunt; Davies v. Hetherington (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 753), where a testator bequeathed certain property in trust for his grandchildren, who being a son or sons shall live to attain the age of twentyone years, or being a daughter or daughters shall marry under that age with their mother's consent, to be divided between them share and share alike," and gave to the trustees a power of maintenance of the grandchildren during their minorities, and also a power of advancement. His Lordship said that to compel children to marry during minority would be downright madness," and held that granddaughters who had attained majority took vested interests, though they had not previously married. In Re Daniel's Settlement Trusts (34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 308; 1 Ch. Div. 375) daughters were not expressly included in the class of beneficiaries, but it was clear from the context that this was a clerical error, and the Court of Appeal held that they were entitled to share in the fund if they attained twenty-one. The trust in that case was "for all and every the child and children of the said T. D. by the said A. M. his wife, begotten or to be begotten, who being a son or sons have or hath already attained, or shall hereafter live to attain the age of twenty-one years, equally to be divided between them 66 and if there shall be but one such child, the whole shall be in trust for such one or only child, and his or her executors and administrators," and power was given to apply the income "of the presumptive share of every such child in the said trust funds for or towards his or her respective support until such his or her respective share shall become vested, or he or she shall previously die." Then followed a power to sell all or any part of the expectant share of " each of the said sons," and apply the same for his advancement. Lord Justice JAMES pointed out that there was abundant evidence on the face of the instrument of an intention to provide for female children as well as male, and that the words declaratory of the trust were part of a common form, so that there was no difficulty in supplying words which would include daughters who attained twenty-one. On the other hand, conveyancers who aim at conciseness will find many opportunities of omitting surplusage, even when they follow the outline of the common precedents. A way THE following short question of some interest was raised in the case of Re Lehmann; Ex parte Hasluck (62 L. T. Rep. N. S.941), decided by Justices CAVE and SMITH, in the Bankruptcy Divisional Court: Can a creditor, who wishes to issue a bankruptcy notice, under sect. 4 of the Act of 1883, on a judgment debt add to the judgment debt the interest which has accrued due upon it, and issue his bankruptcy notice for the full amount ? Judgment was obtained against a debtor for £13,796 in 1888, and interest at 4 per cent. having under the provisions of 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, sect. 17, accrued to the amount of £1100 on the debt, the creditor applied to the registrar of the Guildford County Court for leave to issue a bankruptcy notice for the debt plus the accrued interest, making in all a sum of £14,896. The registrar was willing to issue the notice for the amount of the debt, but declined to do so for the amount of the debt with the interest added to it. The section under which bankruptcy notices are issued is sect. 4, and it speaks of the notice as requiring the debtor to pay the judgment debt, or to compound for it, but makes no mention of interest at all; and the registrar came to the conclusion that the words of the section were confined to the judgment debt itself, and could not be extended so as to include the interest that had accrued on the debt. out of the difficulty was suggested in the course of the argument, for by rule 136 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1886 a bankruptcy notice is required to be in a certain form, but "with such variations as circumstances require," and this addition of interest, it was said, was a variation which the circumstances of the case required. Whether it was so or not is a matter of little moment, as we cannot believe it was ever intended that the interest could not be included in the debt. A debtor is entitled to know clearly and fully the exact amount in which he is indebted to his creditors, so that he may at least have the opportunity of either paying it or compounding in some way for it. If the interest is not to be included in the bankruptcy notice, it follows that the debtor must be left to a great extent in ignorance of his position with regard to his creditor. Whether the interest ought to be lumped into the debt in one sum on the notice, or the debt and the interest should be placed separate and distinct on the notice, is, as Mr. Justice CAVE puts it, a matter of detail. But that, in some form or other, the interest should appear on the notice is certain, in order that the debtor may be informed, by means of the notice, that he cannot comply with its terms without paying the interest. Accordingly leave was given to issue the bankruptcy notice for the whole amount including the interest. THE question as to what will amount to a "renunciation in writing " of a bill of exchange or promissory note, within the meaning of sect. 62, sub-sect. 1 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), came before Mr. Justice CHITTY in the case of Re George Francis v. Bruce, reported 63 L. T. Rep. N. S. 49. By that sub-section a bill is discharged when the holder, at or after its maturity, absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor; and the renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered up to the acceptor. Sect. 89 makes, with the necessary modifications, the Act applicable to promissory notes. The point which Mr. Justice CHITTY had to decide arose under the following circumstances: In 1886 a testator lent to his niece £2000, secured by a promissory note payable on demand. By his will, dated in 1887, he bequeathed to her a legacy of £6000. By a codicil to his will he recited the legacy, and the existence of the loan, which he wished to be considered an advance on account of the legacy, and declared that, if at his decease the sum of £2000 should be due and owing, such moneys should be deducted from the legacy, and that the legacy should be reduced accordingly in satisfaction of the moneys due. A few hours before his death, which occurred in 1889, he expressed a desire to destroy the promissory note, and to forgive the debt. This note could not then be found, in spite of the search instituted by the directions of the testator, and a nurse present at his bedside wrote at his instance a memorandum, which was not signed by him, to the effect that it was his dying wish that the note should be destroyed as soon as found. There was thus a written direction given in articulo mortis by the holder of a promissory note payable on demand, that it should be destroyed as soon as found, the note at the time being missing, and therefore not able to be delivered up to the maker. Mr. Justice CHITTY, whilst satisfied that the testator intended to discharge the note and to forgive the debt, was of opinion that he had not absolutely and unconditionally renounced his rights as required by the statute. His Lordship did not, however, consider that it was necessary that the actual words should be put in the document of renunciation, but that it must in effect be absolute and unconditional; and further, that the document must not be a mere memorandum or note of the intention, but must be in itself a record of the renunciation. All that appeared here was an intention to destroy the note, and the memorandum made by the nurse was meant to be evidence of that intention. This Mr. Justice CHITTY held to be insufficient to meet the statutory provision, because, as the learned judge pointed out, the testator could have altered his intention if he had changed his mind at any time before his death. He had therefore a locus pœnitentiæ, that was fatal to the view that the renunciation was absolute and unconditional. With the view taken by Mr. Justice CHITTY we feel bound to agree, for, although admittedly a hard case, it is difficult to see how it could have been decided differently in the face of the clear provisions of the section. The learned judge purposely left undecided the important question whether or not a signature is necessary to make a renunciation valid. It is true that the section says nothing about the direction being signed, but only requires it to be "in writing." Still, it seems very much open to doubt whether signing the written direction is not impliedly essential. SHORTHAND NOTES IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. THE immense convenience and saving of time effected by the use of shorthand are fully appreciated by members of both branches of the Legal Profession. To the solicitor in extensive practice the services of an expert shorthand-clerk are indeed indispensable; if only for the purposes of professional correspondence. But the utility of shorthand in the conduct of legal business is yet more notable in connection with litigation. Most of the judges now admit the advantage to be derived from a shorthand record, and the probability is that all of them will, in time, accept the shorthand system as an invaluable adjunct of legal machinery. Meanwwile, it is important to the Profession to remember the exact limitations of the practice in regard to the use of shorthand notes in the course of legal proceedings. According to a general direction given by the Court of Appeal, the costs of a shorthand note of a judgment will generally be allowed: "That should be taken as the rule, unless we give some direction to the contrary. It must be always understood that, where we give costs, they are to include the costs of the shorthand-writer's notes of the judgment: " (per Lord Justice Cotton in Re Medland; Eland v. Medland, 60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 851; 41 Ch. Div. 493.) Efforts to get the costs of shorthand notes of evidence also allowed as part of the party and party costs of appeal have, however, only been successful in exceptional cases, as, for example, where there was no judge's note and the shorthand notes were found to be of indispensable assistance, or where such notes had been used by all parties and by the court with advantage to the ends of justice. But, even in regard to a shorthand note of the judgment, it is not to be supposed that every shorthand-writer's qualifications will entitle him or his employer to the costs ad hoc on a successful appeal. The Lords Justices have drawn a marked distinction between the services of a "professional shorthandwriter" and those of a solicitor's clerk, however expert such clerk may be. In Re Norman (54 L. T. Rep. N. S. 144) some rather strong remarks on the subject fell from the Master of the Rolls. The question raised had reference to a solicitor's bill of costs, in commenting on which his Lordship said: "Then you come to the extraordinary charge of £71 for shorthand notes, which is put down as if it had been incurred in the ordinary course, that is, in respect of the employment of a professional shorthandwriter, at the usual charge of one guinea per day, and a further sum for transcribing his notes. It turns out that no such person was employed at all, but only a clerk. It is an astounding charge which will require careful consideration by the taxing master before he allows any. thing in respect of it." It is to be observed, nevertheless, that the services of a shorthand-clerk may often be of great advantage to those who employ him, and who may desire a record day by day of proceedings in court in a case which would not justify the expense of engaging a professional shorthand-writer. While it may be unreasonable to treat such a clerk as an independent expert, there would seem to be no sufficient reason for disallowing a charge of some kind as between party and party, or at least as between solicitor and client. Nor does the fact that the clerk receives a fixed salary from the solicitor whe employs him tell very strongly against the principle of making an allowance. The clerk, shorthand or other, necessarily does a great deal of work which is charged for in the bill of costs as if personally done by the solicitor himself. Indeed, if a clerk could not manage to earn for his principal something over and above the amount of his salary, it would be an argument for cutting down a clerical staff to the lowest possible number. Moreover, it is well known that there are many non-professional firms in London who undertake nothing but shorthand work, and who receive payment from the solicitors employing them without feeling under any obligation to pay the members of their staff anything beyond their fixed and regular remuneration. These are considerations which, perhaps, were not present to the mind of the Master of the Rolls when his Lordship delivered judgment in Re Norman (ubi sup.). On the other hand, it would be obviously unjust and inexpedient to bind one party to an action by the shorthand note which might have been taken by the clerk of his opponent's solicitors. This was the view to which the Court of Appeal gave effect in Ellington v. Clark and others (38 Ch. Div. 332). "We wish it to be understood," said Lord Justice Cotton, "that hereafter we shall not allow shorthand notes of evidence taken by a clerk of one of the solicitors in the action to be in any way referred to. Such notes are not to be relied upon. I do not suppose that the clerk would be guilty of intentional dishonesty, but it is impossible for him to help being unconsciously biassed by his wish that the evidence should turn out in a particular way. A note by a professional shorthand-writer stands in a different position." We do not say that the rule thus laid down is not on the whole a prudent one, but at the same time it would seem that the court somewhat exaggerated the probabilities. A shorthand-clerk generally has quite enough to do in making a correct verbatim record, and, even if disposed to favour his employer's interests, might not know how to do it, particularly with the fear of detection before his eyes. GIFTS TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. A FAIRER spirit is now shown by the law towards illegitimate children, persons who through no fault of their own have been sufficiently wronged in their birth, without technical rules being allowed to stand in the way of gifts intended for them. In Re Brown; Walsh v. Browne (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 899) a testator, James Brown, appointed as one of his executors and trustees J. L. Browne, whom he described as his sonin-law, and devised certain property to trustees during the life of "my daughter Mary Ann Martin, the wife of the said J. L. Browne," as therein mentioned. Other property he devised in favour of his daughter Adelaide, upon such trusts as would correspond with the preceding trusts in favour of "my said daughter M. A. M. Browne," and gave his residuary real and personal estate upon trust for "such of my children living at my death, and such of the issue then living of any child or children of mine dying in my lifetime," in manuer therein mentioned. M. A. M. Browne was illegitimate, and the question was whether she was sufficiently described in the will to allow her to share in the residuary gift, there being also legitimate children. Mr. Justice Stirling quoted from the judgment of Lord Justice Cotton in Megson v. Hindle (43 L. T. Rep. N. S. 551; 15 Ch. Div. 198), where his Lordship says: "To take a case out of the common rule, that only legitimate children can take under a gift to children,' there must be on the face of the will such a strong probability of the testator's intending to include illegitimate children that a contrary intention cannot be imputed to him." Taking that as a statement of the law, Mr. Justice Stirling found such a strong probability on the face of the will of the testator's intention to include her, that, in his Lordship's opinion, he would be going very far wrong if he were to hold that the testator did not intend to do so. The illegitimate child did not. fare so well in Re Hindle (sup.), where a testator bequeathed a legacy "unto my grandson James (the son of my daughter Alice Jane, and who is now residing with me)," with a gift over if "my grandson James shall die under the age of twenty-one years." Subsequently there was a gift of other property to be divided among the children of Alice Jane. James Hindle was illegitimate, and the late Master of the Rolls held that he could not share with the legitimate children of Alice Jane in the other property. That learned judge pointed out that the testator had made a separate provision for his illegitimate grandson, and then provided for the legitimate one, and that the case was governed by the decision of Sir John Leach in Bagley v. Mollard (1 R. & M. 581), given in 1830. There the testator bequeathed a leasehold house in trust for his grandchild, Elizabeth Mollard, whom he described as the then only surviving Ichild of his son W. Mollard, and concluded his will by a residuary bequest to all and every the children of his sons J. M., W. M., and his daughter. Elizabeth was illegitimate, so she was not permitted to have a share in the residuary gift. Sir John Leach expressed his concurrence with Lord Eldon's view, as declared in Wilkinson v. Adam (1 Ves. & B. 468), that whenever the general description of children will include legitimate children, it cannot also be extended to illegitimate children. Sir G. Jessel's decision was affirmed on appeal by Lords Justices James, Cotton, and Thesiger. In Re Browne; Raggett v. Browne (61 L. T. Rep. N. S. 463) Mr. Justice Chitty said that it was possible, some might even think that it was probable, that the testator in the case before him intended to include illegitimate children, but mere probability was not sufficient, as he had not adequately expressed his intention if he had it. Smith v. Jobson (59 L. T. Rep. N. S. 397) was a case where a testator gave certain portions of his property to various children, and a particular property in a certain parish he gave to his "eldest daughter E.," and the testator directed that should any of his children die without having children of their own lawfully begotten, their share should be divided equally among his surviving children. E. was illegitimate, having been born before marriage, and she died without issue. On the AttorneyGeneral's behalf it was argued that the gift over, if any of the testator's children should die, could not apply to E.'s share, which must be taken to devolve on the Crown. Mr. Justice Kay said that he had never heard of the rule which prevents an illegitimate child taking concurrently with legitimate children in the absence of a special context rendering it absolutely necessary that he should, being applied to a gift over, and declared that E.'s share went to the other children. If the argument for the Crown had been adopted, this strange result would have followed, that the legitimate children would not have taken under the gift over, because their sister was illegitimate, so that the very class whom the rule is designed to protect would have suffered from it. It was sought, in Re Hall; Branston v. Weightman (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 42; 35 Ch. Div. 551), to save an illegitimate child from losing his share, as the testator called him in the will "his nephew," and afterwards gave his residuary estate in trust to be divided among certain people, including the children of his sister J. W. There were legitimate children of J. W., as well as the illegitimate one. Mr. Justice Kay expressed some inclination in his favour; but, as there was nothing whatever in the will to include him among J. W.'s children, except the fact that he was called "nephew,' felt compelled to decide against his claim, thinking too that the circumstance that the testator gave him a legacy in the earlier part of the will was rather against his being intended to share in the residue than otherwise. The recent case of Re Jodrell; Jodrell v. Searle (63 L. T. Rep. N. S. 15; 44 Ch. Div. 590), may be put in a similar category to the preceding instances, except that the ques |