nesses; and in several cases much valuable evidence has thus been obtained which would otherwise have been lost. There is still a false notion prevalent that the system would be hard upon prisoners. The chief reason in its favour seems to be that it improves an innocent man's chances of acquittal and lessens a guilty man's chances. Surely the man most capable of giving important evidence at a trial is the man accused of the crime. If ho wishes to give evidence he ought to do so on the same footing as any other witness, and subject to the same liability to crossexamination. Magistrates and juries would make due allowance for the natural bias of such witnesses, as they do now in the evidence of near relations and friends. For the above reasons it is to be hoped that tho experiment recently tried may be extended to all criminal cases, of allowing prisoners and their wives or husbands to be competent but not compellable witnesses on oath.

In connection with evidence, must be mentioned a useful section in a recent Act permitting children of tender years, although they may not understand the nature of an oath, to give evidence in cases under that Act without being sworn. A proper safeguard is provided that such evidence shall not be acted upon unless corroborated. This needful reform should be extended to all criminal trials.

The question of capital punishment has lately received a considerable amount of attention. During the ten years from 1879 to 1888 only 154 persons have been hanged in England, making an average of less than sixteen a year. This represents, however, only about half the cases in which the sentence of death has been pronounced by judges. Its uncertain enforcement naturally tends to destroy the deterrent effect of the punishment. There can be no doubt also that the objection to capital punishment on the part of juries drives them to acquit many prisoners, or at least to reduce the crime to manslaughter on the slightest pretext. Moreover, the amount of public excitement as to the enforcement of capital punishment frequently creates a wave of sympathy for a murderer, and weakens faith in the just inflexibility of legal administration. It is hard for us to recollect that at the beginning of this century more than a hundred kinds of offences were punishable by death. Public sentiment seems now to have destroyed the effectual carrying out of the death penalty, and for this reason it seems desirable to follow the example of many other civilised nations by abolishing the penalty altogether. If it cannot be sternly and unflinchingly carried out in nearly all cases where it is solemnly ordered by a judge, its retention can only weaken public confidence in the certainty of punishment.

There are, however, other points in connection with legal punishments of wider importance than even capital punishment. The true principles of punishment are seldom considered, and consequently seldom acted upon. Observe how prior convictions unduly augment punishments. Two opposite views on this question are held and unfortunately acted upon by judges, recorders, and magistrates. On the one hand we have what may be called the modern view, advocated by the Lord Chief Justice, that a sentence should be appropriate to the crime of which a man is convicted without much regard to prior crimes, for which he has presumably received adequate sentences. On the other hand, a kind of customary law has grown up, that if a prisoner has been previonsly convicted, a heavy sentence ought to be imposed, although his present offence be slight. Let me give an instance. At the Leicester quarter sessions for April last the recorder sentenced a prisoner convicted of stealing a set of fire irons value 11s. to ten years' penal servi tude, with five years' police supervision. In the very next case he inflicted a sentence of seven years' penal servitude upon a labourer convicted of stealing a pair of boots. In both cases there were of course prior convictions proved, but no quantity of prior convictions, it seems to me, could possibly justify such savagely cruel sentences as these, which unfortunately are merely local samples of daily occurrences throughout the country. Mr. Justice Mathew in his charge to the grand jury at Liverpool assizes last March, said: "I notice persons charged with small offences who have been sentenced to seven years' penal servitude for stealing a coat. Surely such sentences are barbarous and most cruel, and should be stopped." Time will not allow me to do more than make three practical suggestions upon this subject: 1. The power of magistrates to deal summarily with cases of petty theft and other small offences should not be prohibited because prior convictions can be proved. A power to impose slightly extended periods of imprisonment in such cases might usefully be conferred. 2. The power of quarter sessions to impose sentences of penal servitude should be much restricted. 3. The minimum term of penal servitude to be imposed should be reduced from five to three years, the former limit, the present gap between two years' imprisonment and five years' penal servitude being unreasonably wide. In reference to punishments, there is an old-established tendency to punish thefts too severely, and assaults too lightly. What is called " a common assault" is usually visited with a fine of 5s., whilst "a common theft" of an article worth only a few shillings almost invariably involves imprisonment without the option of a fine. This distinction of punishment for offences to person and offences to property is unfair, and should be swept away. The whole question of punishments could be dealt with most clearly by annexing to the Criminal Code a schedule or list of maximum punishments alphabetically numbered, ranging from capital punishment down to the smallest fine. In this way a vast amount of verbiage could be saved. When a section of the code, or of any future Act, created an offence or crime, the punishment need be referred to only by the required letter in the schedule.

Passing from my own suggestions for reform, let me mention a few main reforms proposed by the Criminal Code Bill. The old distinction between felonies and misdemeanours has now ceased to have any real significance, and serves only to confuse lawyers and laity. The code proposes its entire abolition, and the substitution of the two well-known terms crimes and offences, the latter being acts or omissions of a lighter nature than crimes, and punishable summarily. The present restrictions upon the rapid administration of justice by the technical laws as to venue will be removed. It is proposed to confer upon all courts otherwise competent, power to deal with offenders brought before them, wherever the offences were committed. English warrants, too, will run through all counties, without being "backed" by a magistrate of each county. A useful power is conferred upon magistrates to take evidence immediately on receiving information that a crime has been committed, and before any person is charged. The remarkable omission of any such power in the English criminal law is rightly stigmatised by Mr. Justice Stephen as "one of its most irrational defects."

In conclusion, let me again urge the need for a criminal code. The public naturally looks to our Profession for aid in this direction. The most difficult portion of the work is actually complete. An admirable

code has been drafted by one of our judges, (admittedly our greatest authority on Criminal Law. All that remains is to pass it into law. The code is ready to hand, skilfully shaped as a masterly monument of our age. Shall we grudge the time and labour needful to raise this monument to its pedestal? Let it be the proud ambition of this influential society to lead the way in this important work.

At the conclusion he moved as follows: "That the council be requested to consider the Criminal Code Bill, and, if they thought it desirable, to urge upon the Government the desirability of promptly passing the Bill into law."

Mr. RALPH SIMEY (Sunderland) seconded the motion.

A discussion followed, the speakers giving their opinions principally with regard to grand juries, and statements by prisoners, and eventually the motion was carried.

WEDNESDAY'S PROCEEDINGS.

ENFORCEMENT IN SCOTLAND OF OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY SCOTCHMEN TO ENGLISHMEN.

Mr. MUNTON, in the absence of Mr. Purves (Edinburgh), the writer, read the following paper :

The object of my paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to give to the members of the society a plain, useful statement, in language stripped of all technicality, regarding the courts in Scotland to which they may have to apply on behalf of clients for the enforcement of obligations and the payment of debts, and the modes of operation of these courts. I do not doubt that many members of the society are personally well acquainted with the machinery of the Scottish courts, and in large centres of popula tion it is not difficult to consult manuals prepared in considerable numbers by those gentlemen of the Inns of Court who have much time at their disposal, which give full particulars of the constitution and operation of the Scotch courts. But many members reside at a distance from libraries, and it is for these in particular that I desire to make what I hope will be a useful statement, in popular form, regarding the administration of the Scottish courts. In the second place, I wish to point out some of the questions which arise in the enforcement of obligations by Scotchmen to Englishmen in consequence either of conflict of jurisdiction between the English and Scotch courts, or in consequence of differences between the laws of England and Scotland in regard to contracts.

Dealing in the first place with the constitution and operation of the Scotch courts, I may point out to the members that the one Supreme Court of Scotland, viz., the Court of Session, sitting in Edinburgh, has for many years, by all its judges, been practically what the High Court of Justice in England now is, but without any divisions into Chancery, Queen's Bench, Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Divisions. In it no distinction has ever been drawn between law and equity. It exercises jurisdiction as a court of first instance throughout Scotland in all cases in which the pecuniary question involved amounts to £25 hnd upwards, and in all questions of status, divorce, legitimacy, and the like, and has certain exclusive jurisdictions in questions in regard to land and the rights connected with land above the value of £50 a year or £1000. It also sits as a Court of Review upon the judgments of County Courts, called in Scotland Sheriff Courts, which are brought to it by appeal. The Court of Session as at present constituted consists of two divisions of four judges each, who together form the "Inner House," and of five Lords Ordinary who form the "Outer House." The two divisions are the Courts of Review of the judgments of the Lords Ordinary, who sit as judges of first instance, as well as of all inferior courts, and also with regard to verdicts and directions of judges at jury trials to which exception has been taken. The divisions also act in various other cases which need not be enumerated here, where the supreme equitable power or nobile officium of the court is asked to be exercised. Assuming, therefore, that, for example, an English client of a member of the society desires to recover a debt due by a Scotchman-the amount of which is sufficient to render it probable that the Court of Session will be invoked by way of appeal-or to enforce an obligation of importance, the course to be followed is to institute a suit in the Court of Session at Edinburgh, by way of writ or summons, which contains a conclusion for the amount of the debt, or for enforcement of the obligation with the costs and charges of the suit, and a clear statement of the facts of the case intended to be proved, and the pleas which the pursuer or plaintiff states in law. This is served by registered letter or personal service upon the defender or defendant, and, in case of his being resident in Scotland, the case comes into court after the lapse of seven days from the date of service before a Lord Ordinary, a single judge of the Outer House" selected by the plaintiff, who at the same time selects which division of the court an appeal must be taken to, should appeal eventually be brought. In case of the defendant not being resident in Scotland, fourteen days must elapse before the summons is lodged in court. Ten days thereafter the defendant puts in his answer, which is called defences, and about a fortnight after defences have been lodged, the pleadings are adjusted and closed, and form what is called the "record," which is printed at the mutual expense of the parties. If there is objection to the case proceeding at all, or if it is not clear that the legal point can be debated at once, or whether it should be tried by a jury or before a single judge without a jury, the case is sent to the Procedure Roll, coming up probably in the course of a month or six weeks, and in that roll the judge decides upon these points. Thus, when the court is not in arrear (which, however, it often is), a case will probably be tried in from three to six months of its being instituted. Here I must point out a material difference, as I understand, between the systems of England and Scotland. It by no means follows in Scotland that any case in which evidence is required goes before a jury, and, indeed, up till 1815, except in very old times before the War of Independence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the ancient common law of Scotland differed little from that of England, jury trial in civil cases was unknown. In fact, by the statute which reinstated jury trial it was limited as a mode of decision to actions for libel, or for nuisance, or rights of way, or actions properly in substance actions of damages. Practically at the present time it is mainly these classes of actions which are tried by juries in Scot land, and all other actions which require parole evidence for their decision are tried before a single judge without a jury, the witnesses being examined in his presence, and the evidence taken in shorthand. Further, oven in cases of the above kind, for which jury trial has been declared appropriate, if a question of law should enter seriously into the matter, it is entirely in the discretion of the court whether a jury should be allowed to adjudicate or not, and it very frequently happens that even such an action as a right of way suit is withdrawn from a jury and tried before a single judge, in consequence of some question of law entering into the

merits. Upon the mode of trial being settled, the case is tried or debated and decision given by the verdict of a jury or by a single judge. In most cases where there is not a jury the judge gives judgment in the shape of a written opinion read in court, and given to the parties, and directions following upon the opinion, contained in what is called an interlocutor. This interlocutor or judgment is subject to the review of that division of the court consisting of four judges, to which the suit has originally been marked by the plaintiff, and their decision is not subject to review except on appeal to the House of Lords. In cases of division or difficulty, cases may be reheard before seven judges, or the opinion of the whole court (thirteen judges) may be taken. I have said that the pecuniary sum involved in any suit instituted before the Court of Session in the first place must exceed the sum of £25, but, of course, the court exercises jurisdiction in numerous cases of every description where such value may not be involved directly. It is only where a sum is named as to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in the writ or summons originally issued, that the sum must be £25 or upwards, otherwise the action will be thrown out. Both divisions of the Court of Session, and four out of the five Lords Ordinary, sit each day of the week during session, except Monday, which is devoted to criminal and incidental business, the judges of the Court of Session being judges in the High Court of Judiciary, the Supreme Criminal Court of Scotland. The winter session lasts from the 15th Oct. to the 20th March in the following year, with an interval of a fortnight at Christmas and a week in February. The summer session lasts from the 12th May to the 20th July. During the whole period of the year, however, one of the Lords Ordinary or single judges sits in what is known as the Bill Chamber to hear all sorts of incidental business, such as bankruptcy, injunctions, appointments of receivers, and the like requiring instant decision. The County Courts, called the Sheriff] Courts, are administered in the various counties of Scotland by paid magistrates, denominated sheriffs, who are divided into two classes, viz., sheriffs depute or principal, who reside in Edinburgh, and must practise in the Court of Session (with exceptions in the case of Edinburgh and Glasgow), and sheriffs substitute who must reside in the different towns of the counties to which they are appointed. The sheriffs depute or principal must be advocates, that is, barristers of at least three years' standing at the bar, and cannot act as counsel in the Court of Session in causes from the county for which they are sheriffs. The sheriffs substitute must be advocates or writers to the Signet, or solicitors before the Supreme Court, or law agents of at least five years' standing; but practically, as the appointments rest with the Crown and are made by the Lord Advocate, who is always a foremost advocate of the Scottish Bar, advocates or barristers are selected. There are, however, a few such appointments which are held by solicitors, and ten years ago these were more numerous than they are at present. Within the last few years the feeling that an experienced solicitor in a county is worthy of appointment, and is better able to conduct the practice at his bar than a young advocate who had probably failed at the bar in Edinburgh, and had but little experience, has been growing, and one or two appointments of solicitors have been made in consequence. The sheriff court business is practically divided into that of ordinary sheriff courts and that of small debt and debts recovery courts. In the former sums of any amount may be sued for, and of recent years the jurisdiction of the sheriff courts has been so extended as practically to be similar to the jurisdiction of the Court of Session, except in cases of status, divorce, legitimacy, and the like, and in cases relating to land succession and division of common property where the value of the subject in dispute exceeds £50 a year or £1000 capital value. Cases of actions of reduction, that is, of setting aside deeds or documents, including judgments of courts and illegal acts or resoultions, cannot be tried except in the Court of Session. The second branch of the sheriff court business is the small debt and debts recovery courts, the first having relation to all debts or sums sued for not exceeding £12, in which case the decision of the sheriff substitute is final and not subject to review by any court whatever (unless fraud or corrupt practices be alleged), and the second the debts recovery court, in which certain classes of debts, viz., house rents, wages, merchants' accounts, and other similar debts in which the debt exceeds £12, but does not exceed £50, are tried. These cases are heard generally in a very summary manner, and the fees are so small that it is hardly worth while for solicitors to practise. The sheriff substitute is resident in each of the county towns of Scotland, and, in cases where the counties are large, they are divided into districts, with a sheriff substitute attached to each. Of course, in such towns as Edinburgh or Glasgow there are more than one sheriff substitute acting as resident judges. The defendant must, as a general rule, be resident in the county where he is sued; but it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be a Scotchman, as an Englishman or a foreigner can sue in the county or sheriff court in Scotland provided the defendant is domiciled in that county. The action is brought by way of petition in a somewhat similar manner to that described in the case of the Court of Session, the writ being called a petition, which contains a prayer of what it is asked that the court shall do, to which is annexed a statement of the facts which form the grounds of action, and a note of the plaintiff's pleas in law. This is served on the defendant in much the same manner as in the Court of Session, and the procedure in making up the "record," as it is called, is similar to that followed by the Court of Session, although, as a general rule, the written pleadings in the sheriff court take more time to be concluded and closed than in the Court of Session. The "record," however, is not printed. The case then proceeds very much as in the Court of Session, except shat in cases where trial by jury is necessary the case is sent to the Court of Session, there being no trial by jury in civil cases in the County Courts of Scotland. The sheriff courts sit during the same period of the year as the Court of Session. In the ordinary case, when a decision is pronounced by the sheriff substitute, it may be appealed to the Court of Session direct if the sum in dispute exceed £25, or it may be appealed to the sheriff depute or principal if the sum exceeds £12. Upon the sheriff principal's decision being given, that also, if the sum exceeds £25, can be appealed to the Court of Session. In the case of appeal from either the sheriff substitute or the sheriff principal, the case is heard by a division of the Court of Session consisting of four judges, whose decision is final unless an appeal to the House of Lords is competent and is taken.

I come now to the second branch of my subject-viz., the questions which occasionally arise in the enforcement of obligations by Scotchmen to Englishmen in consequence of conflict of jurisdiction, difference of law, and similar causes. On the subject of conflict of jurisdiction, the case of Orr Ewing v. Orr Ewing, decided in the House of Lords on July 24, 1885, is the great emporium of authority, and Lord Selborne, with his usual clearness, has stated the whole of the leading cases

which bear on the subject. I do not propose to go into these in detail, but I may point out the effects very shortly:-1. A domiciled Englishman, acting as trustee under an English will, in administering the English estate, who may go to reside in Scotland, can be obliged by the Scotch courts to implement the terms of the will. 2. A Scotch court may act in personam against a debtor or obligant when the plaintiff and defendant are within its jurisdiction, although the subject-matter may not be within the jurisdiction. 3. As a general rule, where there is trust estate in both countries which must be administered by a body of trustees, and proceedings have been instituted in both countries to have the administration proceeded with, the House of Lords eventually, as was done in the Orr Ewing case, will apply the doctrine of forum conveniens or forum non conveniens in deciding in which country the administration is to proceed, and to which country the assets, if personal, are to be removed. These are the leading doctrines so far as I have been able to see then which regulate questions of conflict of jurisdiction generally arising in reference to testate estate. But the question whether a Scotch court will entertain an action as within its jurisdiction is often complicated by considerations of whether s domicile has been lost or has not been lost. It has been decided in regard to this that an Englishwoman may sue for divorce in the Scotch courts-her husband originally an Englishman-on the ground that the adultery complained of has been committed in Scotland, and that the defendant had a lease of a house and shootings in Scotland, and that the domicile was in Scotland. Such a decision carried with it very much more than may appear, because in Scotland a simple act of adultery constitutes a ground of divorce at the instance of the wife against the husband, and, in addition, the result of a decree of divorce in Scotland is that marriage contract provisions or the goods in communion -that is, the personal estate belonging to the husband and wife together, is treated as if the divorced party were naturally dead, the aggrieved party immediately taking her rights under the marriage contract, or by operation of Scotch law. It has been decided, however, that a Scotchman who had gone to reside in England, married an Englishwoman, and committed adultery there, and who thereupon came to Scotland with the party in fault along with him, for the purpose of allowing the aggrieved wife to divorce him and obtain half his personal estate under Scotch law, was not so domiciled in Scotland as to entitle the courts to grant decree of divorce. As regards cases of domicile, it is a well-established rule that, apart from any question of having elected to take a Scotch domicile, a foreigner cannot be sued in the Scotch courts merely by personal service, but must have been forty days resident in Scotland. No doubt a remedy is provided in the case of a foreigner visiting Scotland and incurring obligations and meditating flight, but that is a different remedy from the remedy by direct action. In the case of a domiciled Scotchman, who had gone to the East to make his fortune, and incurred considerable obligations to an English manufacturer there, and had returned to Scotland for a time, it was held that he had lost his Scotch domicile, but that forty days' residence in Scotland had been sufficient to reconstitute jurisdiction over him. Even in the case of a foreigner going to reside in Scotland, intending to create a domicile, forty days' residence is necessary before jurisdiction can be created. While on this subject, I may remark that, as the members are probably aware, the old Gretna Green marriages have been done away with for upwards of thirty yeags; but it is quite possible still, if one of two English parties desiring to get married comes to Scotland previous to the marriage and resides there for twenty-one days, to contract an irregular Scotch marriage by the mere interchange of consent, which can be unequivocally proved by either of the parties desiring to do so, or others interested. Another ground of jurisdiction is the existence of real estate or heritable property, although the defendant may not be domiciled in Scotland or resident in it at the date of citation. It is to be kept in mind in considering obligations that there are considerable differences in the laws of the two countries. A main difference is that sealing is not required in the granting of deeds, and a contract of sale of an estate, or a contract of lease of a farm for a term of years, may be constituted by the interchange of letters, the purpose of which is made clear as effectually as if a signed and sealed deed were granted and delivered. Of course the stamp duties and stamp laws in both countries are the same. A contract, therefore, which may be insufficient to maintain an action by an Englishman against an Englishman regarding a subject in England may be quite sufficient to maintain an action by an Englishman against a Scotchman regarding a subject-matter in Scotland. There are no bills of sale in Scotland, as a security cannot be effectually constituted over movables without possession. Up till the period of the Judgments Extension Act 1868, an Englishman suing a Scotchman required to be represented in Scotland by a mandatory domiciled there, who was responsible for costs and for whatever orders the court might make on the party suing; but this system has been given up since the Judgments Extension Act rendered it possible to enforce in one country what had been ordered by the courts of the other. The Act enables the judgment or decree to be registered in the country in which execution is required, and thereupon it has, to all intents and purposes, the effect of a judgment of the court of that country. In Scotland the system of enforcing payment after judgment has been obtained seems more summary than that of England, and more favourable to the party claiming a debt. In the first place, he can, immediately upon putting his action into court, arrest in the hands of a banker or other debtor of the defendant sums due to the defendant to the amount claimed in the summons; or he can, by registering an inhibition, prevent the debtor selling real estate until the action is disposed of. On judgment being obtained, he can make these arrested subjects available for payment of the sum in his judgment, without their passing through the debtor's hands, by what is called a process of furthcoming," or he can have the debtor's lands made over to him by the court, and either retain them as his property or sell them. He can seize the debtor's effects even in his own possession, and, in default of payment, can by a summary proceeding sell these by auction and pay himself.

If I have given the members, although merely an outline, some idea of the constitution and operation of the Scotch courts, to which at any moment they may be called on on behalf of clients to resort, and have indicated some of the questions in regard to jurisdiction, some of the slight differences in law which might make an action maintainable in Scotland, although not maintainable in England, and have pointed out how an English client's rights can be secured and made effectual, even although my observations may have been some. what disconnected and fragmentary, my object has been attained. To go into the subject with anything like completeness would require far more time and far more elaboration than would suit a paper to be read at a meeting like this,

The PRESIDENT observed that, as Mr. Purves was not present, it would not perhaps be desirable to discuss the paper. He thought there was a good deal in Scotch law which might teach English solicitors a lesson.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.

Mr MUNTON read the following paper so entitled :

Some twenty years ago, shortly after the coming into operation of the 1869 Act, which took away the uncontrolled power of a creditor to imprison a defaulting debtor, a controversy was carried on through the Times and other leading journals as to the expediency of completely abolishing imprisonment for debt, and I must frankly admit that I joined in this public correspondence, strongly opposing abolition. A generation, however, has passed since then, and we have experience to guide us in forming a sound conclusion. We live in the freest country in the world, yet, strange to say, every other European nation (at all events, every nation having the slightest influence) has entirely abolished imprisonment for nonpayment of a common debt. We stand practically alone in the course we adopt. I do not mean to assert that Great Britain ought to be guided by lesser mercantile nations, but their views form an important item for consideration. I propose to examine shortly the advantages and disadvantages of the existing system, and to consider where the balance of convenience lies. If I take a different side in 1890 to that which I advocated in 1870 it will be with a good grace, for my opinion has not undergone violent change; I desire only to offer a brief review of a subject to which I have given more than usual attention. No assembly in the kingdom is better capable of forming a correct judgment on this question than a meeting of solicitors representing all parts of the country from Land's End to Berwick, and having experience not only of the peculiarities of litigants and the special requirements and wants of particular districts, but of the idiosyncracies, if any, of those who have to administer a law clothed with so large an element of discretion. To thoroughly appreciate the position it is necessary to go back to 1862. Every lawyer is aware that prior to Lord Westbury's Act, which came into operation in Oct. 1861, traders alone could become bankrupt in the generally recognised sense. All other persons were unable to get rid of their debts except to the extent of the provisions of what was popularly known as the Gentleman's Act, under which non-traders could only get released from prison without escaping future liability to pay in case of after-acquired assets. The result of the law as it stood in 1861 was that most of the debtors' prisons in England, and especially in the Metropolis and other large centres were full of impecunious debtors detained there at the sweet will of the creditor for weeks, months, or years, in some instances extending to nearly a lifetime. The Bankruptcy Act 1861 not ouly practically abolished the difference between traders and nontraders, but enacted that all persons then in prison for debt should be declared bankrupt at the instance of the State and turned out of prison whether they liked it or not. By this process the debtors' prisons were speedily emptied. Many of the prisoners, as any history of the day will tell, had become so accustomed to their incarceration (civil prison life, as contradistinguished from criminal, being at that time a very free-andeasy affair) that they reluctantly allowed the doors of the gaol to be closed behind them, the outer world to them being an unknown country. The 1861 Bankruptcy Act in no way curtailed the creditor's uncontrolled power to imprison his debtor, but it provided that any debtor who should remain in prison beyond a certain period (fourteen days in the case of a trader, and two months in the case of a non-trader) should be considered to have committed an act of bankruptcy. The inclination of plaintiffs to voluntarily incarcerate their debtors became lessened, and by 1869 the number of persons then in prison was so small that the Government saw that the gao's were not worth the expense of maintenance, and thereupon by a bold stroke the ground was cleared by declaring that a creditor's absolute option of shutting up his debtor should be abolished; nonpayment of an ordinary debt only to be followed by imprisonment on its being established that the debtor bad means and refused to pay. So much for the history of the system as far as is requisite to consider what is now best to be done. It is hardly necessary to remark in passing that the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, which at one time was issued as a matter of course, was restricted to cases over £20; and therefore the voluntary sending of a debtor to gaol was always unknown in the County Court where, up to 1861 (and for many years afterwards) the normal jurisdiction was limited to that sum. The process in the inferior courts of committing a defaulting debtor to prison was all along based upon the theory that it had to be brought home to the judge's satisfaction that a debtor practically could, but would not, pay before making an order for committal. One need not now consider the details of the old practice, as since the Debtors Act of 1889 the principle upon which persons are sent to prison for nonpayment of debt is precisely the same in the County Court as in the High Court. Let us glance at the sections of the last-mentioned Act which call for present consideration. Sect. 4 practically conserved the old law for peremptory imprisonment (limited, however, to one year): for default in payment of a penalty other than a penalty in respect of any contract; default in payment of any sum recoverable summarily before a justice of the peace; default by a trustee or person acting in a fiduciary capacity; default by a solicitor ordered to pay money as such; and lastly, default in payment to creditors under certain bankruptcy orders. The maintenance of this section in some form or other will always be essential to deal with nonpayment of debt associated with dishonesty. Then we come to the important sect. 5, which runs thus: "Subject to the provisions hereinafter mentioned and to the prescribed rules, any court may commit to prison for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until payment of the sum due, any person who makes default in payment of any debt, or instalment of any debt, due from him in pursuance of any order or judgment of that or any other competent court. Provided" (sub-sect. 2) "that such jurisdiction shall only be exercised where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the person making default either has or has had since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default, and has refused or neglected, or refuses or neglects, to pay the same. Proof of the means of the person making default may be given in such manner as the court thinks just; and for the purposes of such proof the debtor and any witnesses may be summoned and examined on oath, according to the prescribed rules.' The discretionary power given to judges under sect. 5 has led to endless trouble and confusion. In the first place, it is not altogether easy to say what the Legislature meant by the word means. If Parliament intended to lay down that a debtor possessing means in hand (i.e., capital) should pay his debts thereout, that is one thing; on the other hand, if it meant possessing mere earning power" it was simply a re-enactment of

the principle of the Gentleman's Act, to which I have previously adverted. Some judges, imbued with the belief that imprisonment for debt is a natural 'penalty for nonpayment, accept very slight evidence of ability and refusal. On the other hand, many judges opposed to the principle of imprisonment for debt require almost impossible proof of means; nay more, some judges openly express their disinclination to put the Act into force by ordering a debtor against whom a plaintiff has a judgment for, say, £19 to discharge the same at the rate of a shilling a month, thus extending the repayment over a generation. We are all aware that from the outset of the 1869 Act, neither the High Court judges nor the County Court judges made absolute orders in the first instance even when they were satisfied-the practice all along being to make orders nisi, so to speak, and to require a second application before directing actual enforcement. A long-standing committee of our society unanimously passed a resolution that it would be desirable that the onus of proof of want of means should be cast upon the debtor by statutory authority; in other words, they were of opinion that, as the person primarily able (and often solely able) to give information upon the question of means was the defendant himself, it should be his business to demonstrate chapter and verse that he could not pay, and that silence or absence should be regarded as prima facie evidence of ability and refusal. It was suggested by some of us on the committee that all imprisonment summonses should have annexed to them a schedule with the view of securing full particulars for the judge's guidance, and that it should be the duty of the debtor, on being served with the summons, to fill up and return such schedule to (or attend and sign in the presence of) the officer of the court. The schedule in question was to be of the plainest character, within the power of every debtor, however humble, to answer, and it went to the following points, i.e. What is your present occupation and the name of your employer, if any? How long have you held the position?. About how much per day, week, month, or year do you receive? Have you any and what children dependent upon you for support, giving their respective ages? How much has your household and personal expenses amounted to during the past twelve months? Have you received any assistance, and how much, during that period-from any and what friend or relative? If you have not lived on your wages or gifts from friends, what have been your means of subsistence during the year last past? What are your present resources, and have you any and what effects or property in possession or reversion, and have you given any and what charge or incumbrance thereon? It was proposed that these answers should be imperative (with all the penalties attached to legal falsehood)—no unreasonable demand, seeing that the questions are the very first that are put to the debtor when he appears, and they are better answered quietly beforehand as against taking up the time of the judge; moreover, many debtors in the box are found either unwilling or unable to give the information_required, alleging unpreparedness, a device which could not be effectively attempted with the schedule and leisure to answer. The proposal, although favourably received in many official quarters, was not adopted-first, because it seemed to require legislation to decide what should be done in case of wilful default (the idea being that silence should be treated as admission of means); secondly, because without new statutory authority County Court judges have no power to commit a debtor or anybody else for refusing to appear even under a subpoena default is only punishable by a momentary fine-indeed, in the Supreme Court itself such power of committal, though technically existing, has practically fallen into disuse; and, lastly, because the great bulk of the plaintiffs who issue commitment summonses belong to a type entitled to little sympathy or assistance. Those who have had the misfortune to attend a County Court on a judgment-summons day (we know that Superior Court judgments go there, as to committal, beyond the London district) must have been struck with the scene. One may remark, in passing, that as the rules imperatively provide that a commitment summons must be personally served, the artful defaulter often contrives to steer clear of the process. A County Court bailiff, as a rule, is the most easily evaded official, his intervention being mere routine, calling for no enthusiasm or exceptional zeal. It is notorious that many debtors are absent' or "ill" when the bailiff is on his rounds, and as the debtor takes care not to appear on the hearing day, numerous cases are struck out on this score, the better class of creditors frequently abandoning the chase. But, assuming this initial difficulty over, the waste of the valuable time of the judge in dealing with applications for imprisonment is undeniable. I do not suggest that in itself the tax on the judge's time is sufficient to condemn the system, but I am coming to the conclusion that, as a balance of convenience and advantage, it would be wise to recommend the authorities to reconsider the whole question. I am prepared to hear that it is useless to tell people they must give less credit, or make more inquiry before they trust, and that in certain districts absence of the pressure, which imprisonment for debt commands, will injure the poorest of the poor, to whom essential credit will be denied, but practical men must weigh all the advantages and all the drawbacks. I shall, no doubt, be asked what can be substituted for imprisonment where the debtor has no visible effects. It might, perhaps, be possible, without actual bankruptcy, to record a sort of quasiinsolvency, after unsuccessfully summoning a debtor to liquidate a debt ordered to be paid, so as to create some offence on the lines of the present bankruptcy law as to undischarged debtors getting credit without disclosing their failure-in other words, to bring about a well-defined proof of misconduct which could be made the subject of peremptory imprisonment without the everyday wrangle and uncertain attempts to put the present discretionary law into force. I have long been considering this matter, and I hope that I am justified in inviting discussion _to-day-in any case I should like to secure the deliberate judgment of the Profession, and I venture to move: "That, in the opinion of this representative meeting of solicitors, it would, on the whole, be advantageous to abolish the existing power of imprisoning a debtor for mere nonpayment of money, unassociated with circumstances of a defined fraudulent character.'

Mr. W. F. MCLELLAN (Rochester) seconded the motion, giving it as his opinion that the judge should in each case consider the position of those brought before him. He was registrar for a district in which there was a large labouring population earning from 16s. to 24s. a week, and it could not be expected that a man could pay possibly several orders of 2s, each a week and yet find necessaries for his family. He would have sect. 122 of the Bankruptcy Act extended, so that the creditors might act upon it, and that it should include debts up to £100.

Mr. THOMAS MARSHALL (Leeds) thought the chief difficulty in connection with the present practice was the various ways in which it was administered by the different judges, giving some figures in illustration. In the Leeds court, for instance, during the last year for which there were

any returns, 26,500 plaints were issued, on which 5500 judgment summonses were obtained, and 3300 orders of committal. As a result 429 debtors actually went to prison, in by far the larger number of which the debts were paid. Of those persons who were sent to gaol 120 paid the debt within the first two days, and the remaining 300 served their sentences. But he looked upon these latter as the lever by which the whole machinery for the collection of debt was set in motion. In the Manchester County Court there were 24,000 plaints, and but 377 committal orders, which would go to prove that the judge disapproved the jurisdiction. In Middlesbrough, where there was a largo working population, there were 14,000 plaints, and 3557 committal orders. It should be remembered that since during the last two years administration orders had been made under sect. 122 the working-class population had had but little to complain of, and if their debts exceeded the limit they could take advantage of the Bankruptcy Act. He believed that if imprisonment for debt were abolished it would practically mean the abolition of credit, which would be a serious matter to those who, earning small wages, paid for necessaries by instalments, or the costs of those necessaries would be greatly enhanced.

Mr. W. T. ROGERS (Liverpool) was in favour of retaining the power of imprisonment for debt, which appeared to him just in principle. It was often the only method of obtaining payment.

Mr. F. N. PARKER (London) said that imprisonment for debt was the creditor's last resort, and it ought not to be taken away because it was difficult to pursue or enforce. He thought there should be rules defining what were sufficient means, which should be generally accepted by all County Court judges, and thus diversity of practice would be avoided.

The PRESIDENT said that it was not Mr. Munton's intention to press the motion. He would be satisfied with the discussion. The council had a committee on the subject of County Courts sitting en permanence. They were waiting for a report, and this matter would be included therein.

Mr. S. DAY (London) considered imprisonment for debt of great value. It was often the screw which effected payment when all other means were inoperative.

Mr. J. MILLER (Bristol) was also opposed to the abolition of imprisonment. He thought the diversity of practice on the part of the judges in regard to the length of imprisonment they gave objectionable.

Mr. T. DEVONSHIRE (London) rose to order, as there was nothing before the meeting.

The PRESIDENT ruled accordingly.

BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

Mr. G. R. DODD (London) read a paper upon actions for breach of promise of marriage as follows:

Marriage is a matter of more worth Than to be dealt in by attorneyship.

SHAKESPEARE.

A Bill having been introduced into the House of Commons by Sir Roper Lethbridge to abolish actions for breach of promise of marriage, and public attention having been called to the subject by reason of the recent trial of the action against the editor of the Matrimonial News (Knowles v. Duncan, Times Reports, Aug. 1890) will, I trust, be accepted as a sufficient reason for my now addressing you on this subject. A bachelor of my acquaintance possessed of good means, and above middle age, has repeatedly informed me that he was not unwilling to enter into the marriage state, but that he had firmly resolved not to make any advances with such object in view until the present law should be altered, fearing an action for breach of promise. He is, in fact, fully convinced that the first thought of a lady on being introduced to a man known to be pos sessed of property is that of bringing such an action should he fail to marry her. In truth, the gentleman alluded to, being extremely cautious, has assured me that previously to presenting a lady of his acquaintance with a watch he had engraved on the inside of the case-after stating that it was presented by a friend-the words "Without prejudice.' Now, if others are deterred by a similar fear, whilst many ladies appear desirous of being married (at least if we may so judge from the recent correspondence in one of the daily papers), the matter is worthy of our serious consideration. As it is not the particular object of this paper to discuss the present law, I do not propose to trouble you with the several decisions bearing on the subject, but simply to remind you that, although it was formerly suggested that promises to marry came within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, it is now distinctly settled that it is not necessary for such a promise to be in writing (Cook v. Baker, 1 Str. 34), nor is a stamp or written evidence of contract requisite. The promise must be reciprocal (1 Salk. 24). The rule that damages should be limited to the pecuniary loss resulting not too remotely from the breach of contract is not applicable to these actions (Smith v. Woodbine, 1 C. B. N. S. 660; Berry v. Da Costa, L. Rep. 1 C. P. 331); but a jury will, we are told, assume to punish the defendant, as well as to compensate the plaintiff. A general promise to marry has been held to be a promise to marry within a reasonable time: (Potter v. De Boos, 1 Stark. 82; Phillips v. Crutchley, 3 C. & P. 178.) It is not my province in this paper to go into the question of the evidence necessary in this class of actions; but I may be permitted to mention that there is an interesting and amusing instance of a young lady standing by her parents in a room on the occasion of a gentleman applying for and obtaining their consent to the marriage, and it was held that her presence and failure of objection to the proposal (coupled with what happened afterwards as appearing in the report of the case), afforded evidence of consent: (Daniel v. Bowles, 2 C. & P. 553.) This hint may possibly be useful to some of our lady friends should they be placed in similar positions-as showing to what extent they may not maintain silence under such circumstances. Since the passing of the Infants' Relief Act 1874 an infant's promise cannot be confirmed on attaining the age of twenty-one; but in order to sustain an action evidence of a renewed promise must be given; an infant can, however, bring such action. Until the passing of Lord Hardwicke's Act in the year 1753 (20 Geo. 2, c. 33, s. 17) specific performance of an agreement to marry could be enforced by the Ecclesiastical Court, and the plaintiff was at liberty to elect whether to bring the action in that court or for recovery of damages in the common law courts. In passing I may observe that the six clerks in Chancery, although laymen, were not permitted to marry until the 14th and 15th of Henry VIII. The first action of this nature appears to have been brought in the reign of Elizabeth, and such actions having continued for about 300 years, it is only reasonable, before assenting to the proposal to abolish them, that the arguments in favour of so doing should be carefully considered. The principal arguments for the abolition of actions for breach of promise of marriage appear to be that many such actions have been brought merely for the purpose of extortion and the levying of

blackmail, which would of course be a gross abuse of the law, and actions are, it is stated, frequently brought where no promise has been made, and are often commenced to redress no real wrong or injury. It has been asserted that it is almost impossible for a man to obtain justice, as there is usually a difficulty in getting a jury to properly weigh the facts; but that if it were possible to do so, and the case could be fairly investigated, it would be clearly shown that the defendant had not been one whit to blame. Under such circumstances actions of this character, it is said, are a scandalous abuse of the law; but are not, I would ask, actions of other kinds also frequently brought which might be subjected to a similar charge? The following resolution was moved in the House of Commons by Sir Farrer (now Lord) Herschell in the year 1879, viz. : "That in the opinion of this House the action of breach of promise of marriage ought to be abolished, except in cases where actual pecuniary loss had been incurred by reason of the promise the damages being limited to such pecuniary loss." To which the following amendment was moved by Sir Eardley Wilmot, and seconded by Mr. Morgan Lloyd, Q.C., viz.: That the injury sustained by a breach of promise of marriage cannot be weighed by the standard of pecuniary loss alone, and that the limitation of the action in the manner proposed by the resolution would be very undesirable." After a long discussion, in which Mr. Rodwell, Q.C., Sir Henry James, Q.C., and others supported the resolution; whilst it was opposed by the present Lord Chancellor, Mr. Forsyth, Q.C., Mr. Cole, Q.C., Mr. Justice Grantham, and others, it was carried. A very extraordinary petition was about this time presented to Parliament against the proposal, in which the petitioners declared that marriage was a profession in which women earned their livelihood by the discharge of social, conjugal, and domestic duties which appertained to matrimony, that the entrance to that profession came through an offer of marriage, and that the breach of such promise hindered a woman from obtaining her proper station in life, inasmuch as a woman who gave her affections to one man could not transfer them to another without grievous loss." I am unable to say whether this petition was prepared or signed by women or men-anyhow, I do not think we shall be disposed to take a similar view of the matter. Sir Roper Lethbridge's Bill contains one short section to the effect that after the passing of the Act no person shall be entitled to maintain an action in respect of the breach of promise to marry, but the Act is not to apply to any action commenced previously to the passing of the Act. Although it cannot be denied that there is some truth in the allegations made by those who desire to abolish such actions, the reasons are, I think, insufficient for alteration of the law, at least to the extent proposed, for the position of women widely differs from that of men, and it would not, in my view, be just or reasonable that the measure of damage should be limited to the pecuniary loss, but any other proved loss or damage sustained by the plaintiff as a direct consequence of the breach should be taken into account by the jury in estimating the amount of their verdict. I confess that I see no objection to the institution of such proceedings being restricted to women-we, in fact, find very few instances of the lady having been sued. There certainly was a remarkable action tried some years ago in Ireland (Blake v. Wilkins, Galway Spring Assizes 1817), in which the plaintiff (a young naval officer under thirty years of age) sued the defendant, a lady aged sixty-five, the widow of a Staff physician, possessed of considerable means, and the plaintiff claimed £5000 damages; when her counsel, by ridiculing the plaintiff, and speaking in the most disparaging terms of the charms of his own client, succeeded in getting the plaintiff to withdraw a juror and pay his own costs. Undoubtedly to some extent the fear of such actions acts as a deterrent to men who might otherwise be disposed to trifle with the affections of women. Plaintiffs seem unwilling to leave these actions to be tried by a judge (alone) pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court 1833 (Order XXXVÏ., r. 2), and doubtless in the recent case before referred to (Knowles v. Duncan), the plaintiff would have had some difficulty in persuading a judge that she was entitled to a similar amount (£10,000). It certainly was fortunate for her that she was legally competent to give evidence (32 & 33 Vict. c. 68) in such action. It has been suggested that the trial might advantageously take place before three judges without the assistance of a jury, or by a judge and three counsel acting as assessors. It may be interesting to you to know that a man who took some trouble to collect particulars respecting actions of breach of promise of marriage was unable to discover that more than one action had been brought against any member of our branch of the Profession, whilst he could find none reported against a member of the Bar. I trust I may be excused for taking this opportunity, although beyond the point under consideratior, of referring to the subject of "Matrimonial Agencies," so much recently discussed in one of the London journals. A correspondent, in fact, suggested the formation of a limited company to carry on such a business, and if there be any truth in the statement made at the trial of the action before referred to against the proprietor of the Matrimonial News that he had negotiated 40,000 marriages, it must be a very profitable business, for the fee usually charged by him, we are told, was £10 for negotiating such marriages in addition to a commission of 5 per cent. upon the value of all property thus obtained whether in possession or reversion. But the illegality of marriage brokerage bonds must not be lost sight of, the House of Lords having held that all such contracts concerning marriage are of dangerous consequence, and not to be allowed:" (Hale v. Potter, 3 Lev. 411.) I do not remember having seen the report of any action brought for recovery of commission under the agreements which are usually signed. Being possessed of a copy of one through having been professionally consulted in respect of threatened proceedings, I have at the end of this piper given a copy of it (merely omitting the names). My client, a worthy, honest, and industrious man, in a humble position of life, thought he had secured a prize through this agency, for the woman to whom he was introduced represented that she was in receipt of an annuity, and was entitled to a sum of £4000 in reversion expectant on the decease of a person aged about eighty years; but he afterwards found to his chagrin that he had been greatly deceived, for she had no money whatever, and he had married a woman given to intemperance, who actually made away with his goods to raise money for such purpose. The laws of the Lacedemonians were remarkable for their severity towards those who deferred marriage after a limited time, as well as against those who wholly abstained from it. Amongst the Athenians it seems that all senators and persons intrusted with public affairs were compelled to be married, and even in feu lal times in our own country ladies possessed of copyhold property were under a similar obligation. It has recently been suggested that clergymen and medical men should act as matrimonial agents. If and when women shall be enabled to sit and vote in Parliament they may possibly succeed in inducing our Legislature to pass an Act making marriage compulsory, and then we should no longer hear the complaints as to the inability of

women to find men ready and willing to marry, or the lamentation that our "maidens were not given to marriage.' (Psalm lxxviii. 63.) Our profession may then look forward with hope to a large increase of business in one way and another, provided the little difficulty before referred to as to the illegality of marriage brokerage bonds could be removed. Who even can say that the negotiation of marriages may not in the future form an important part of our professional business? I trust our younger members will excuse me for here giving them a word of warning, so that they may not be deceived as one of our profession was not very long since, who received a visit from an elderly lady living near him and took instructions for her will, by which a large sum of money was bequeathed to her niece who was staying with her. As he had some idea at that time of taking a wife, he managed to get introduced to the niece and afterwards married her, but upon the decease of the aunt he discovered that she never had anything to leave, as she only enjoyed a life interest in some property, and at the time of making her will she must have been fully aware of that fact. Another brother professional man, with whom I was acquainted some years ago, formed the acquaintance, at Brighton, of a woman who represented that she was nobly connected, and was entitled to valuable property; but that he could not be introduced to her family, for her aunt, with whom she resided, would uot consent to her being married. Under such circumstances it was agreed that they should elope, which they accordingly did. Soon after the wedding she coolly informed him that she was the lady's maid, and on his refusing, under such circumstances, to live with her, he had to make her a liberal allowance to induce her to agree to a separation. Copy of agreement referred to :-"In consideration of being introduced to or put in correspondence with a lady through the influence of the proprietor of the and in the event of a marriage taking place between such lady and myself, I hereby agree to pay to the said proprietor, his heirs or assigns, the sum of £20 within one month after my said marriage, and also agree to pay to the said proprietor of the his heirs, or assigns, five per cent. within one month after my said marriage on the gross amount or value of all property exceeding the sum of £400 such lady may possess, or that I may obtain through such marriage, and should such property, or any part thereof, be of a reversionary character or an annuity, then in that case the said five per cent. shall be calculated at the time of the marriage according to the Government reversionary or annuity tables; and I further bind myself to pay to the said proprietor of the his heirs or assigns, the like percentage

on all further property such lady may thereafter (that is, after marriage) become entitled to or receive by gift, will, reversion, annuity, or otherwise, or that I may obtain in consequence of such marriage, the said five per cent. to be paid within one month after such property has been received by or become available to the said lady or myself. And I bind myself under a penalty of £20 to give the said proprietor of the notice within one month of the fact that such marriage has taken place, and that such property has been received or become available as aforesaid, and also to pay the said five per cent. within one month after it falls due. As witness my hand this 31st day of Aug. 1878."

He moved the following resolution: "That in the opinion of this meeting it is inexpedient to abolish actions for breach of promise of marriage," which was carried.

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JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND STIPENDIARY MAGISTRATES. Mr. J. W. MARTIN (Reading) read a paper on this subject as follows:Land Transfer Bills, Trusts and Trustees, Legal Education, not to mention the Law of Bankruptcy and Bills of Sale, have frequently formed the subject-matter of papers and discussions at these meetings of the Law Society. The sittings of the law courts, divisional courts, and County Courts have in turn been the themes of debate, but the subject of petty sessions and the justices who administer the laws to thousands and tens of thousands of Her Majesty's subjects has rarely if ever been dealt with, and I have therefore thought it a good opportunity of ventilating the question before this meeting. In every town and county throughout England and Wales there exists that tribunal known as "petty sessions,' where all offences of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature are brought. The dignitaries who preside over such courts are denominated magistratos or "justices of the peace." There aro borough and "county" magistrates, cach having jurisdiction in their respective boroughs and divisions of counties. The office of "justice of the peace was originally created by Edward III., A.D. 1327, for the purpose of suppressing commotions which were anticipated in consequence of the dethronement of his predecessor. Before the time of Edward III. the preservation of the peace was by the common law entrusted to peculiar officers under the calling of custodes or conservatores pacis. Although some of these held power by virtue of their office, such as the Lord Chancellor, and some by prescription, yet most of these were chosen by the freeholders in full County Court before the sheriff in the same manner as those ancient common law officers, the " coroners," were until quite recently elected. Therefore, although in former times the custodes were elected generally by the vox populi, they were in the first year of the third Edward transferred over to the prerogative of the king or the king's commission. The powers, which were at first very limited, were gradually extended in succeeding reigns, and so on until the present day, when scarcely a year passes by without adding something to the criminal or civil jurisdiction of the magistrate. Justices of the peace are defined by Dalton to be "Judges of record appointed by the king to be justices within certain limits for the conservators of the peace, and for the execution of divers things comprehended within their commission, and within divers statutes committed to their charge." Even so early as the reign of Henry VII. those duties had become extremely onerous account of the numerous statute laws which justices had been charged to carry into effect. And Sir William Blackstone, in his celebrated Commentaries, laments that, in consequence of the infinito variety of business heaped upon justices of the peace, few cared to undertake the duties of the office. In the present day, however, aspiring men of various degree, both in the counties and boroughs, have always been found ready and willing to accept the office in fact, we can boast of quite an army of amateur judges. The authority of justices of the peace is either ministerial or judicial. The former in cases of felony or misdemeanour, when they merely initiate the proceedings by receiving an information of the offence, and issuing a warrant of apprehension, and, upon the offenders being brought before them, taking the depositions and committing for trial. They act judicially in all cases in which they are empowered to convict, and to make and enforce orders for payment in certain matters not coming within the jurisdiction of the County Court, and to inflict punishment by fine or imprisonment, and in all cases of

on

summary jurisdiction. Again, it is sometimes of a civil kind, as in cases where they have to adjudicate between master and servant, landlord and tenant, or to enforce the payment of rates, or in licensing questions, or in bye-laws of sanitary authorities, and in School Board regulations. Jus tices of the peace are at the present time appointed either by the Queen's Commission or by certain Acts of Parliament. County magistrates are appointed in the former mode, as also are justices for the boroughs under the Municipal Corporations Aot 1882, but as mayors and recorders of boroughs are made ex officio Justices of the peace under the authority of that Act, and the chairman of county councils under the Local Government Act 1888 their appointment may be referred to the latter mode. The mayor of the borough takes precedence within the borough, and he acts as justice not only during the year of his mayoralty, but also for the year following his retirement from office. New candidates for the office of county magistrates are usually recommended to the Lord Chancellor by the respective lord-lieutenants; and are appointed almost as a matter of course upon such recommendation; but the Lord Chancellor may, and sometimes does, appoint persons to this office of his own motion. No solicitor whilst in practice is capable of being a county magistrate; but any other person, lay or clerical, who is qualified in regard to property, may be appointed a county magistrate. The qualification is not the person who has the brains or ability to act as such, but merely such person who has freehold or copyhold lands and hereditaments yielding the clear yearly value of £100 over and above all incumbrances, or leaseholds of the clear yearly value of £300; or an occupier of not less than two years of a house assessed at not less than £100; which qualification he has to swear to at some general or quarter sessions for the county he intends to act in. They also have to take, within six months after their appointment, the oath of allegiance. Justices of the peace for boroughs, as well as for counties, of cities and towns are, as before-mentioned, appointed by the Queen's Commission, and it is necessary for them, while acting as such, to reside within their respective boroughs or within seven miles thereof. They have to take the oath of office the same as the county magistrates, except that which relates to the qualifications by estate, which in the case of borough justices is expressly dispensed with. In some boroughs the appointment of justices is regulated by the charter or by private Acts. It is open for the council of any municipal corporation to present a petition for the appointment of a salaried police magistrate to the Secretary of State, and the Queen may appoint a barrister of not less than seven years standing to be a stipendiary magistrate and justice of such borough. Some large provincial towns have their police magistrates under the Municipal Corporation Acts, and one or two have them under the Stipendiaries Act 1863. The metropolitan police magistrates are also chosen from barristers, and they are regulated by Act of Parliament. Their duties and powers are the same as those pertaining to the unpaid magistracy. In every division of a county, and in every borough, a person is appointed as clerk to the magistrates whose duty is to keep a record of all the proceedings, and to advise the magistates on the law relating to the duties of justices of the peace. Having briefly described the present system, let us now consider how it operates. Does it work satisfactorily for the benefit of the community? Here we see a certain body of county gentlemen and citizens administering the law within their own localities without ever having had any legal training for the purpose. The question arises, is it safe for men, however honourable and willing they may be, to adjudicate upon points of law and intricate cases without having a fair knowledge of the law in general. and the law of evidence in particular. True it is that they have their clerk to refer to, but in some courts the person sitting in the place of the clerk is not a solicitor at all, and in many instances is quite incapable of giving a correct opinion-and, even if he were, not having the power of decision in his own hand, he is frequently placed in a very humiliating position by the justices preferring to take their own opinion. How frequently do wo see and hear of blunders occurring both in the summary convictions and in the commitments of justices, owing to their lack of legal training. A little legal knowledge is a very dangerous thing. Common sense, honourable intentions, and humane ideas, may go a long way towards making a geod magistrate, but standing alone without legal knowledge they are not sufficient to guarantee a carriage of justice. The justices' bench is undoubtedly a seat of honour, and many persons who aspire to power and dignity, and who have profited by trade and speculations, will at all times be forthcoming to secure the office of J.P.; but should the administration of justice be left in their hands? It can be proved by blue books, by the frequent comments of the judges of assize, and by the decisions of the High Court, that their blunders are not only costly but tending to bring the administration of the law into contempt and ridicule. The present system of appointing justices is wrong in principle. Justices are selected to sit in courts in their own town, or in that part of the county in which they reside and have their property. This raises the question of an interest in the proceedings, not only by personal ties, favours, and friendships, but various other matters that too frequently influence the minds of members of the bench. However conscientious or high minded justices may be, it is impossible for those who administer justice in their own neighbourhood to avoid forming prejudices which must interfere with the impartiality of their decisions, whereas the decisions of comparative strangers to the parties interested command the greatest respect. Borough magistrates are mostly appointed from the leading merchants and tradesmen of their own towns, and it is of frequent occurrence for friends and acquaintances to meet in court, one on the bench the other in the witness-box or maybe in the dock. Bad, however, as the system is in the appointment of borough justices, it is, if possible, worse as regards the county justices. The latter are selected from landowners, and they cannot be expected to hold the scales to the satisfaction of all litigants in the agricul tural districts, as they are directly interested in the prosperity of the landowners, the tenant-farmers, and the preservers of game. Fancy a case connected with the game laws or landlord, and tenant, or master and servant, coming before a bench of five ar six of these county justices! It is of course repugnant to all the principles of liberty and justice. Few of the poorer classes of people care to seek redress in these courts, so great is the dread they have of coming to such a tribunal. It is quite the reverse with the County Courts, which are sometimes styled the poor man's court. It is undoubtedly a great misfortune when such an office as that of Justice of the Peace can be ensured by thrift and wealth; for in the county the purchaser or inheritor of an estate of a certain size stops almost as a matter of course on to the magisterial bench. Many instances might be given, if time permitted, of these miserable exhibitions which from time to time turn up, but I will content myself by naming three cases which have come under my personal notice. I attended before a county bench for a poor woman who was clearly a yearly tenant. Her landlord, a county magistrate, took out a summons in his own court, tó