ROWLETT, JAMES GARNER, late Stock Exchange, stockjobber. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 19, at noon, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 10, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-flds. Order sum. adm. May 1.

ROLLS, JOHN AUGUSTUS, late Dover, brewer. Ct. Canterbury. Meeting, May 17, at noon, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. May 23, at 10.30, at the Guildhall, Canterbury. Order sum. adm. May 5.

RIMMER, ROBERT, Liverpool, licensed victualler. Ct. Liverpool. Meeting, May 20, at 2, at office of Off. Rec. Liverpool. Exam, May 15, at 11, at the Court-house, Liverpool. RANZATTO, JOSEPH, Maindee, grocer. Ct. Newport, Mon. Meeting, May 21, at noon, nt office of Off. Rec. Newport. Exam. May 22, at 11, at the Townhall, Newport. Order sum, adm. May 7. SANDERS, ALFRED, Swansea, late fruiterer. Ct. Swansea. Meeting, May 19, at 3, at office of Or. Rec. Swansea. Exam. May 29, at 11.30, at the Townhall, Swansea. Order sum. adm. May 2. SPENCE, JOHN BERGER, Halfmoon-st, Piccadilly. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 19, at 11, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 10, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's. inn-fids. SUTTON, WILLIAM JOSEPH. late Barking, oilman. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 19, at 2.30, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Exam. June 10, at noon, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Order sum, adm. May 1.

THOMAS, WILLIAM, Merthyr Tydfil, grocer. Ct. Merthyr Tydfil. Meeting, May 20, at noon, at office of Off. Rec. Merthyr Tydfil. Exam. June 2, at 3, at the Court-house, Merthyr Tydfil. Order sum. adm. May 2.

VASSALLI, JAMES ANTHONY, Scarborough, eweller. Ct. Scarborough. Meeting, May 19, at 11.30, at 74, Newborough-st, Scarborough. Exam. June 3, at noon, at the Court-house, Scarborough. Order sum. adm. May 7.

WILLIAMS, ALFRED, Cheltenham, baker. Ct. Cheltenham. Meeting, May 20, at 4.15, at the County Court-bldngs, Cheltenham. Exam. June 5, at noon, at the County Court, Cheltenham. WILLIAMS, EPHRAIM, Merthyr Tydfil, late weaver. Ct. Merthyr Tydfil. Meeting, May 20, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Merthyr Tydfil. Exam. June 2, at 3, at the Court-house, Merthyr Tydfil. Order sum, adm. April 29.

WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN, Skewen, coal trimmer. Ct. Neath. Meeting, May 19, at 2.30, at office of Off. Rec. Swansea. Exam. May 27, at 11.30, at the Townhall, Neath. Order sum. adm. May 2.

WIGGINS, DANIEL, Fritwell, baker. Ct. Oxford. Meeting, May 17, at noon, at 1, St. Aldate's,
Oxford. Exam. June 5, at 11.30, at the County-hall, Oxford. Order sum. adm. May 5.

The following amended notices are substituted for that published in the London Gazette of May 6.
AYLWIN, ALBERT, Bournemouth, corn merchant's clerk. Ct. Poole. Meeting, May 14, at 3, at
office of Off. Rec. Salisbury. Exam. June 4, at noon, at the Townhall, Poole.
PILCH, ARTHUR, Norwich, builder. Ct. Norwich. Meeting, May 17, at 11.30, at office of off. Reo.
Norwich. Exam. May 19, at 11, at the Shirehall, Norwich Castle. Order sum. adm. May 2.

Gazette, May 13.

BEARDON, WILLIAM HENRY LENDON, Liverpool-rd, Islington, coachbuilder. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 23, at 2.30, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 11, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. BROWN, EDWARD, late Hanbury-st, Spitalfields, licensed victualler. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 30, at 11, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 11, at 11, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids, Order sum. adm. April 30. BOWKETT, CHARLES ROBERT, Birmingham, painter. Ct. Birmingham. Meeting, May 21, at 11, at 25, Colmore-row, Birmingham. Exam. June 10, at 2, at the County Court, Birmingham. Order sum. adm. May 9. CRANSTON, GEORGE, Longsight, travelling draper. Ct. Manchester. Meeting, May 20, at 2.30, at office of Off. Rec. Manchester. Exam. June 11, at 1, at the Court-house, Manchester.

Order sum. adm. May 8.

DOMPE, GIOVANNI, Wardour-st, Oxford-st, provision merchant. Ct. High Court of Justice, in
Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 23, at noon, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn.
Exam. June 5, at 12.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Order sum. adm. April 18.
DICKIN, GEORGE PRICE, and DICKIN, THOMAS BENJAMIN, Selattyn, farmers. Ct. Wrexham.
Meeting, May 28, at 2, at the Queen's hotel, Oswestry. Exam. May 13, at noon, at the County.
hall, Wrexham.

ELMITT, HENRY, Blankney Dales, farmer. Ct. Boston. Meeting, May 21, at 12.30, at office of off.
Rec. Lincoln. Exam. May 22, at 11, at the Sessions-house, Boston. Order sum. adm. May 7.
FLOWER, F. G., late Queen Anne's-mansions. Ot. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meet-
ing, May 23, at 1, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 5, at 2, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids.
GARNAR, ARTHUR, and GARNAR, WALTER, Frankton-rd, Hill-st, Peckham, builders. Ct. High
Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 23, at 11, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st,
Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 5, at 11.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids.
GEBHART, THOMAS Forest Hill, late manager to a firm of foreign cattle salesmen. Ct. Greenwich.
Meeting, May 20, at 11, at 24, Railway-approach, London Bridge. Exam. May 20, at 1, at the
Court-house, Greenwich. Order sum. adm. May 6.

HARRIS, SAMUEL, Bishopsgate-st. Without, bookseller. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy.
Meeting. May 20, at 2.30, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 5,
at 2, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Order sum. adm. May 7.
HOBERN, WILLIAM RICHARD, and HOBERN, JOHN, late Lombard-st,lbuilders. Ct. High Court
of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 23, at 2.30, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st,
Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 5, at 12.30, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Order sum. adm. April 25.
HOOPER, JOHN DAVID, St. Swithin's-la. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting,
May 20, at 1, at Bankruptcy-bldngs, Portugal-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 5, at 12.30, at
34. Lincoln's-inn-fids.

HAWCROFT, WILLIAM, Worsborough Bridge, grocer. Ct. Barnsley. Meeting, May 23, at 11.30, at office of Off. Rec. Barnsley. Exam. June 19, at 11.30, at the County Court-hall, Barnsley. Order sum. adm. May 10.

HAIGH, EDWARD, Wibsey, late innkeeper. Ct. Bradford. Meeting, May 23, at 11.30, at office of Off. Rec. Bradford. Exam. June 20, at 10, at the County Court, Bradford. Order sum, adm. May 10.

HARDWICK, WILLIAM, and HARDWICK, HENRY SMITH, Keighley, worsted spinners. Ct. Bradford. Meeting, May 22, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Bradford. Exam. June 20, at 10, at the County Court, Bradford.

HANCOCK, GEORGE, Stoke Newington, no occupation. Ct. Edmonton. Meeting, May 21, at noon, at 95, Temple-chmbrs, Temple-avenue. Exam. June 2, at 11.30, at the Court-house, Edmonton. Order sum. adm. May 8.

HARGRAVES, SAMUEL, and HARGRAVES, MARY ELIZABETH, Leicester, boot manufacturers. Ct. Leicester. Meeting, May 20, at 12.30, at office of Off. Rec. Leicester. Exam. June 11, at 10, at the Castle, Leicester. HELM, HENRY, Preston, furniture painter. Ct. Preston. Meeting, June 6, at 2, at office of Off. Rec. Preston. Exam. June 6, at 2, at the County Court-offices, Preston. Order sum. adm. May 5. JONES, JOHN MARCHANT, late_Kilmersdon, grocer. Ct. Frome. Meeting, May 21, at 12.30, at office of Off. Rec. Bristol. Exam. June 24, at 11, at the Mechanics' hall, Frome. Order sum. adm. May 10.

JOHNSON, JOHN AYERS, Brierley Hill, cornfactor. Ct. Stourbridge. Meeting. May 20, at 2. at office of Wall, solicitor, Stourbridge. Exam. May 20, at 2.30, at the Court-house, Stourbridge, Order sum, adm. May 1.

KNOTT, WILLIAM, sen., Brierley Hill, maltster's labourer. Ct. Stourbridge. Meeting, May 20, at 2.15, at office of Wall, solicitor, Stourbridge. Exam. May 20, at 2.30, at the Court-house, Stourbridge. Order sum. adm. May 1.

KENT, ARTHUR, late Sandal Magna, journeyman blacksmith. Ct. Wakefield. Meeting, May 20, at 11, at office of Off. Rec. Wakefield. Exam. June 5, at 11, at the Court-house, Wakefield. Order sum. adm. May 10.

LEVY, ABRAHAM DAVID, Hackney-rd, boot manufacturer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 28, at 11, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 13, at 11, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Order sum. adm. May 3.

LUSH, JOHN, Bradford, tobacconist. Ct. Bradford. Meeting, May 23, at 11, at office of Off. Rec.
Bradford. Exam. June 20, at 10, at the County Court, Bradford. Order sum. adm. May 10.
MONY, SAMUEL ERNEST, Cambridge, draper. Ct. Cambridge. Meeting, May 20, at noon, at office
of Off. Rec. Cambridge. Exam. May 14, at 11, at the Guildhall, Cambridge. Order sum. adm.
May 9.
MOSES, WILLIAM PEEK, Enfield Highway, builder. Ut. Edmonton. Meeting, May 20, at noon,
at 95, Temple-chmbrs, Temple-avenue. Exam. June 2, at 11.30, at the Court-house, Edmonton.
MYERS, JACOB, Southsea, traveller. Ct. Portsmouth. Meeting, June 2, at 4, at 16, Queen-st,
Portsea. Exam. June 2, at noon, at the Court-house, Portsmouth. Order sum. adm. May 9.
OWEN, ARTHUR, Silloth, hotel-keeper. Ct. Carlisle. Meeting, May 27, at noon, at 12, Lonsdale-st,
Carlisle. Exam. May 27, at 11, at the Court-house, Carlisle. Order sum. adm. May 7.
PANE, LEONARD, and PANE, HENRY, Birmingham, brass tube manufacturers. Ct. Birmingham.
Meeting, May 23, at 11, at 25, Colmore-row, Birmingham. Exam. June 9, at 2, at the County
Court, Birmingham. Order sum. adm. May 2,
PERRONS, JOSEPH, Nottingham, late butcher. Ct. Nottingham. Meeting, May 20, at noon, at
office of Off. Rec. Nottingham. Exam. June 6, at 10, at the County Court-house, Nottingham.
Order sum. adm. May 10.
REYNOLDS, THOMAS, Kidwelly, draper. Ct. Carmarthen. Meeting, May 20, at 11, at office of Off.
Rec. Carmarthen. Exam. June 5, at 11.30, at the Guildhall, Carmarthen.
ROWNTREE, WILLIAM LITTLE, Howden, late printer. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull.

Meeting,

May 22, at 11.30, at office of Off. Rec. Hull. Exam. June 16, at 2, at the Court-house, Hull Order sum. adm. May 5.

SMITH, JAMES, Ashley Box, builder. Ct. Bath. Meeting, May 22, at 1, at 1, Abbey-st, Bath. Exam. May 22, at 11.30, at the Guildhall, Bath.

THOMAS, JAMES, and ROBERTS, ARTHUR TREVOR, Cardiff, general carriers. Ct. Cardiff. Meeting, May 20, at 10.30, at office of Off. Rec. Cardiff. Exam. May 20, at 11, at the Townhall Cardiff. Order sum. adm. May 3.

THOMPSON, ROBERT, late Carlisle, tailor. Ct. Carlisle. Meeting, May 23, at noon, at 12, Lonsdale-st, Carlisle. Exam. May 27, at 11, at the Court-house, Carlisle. Order sum. adm. May 8.

THORPE, GEORGE, Kingston-upon-Hull, builder. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Meeting, May 22, at 11, at office of Off. Reo. Hull. Exam. June 16, at 2, at the Court-house, Hull. Order sum. adm. May 10.

VOGT, HENRY CHARLES, Turin-st, Bethnal Green-rd, baker. Ct. High Court of Justice, in
Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 28, at noon, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam, June 10, at
noon, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids. Order sum. adm. May 1.
WALLIS, H. E., Holborn-circus. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Meeting, May 22,
at noon, at 33, Carey-st, Lincoln's-inn. Exam. June 10, at noon, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-flds.
WRIGHT, JOHN, Cannock, butoher. Ct. Walsall. Meeting, June 11, at 10.45, at office of Off. Rec.
Walsall. Exam. June 11, at noon, at the Court-house, Walsall. Order sum adm. May 8.
WHELLER, RICHARD, Glastonbury, farmer. Ct. Wells. Meeting, May 21, at noon, at office o
Off. Rec. Bristol. Exam. June 10, at 11, at the Town-hall, Wells.

NOTICE OF DAY APPOINTED FOR PROCEEDING WITH PUBLIC
EXAMINATION ADJOURNED SINE DIE.
Gazette, May 13.

PIRIE, JOHN, Eastcheap, Scotch factor. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Exam.
June 6, at 1, at 34, Lincoln's-inn-fids.

ADJUDICATIONS. Gazette, May 9.

BRYANT, THOMAS, Curtain-rd, chairmaker. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Orde
May 7. Pet. May 7.

BOWKETT, CHARLES ROBERT, Birmingham, painter. Ct. Birmingham. Order, May 6. Pet. May 3.
BROCK, HENRY BLAKE, late Bristol, solicitor. Ct. Bristol. Order, May 5. Pet. April 12
BARKER, THOMAS, Leeds, butcher. Ct. Leeds. Order, May 6. Pet. May 6.
BLACKBURN, HENRY, Milnrow, flannel manufacturer. Ct, Oldham. Order May 6. Pet. May 6.
BABLOW, NATHAN, Stoke-upon-Trent, builder. Ct. Stoke-upon-Trent. Pet. May 5. Order,

April 23.

BREWER, ELIZA JANE, Penzance, butcher. Ct. Truro. Pet. May 6. Order, May 1. CARAMELLI, PIETRO, Tottenham Court-rd, restaurateur. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bank

ruptcy. Order, May 6. Pet. May 1.

CIRIAX, HEINRICH, Newman-st, Oxford-st, bootmaker. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bantruptcy. Order, May 6. Pet. May 8.

DANN, HENRY NEWMAN GROVES, Chapel-st, Milton-st, dealer in umbrella materials. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, May 7. Pet. April 9.

DE ARTOLA, JOSE MARIE; DE ARTOLA, JORGE; DE ARTOLA, RAMON; DE ARTOLA, FRANCISCO; and DE ARTOLA, DANIEL, Austin Friars, merchants. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, May 6. Pet. Jan. 2.

EASTWOOD, HARRY WILLIAM, Queen's-rd, Bayswater, confectioner. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, May 8. Pet. May 3.

EDWARDS, FRED, Gillingham, plumber. Ct. Salisbury. Pet. May 5. Order, May 2.

GARNER. WILLIAM THOMAS, sen., Willenhall, brass caster. Ct. Wolverhampton. Pet. May &
Order, May 3.

HOPE, HENRY, York, provision dealer. Ct. York. Pet. May 7. Order, May 6.
HUNTINGFORD, ROBERT RICHARD PRIDEAUX, Winchester, tobacconist. Ct. Winchester. Pet.
May 6. Order, May 5.

HAWCROFT, WILLIAM, Worsbrough Bridge, grocer. Ct. Barnsley. Order, May 5. Pet. May 5.
HALLETT, FREDERIC FRANCIS, Brighton, farmer. Ct. Brighton. Order May 7. Pet. April 2.
HUTCHINGS, SAMUEL, Halberton, dealer. Ct. Exeter. Order, May 6. Pet. May 6.
HOARE, JAMES ROBERT BUTLER, Ipswich, grocer. Ct. Ipswich. Order May 3. Pet. May 3
HONOUR, ALBERT STEPHEN, Harrow, grocer. Ct. St. Albans. Pet. May 5. Order, May 5.
HOSKYNS, THOMAS SNOW, Leamington, grocer. Ct. Warwick. Pet. May 5. Order, May 5.
JAMES, ROBERT, Church-et, Paddington, tax collector. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bank-
ruptcy. Order, May 5. Pot. March 3.

KING, HORACE, King's Lynn, watchmaker. Ct. King's Lynn. Order, May 5. Pet. April 22.
LILLEY, ARTHUR HENRY, late Clement's-la, timber merchant. Ct. High Court of Justice, in
Bankruptcy. Order, May 7. Pet. April 1.

LOADS, HERBERT WALTER, Parliament Hill-rd, Hampstead, boot manufacturer's manager. Ct.
High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, May 6. Pet. May 6.
LOCHHEAD, WILLIAM KERR, Gringley-on-the-Hill, physician. Ct. Lincoln Order, May 5. Pet.
May 5.

LOCKYER, JOHN, Bournemouth, baker. Ct. Poole. Order, May 6. Pet. March 30,
MARTIN, HENRY, Trawden, cotton waste bleacher. Ct. Burnley. Order, May 6. Pet. May 6.
NATHAN, HENRY, Central Meat Market, Smithfield, meat salesman. Ot. High Court of Justice,
in Bankruptcy. Order, May 7. Pet. April 3.

NEILL, GEORGE ROBERT, late Holborn-viaduct, no occupation. Ct. High Court of Justice, in
Bankruptcy. Order, May 6. Pet. Feb. 6.

PERKINS, JOHN, Gainsborough, late provision dealer. Ct. Lincoln. Order, May 5. Pet. May 5, PERRONS, JOSEPH, Nottingham, late butcher. Ct. Nottingham. Order, May 5. Pet. May 5. BANZATTO, JOSEPH, Newport, grocer. Ct. Newport, Mon. Order, May 7. Pet. May 7. REYNOLDS, THOMAS, Kidwelly, draper. Ct. Carmarthen. Order, May 7. Pet. May 7. ROWNTREE, WILLIAM LITTLE, Howden, late printer. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hall. Order, May 5. Pet. May 2.

SOLOMON, SAMUEL, Guildford-st. Ct. High Court of Justice in Bankruptcy. Order, May 6. Pet

March 6.

THOMAS, JAMES, and ROBERTS, ARTHUR TREVOR, late Cardiff, general carriers. Ct. Cardiff. Order, May 3. Pet. May 2.

THORPE, GEORGE, Kingston-upon-Hull, builder. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Order, May 6. Pet.
May 6.

TEBBS, ROBERT, Leicester, baker. Ct. Leicester. Order, May 6. Pet. April 28.
TOMES, ALFRED, Liverpool, boot dealer. Ct. Liverpool. Order, May 6. Pet. May 5.
VASSALLI, JAMES ANTHONY, Scarborough, jeweller. Ct. Scarborough. Pet. May 7. Order,
April 26.

WHELLER, RICHARD, Glastonbury, farmer. Ct. Wells. Pet. May 6. Order, May 6.
WIGGINS, DANIEL, Fritwell, baker. Ct. Oxford. Order. May 5. Pet. April 30.
YOUNG, A. STEWART, First Avenue hotel, Holborn, Esq. Ct. High Court of Justice in Bankruptcy.
Order, April 28. Pet. Sept. 13.

Gazette, May 13.

ATKINSON, HENRY, Southwick, market gardener. Ct. Sunderland. Order, May 9. Pet. March 22
BRAY, ROBERT, Holme, farmor. Ct. Great Grimsby. Order, May 9. Pet. May 8.
BULLIVANT, RICHARD ARTHUR, Shadwell, architect. Ct. Leeds. Order, May 9. Pet. May 9.
CORBETT, JOHN, late Hercules-bidngs, Lambeth, publican. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bank-
ruptcy. Order, May 9. Pet. April 18.

CROFT, THOMAS HENRY, Clay Cross, baker. Ct. Chesterfield. Order, May 7. Pet. April 22.
CURTIS, WILLIAM, Kingston-upon-Hull, bricklayer. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Order, May 9
Pet. May 9.
COGSWELL, J. M., sen., Purley, builder. Ct. Croydon. Order, May 9. Pet. March 25.
COOPER, GEORGE, Leatherhead, plumber. Ct. Croydon. Order, May 10. Pet. April 24.
CRANSTON, GEORGE, Longsight, Manchester, travelling draper. Ct. Manchester. Order, May
Pet. April 23.

DRAKEFORD, JOSEPH, Littlemore, accountant. Ct. Oxford. Order, May 9. Pet. April 18.
FLANAGAN, JOHN, Leicester, cattle dealer. Ct. Leicester. Order, May 8. Pet. April 19.
FORD, FREDERICK HENRY ALFRED (late trading as the Association of Tobacco and Cigar
Manufacturers), Commercial-rd. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, May 9.
Pet. May 1.

GREAVES, JAMES, Birkenhead, boiler maker. Ct. Birkenhead. Order, May 8. Pet. April 21.
HOOK, GEORGE EMANUEL SAMUEL LUPINO, Birmingham, pantomimist. Ct. Birmingham.
Order, May 8. Pet. May 7.
HAIGH, EDWARD, Wibsey, late innkeeper. Ct. Bradford. Order, May 9. Pet. May 9.
HARRIS, DAVID, Staplecross, butcher. Ct. Hastings, Order, May 9. Pet. May 9.
HOLDEN, RALPH, Southport, grocer. Ct. Liverpool. Order, May 10. Pet. May 10.
HUNT, JAMES JOHN, Norwich, confectioner. Ct. Norwich. Order, May 8. Pet. March 31.
JONES, JOHN MARCHANT, late Kilmersdon, grocer. Ct. Frome. Order, May 8. Pet. May 6.
JAY, CHARLES, Hagley, coal merchant. Ct. Hereford. Order, May 9. Pet March 18.
JONES, JOHN EDWARD, Aberavon, grocer. Ct. Neath. Order, May 8. Pet. May 8.
KENT, ARTHUR, late Sandal Magna, journeyman blacksmith. Ct. Wakefield. Order, May &
Pet. May 7.
KEENE, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, Armley, prison governor. Ct. Leeds. Order, May 8. Pet. June 18.
LUSH, JOHN, Bradford, tobacconist. Ct. Bradford. Order, May 9. Pet. May 8.
MELLORS, HUBERT CHARLES, Burton-on-Trent, builder. Ct. Burton-on-Trent. Order, May &
Pet. April 29.

MONY, SAMUEL ERNEST, Cambridge, draper. Ct. Cambridge. Order, May 9. Pet. May 9.
MITCHELSON, HENRY, Squire's-mount-cottages, Hampstead Heath, late bank clerk. Ct. High
Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order, May 10. Pet. May 6.

MEATS, WILLIAM, Clacton-on-Sea, engineering contractor. Ct. Colchester. Order, May & Pet.
May 6.

MARTIN, ROBERT, Liverpool, late builder. Ct. Liverpool. Order, May 8. Pet. April 15.
MORRIS, ARTHUR, sen., Carlton, general carter. Ct. Nottingham. Order, May 9. Pet. May 9.
MYERS, JACOB, Southsea, traveller. Ct. Portsmouth. Order, May 8 Pet. May 8.
MORRIS, RICHARD OSCAR, Stratford-upon-Avon, gunsmith. Ct. Warwick. Order, May 7. Pet.

March 18.

OWEN, ARTHUR, Silloth, hotel-keeper. Ct. Carlisle. Order, May 9. Pet. May &
PUGH, HENRY, West Felton, grocer. Ct. Wrexham. Order, May 8. Pet. April 12.
RUTTER, THOMAS, Stockton-on-Tees, weighman. Ct. Stockton-on-Tees and Middlebrough.
Order, May 9. Pet. May 9.

SCARBER, ROBERT, High-st, Borough, wholesale ironmonger. Ct. High Court of Justice, in
Bankruptcy. Order, May 8. Pet. April 1.

SEYMOUR, HENRY, Newington Green-rd, sign writer. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy, Order, May 9. Pet. April 16.

SPANTON, CHARLES, jun., Vauxhall Bridge-rd, timber merchant. Ct. High Court of Justice, in
Bankruptcy. Order, May 8. Pet. March 11.

THOMPSON ROBERT, late Carlisle, tailor. Ct. Carlisle. Order, May 7. Pet. May 7.
THOMAS, WALTER DAVID, Swansea, grocer. Ct. Swansea. Order, May 10. Pet. May 10.
WHITTAKER, WILLIAM, Warrington, fishmonger. Ct. Warrington. Order, May 8. Pet. May 7.
WORTHAM, HALE, Portobello-rd, tripe seller. Ct. High Court of Justice, in Bankruptcy. Order,
May 8. Pet. May 8.
WRIGHT, FREDERICK ARTHUR, and WRIGHT, MARY JANE, Wombwell, grocers. Ct. Barnsley.
Order, May 9. Pet. May 8.
WILES, HENRY, Bedford, tailor. Ct. Bedford. Order, May 9. Pet. May 8.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

MARRIAGES.

CAMERON-LANYON.-On the 10th inst., at Wimbledon parish church, Henry James Cameron, one of H.M. Inspectors of Factories, to Elizabeth Helen, second surviving daughter of the late Sir Charles Lanyon, D.L., The Abbey, co. Antrim. TEMPEST-JACOB.-On the 8th inst., at Horningsham, Wilts, Charles Ernest Tempest, of Ipswich eldest son of the late Charles Tempest, Solicitor of Leeds, to Frances Sarah, eldest daughter of the Rev. Canon Jacob, Vicar of Horningsham.

DEATHS.

BELLINGHAM.-On the 9th inst., at Saffron Walden, James Gordon Bellingham, Solicitor, Town
Clerk and Clerk of the Peace of the Borough, aged 53.
DRESSER-ROGERS.-On the 7th inst., at Rockley, Champion-park, Denmark Hill, S.E., Mr.
Deputy Edward Dresser-Rogers, D.L., in his 66th year.

FAWCETT. On the 6th inst., suddenly, William Rhodes Fawcett, of Stainton-in-Cleveland and
Stockton-on-Tees, Solicitor, aged 49 years.

HOLDSWORTH. On the 10th inst., Ellen Caroline, the wife of C. J. Holdsworth, of 32, Croxted. road, West Dulwich, and 23, Bush-lane, E.C., Solicitor, aged 49.

HUMPHREYS. On the 6th inst., at 8, Chichester-street, St. George's-square, S.W., John James
Hamilton Humphreys, of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-at-law, in his 74th year.

SEARLE. On the 6th inst., at Brighton, Hannah Maria, eldest daughter of the late Joseph
Searle, Solicitor, of the City of London.
SPARLING. At his residence, 20, Culver-street, Colchester, Philip Smith Sparling, Solicitor, in
the 80th year of his age.

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vacation? We thought it was the Whitsun Vacation. We do not complain. The system is so bad that any new departure may be an advantage. In fact, however, Trinity Vacation would be the Long Vacation.

THE Midland Circuit will celebrate the elevation of Mr. Justice LAWRANCE to the Bench at the Ship, at Greenwich, on June 6, making their progress thither by water.

EACH year that HER MAJESTY'S Birthday comes round the leading members of the Bar are invited to dine with the AttorneyGeneral. This imposes a heavy pecuniary tax upon the first law officer, and spoils the holiday for the guests, who but for the obligation to honour their leader's invitation would probably be taking a holiday out of town. We shall not be surprised to find this custom honoured by a breach next year.

THE Kent Sessions Bar invited the new metropolitan magistrate, Mr. GEORGE DENMAN, and Mr. DICKENS, to dinner at the Criterion, on Tuesday, in honour of the occasion of the promotion of the former and the retirement of the latter from the Sessions. Mr. Justice DENMAN was present; and also the past members, Sir JOHN BRIDGE, Mr. BIRON, Q.C., and Mr. MEAD, metropolitan magistrates, Mr. CHANNELL, Q.C., Mr. CRUMP, Q.C., Mr. WINCH, Q.C., and Master KAYE.

AN amusing incident occurred before Mr. Justice DAY last week. The question involved was whether writing a letter by means of a typewriter was a publication to the typewriter. Mr. OSWALD, for the plaintiff, urged that if a man were to go out into the wilderness and make a defamatory exclamation, that might be actionable. Mr. Justice DAY gravely remarked that that was an old reported case of Robinson Crusoe. The libeller spouting defamation in the wilderness was graphically pourtrayed in pen and ink by Mr. LOCKWOOD, Mr. OSWALD'S leader. Judgment went for the defendant. We doubt whether the law of the judge on this point was as good as his joke.

THE punishment inflicted by Mr. Justice CAVE on Mr. NEWTON, the young solicitor who pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiring to impede the course of justice, is, we think, sufficient. Youth, indiscretion, and excessive zeal were pleaded on his behalf, and, curiously enough, the ATTORNEY-GENERAL concurred with the defending counsel in thinking that there was a great deal in the excuse that the prisoner was seeking to save his clients from blackmail. But the learned judge, taking a strong course, differed from both counsel: he saw nothing to justify such a plea, nor did he see his way to suffering the offender to go at large and come up for judgment when called upon. It is perfectly certain that the course of justice must be kept free. Professional men are no doubt often sorely tempted to obstruct it in favour of good clients. We trust the lesson now taught will not be soon forgotten.

THE following appointments were made on the occasion of the QUEEN'S Birthday:-Messrs. F. G. JOHNSTON, Chief Justice of the Superior Court, Quebec; HENRY LUDLOW, Chief Justice of the Leeward Islands; R. J. PINSENT, D.C.L., Senior Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court, Newfoundland; and His Honour Judge LLOYD, to be knighted. Mr. PATRICK COLL, Chief Crown Solicitor for Ireland, to be C.B.; Mr. CHARLES HALL, Q.C., M.P., to be K.C.B. Messrs. JAMES R. NAYLOR, Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bombay, and ROBERT J. CROSTHWAITE, Judicial Commissioner Central Provinces, to be C.S.I. Mr. ALEX. MCHINCH, Member of the Council of the Governor of Bombay for Making Laws and Regulations, to be C.I.E. Messrs. PAOLO VELLA, LL.D., late Judge of the Court of Appeal of the Island of Malta; W. MEREDITH DEANE, Captain Superintendent of Police of the Colony of Hong Kong, and Member of the Executive and Legislative Councils; and MORGAN STANISLAUS GRACE, M.D., Member of the Legislative Council of the Colony of New Zealand, to be C.M.G.

A CONTRIBUTOR from the Parliamentary Committee Rooms writes:-An incident occurred the other day in one of the Committee Rooms of the House of Commons not unworthy of observation. In the Richmond Foot Bridge and Lock Bill, the case of the promoters having closed, the question was raised which of the opponents to the Bill should be heard first. Counsel representing the DUKE of DEVONSHIRE, as the senior counsel, claimed the right to be heard last against the Bill; counsel on behalf of the Conservators of the Thames followed suit; and then counsel on behalf of the Local Board of Brentford, as the next senior in rank, claimed the same right, his witnesses not being in attendance, and contended that, in the absence of any agreement between counsel representing opponents to a scheme, the true course to adopt was to hear the petitioners against a Bill in the order in which their petitions were presented. The Chairman, Sir JOSEPH BAILEY, very courteously said that he could not

interfere with the etiquette of the Bar, and in these circumstances counsel on behalf of the Brentford Gas Company had to proceed. To ordinary mortals like ourselves this forensic rule would seem to cause great and unnecessary expense and delay to the parties to parliamentary litigations. It would seem to us that the better plan-the only plan in the interest of suitors we think, regard being had to the character of parliamentary contests, their duration and expense-would be that the opponents should be heard in the order suggested by counsel for the Local Board, and not according to the mere chance, for chance it is, of the standing or seniority of counsel. As it is, with this right existing, or alleged to exist, all opponents may have to be in attendance with their witnesses, not knowing in what order it may suit the caprice or convenience of the senior counsel engaged to take their cases.

SOLICITORS will doubtless congratulate themselves (and with good reason) upon the decision of Mr. Justice NORTH in Re Robson. Mr. ROBSON, a solicitor, was instructed to prepare a lease for a term of ninety years, the consideration being an annual rent of £50 and a premium of £4400. The bill of costs subsequently delivered amounted to £69 10s., consisting of £3 10s. for disbursements and £66 for professional charges. The last item, calculated according to the scale under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, was made up of £14 by way of percentage on the rent and £52 in respect of the premium. The taxing master, however, refused to allow anything beyond the £14, and struck out the £52 altogether, at the same time giving leave to the solicitor to bring in a bill of costs according to the old system, as altered by schedule 2 of the rules under the Act of 1881. The fallacy of this mode of dealing with the costs was very clearly shown by the judgment of Mr. Justice NORTH. A solicitor must be paid according to a scale, or independently of a scale. There can, speaking generally, be no blending of the two systems. A reasonable interpretation of the rules and schedule as applying to transactions between lessor and lessee can only lead to the conclusion that the basis on which Mr. ROBSON's costs were made out was perfectly correct. If the taxation had been sustained it would be quite possible that, in the case of a lease at a nominal or small rent, where the real consideration was a large premium, no title being deduced, the solicitor would receive a most inadequate remuneration for his services-a result which, as Mr. Justice NORTH pointed out, was scarcely contemplater by the framers of the Act, orders, and rules. In the opinion of the learned judge, the language of rule 5 (referring to a further sum equal to the remuneration of a purchase at a price equal to the premium) made the object in view perfectly intelligible. In the result, therefore, Mr. ROBSON is held to be entitled to the full amount claimed, and an important precedent has been established.

TOWN CLERKS will peruse with pleasure Mayor of Salford v. Lever, which we reported last week (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 434). It was held (distinguishing Mayor of Swansea v. Quirk, 41 L. T. Rep. N. S. 758), that a town clerk might refuse to answer interrogatories, in an action in which the corporation of which he was town clerk were plaintiffs, on the ground that the whole of the information which he possessed was obtained by him as solicitor for the plaintiffs in the action, and therefore privileged. Quirk's case is clearly distinguishable, inasmuch as there the order was for the examination of the town clerk of the corporation, 6: or other their proper officer," and the corporation having elected to answer through the town clerk could not maintain their objection of privilege. In Lever's case the corporation had no choice in the matter, as the order was for the examination of the town clerk. The practical result will be that, in actions where corporations are parties, those wishing to interrogate them will take care to have their order directed to the town clerk, or other proper officer, and that the "other proper officer," and not the town clerk, will make the answer, which, however, will not of course be so full or satisfactory as an answer by a town clerk would be.

THE debate in the House of Commons on the Government Bill for allowing the county councils to spend a certain amount of money in buying up liquor licences is of special interest to lawyers. Of course, the very practical question arose, whether publicans have a vested interest or not? The SOLICITOR-GENERAL renewed his extraordinary and unwarrantable assertion of two years ago, that the effect of the Licensing Acts is to confer upon them such a vested interest by law. Notwithstanding that Mr. Justice FIELD, in Sharp v. Wakefield (58 L. T. Rep. N. S. 494; affirmed 60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 130), saw no reason 66 either under

the old Acts or the new Acts, or the old cases or the new cases for throwing the smallest doubt upon the universal practice that in granting either new licences or licences by way of renewal the justices have an absolute discretion," Sir EDWARD CLARKE contrived to avail himself of a correction by Lord FIELD of his previous judgment in Reg. v. Over Darwen (39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 444) in support of this statement. Finally, he distinguished Sharp v. Wakefield on the ground that in that case there was an

absence of proper police supervision, and this distinction, though almost entirely lost sight of in the judgments, appears to be technically correct. Mr. MATTHEWS, Mr. FINLAY, and Mr. FORREST FULTON followed on the same side, but, though they all supported the Bill, none of them ventured to adopt the SOLICITOR-GENERAL'S construction of the Licensing Acts. It is in the highest degree unfortunate that the opinion of the House of Lords as a court of law cannot be ascertained upon the question of vested interest or no vested interest before the Bill is submitted to the House as a legislative assembly.

In the case of Crawford v. Forshaw, Mr. Justice KEKEWICH held that an executor who had renounced probate was entitled to exercise a discretionary power of distributing his residue amorg charitable objects. The power was expressed to be exercisable by "my executors therein named," and his Lordship considered that the testator intended the exercise of the power to be independent of the acceptance of the executorial office. The question is no doubt one of construction, and it may be said that a decision upon one will is no authority as to the construction of another. The only case which was cited to the court was Keates v. Burton (14 Ves. 434), which had no further bearing upon the question at issue than that Sir WILLIAM GRANT, in giving judgment on a different point, said, "The power is given to the executors, but they have not exercised it, and they have renounced the only character in which it was competent to them to exercise it." There is, however, another case, to which it is curious that no reference was made, in which, upon a will (so far as material) scarcely distinguishable from Crawford v. Forshaw, Lord LANGDALE came to a precisely opposite conclusion to that adopted by Mr. Justice KEKEWICH. The case is Attorney-General v. Fletcher (5 L. J. 75 Ch.), cited in the last edition of Tudor's Charitable Trusts, p. 31. There the testator bequeathed his residuary estate "to charitable purposes which should be thereafter specified, or in default of which, according to the best judgment of the Rev. Dr. JOHN MADDY Sole executor of my said last will." Dr. MADDY having renounced the executorship, Lord LANGDALE held that he could not exercise the power on the ground that "the power of appointment being given to him as sole executor it was coupled with his office."

A NOVEL question as to the right of cattlemen on board an Atlantic steamship to share in salvage was disposed of in the recent case of The Coriolanus. In this case the salving ship was carrying live cattle on a voyage from Boston to Liverpool, and for the purpose of looking after the cattle there were eighteen cattlemen on board. In order to comply with the requirements of the American authorities these men were on the ship's articles, and therefore in legal strictness formed part of the crew. As a matter of fact, however, they were rated at some merely nominal sum, their remuneration being a lump sum paid them by the shippers for the voyage, the shipowners providing them with food. In these circumstances the cattlemen sought to share in the salvage as forming part of the crew. In support of their contention reliance was placed on the case of The Hope (3 Hagg. 423), where passengers on a salving ship were allowed to participate in the award as able-bodied seamen. It is, however, to be noticed that the facts of that case do not appear in the report, and it may be that the passengers took some effective part in rendering the services. In the present case the cattlemen did nothing, and hence Sir JAMES HANNEN refused to allow them to share in the reward, the test of a right to claim salvage being, according to the learned judge, taking some part directly or indirectly in saving the salved property. This is certainly both good sense and good law. It not unfrequently happens that the particular members of the crew who have been the chief means of saving the property are somewhat inadequately rewarded in comparison with the other salvors in consequence of the necessary division of the award among the owners and all the crew. To further diminish their proportion by allowing persons to share who are members of the crew merely by a legal fiction, and take no part in the navigation of the ship, would be doing them a grievous injustice.

of

THE Court of Appeal have promptly, and if we may say so with great respect have properly, overruled the decision of Mr. Justice KEKEWICH (1890, 7 P. O. R. 41) in Van Gelder and Co. v. Sowerby Bridge, &c., Society. V. and Co. mortgaged a patent by way assignment to various persons, and subsequently brought an action of infringement against S., without joining as parties their mortgagees, whose mortgages were all entered on the Register of Patents. Upon a preliminary objection being taken by the ATTORNEY-GENERAL at the trial, Mr. Justice KEKEWICH held that the mortgagees were necessary parties, and that, if their consent to be made co-plaintiffs could not be obtained, the action must be dismissed. This decision-which, it will be observed, put the mortgagor of a patent in a worse position than the ordinary mortgagor, who can sue to protect the subject of the mortgage was apparently based on sections 46 and 87 of the Patents Act 1883. The former of these sections defines

"patentee" as the person for the time being entitled to the benefit of a patent;" and it was contended by the ATTORNEYGENERAL that "the whole body of persons for the time being entitled constitute the patentee." The latter section provides that "where a person becomes entitled by "assignment, transmission, or other operation of law to a patent" he shall be entitled to be registered as proprietor. Mr. Justice KEKEWICH held that a mortgage by way of assignment was clearly an "assignment" within the meaning of this section, although there was an equity of redemption behind it. These arguments have now been satisfactorily disposed of by the Court of Appeal. Sect. 46, Lord Justice COTTON pointed out, had no bearing upon the question, the point being whether there is anything in the Patents Act to exclude, as regards mortgages of letters patent, the ordinary rule of law which gives to a mortgagor in possession the benefit of his property, subject to the incumbrance. Sect. 87 was equally irrelevant, since it appeared upon the evidence that assignees by way of mortgage were invariably registered at the Patent Office as mortgagees and not as assignees. Even if sect. 87 had been relevant, their Lordships intimated that they would have dismissed the argument based upon it, on the ground that such a startling exception to the ordinary law of mortgage needs something stronger than mere implication to support it. It seems strange that neither in the judgment of Mr. Justice KEKEWICH, nor in the arguments before him, was any reference made to the cases of Dunnicliff v. Mallet (1859, 7 C. B. N. S. 209) and Fairclough v. Marshall (1878, 4 Ex. Div. 37), which were far more relevant to the decision than sects. 46 and 87 of the Act of 1883.

THE words "before marriage," in the 13th and 19th sections of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, have now for the first time received a judicial interpretation by the Court of Appeal, in the important case of Jay v. Robinson, in which the considered judgment of the court was delivered on the 19th May, the question being whether these words meant "before the existing marriage," or "before ever having been married." The 13th section of the Act provides that" a woman after her marriage shall continue to be liable, in respect and to the extent of her separate property, for all debts contracted and all contracts entered into or wrongs committed by her before her marriage," and sect. 19 provides that " no restriction against anticipation contained in any settlement or agreement for a settlement shall have any validity against debts contracted by her before marriage, and no settlement shall have any greater force or validity against creditors of such woman than a like settlement made or entered into by a man would have against his creditors. The defendant, whose property it was sought to render liable, was married to her former husband in 1881, and in 1886 the plaintiff recovered judgment against her, execution being limited to her separate property not subject to restraint upon anticipation. After the date of this judgment the defendant was divorced from her husband, and in 1889 was married to her present husband, and a certain sum of money which was ordered to be paid to her upon her petition for the variation of the trusts of her first marriage settlement-was settled upon her for life without power of anticipation. The judgment creditor now sought to have this sum taken in execution for the payment of his debt, and for that purpose to have a receiver appointed. It is quite clear that, if the debt in question were a debt contracted during the marriage, the judgment creditor must have failed, as the separate property was subject to a restraint upon anticipation; but if it were a debt contracted before marriage within the meaning of the Act, then by the 19th section the restraint on anticipation would not have availed to defeat the claim of the creditor. After taking some time to consider the question, the Court of Appeal, consisting of the MASTER of the ROLLS and Lords Justices FRY and LOPES, have now held that the words "before the marriage" in those sections mean "before the then existing marriage," and as a necessary consequence they held that, as the debt was a debt contracted before the marriage within the meaning of these sections, the fund in question was liable to satisfy the debt, notwithstanding the restraint upon anticipation, as such restraint upon anticipation imposed by her would be inoperative to defeat the claims of her ante-nuptial creditors.

THE decision in Hay v. Justices of the Tower Division of London (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 291; 24 Q. B. Div. 561) gives rise to considerations of far higher importance than a mere technical point in the law of licensing. The prerogative of the Crown, not merely to pardon an offender, but to nullify conviction for felony, is involved in it. It is a decision of the nineteenth century, following the ancient authorities that the Royal pardon takes away both the pœnam et culpam. The practical evil arising from such a doctrine may not be so serious as it was in the time of the STUARTS; but it is unfortunate that such an important constitutional question, after lying dormant for 200 years, should now be raised in a Divisional Court incidentally to the question whether a Mr. HAY is entitled to a licence to sell spirits by retail. The case was this: HAY was convicted of felony. By

33 & 34 Vict. c. 29, s. 14, "Every person convicted of felony shall for ever be disqualified from selling spirits by retail, and no licence to sell spirits by retail shall be granted to any person who shall have been so convicted as aforesaid," but HAY had received a free pardon under HER MAJESTY'S Signmanual. The ATTORNEY-GENERAL argued that the pardon "took away not only pœnam, but reatum, for felony is contra, coronam et dignitatem regis; when the king has discharged it and pardoned him of it, he hath cleared the person of the crime and infamy," citing a case decided in the first years of the seventeenth century. It appears that HALE uses the expression "takes away poenam et culpam," and Baron POLLOCK says: "This points to the character, condition, and status of the convict." So it does; to his status from the date of the pardon, but does the effect date back so as to nullify the fact of conviction? It would have to do this in order to support the decision of the Divisional Court, which was not only that a free pardon takes away the disqualification of the quondam convict, but that the justices had power to grant the licence in spite of the statute. There are also some few words in a case in Cro. Car. that tend to support the theory. But surely it is contrary to the whole spirit of trial by jury in criminal cases to say that when a person has been convicted the Crown has power to nullify that conviction. The very word "pardon" implies an act of mercy to a delinquent: pardon is not applicable to a person who is not guilty, or, in other words, has not been convicted. If he has been convicted by a jury, and the Crown has power by pardoning him to decree that he has not been convicted, then the Crown has in some measure revived the old dispensing power, and that with a retrospective action.

THE recent cases in connection with Mr. BELL Cox and Dr. BARNARDO afford an interesting ground for inquiry as to the course pursued by the courts in awarding costs in cases of habeas corpus. The authorities on the point during the last 100 years are scanty, and throw no very clear light on the subject. The first of these cases is Re Cobbett (1845) reported in 14 M. & W., p. 177. In that case WILLIAM COBBETT, being in custody for contempt for not putting in an answer to a bill in equity, applied to the court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court granted the writ, and directed notice thereof to be given to the plaintiff in the cause, who, upon the return of the writ, opposed the prisoner's discharge, and he was remanded into custody. Held by the court, that they had no authority to give the plaintiff his costs. It is, however, suggested in the course of argument that, although where a writ is issued absolutely with notice to a party interested, the court will not award costs, yet that it might do so if it were a rule calling on a party to show cause why a writ should not issue; for, as Baron ROLFE remarked to the plaintiff, You were not bound to come here; the court might have decided for itself, on inspection of the warrant, whether the party was entitled to discharge. In the case of Re Reilly (reported in 10 L. T. 853, an Irish case (1864), it was held that, where a writ of habeas corpus has been allowed to go, and it has been obeyed without argument, that the court has no authority to grant costs against the defendant. Again in the case of Re Dodds (1857) (2 De Gex & J.), Lord Chancellor CRANWORTH, Lord CHELMSFORD, Mr. Justice WILLES, and Mr. Baron MARTIN held that the court had no jurisdiction to give costs; but, per Lord CHELMSFORD, it had power to grant expenses as distinguished from general costs, as all the older authorities hold that the gaoler has a right to demand his charge of fees. Cases on this latter point will be found in 1 Keble, pp. 272, 566. In Mr. Bell Cox's case (58 L.T. Rep. N.S.323; 20 Q. B. Div. C. A.) the Court of Appeal has intimated that it might award such costs, and if so, they could have jurisdiction over all the costs both in that court and in the court. below. In this actual case the Court allowed the costs of the appeal, but not the costs of the court below. It is clear that, as regards gaolers, sheriffs, &c., costs will not be given, as these are not really the parties to the suit; but where parties appear to show cause against the rule, the law does not seem clear. But it is more than probable that the point will arise in one of the cases connected with Dr. BARNARDO, namely in Re Gossage, in which an appeal is lodged to the House of Lords; or in Re Jones, which is now awaiting the decision in the Divisional Court, when the difficulty may be elucidated and finally settled.

LAW LIBRARY.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A General View of the Criminal Law of England. Second Edition. By Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. Macmillan and Co.

Roscoe's Criminal Evidence. Eleventh Edition. By H. Smith and G. G. Kennedy, Metropolitan Magistrates. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane, and Sweet and Maxwell, 3, Chancery-lane.

Greenwood and Martin's Magisterial and Police Guide. Third Edition. By T. C. Martin, Chief Clerk Lambeth Police Court. Stevens and Haynes, Bell-yard, Temple Bar.

THE JUDGES AND THE PRESS. LORD MANSFIELD ceased to be Lord Chief Justice of England in the year 1788. His retirement paved the way for the passing of Fox's Libel Act, a measure which has largely conduced to the present liberty of public journalists, and one which in its bearings on the functions of a jury in actions for defamation has recently been discussed in Mr. O'Brien's action against the Prime Minister. Lord Mansfield had laid it down that, in prosecutions for libel, it was for the judge to decide whether a publication was to be construed in the libellous sense attributed to it by the prosecution, and for the jury merely to ascertain, and say by their verdict, that the defendant was the person by whom the libel had been published. The correction of this judicial doctrine-a correction courage. ously and steadily advocated by Erskine, and finally supported and carried through by Fox-was enacted in statute form in 1792. The Act (32 Geo. 3, c. 60) recites that "whereas doubts have arisen whether on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined between the king and the defendant or defendants, on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury impannelled to try the same to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue," and proceeds to enact that the jury may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty ". upon the whole matter put in issue and shall not be required or directed by the court or judge to find the defendant or defendants guilty merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or information." Thenceforward, instead of being at the mercy of the judge, or, as in effect it often happened, of the AttorneyGeneral of the day, a man might write and publish anything which twelve of his countrymen did not think blamable. That in the words of Jeremy Bentham was the result of the passing of Fox's Libel Act.

In modern times cases of libel and slander have been looked upon as eminently fit to be tried by jury. Fox's Act, it is true, related only to criminal proceedings, but the propriety of civil actions for libel being tried by jury was never in question at all, and has been expressly recognised in the present rules of the Supreme Court. It has been reserved for the Chancery judges of our own day, in establishing a new practice with respect to interim injunctions, to jeopardise in some measure the longestablished and valuable usage to which reference has been made. This new departure is, or may become, of no small importance both to the public and the Press.

The effect of the new claim to jurisdiction might not at first be apparent; for though the judges have distinctly affirmed their power to grant interim injunctions in civil actions for defamation, the power has not hitherto been exercised in a manner calculated to excite inquiry. There is, however, reason to believe that amongst lawyers, both in England and America, certain modern dicta of the learned members of the Court of Appeal have not passed unnoticed, or without causing surprise. Barely nine years ago, a well-known writer on the law of libel wrote as follows: "No injunction can be obtained to prohibit the publication or republication of a libel, or to restrain its sale. The matter must first go before a jury, who are to decide whether the words complained of are libellous or not. The Crown has no authority to restrain the Press, and the court, whether of law or of equity, cannot, till after verdict, issue any injunction in respect of any libels, save such as are contempts of court." It involves no reflection on the author of the work referred to to state that the practice is now recognised as being exactly the reverse of that which, in 1881, he described it to be. The passage quoted was based primarily on the decision of the Court of Appeal in an action brought by the Prudential Assurance Company to restrain the publication of a libel: (10 Ch. Div. 142.) In that case Lord Cairns, who was then Lord Chancellor, and the Lords Justices James and Mellish, expressly decided that the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel as such, and overruled certain earlier cases in which the late Vice-Chancellor Malins had eredited himself with possessing such powers. Not long afterwards, however, the Judicature Act 1873 came into operation; and the same Vice-Chancellor found in sect. 25, sub-sect. 8 of that Act, certain general words which he regarded as conferring on the judges the right, which in his Lordship's view they ought to possess, of granting interim injunctions in cases of libel. The sub-section declares that an injunction may be granted by an interlocutory order “in all cases in which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made." But it is right to state that, as recently as the year 1878, the Court of Appeal (consisting of Sir George Jessel, the late Master of the Rolls, and Lords Justices James and Thesiger) distinctly held that the rule as to granting injunctions was not enlarged by sect. 25 of the Judicature Act, and that the words in subsect. 8 made no difference in the principle involved in the exercise of jurisdiction. Sir George Jessel added that the words "just or convenient," must be taken to mean just as well as convenient. But, four years later, the present Master of the Rolls, sitting in the Court of Appeal with Lords Justices Baggallay and Lindley, affirmed, in plain terms, that the court has jurisdiction on an interlocutory application to restrain the publication of a libel, though, at the same time, Lord Esher allowed that the jurisdiction is to be exercised with caution. Further, it was conceded that this summary power should not in general be put in force unless the applicant satisfies the court that the statements complained of are untrue. But it would seem that the saving clause thus introduced scarcely improves the aspect of the matter. Who is to decide whether a libel is true or false-the judge or the jury? The outcome of the decision is, that the judges have this great power; but that it ought to be exercised with discretion. Practically the law now empowers one man to prejudge the case, "when he considers it just or convenient" to do so, instead of awaiting the general verdict of the jury.

Thus we have at least a partial return to the system which prevailed in the days of Lord Mansfield. It is said that, under the Common Law

Procedure Act 1854, the common law judges formerly possessed the power which is now exerciseable by every judge of the Supreme Court. If this be correct, it is no less certain that interim injunctions in libel cases rarely or never were granted in the old courts at Westminster. In the face of the dicta of Lord Cottingham and other eminent judicial authorities, any interlocutory application made with such an object would probably have excited the surprise and indignation of the Bench, Nor even now has the new practice been adopted by the judges of the Queen's Bench Division, though, in one case, after verdict (which is a very different matter) Lord Coleridge restrained the further publication of a libel. But the truth is, that eager plaintiffs, taking advantage of the set of the legal tide, may find it convenient to launch their libel actions in the Chancery Division, doubtless in the hope of muzzling their opponents by means of the summary powers referred to. In this way the system of legal warfare in regard to actions for defamation may undergo a gradual and perhaps perilous revolution. At any rate it will be seen that the main point involved-namely, the possible substitution of judge for jury as a tribunal in libel actions-is one of no small pith and moment.

THE EXPERT BEFORE THE LAW.

UNNOTICED, and therefore perhaps unopposed, by the Legal Profession, a remarkable change has in recent years taken place in the position of expert witnesses before the law. That the Court of Admiralty summons to its assistance, in the solution of difficult nautical problems, the wisdom and experience of the Brethren of Trinity House, is a fact of which all are aware, and to which we have long since grown accustomed. But that the law of England with its distinctly litigious character, its inherited distrust of experts and all their ways, and its storehouse of judicial deliverances upon the utterly unreliable nature of expert evidence, should be steadily marching backwards to the standpoint which it occupied in the days of Plowden, when the expert was an assessor and not a witness, is a phenomenon which English lawyers can hardly realise. Yet such a retrogression undoubtedly appears to be going on. Let us consider very briefly two of its manifestations.

1. The Judicature Act 1873, sect. 56, invests the Court of Appeal and every judge of the High Court with power to call in the aid of an assessor upon the trial or hearing of any cause or matter other than a criminal prosecution by the Crown. The omission of the words in italics would make the power of the judicature to avail itself of the advice of scientific assessors practically unlimited. 2. But the Patents Act 1883 goes further still. Besides enabling the law officer (sect. 11, sub-sect. 4), the Court of Appeal, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (sect. 28, sub-sect. 2) to summon to their assistance specially qualified assessors, it gives to either party to an action of infringement or proceeding for revocation power to demand that an assessor shall be called in (sect. 28, sub-sect. 1.) That this machinery has not yet in England (a) been put into effective operation is nothing to the point in question. The machinery is there, and ready to be set in motion, whenever a litigant chooses to exercise his statutory rights.

If medical experts, to whom the law has as yet thrown no sop save a conciliatory section in the Regulation of Railways Act 1868 (sect. 26), studied the Parliamentary Reports upon the Patent Laws of 1829, 1851, 1865, and 1872, and came to know how completely the staple objections to the character of their evidence, and to their reconversion into assessors have been disposed of by anticipation, in the history of the Patent Law of England, they would probably ere long obtain from the Legislature & recognition at least as favourable as that which the Patents Act has accorded to the chemist and the engineer; and thus the change in English procedure from the litigious to the inquisitorial, so far as matters of scientific opinion are concerned, would be accomplished.

The problem of how to adjust the relations of judge and assessor has been settled already: (cf. The Beryl, 1884, 51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 554; 9 P. Div. at p. 141.)

APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES. SIR HENRY JAMES's "Criminal Cases Appeals Bill" gives a right of appeal to "a defendant convicted on an indictment upon whom judgment of death has been pronounced, on any ground whetherof law or fact, or of mixed law and fact arising in or out of his trial." At present the possible proceedings in the nature of an appeal in criminal cases are three (1.) Proceeding in error-only available where there has been an error in the proceedings themselves, such as an irregularity in empanelling the jury (Mansell v. R., 8 E. & B. 54), or a defect appearing upon the face of the indictment (Bradlaugh v. R., 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 118; Castro v. Murray, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 675). These proceedings are consequently of rare occurrence, and the procedure is very technical. (2.) Motions for a new trial, which can only be had when the case has originated or been removed into the Queen's Bench Division. (3.) The judge may state a case for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved (by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78). This can only be done on a point of law, and if the court holds the judge at the trial decided wrongly on the point of law submitted-as e.g., by the improper reception or rejection of evidence, however unimportant-the court can only quash the conviction, and has no power to order a new trial.

(a) Aliter in Scotland: (cf. Mackie v. Berry, 1885, 2 P. O. B., at p. 147; and United Horseshoe and Nail Company v. Stewart, Ib. at p. 127.)