of that period the rules are to have effect either in the original form or with such alterations or additions as may be found advisable. It is a question, however, whether the course recommended will ensure what is aimed at, viz., adequate publicity. Every profession, trade, and important interest now has its organ in the Press, and it would be well that the class primarily affected by new rules should be able to rely on seeing them in draft in the journals which almost, as a matter of course, come under their notice.

WE have before us the Statute Law Revision Bill as amended by the Select Committee of the House of Commons, to which it was referred. A note of very great importance is prefixed to the Bill. It is too long to transcribe, and as it is, in accordance with the usual legislative practice, "to be struck out at a late stage of the Bill," we would recommend all lawyers who have time and opportunity to read it through. The main point is, that for the purposes of repeal "six classes of enactments are considered as having ceased to be in force, although not expressly and specifically repealed," being enactments either (1) expired, or (2) spent, or (3) repealed in general terms, or (4) virtually repealed, or (5) superseded, or (6) obsolete. The enactments thus about to be repealed range from 43 Geo. 3, c. 46, to 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 116. Very numerous preambles are repealed as unnecessary, and very numerous enactments are repealed as superseded by the Interpretation Act 1889, to the importance of which attention has frequently been called in these columns. The Bill is eighty-four pages long. There are the usual lengthy saving clauses for (inter alia) enactments not comprised in the Bill which have been "repealed, confirmed, revived, or perpetuated" by any enactment proposed to be repealed by the Bill.

Ir would, indeed, be an amendment of the criminal law if the Bill which is brought by Mr. CHANCE, Mr. GANE, and Mr. HUNTER were to blossom into the Criminal Sentences Act 1890. The proposal is to enable juries to measure punishment-to make it lawful for a jury who find a person guilty of a criminal offence to say in their verdict (by a majority) what punishment, within the limits now prescribed by law, ought to be inflicted upon the person so found guilty, and in such case such person shall not be sentenced to a greater punishment. Imagine the procedure. A thief is found guilty. The judge turns to the jury to ask what in their judgment the sentence ought to be, telling them at the same time that they cannot give more than, or in one case less than, a particular punishment. Then the jury deliberate and eventually decide by a majority what the punishment, should be. Though there may be no better thing than the verdict of a jury for general accuracy "guilty not guilty," still we conceive that there would be far more uncertain and variable things than the jury's idea of the quantum of punishment. Judges may be variable in this matter, but they are not so variable as juries would prove to be. Happily there is no prospect of Mr. CHANCE's proposed reform coming into operation on the 1st July next, as he wishes it to do.

or

66

A DETERMINATION by an umpire of the amount of compensation to be paid to a market gardener on giving up possession before the expiration of his lease, in respect of giving up such possession, and also in respect of his plants and shrubs, is a valuation, and not an award, within sect. 12 of the Arbitration Act 1889; so that the person entitled to the amount may not issue execution for it under that section. So it was held in An Arbitration -between Hammond and Waterton (noted ante, p. 6), and the decision, which is of great importance, appears to be correct. The section merely provides that an award on a submission may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect, and Order XLII. provides that a judgment may be enforced by execution. By sect. 27 of the Act submission means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration." No definition is given of the term "award." But we think that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Re Dawdy and Hartcup (53 L. T. Rep. N. S. 800) is clearly in point. It was there held that no submission to arbitration, but an appointment of valuers only, was constituted by a clause stipulating that a tenant at the end of his tenancy should be paid the usual and customary valuation as between landlord and tenant, and that the persons making such valuation should take into consideration the state of the lands, and, if they were not left in a proper state, should determine what sum was payable to the landlord therefor, and should deduct such sum from the amount of the valuation. An arbitrator, it appears from that case, is one who proceeds by fixed rules on hearing evidence, while a valuer is one who decides by the use of his own eyes, skill, and knowledge.

THE correlative of privilege is responsibility, and the clergy who naturally advocate the maintenance of the voluntary schools run thereby a risk of being held answerable for the negligence of the teachers. In Crisp v. Thomas (noted ante, p. 27) a black

board fell on the head of one of the scholars in a voluntary school. The vicar of the parish was a trustee, and one of the committee of management who appointed the staff of teachers, but did not otherwise exercise control over them. He was a natural person to select as a defendant, and the injured scholar brought an action against him, seeking to make him liable in damages. Fortunately for him, Mr. Justice CHARLES held that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury, as, if there had been negligence proved against the teacher, the vicar would have been liable as one of the committee of management. This is, after all, but an example of the well-known rule that a principal is answerable for the negligence of his agent while acting in the ordinary course of his business. This liability is presumably not limited to the committee of national schools, but must also apply to the governors of the public schools, though their duty is, according to the dictum attributed to a head master of great experience, to choose the best man possible as head master, and then leave him alone as much as possible.

66 ADVANCEMENT "has in a court of equity at least four meanings, all of the same genus. First, there is the advancement to which we referred ante, p. 3, where a parent wishes a child to have a certain share in his property on his death, and subsequently pays, or covenants to pay, something to the child which the courts presume was intended as an advancement. The next arises under the Statutes of Distribution, where a child would have to bring into hotchpot any large sum received from his parent in the latter's lifetime, before he could share in his estate. Then there is the advancement which trustees are often authorised to make out of capital for the benefit of their cestuis que trust before the capital can be paid over to the latter. Lastly there is the advancement which is presumed when a parent makes purchases in his child's name solely or jointly with his own. Like most equitable presumptions, it can be rebutted. In Re Gooch; Gooch v. Gooch (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 384), Mr. Justice KAY held that the presumption was rebutted, shares having been taken in the son's name merely to qualify him to be a director of certain companies, where a beneficial interest was not necessary. The son, though held to be a trustee of the shares for the benefit of the persons interested in his father's estate, was, how ever, allowed to retain the directors' fees, so that he made a profit out of his trust.

It is instructive to notice the new clauses which it is proposed to insert in committee upon the Public Trustee Bill, which has now been brought from the House of Lords. The main rule to be laid down is, that the Consolidated Fund is to be liable to make good any liability arising out of any fraud or negligence on the part of the public trustee, or his officers, and also any liability arising out of any such other act on default of the public trustee, or his officers, as may be specified in rules to be made in the future, and all sums thus payable out of the Consolidated Fund are to be charged on and issued out of that fund or the growing produce thereof. Then the salary of the public trustee and the remuneration of his subordinates, and such expenses of executing the office of public trustee and carrying the new law into effect, as may be sanctioned by the Treasury, are to be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament. The fees, however, which are to be paid in the Public Trustee Office are, under the regulations of the Treasury, to be applied as an appropriation in aid of moneys provided by Parliament for the expense of the office, and so far as not so applied are to be paid into the Exchequer. If the creator of a trust directs that discretionary powers be vested in the co-trustee only of the public trustee, neither the public trustee, nor the Consolidated Fund, are to be responsible for any concurrence or non-concurrence on the part of the public trustee. The most important insertion is the last, in the clause regulating the employment of solicitors and banks. Where a solicitor or bank is employed, the Consolidated Fund is not to be liable to meet any liability arising from any default of the solicitor or the bank, and the public trustee is not to be deemed to have notice of any matter merely by reason of the solicitor or the bank having had notice thereof. These are but fair restrictions on the liability of the Consolidated Fund. It is that liability which will, speaking generally, go further than anything else to ensure the success of the Public Trustee Bill.

THE plan adopted by a testator, who had two properties, one in Great Britain and one in South Africa, of making two concurrent wills, and leaving all his British property by the one, and all his African property by the other, deserves legal commendation: (see In the Goods of Callaway, ante, p. 46.) Owing to this arrangement no question could arise as to whether the British will was sufficient to pass African property, or the African to pass British; and the testator even appointed two gentlemen permanently resident in England executors and trustees of the British will, and two permanently resident in South Africa as executors and trustees of the other. On the testator's death the African will was sent out to Africa for

probate to be obtained there, and the executors of the other will applied for probate of it here. The registrar refused this, unless the African will was also brought in for proof at the same time, on the ground presumably that he had not all the testator's testamentary dispositions before him. Mr. Justice BUTT, however, took a larger view, and permitted probate to go of the British will alone. In doing so he followed the decision In the Goods of Astor (34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 856; 1 P. Div. 150), where the President, after referring to the fact that the testator evidently intended to keep the English and American properties distinct from one another, said: "I have come to the conclusion that his wishes need not be disappointed, and that there is no reason why I should insist on the incorporation of the American will in the probate of the English will." His Lordship drew a distinction between the case of the wills being quite distinct, and that of an English will confirming a foreign one. In the latter case, in his Lordship's opinion, the foreign one should be included in the probate "because the ratification incorporates them." An affidavit was directed to be filed, verifying copies of the American will and codicils, and a note appended to the probate of the filing of such an affidavit.

PRACTITIONERS must realise that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Coleman; Henry v. Strong (60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 127; 39 Ch. Div. 443), was upon a special case, upon which it is unsafe to rely indiscriminatingly. There money was to be spent on the maintenance of four children in such manner as the trustees deemed most expedient until the youngest child attained twenty-one, when the estate was to be divided

equally among the children then living. One of the children assigned, and it was decided that no child was entitled, prior to the date of distribution, to the payment of any specific part of the income, the trustees having an absolute discretion; and that the assignee of the one child was entitled to nothing except what the trustees handed over to the child, the trustees for their part not being entitled to pay the child cash or deliver him goods which would at once pass to his assignee. It would seem as if the trustees, in the more recent case of Re Neil; Hemming Neil (89 L. T. 25), had relied on Re Coleman, and handed over income to a beneficiary who had assigned. Their trust was to pay for the support, maintenance, and education of a single child as they should in their discretion think fit. The child assigned his interest, and notice of the assignment was given to the trustees. After receiving the notice the trustees made payments out of the income of the child's share to or on behalf of the child. They urged that, on the authority of Re Coleman, the assignment had no operation until the payment was actually made, and therefore could not entitle the assignees to recover from the trustees, but only from their assignor. But this contention did not avail with Mr. Justice KEKEWICH, who held the trustees liable for all sums which they had paid to or on behalf of the son after they had received notice of the assignment. The beneficial interest of the child under the will was that which he was entitled to assign. Money paid to him or on his behalf was part of the beneficial interest. Therefore it was to be assumed that money paid by the trustees to him, or to any person on his behalf, was his property in their irrevocable determination immediately before the payment, a moment at which the trustees were fixed with notice of the child's assignment. This is a decision which seems hard upon the trustees, but it is good law, and therefore we should take no account of the hardship.

THE case of Long v. Long and Johnson illustrates a peculiar aspect of divorce law. The petition was presented by a labouring man, who alleged that his wife had committed adultery with a man in a better position__than_the_petitioner, and there was a claim for damages. The respondent entered no appearance, but the co-respondent appeared, and not only denied the charge, but pleaded that the petitioner and the respondent were acting in fraudulent collusion with respect to the charge contained in the petition. In the course of the trial a confession signed by the respondent was put in evidence, but, as it was not admissible against the co-respondent, whose case had to be decided by a jury, Mr. Justice BUTT refused to allow the confession to be read by the petitioner's counsel. In the result, however, the jury found that the co-respondent had committed adultery with the respondent, and that there had been no collusion between the petitioner and the respondent, and they assessed the damages at £50. But the issue as between the petitioner and the respondent was for the learned judge to decide, and the evidence did not satisfy him that adultery had been committed. Mr. Justice BUTT, therefore, declined to pronounce a finding without further evidence, and directed the petitioner's solicitor to subpoena the respondent. It was obvious that no one would be entitled to question her as to the alleged adultery unless she herself wished to give evidence with respect to the charge (see sect. 3 of the Evidence Further Amendment Act 1869), but Mr. Justice BUTT considered that there were "other points" on which he should like to put some questions. When, in obedience to the subpoena, the respondent appeared in the witness-box, she said, in answer to the learned judge, that

she wished to give evidence as to the charge of adultery, and adhered to the truth of the so-called confession; adding, however, that intercourse with the co-respondent took place despite her resistance. In view of this evidence Mr. Justice BUTT inter

preted the "confession as a denial of voluntary immorality on the respondent's part, and refused to dissolve the marriage. Thereupon the co-respondent's counsel announced his client's intention to appeal against the finding of the jury, on the ground that it was against the weight of evidence. This pointed to a way out of the dilemma, and induced the learned judge to refrain from dismissing the petition then and there. The ques tion of dismissal is to stand over until the appeal has been disposed of. Meanwhile the result, so far, of the petition must be regarded as decidedly curious and inconvenient."

SEPARATE Sewage and drainage, as clearly as possible, both on the surface of the Statute-book and below the surface of the earth. This is the motto of the Drainage Separation Bill, for which Mr. STEPHENS, Mr. HASTINGS, Sir HENRY ROSCOE, Sir GUYER HUNTER, Mr. SHIRESS WILL, Mr. ISAACS, Mr. AMBROSE, and Mr. TATTON EGERTON are making themselves responsible. Their Bill proposes to enable local authorities, if in the circumstances of their districts they deem it expedient so to do, to keep separate, wholly or in part, the sewage and the water drainage of their districts, and confers upon them the necessary powers, including power to make needful bye-laws. The memorandum at the head of the Bill avers that at present the sanitary and economical advantages of separation cannot be enjoyed by the community, owning to drainage rights acquired by owners and occupiers in their relations with local authorities under the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55). Reasoning thus, the promoters of the Bill would render it lawful for any local authority to construct or alter the drains or sewers within its district in such manner as to keep separate, wholly or in part, the sewage and drainage of the district, and would make all the drains and sewers so constructed or altered to be deemed drains and sewers within the meaning of the Public Health Act 1875. And they would make it unlawful for anyone to discharge sewage into the drainage drains, or drainage into the sewage drains. Further, they would empower any local authority that shall have so constructed or altered the drains in its district as to fit them to keep separate wholly or in part the sewage and drainage thereof, to give notice to the owners or occupiers of any house or premises situated in the district which the separate system is capable of serving, requiring him to keep separate the sewage and drainage of his house and premises in any reasonable manner prescribed by the notice, and to discharge the same into the corresponding drains and sewers, and the owner or occupier will have to comply with the notice. But, if the house or premises have at the date of the notice drains and sewers which, but for Mr. STEPHENS' Bill, would have been sufficient to drain the house and premises effectually, the local authority will be bound to repay the owner or occupier the reasonable expenses of all alterations necessary to be made in the drains and sewers in order to comply with the notice. This is the nature of the Bill, which, of course, adds the inevitable power for the local authority to make bye-laws. It is a well-considered and a well-drafted Bill, with a most laudable object. But we fear that the rights of private members have been so much encroached upon by Government necessities that there is little prospect of Mr. STEPHEN'S Bill receiving much attention this year at St. Stephen's.

DECLINE OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. THE Treasury, according to the Times, is becoming alarmed at the decline of the receipts from stamps from the Supreme Court of Judicature. And the Times devotes a Whit Monday leader to echoing the alarmist cries not only of the Treasury but of the LAW TIMES and the Profession generally, on the subject of the Queen's Bench Division. After referring to the development of private arbitrations and the Bill now before the House of Commons, for the purpose of establishing Tribunals of Commerce "whole classes of the community have felt themselves constrained to form courts of their own"—and the transfer of business to the County Courts, our contemporary says:

"The Judicial Statistics-always tardy-for 1889 have not yet seen the light. But in all probability they will show signs of a decline in business in the High Court. This may not be so marked in the Chancery Division. In a wealthy country, such as ours, the business of the Chancery Courts cannot seriously diminish. Some of it may be transacted elsewhere; and at this moment Chancery practitioners see with alarm the prospect of their work in connection with windings-up being disposed of by official liquidators. It is, too, possible that other administrative functions may be withdrawn. In the time to come that interesting object of general attention, the 'fund in court,' may be handled with less science, but with more economy, than it now is. But in the immediate future we see no sign of any material diminution in the work of the Chancery Division. It is otherwise with the Queen's Bench Division. The stars in their courses fight against it. It runs a danger of being left with the mere lees of the business which might fall to it."

These comments commence by an allusion to the arrears described as "nothing unprecedented or very alarming." Unfortunately the writer did

not know that the courts deserve no thanks that the arrears are not half as big again as they are. Every practising barrister is familiar with a process known as "settlement before trial. Case after case has dropped out of the cause lists because the parties despaired of being reached within a reasonable period. Thereby the arrears are reducedto the disgust of the suitor, the loss of the revenue, the discredit of the judicial system, and the prejudice pecuniarily and otherwise of the Legal Profession. We agree that the arrears are not unprecedented or very alarming; but we will venture to say that they would have been probably unprecedented and certainly alarming had all the cases once ripening or entered for trial taken their ordinary course of coming before the Queen's Bench for hearing.

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4

The return of the invalid judges next week, and the passing of Mr. Finlay's Bill, are mentioned by our contemporary as probably rehabili. tating the common law tribunals. We would gladly see both these desirable results supplemented by a parliamentary inquiry into the sittings of the courts, which of course includes the sittings of the judges. No judge ought to be able to regulate his own time o sitting or rising or his own holidays. No judge ought to be able to say that he will not sit because he prefers to take a holiday. No judge should be able to rise two or three days before the close of the sittings because two or three days' less work is more congenial than the performance of duty. All this we think ought to be inquired into-not to expose individual shortcomings, but to ascertain definitely where is the root of the evils which are sapping the vitality of the successor of the great Common Law Courts which used to sit at Westminster and Guildhall and do an infinite amount of heavy and important work-compared with which the bulk of the work of the Queen's Bench Division is trivial-notwithstanding all the technical impediments which obstructed the merits of causes in the old days. We repeat, we desire no exposure of individual negligence and shirking, for its own sake, but to wipe away the reproach which now acts like a blight upon the Queen's Bench Division.

APPORTIONMENT.

WHILE nearly all kinds of income are apportionable under the Apportionment Act 1870, and the remainderman has to hand over to the personal representatives of the tenant for life the amount of income which can be apportioned to the latter's lifetime, it is at least very doubtful if the remainderman can call upon the tenant for life's estate to bear its proportion of outgoings, unless they can be deducted from the share of rent which he is paying over. In the recent case of Radnor v. PleydellBouverie this question came, apparently for the first time since the Act of 1870, before the court. The late Lord Radnor devised certain property to his son, together with such part of his rents and profits accruing due at death. The property was subject to tithe rentcharges and outgoings of a somewhat similar kind. It was contended on behalf of the devisee that, while he could under the will claim the whole of the rent when it became due without paying an apportioned part to his father's executors, he could call upon them to pay a proportionate part of the outgoings, as they were not affected by the will. Mr. Justice Chitty decided that Lord Radnor intended the son to have the net rent after payment of the outgoings, so that there was no apportionment of the latter. It was a friendly action, so it is not likely to be taken further, though it would be instructive to have the decision of the Court of Appeal on the subject. If the accruing rents had been left to a specific legatee, would he have had to bear an apportioned part of the outgoings? On the principle of Mr. Justice Chitty's decision he would, as the devisee in the case before him was, as regards the rents, in the position of a specific legatee. If the Apportionment Act applies to outgoings, it would seem that the specific legatee of the accruing rents, though also devisee, would not be compelled to allow outgoings to be deducted from them. According to the testator's will, there would be no apportionment of the rents, as the devisee would take the whole of the rent payable on the next rent day; but ex hypothesi the devisee could call on the testator's executors to pay their proportion of the outgoings. If it does not apply, in some cases the remainderman would appear to be hardly dealt with. For instance, A. is the tenant for life and B. the remainderman of a property subject to some outgoings payable half-yearly on the 25th March and the 29th Sept. If A. died on the 24th March, B. would have to pay the whole half-year's instalment, though he had had only one day's enjoyment of the property. The 4th section of the Act gives to the persons entitled to the proportionate share of income certain rights for recovering the same," allowing proportionate parts of all just allowances." Justice Chitty was of opinion that these "just allowances" included a share of outgoings. If, however, there were no proportionate shares of Tents to be recovered (as would be the case if the property were not let but was in hand), this section would not apply. The 2nd section is very general in its phraseology. It runs as follows: "From and after the passing of this Act all rents, annuities, dividends, and other periodical payments in the nature of income (whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing or otherwise) shall, like interest on money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly." It is true that the general aspect of the question taken by the draftsman of the Act would seem to be from the recipient's point of view, but the interpretation clause (sect. 5) defines "rents" as including "rentcharges," so that if the other periodical payments were omitted we could read the section thus : rentcharges shall, like interest on money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be apportioned in respect of time accordingly." Why should that general enactment be limited to remaindermen receiving the rentcharge? The Apportionment Act of George II. (11 Geo. 2, c. 19), s. 15, was held not to apply to land tax, quit rents, and other charges as between tenant for life and the remainderman. "The statute," said Sir William Grant, in Sutton v. Chaplin (10 Ves. 66),

Mr.

"All

"has no application to this case. The argument shows, it might be very reasonable to make such a statute as to the apportionment of taxes between the tenant for life and the remainderman; but the statute of Geo. 2 has no reference to that case, giving the tenant for life the benefit only as against the tenant, the under-lessee." If it is correct that the Act of 1870 only applies to income, and that outgoings are not apportionable unless they can be set off against payments of rent, "it might be very reasonable" to make yet another Apportionment Act which should apply to outgoings.

REVOCATION OF WILLS BY CUTTING OR ERASURE, A BELIEF that a parent could not wholly disinherit his children led to the trite phrase "to cut him off with a shilling." In the Goods of Dinah Leach (ante, p. 27) the testatrix said that she had "cut G. out of her will." This was no figurative phrase, implying simply that she had revoked a legacy previously given by her will to G., as she literally cut the name of G., whom she had appointed as an executor, out of the will with a pair of scissors. The testatrix, it seems, was G.'s mother-in-law, and some disagreement had taken place between G. and his wife. Mr. Justice Butt held that there had been only a partial revocation, and that the will was entitled to probate in the form in which it was found at the testatrix's death. It would have been better for G. if his name had never been in the will at all, as, though notice had been given to him by direction of the judge, he was not allowed his costs on the application for probate. In the Goods of Maley (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 500; 12 P. Div. 134) the facts were somewhat similar. A testator appointed C. and M. trustees and executors of his will, and gave a legacy to C. if he should act as trustee. The testator and C. quarrelled, and legal proceedings took place between them. The former told a friend that he had cut "that rascal C." out of his will with a pair of scissors, and on his death it was discovered that the portion relating to the appointment of executors and the legacy to C. had been cut off, the cut-off piece being found in the bag containing the will. The President expressed his opinion that by cutting out this part of the will the testator had revoked the legacy to C. and the appointment of executors. In the Goods of Henrietta Morton (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 501; 12 P. Div. 141) the testatrix erased, apparently with a penknife, the signatures of herself and the attesting witnesses. Mr. Justice Butt said: "I have no doubt about this case. When a person sets to work to scratch out he actually cuts away the paper. What this testatrix did may be regarded as a lateral cutting out. The paper is not pierced, but the signatures are scratched away. I think the will has been revoked." On the other hand, a subsequent erasure of their own initials by the witnesses to the will of a dying man was held by the President to be no revocation in Margary and Layard v. Robinson (57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 281; 12 P. Div. 8). In that case the witnesses, having duly attested a card on which the wishes of the testator, elicited from him with some difficulty, were written, thought that they had undertaken too great a responsibility, and erased their initials, telling the testator that they did not consider it a will, but only a memorandum. They said that the testator gave signs of assent to all this. The distinction between an erasure by the testator and by the witnesses is obvious, as the former has the power to revoke the will, the latter have not. Sir James Hannen, in delivering judgment, said: “Whether they (i.e., the wit nesses) thought it to be a valid will or a memorandum is immaterial. The function of witnesses to a will is simply to authenticate the testator's signature, and, this being done, their opinions, or beliefs, or intentions are irrelevant. I am further of opinion that the subsequent erasing of attestation by the witnesses is immaterial." His Lordship, however, pronounced against the card on the ground that the testator's mark was in the middle of the will instead of “at the foot or end thereof." In the Goods of Gosling (11 P. Div. 79) the testator obliterated the whole of a codicil, including his own signature, and the subscriptions of the attesting witnesses, by means of thick black ink marks, and wrote at the bottom of it, signed by himself and two witnesses, the words, "We are witnesses to the erasure of the above." The effect of the obliteration, if it had stood alone, was not considered, as the words below the codicil were held to be words declaring an intention to revoke within the 20th section of the Wills Act. "If a testament was in the custody of the testator, and upon his death it is found among his repositories mutilated or defaced, the testator himself is to be presumed to have done the act; and it has already appeared that the law further presumes that he did it animo revocandi." That proposition, laid down in Mr. Justice Williams's standard work on Executors (8th ed., vol. 1, p. 160), received the sanction of Lord Penzance in Bell v. Fothergill (23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 323; L. Rep. 2 P. & D. 148), where the testator appears to have repented of his revocation of the will, and to have gummed on the signature which he had previously cut off. His Lordship held that the will had been revoked by the cutting, and that the subsequent gumming on was not sufficient to revive it.

NOTICE

TO QUIT AND DISTRESS UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS ACT (ENGLAND) 1883. In a previous article (88 L. T. 235) we summarised the decisions upon the subject of compensation for improvements under the above Act, and we now propose to discuss some other provisions of the statute which are perhaps of greater practical importance. It is noteworthy that part 1 of the Act, which is headed "Improvements," and includes sects. 1-43, comprises a section (33) on "Notice to quit" and another (34) on "Fixtures." This can hardly be accidental, and is probably due to the idea that extension of the length of notice to quit gave to a tenant a better opportunity of reaping the full benefit of improvements he may have made, while the additional, though still limited, power of removing fixtures

will enable him in some cases either to sell his fixture to the landlord or to take it away when he quits the holding.

Notice to quit (Sect. 33).

"

This section enlarges the period of notice," where a half-year's notice expiring with a year of tenancy is by law necessary and sufficient for determination of a tenancy from year to year," to a year. It applies to tenancies created either before or after the Act, but not where the landlord and tenant have agreed in writing that the Act shall not apply, nor where the tenant is bankrupt, &c. The following decision shows the limited scope of this section:-A tenancy under a written agreement from year to year until six months' notice shall have been given in the usual way, to determine the tenancy, is not within sect. 33 of the A. H. Act 1883 which requires a year's notice "where "a half-year's notice " was formerly "by law necessary: (Barlow v. Teal, 54 L. T. Rep. N. S. 63; 15 Q. B. Div. 501, Ct. of App.) This case was decided on the ground that the section did not apply where there was an express stipu. lation as to the termination of the tenancy. In Friend v. Shaw (58 L. T. Rep. N. S. 89; 20 Q. B. Div. 374, 378) the principle of the decision was followed and approved. It will be observed that the ground of the decision of the Court of Appeal covers a case where there is a stipulation for a "half-year's" notice. In the court below great stress had been laid on the difference between "six months" and half a year: (53 L. T. Rep. N. S. 52; 15 Q. B. Div. 403.) In Kinnaird v. Denny (77 L. T. 327) a somewhat similar point arose before Mr. Justice Wills (sitting as a vacation judge) under the Ground Game Act, on an application for an interim injunction, but, as no actual decision was then arrived at, the learned judge ordering the motion to stand over until trial of the action, it is needless to do more than refer to the case.

Distress.

Part II. of the Act (sects. 44-53) relates to distress, but sects. 49-52 have been repealed by Lord Herschell's Law of Distress Amendment Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 21).

Limitation of Distress as to Amount and Time (Sect. 44). Sect. 44 prevents a landlord from distraining for rent due more than a year, subject to a proviso where it has been usual to defer payment for a quarter or half year, in which case the rent shall be deemed to have become due at the expiration of such quarter or half year. It was held that, under the proviso of this section, a landlord can distrain for all rent which his agreement with his tenant made payable within the year preceding the distress, both what was due more than a year before the distress, but which was collected within the year, and also that which was due within the year, but collected at a date subsequent to the distress, and that, too, although the whole amount was more than one year's rent: (Re Bew; Ex parte Bull, 56 L. T. Rep. N. S. 572.)

Limitation of Distress as to Things distrained (Sect. 45). This section confers a limited protection on live stock taken in for agistment at a fair price, and full protection on hired machinery and other persons' live stock on the premises for breeding purposes. Live stock agisted for a fair equivalent may be protected from distress as "taken in at a fair price," though the equivalent is not money. Cows agisted on the terms "milk for meat," i.e., that the farmer taking them in should have the milk in return for their keep, were held within the Act and protected: (The London and Yorkshire Bank v. Belton; Ross and Smith, Claimants, 15 Q. B. Div. 457.) This, perhaps, may be thought to show an inclination to give a liberal interpretation to this section where cattle are agisted; but the next case indicates that the protection will be strictly limited to cases of agistment. A landlord distrained cattle, which he found on his tenant's holding, for arrears of rent due to him from his tenant. The cattle were on the land under an agreement whereby the tenant, in consideration of £2, allowed the owner of the cattle the "exclusive right of eating the grass of a certain field for four weeks." Held, that the agreement under which the cattle were on the land was not an agreement for "agistment," and therefore they were not protected from distress by sect. 45: (Masters v. Green, 59 L. T. Rep. N. S. 476.)

Remedy for Wrongful Distress (Sect. 46).

This authorises the County Court, or court of summary jurisdiction, to hear and determine disputes as to distresses on holdings under this Act, and to make orders "which justice requires." The section gives an appeal from a court of summary jurisdiction to quarter sessions, but a question arose in the following case as to whether there was an appeal from a County Court. Sect. 23 of the A. H. Act declares the decision of the County Court judge to be final, in case of an application to him against an award for compensation. But this is not the case in proceedings in the County Court under sect. 46. It was held, previously to the County Courts Act 1888, that an appeal lay from a decision of a County Court judge in the matter of a dispute heard and determined by him under the 46th section of the A. H. Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 61), under the general powers of appeal contained in the 13th section of the County Courts Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142): (Hanmer and another v. King, 57 L. T. Rep. N. S. 366.)

Appeals are now regulated by sect. 120 of the County Courts Act (51 & 52 Vict. o. 43), which "consolidates the provisions of sect. 14 of the Act of 1850; sect. 58 of the Act of 1856; sect. 18 of the Act of 1865; sect. 13 of the Act of 1867; and sect. 6 of the Act of 1875, the provision as to the mode of appeal, and the conditions subject to which it is to be had being taken from sect. 23 of the Judicature Act 1884: (Lloyd on the County Courts Consolidation and Amendment Act 1888, p. 119.) It is not necessary for our present purpose to inquire whether, or how far, the right of appeal has been extended in any class of cases; it is sufficient to point out that in cases under sect. 46 of the A. H. Act the right of appeal appears to be preserved. But, of course, the appeal can only be had where the party

is dissatisfied with the determination or discretion of the judge in point of law or equity, or upon admission or rejection of any evidence: (see the opening words of sect. 120 of the Act of 1888; Cousins v. Lombard Deposit Bank, 35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 484; 1 Ex. Div. 404; and Sharrock v. London and North-Western Railway Company, 33 L. T. Rep. N. S. 341; 1 C. P. Div. 70.)

Limitation of Costs in Case of Distress (Sect. 49).

As this and the three next sections are repealed, it is only necessary to call attention to Phillips v. Rees (61 L. T. Rep. N. S. 713; 24 Q. B. Div. 17), where it was held that, under this section, the bailiff who levies a distress, and not the landlord, is entitled to the percentage for "levying distress" fixed in the second schedule to the Act. This case overruled Coode v. Johns (55 L. T. Rep. N. S. 290; 17 Q. B. Div. 714).

General Note.

As sect. 60 of the A. H. Act contains a general saving of rights, it may be worth while to mention the following Scotch case. A provision (sect. 28) in the Scotch A. H. Act (46 & 47 Vict. c. 62) declaring six months' notice to quit to be necessary in certain cases where tenancies would otherwise expire without notice, was held to apply to certain tenancies existing at the commencement of the Act, although there was not time to give the required notice, notwithstanding a general saving in sect. 40 of the Scotch Act: (Lord Macdonald v. Finlayson, Ct. of Sess. 4th series, vol. 12, p. 228.)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON TRADE. The committee reassembled on Thursday the 22nd inst., and proceeded with the consideration of a Bill introduced by Mr. Warmington, Mr. D. Thomas, and Mr. Neville, to amend the law relating to the liability of directors and others for statements in prospectuses and other documents soliciting applications for shares or debentures. Mr. A. O'Connor occupied the chair. On the first clause (short title of the Bill), Mr. Dixon-Hartland moved the rejection of the clause, his object being to get rid of the Bill altogether. He considered the Bill would prevent honest men becoming directors of any company and stop all enterprise. Sir J. Goldsmidt submitted that the committee could not entertain such a proposal. A certain business had been referred to the committee, and they were bound to deal with it. No one wished to deter honourable men from becoming directors of companies, but if the sharks in the City were captured by this Bill no one would regret it, he should think. The Chairman ruled that the motion was in order. It was open to any hon. member to move the rejection of the clauses in succession. The motion was declared rejected by 18 against 2.-On clause 3 (prospectus to be deemed to contain warranty of truth of statement), Mr. Warmington moved to omit clauses 3, 4, and 5, and insert new clauses. Mr. Dixon-Hartland submitted that this was practically to submit a new Bill. After some discussion, the clauses were struck out, and Mr. Warmington moved to substitute for them a single clause, declaring that "a director shall be liable to pay compensation to all persons who shall subscribe for any shares, debenture, or debenture stock for the loss or damage they may have sustained by reason of any inaccurate or misleading statement in the prospectus or notice, unless he proves (1) with respect to every statement of fact alleged to be inaccurate or misleading contained in the prospectus or notice, and not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert, that he had made reasonable inquiry and examination into the statement, and had reasonable ground to believe, and did then up to the time of allotment believe, that the statement was true; and (2) with respect to every statement or extract purporting to be a statement of, or an extract from, any report or valuation of any engineer, valuer, accountant, or other expert, that it was a true and fair statement of, or extract from the report or valuation, and that the report or valuation was made by the person whose name it bears, and that he had reasonable ground for believing, and did then and up to the time of allotment believe, that the report or valuation was made in good faith, and that the person making it was competent to make it; or unless he proves that he had not consented to become a director of the company, or that, having so consented, he withdrew his consent before the issue of the prospectus or notice, and that the prospectus or notice was issued without his authority or consent." The clause was inserted in the Bill after a number of modifying and verbal amendments had been made, on the motion of Mr. Warmington.--Mr. Boord moved a new clause, but, after discussion, withdrew it, and the Bill was ordered to be reported to the House. The committee adjourned for a fortnight.

STAMMERERS should read a book by a gentleman who cured himself after suffering nearly forty years. Price 13 stamps. B. Beasley Brampton Park, near Huntingdon.-Advt.

BILLS IN PARLIAMENT.

RULES PUBLICATION BILL. [Prepared and brought in by Mr. Henry H. Fowler, Sir Albert Rollit, Mr. Cozens-Hardy, and Mr. Gainsford Bruce.] MEMORANDUM.

It has become a common practice in modern statutes to delegate to a Government department the power of making rules, supplementary to, and frequently of no less importance than, the provisions of the statute itself. At present these rules are made without notice to the Legal Profession or to the public, and much practical inconvenience has consequently arisen.

The object of this Bill is to enact that all rules made by any rulemaking authority as defined by the Bill shall be published in draft in the Gazette forty days before they are signed, so that the public may have some information as to what is proposed.

A Bill to Improve the Procedure for making Rules of Court and other Rules.

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. Draft rules to be published. The draft of all rules proposed to be made by any rule-making authority shall be published in the London Gazette at least forty days before the same shall be made; and on the expiration of those forty days (but not before) the rule-making authority may make the rules, either in the form or to the effect of the published draft, or with such alterations or additions as to the said authority may seem fit.

In the case of any rules which it is proposed shall extend to Scotland or Ireland, publication in the Edinburgh or Dublin Guzette (as the case may be), as well as in the London Gazette, shall be requisite.

2. Interpretation. In this Act the term "rule-making authority" means the authority for time being empowered to make rules for Her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature in England, and for Her Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland, or any division thereof respectively; the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, acting in pursuance of any Act empowering him to make rules, either alone or with the advice or concurrence of any other authority or persons, or otherwise; any Government department, acting in pursuance of any Act empowering that department to make rules, with the advice or concurrence of the said Lord Chancellor; the Board of Trade, acting in pursuance of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act 1883; and the Rules Committee of County Court Judges appointed in pursuance of the County Courts Act 1888. 3. Short title.-This Act may be cited as The Rules Publication Act 1890.

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LICENSING LAW AMENDMENT BILL. [Prepared and brought in by Lord Randolph Churchill, Sir H. SelwinIbbetson, Sir Algernon Borthwick, and Mr. Johnston.] MEMORANDUM.

The objects of Part I. of this Bill, which applies to England and Wales only, are:

1. To give the power to grant licences now exercised by justices to a popularly elected body.

2. To reduce the number of the different kinds of licences which may be obtained, and to simplify the procedure for obtaining them.

3. To promote the reduction of the number of licences in force, by restricting the power to grant new licences to certain necessary cases. 4. To provide means by which the sale of liquor may be prohibited in any parish where there is a strong popular wish to prohibit it.

To carry out these objects the following changes in the law are made:

1. Every county in England is to be divided into licensing divisions for each of which a committee of the county council will be appointed annually to act as licensing commission.

The authority of justices to grant licences will cease, but their judicial functions with respect to offences against the licensing laws will be unaffected.

The licensing commission will be the licensing authority in their division, and in all cases where they have power to grant a licence their discretion will be absolute and final. They will have power to determine the hours of opening and closing, and powers over the structure of licensed houses.

2. A justices' licence is at present required (as a preliminary to obtaining an excise licence) by all persons wishing to sell liquor for consumption on the premises, with the exception of sales in theatres and in passenger boats, and also by all persons, except wholesale dealers, wishing to sell liquor not for consumption on the premises.

There are altogether 12 different licences, many of which are seldom applied for. The three important "on" licences are (1) the publican's or spirit retailer's licence, which authorises the sale of all liquors; (2) the beerhouse licence; and (3) the wine licence taken out by the keeper of a refreshment or eating house. Under this Bill the only " "" on licences are to be (1) the publican's licence, and (2) a refreshment house wine and beer licence. A restricted form of the publican's licence may be granted to hotels and railway refreshment rooms. A person holding a beerhouse licence may apply for a publican's license, but no beerhouse licenses are in future to be granted.

The present "off" licences are reduced to a combined wine and beer licence.

. The licences mentioned above are to be granted only in renewal of previously existing licences, except that a new licence may be granted (1) for a hotel, and (2) for a railway refreshment room. The licences taken out in these cases are the ordinary publican's licences, but it will be the duty of the licensing commission to grant them subject to such restrictions as will ensure that they shall be used for the purposes only for which they were granted.

In order to provide for a neighbourhood where a new licence is really wanted, a licence may in this case be granted to an applicant who can buy up and extinguish at least one similar

licence in some other part of the division where it is not required. The licensing commission will determine how many existing licences they require to be cancelled in exchange for each new licence granted under this provision.

4. The power of the licensing commission to grant licences may be suspended in any parish of the division, on two-thirds of the ratepayers on the roll voting in favour of a resolution to that effect. The resolution may be rescinded after the expiration of a year, on a like majority being obtained for rescinding it. Otherwise it will continue in force for three years.

The Licensing Acts now in force contain distinct and often different provisions according to the kind of liquor with which they deal. The Acts prior to 1972 are for the most part here repealed, as is so much of the Acts of 1872 and 1874 as relates to licensing proper, nad such provisions of these Acts as it is desirable to retain are re-enacted with necessary modifications. A large part of the Acts of 1872 and 1874, however, relates to to offences, and that part is not affected by this Bill.

Part II. of the Bill provides for the registration of clubs where liquor is sold, and the payment by them of an annual charge according to value. Clubs at present pay no license duty, though proprietary clubs are in fact within the licensing laws, and a licence ought to be taken out for them.

A Bill to consolidate and amend the Law of Licensing and to provide for the Registration of Clubs in which Intoxicating Liquors are supplied. Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

PART I.-LICENSING.

Licensing Divisions and Licensing Commissions.

1. Establishment of licensing divisions.-The county council of every county shall, within six months after the passing of this Act, divide such county, for the purposes of this Act, into divisions to be called licensing divisions, and may from time to time alter the boundaries of such licensing division.

Provided that the licensing divisions in each county shall be arranged wish a view to the population of each division being as nearly as conveniently may be equal, and so that no division shall contain a population greater than fifty thousand or less than ten thousand according to the last published census for the time being, and so that urban sanitary districts shall as far as possible be kept distinct from rural sanitary districts.

Provided also that every such borough or other urban district as had, according to the census of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, a population of thirty thousand or upwards shall be constituted a separate licensing division or separate licensing division, and that the city of London shall be a separate licensing division.

and "

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In this Act county means an administrative county within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1888, and includes a county borough within the meaning of the same Act, and in reference to a county borough county council" means the council of that borough means borough fund. county fund 2. Establishment of licensing commissions.-The county council o every county shall, before the first day of August one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one, and before the same day in every year thereafter, and also in every year in which county councillors are elected, at the first quarterly meeting after such election appoint out of their own body for each licensing division in that county a committee consisting of snch number of persons as they shall think fit, but so that no person shall be a member of more than one such committee at the same time; and they may from time to time supply any vacancies on any such committee. And the committee for the time being appointed for each licensing division shall be called the licensing commission of that division, and the members of such committee shall be called licensing commissioners.

3. Qualification of commissioners.-No person shall be qualified to be a licensing commissioner for any licensing division who is, or is in partnership with or holds any share, in any company which conducts the business of a common brewer, distiller, maker of malt for sale, or retailer of malt, or of any intoxicating liquor in that licensing division, or in an adjoining division, or is wholly or partly the owner, lessee, or occupier for any beneficial interest, or is manager or agent for the owner, lessee, or occupier of any licensed premises in that licensing division, or in an adjoining division.

4. Sessions of licensing commission.-The licensing commission of every licensing division shall, in the month of September in every year, hold a general annual licensing session for the purpose of granting licences under the provisions of this Act.

And shall also hold in every year not less than four nor more than eight special sessions for the purposes of granting transfers of such licences.

Such sessions shall be held at such times and in such manner, with regard to notices thereof and proceedings thereat, and otherwise, as is provided by the rules contained in the First Schedule to this Act.

All costs and expenses properly incurred by or in relation to the proceedings of the licensing commission of any licensing division, including the salary of their clerk, shall be paid by the county council of the county in which that division is situated out of the county fund.

5. No excise retail licence to be granted except to persons licensed under this Act.-No licence for the sale at any place of any intoxicating liquor by retail shall, after the commencement of this Act, be granted by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, or by any officer of Inland Revenue, to any person whatsoever unless such person shall have previously obtained from the licensing commission of the licensing division in which such place is situate a licence under this Act, and such licence of the licensing commission shall be retained by such person after being produced to the commissioners or officers of Inland Revenue, and every licence granted by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, or by any officer of Inland Revenue, contrary to the provisions of this section, shall

be void.

Every licence of licensing justices which is in force at the passing of this Act shall be deemed to have been granted till the tenth day of October one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one, and every licence of licensing justices shall then expire.

No licence of licensing justices shall, after the passing of this Act, be granted in respect of any premises not licensed for the sale of intoxicating