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(ii) a licence to sell beer by retail to be consumed on the premises;

they may grant by way of renewal thereof a licence, in this Act called a publican's licence, authorising him to apply for and hold a spirit retailer's licence.

(2.) In the case of a keeper of a refreshment house holding a licence authorising him to apply for and hold a licence to sell by retail wine to be consumed on the premises, they may grant by way of renewal thereof a licence, in this Act called a refreshment house wine and beer licence, authorising him to apply for and hold a licence to sell by retail beer and wine to be consumed on the premises.

(3.) In the case of a person holding a licence authorising him to apply for and hold

(i.) an excise licence to sell by retail beer not to be consumed on the premises, or

(ii.) an excise licence to sell by retail wine not to be consumed on the premises;

they may grant by way of renewal thereof a licence authorising him to apply for and hold an excise licence for the sale by retail of beer and wine not to be consumed on the premises.

A licensing commission may grant to any person having at the com mencement of this Act any lawful authority to sell any intoxicating liquor such licence as they might have granted to him if he had held a licence in force at the commencement of this Act authorising him to apply for and hold such licence or licences of excise as would have authorised the sale by him of the intoxicating liquor which he had such lawful authority to sell at the place and in the manner at and in which he had such authority to sell the same.

A licensing commission may grant to any person holding a licence under this Act a similar licence by way of renewal thereof.

A licence shall not be granted under this section except at a general annual licensing session.

7. Powers of licensing commission to grant new licences.-The licensing commission of a licensing division may in the following cases grant a licence in respect of premises in that division, whether licensed or not at the commencement of this Act:

(1.) They may grant a licence authorising the holder thereof to apply for and hold a spirit retailer's licence in respect of premises of the value of fifty pounds or upwards which, in the opinion of the licensing commission, are structurally adapted for use as an inn or hotel for the reception of guests and travellers desirous of dwelling therein, and no part of which is set apart or is to be used as an ordinary public-house.

2.) They may grant a licence authorising the holder thereof to apply for and hold a spirit retailer's licence in respect of a railway refreshment room.

On the grant or renewal of such two last-mentioned licences the licensing commission shall impose such restrictions as they may think necessary for preventing the licensed premises from being used otherwise than as an inn or hotel or railway refreshment room respectively.

No such licence shall be granted except at a general annual licensing session. (3.) They may grant in respect of premises not licensed at the commencement of this Act any licence which they would be authorised to grant by way of renewal, provided that the person applying for such licence shall, at the date of his application, name a licensed person or such number of licensed persons in that division as the licensing commission shall require, which licensed person, or each of which licensed persons, holds a licence of the same kind as the licence so applied for, and is desirous of having such licence cancelled, and provided further that each such licence is returned to the licensing commission for the purpose of being cancelled in manner in this section provided.

The licensing commission shall, if they think fit to grant the licence so applied for, direct their clerk to give notice in writing to such licensed person, or to each of such licensed persons, to return his licence to such clerk, and on the return of such licence, or of all such licences, such licence or licences shall be cancelled, and the licensing commission shall issue to the applicant a licence entitling him to carry on business on the premises in respect of which the application is made till the next general annual licensing session, and he shall thereupon be entitled, on returning to the officer of Inland Revenue authorised to grant licences, the excise licence, or all the excise licences granted under the authority of the licence or licences so cancelled, to obtain from such officer, without payment of any further duty, an excise licence authorising him to carry on business during the residue of the term for which the excise licence or licences granted under the authority of the licence or licences so cancelled was or were granted.

Provided that where the licensing commission require the cancellation of more than one licence as a condition to the grant of a licence under this sub-section they shall give to every person applying for a licence under this sub-section, within seven days after the receipt by them of notice of his intention to apply for such licence, a notice in writing of the number of licences which they so require to be cancelled.

No agreement by a licensed person to give up his licence for the purpose of being cancelled under this section, and nothing done by him in pursuance of any such agreement, shall be deemed to be a breach of any covenant in a lease, provided that he shall have given to his lessor, seven days before the return of such licence for cancellation, notice in writing of his desire to have his licence cancelled, and shall have requested his lessor to release him from such covenant on the terms of the payment to such lessor of such sum as, in default of agreement, shall be fixed by arbi tration, and provided that such request shall not have been complied with, or if not complied with, that such sum shall be paid.

8. Powers of licensing commission as to transfer of licences.-A licensing commission may at any special session grant, in the following cases, a licence by way of transfer:

(1.) They may grant to any person becoming by the death, bankruptcy, or assignment of any licensed person or otherwise entitled to possession of the licensed premises, a transfer of the licence held in respect of such premises.

(2.) They may grant to any licensed person whose licensed premises shall have, by fire or otherwise, become incapable of being used for the purpose of his licence a similar licence in respect of such other premises as they shall approve.

(3.) When any licensed person is convicted for the first time of any one of the following offences, namely—

(i.) making an internal communication between the licensed
premises and unlicensed premises;

(ii.) selling spirits without a spirit licence;
(iii.) any felony;

and in consequence either becomes personally disqualified or has his licence forfeited, they may grant to the owner of the premises in respect of which the licence was held, or to some person on his behalf, a similar licence.

On an application for a transfer being made at any other time than at the special session, the clerk of the licensing commission shall cause such application to be laid before any two commissioners, and they may, if they think fit, grant a temporary transfer to be in force until the next special session, or if there will be no special session held previously to the general annual licensing session in that year, then until the tenth day of October in that year; and no notice shall be necessary of any application for such temporary transfer.

On the application at the general annual licensing session in the year of any person entitled to apply for a licence by way of transfer under this section but who has not obtained such licence either because there has been no special session previous to such general annual licensing session at which application could have been made, or for some other cause which the licensing commission shall approve, the licensing commission may grant to such person so applying at such general annual licensing session any licence which they might then, if he had obtained such licence by way of transfer, have granted in renewal thereof.

9. Notices to be given on application for licence.-Every person intending to apply for a licence, or for a renewal or transfer of a licence, shall, twenty-one days at least before he makes such application, give notice in writing of his intention to the clerk of the licensing commission and to the superintendent of police of the district, and shall in such notice set forth his name and address and a description of the licence for which or for a renewal or transfer of which he intends to apply, and of the situation of the premises in respect of which the application is to be made, and shall also, within twenty-eight days before such application is made, cause a like notice to be affixed and maintained between the hours of ten in the morning and five in the afternoon of two consecutive Sundays or the door of such premises and on the principal door or one of the doors of the church or chapel of the parish or place in which such premises are situated, or, if there is no such church or chapel, on some other public and conspicuous place within such parish or place, and shall, within such twenty-eight days, advertise such notice in some paper circulating in the place in which such premises are situate.

10. Powers of licensing commission to grant occasional licences and exemptions from closing regulations 25 & 26 Vict. c. 22-35 & 36 Vict. c. 94. The licensing commission of any licensing division may grant a licence authorising any person holding a publican's or a refreshment house wine and beer licence, to apply for an occasional licence under the provisions of section thirteen of an Act of the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth years of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter twenty-two, and the Acts amending the same; and the Commissioners of Inland Revenue may authorise the grant of such occasional licence to any person having the authority of such licence of the licensing commission, and no other consent to the grant of such occasional licence shall be necessary: Provided that the hours during which such occasional licence shall authorise the sale of any intoxicating liquor shall be specified in such licence of the licensing commission.

The licensing commission of every licensing Idivision shall be the local authority for the purposes of sections twenty-six and twenty-nine of the Licensing Act 1872, and the Acts amending the same, and may grant an order of exemption or a licence under the said sections respectively to any person holding a publican's or a refreshment house wine and beer licence. Provided that a licensing commission may make such rules as to the manner in which any such licence and exemption shall be granted, and may authorise such licence or exemption to be granted by any one commissioner.

11. Disqualifications for obtaining licence.-No licence shall be granted to any sheriff's officer or officer executing the legal process of any court of justice, or to any person who shall be disqualified by law from holding a licence, or who, having been a licensed person, shall have had his licence forfeited, or to any person who shall have been convicted of felony; and any licence granted to any such person shall be void, and if any person holding a licence under this Act shall be convicted as aforesaid such licence shall become void.

No licence shall be granted to any person in respect of any premises which shall be by law disqualified for receiving a licence, and any licence granted in respect of any such premises shall be void.

No licence shall be granted in respect of any premises (not being a railway refreshment room) of less than the annual value following:If such premises are situated in the city of London or in the county of London, or within the four mile radius of Charing Cross, or within the limits of any urban sanitary district containing a population of not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants; and

If such licence is a licence to retail spirits, fifty pounds.

If it is a licence to sell wine and beer to be consumed on the premises, forty pounds.

If it is a licence to sell wine and beer not to be consumed on the premises, thirty pounds.

If such premises are situated elsewhere than as aforesaid, and within the limits of any urban sanitary district containing a population of not less than ten thousand inhabitants; and

If such licence is a licence to retail spirits, forty pounds.

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If it is a licence to sell wine and beer to be consumed on the premises, thirty pounds.

If it is a licence to sell wine and beer not to be consumed on the premises, twenty pounds.

If such premises are situated elsewhere than as aforesaid: and
If such licence is a licence to retail spirits, thirty pounds.
If it is a licence to sell wine and beer to be consumed on the pre-
mises, twenty pounds.

If it is a licence to sell wine and beer not to be consumed on the
premises, fifteen pounds.

12. Extent of powers of licensing commission on granting or refusing licences.-When a licensing commission are by this Act authorised to grant any licence, they may, in their absolute discretion, grant or refuse the same, and such grant or refusal shall be final.

But they may on any application receive upon oath such evidence as they may think proper, and may cause or allow to appear before them, for the purpose of giving evidence, any officer of police or other person, and it shall be lawful for any person interested in any such application to appear, on the hearing of such application, either in person or by his counsel or solicitor.

13. Provisions as to resolutions in parishes against grant of licences and sales of liquor.-Upon the requisition in writing of not less than one tenth of the ratepayers of any parish, the overseers of the poor of such parish shall cause a poll to be taken of the ratepayers of such parish in order to determine whether a resolution shall be adopted that no licences for the sale of intoxicating liquors be granted in that parish, and that the sale by retail of intoxicating liquors in that parish be prohibited.

Every such poll shall be taken in manner provided by the rules contained in the Second Schedule to this Act.

Every such resolution, if adopted, shall be in force for three years from the adoption thereof.

Provided that any such resolution may, at any time not sooner than one year from the adoption thereof, be rescinded in manner provided by the same schedule, and if rescinded shall be in force till such rescission and no longer.

All costs properly incurred in relation to the taking of a poll on any resolution under this section shall, except so far as the same are by rule twelve of the Second Schedule to this Act directed to be paid by the persons requiring such poll, be paid by the county council of the county in which such parish is situated out of the county fund.

14. Effect of such resolution.-A licensing commission shall not, when any such resolution is in force in any parish, grant by renewal or otherwise any licence in respect of any premises in that parish.

And no excise licence taken out when any such resolution is in force in any parish shall, whether it requires the authority of a licence from the licensing commission or not, be of any effect whatsoever with regard to the sale in that parish of any intoxicating liquor by retail.

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the powers of the licensing commission to grant or renew or transfer or remove, under such restrictions as they may make, any licence in respect of a railway refreshment room, or of a hotel used wholly as such, or shall apply to the sale, in pursuance of any excise licence taken out under the authority of such licence of the licensing commission, of intoxicating liquors in any such railway refreshment room to persons arriving or departing by train, or in any hotel to persons lodging therein, or to bond fide travellers taking meals therein, or to the sale of intoxicating liquors in packet or passenger boats, or in canteens, or to the sale of medicated or methylated spirits, or to the sale of intoxicating liquors for use as medicine under such restrictions as the licensing commission shall make, or to the sale of intoxicating liquors by wholesale, but except as in this section provided the savings in section twenty-six shall not apply to this section.

For the purposes of this section a person shall not be considered to be a bona fide traveller unless the place where he lodged during the preceding night is at least six miles distant from the place where the hotel at which such liquor is sold to him is situate, and unless he is travelling through such last-mentioned place and does not intend to spend the night there or at any place within six miles from the place where he spent the preceding night.

15. Register of licences to be transferred to licensing commission-35 & 36 Vict. c. 94.-The county council of every county shall, either before or after the constitution of licensing divisions in that county, cause such inspection to be made, as may be necessary for the purposes of this section, of the register kept by the clerk of the licensing justices of every licensing district in that county in pursuance of section thirty-six of the Licensing Act 1872, and no fee shall be payable for such inspection; and they shall after the constitution of such licensing divisions, where any such register does not relate, or is not divided into parts which relate exclusively to premises in one licensing division, have power to cause, and shall cause, such register to be divided into parts, or cause copies of any entries in such register to be made so that such part and copy shall relate to premises in one licensing division only, and that all entries in the register shall be contained in some or one of such parts or copies, and to order the clerks of the licensing justices to deliver, and such clerk shall deliver, before the first general annual licensing session in any licensing division, to the clerk of the licensing commission of that division, every such register and part of a register heretofore made and every such part of a register and copy made in pursuance of this section as relates to premises in that division. To be continued).

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET

REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL Courts.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Company-Allotment-Directors-Confirmation of Allotment-Reasonable Time.-An allotment of shares in the P. company was made on the 24th Oct. 1888, at a meeting of directors at which which two directors only out of four were present, and of which one director at least had received no notice. This allotment was held invalid by North, J. and by the Court of Appeal (Re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines Limited; Steele's case, 60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 857; 42 Ch. Div. 160), and an applicant who had withdrawn his application on the 25th Oct., had had his name removed from the register. An application was made by two other applicants to whom shares had been allotted at the same meeting on the 24th, and who claimed that they had withdrawn their applications immediately afterwards, though there was some question as to this. It appeared that on the 7th March 1889 a resolu

tion was passed at a validly constituted meeting of directors confirming the allotment. Held, that the allotments of the 24th Oct. 1888 were capable of ratification, and that having been ratified within a reasonable time the subsequent ratification related back and confirmed the allotments made by the two directors as unauthorised agents, and the applicants must therefore retain their shares: (Re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines Limited; Badman's and Bosanquet's cases. Ct. of App.: Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, L.JJ. May 19 and 20.)— Counsel for Badman, E. Beaumont; for Bosanquet, Napier Higgins, Q.C., and Farwell; for the company, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and W. Baker. Solicitors: Stretton, Hilliard, and Co.; Munns and Longden; Burn and Berridge.

Damage to Cargo - Screw Alley-Matters of nautical Skill-Trinity Masters-In Admiralty actions, where the court is assisted by nautical assessors, evidence as to matters of nautical skill and knowledge is not admissible, and hence where in a damage to cargo case the judge found, on the advice of his assessors, that all screw alleys, however well made, may emit smells which may damage sensitive cargo stowed in the vicinity, the Court of Appeal, being assisted by assessors, refused to allow the appellants, the shipowners, at the hearing of their appeal, to call evidence to show that the particular screw alley did not emit a smell, on the ground that it was a question of nautical skill about which evidence could not be given: (The Assyrian. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Fry and Lopes, L.JJ. May 15.)-Counsel: for the appellants, Sir Walter Phillimore and Dr. Raikes; for the respondents, Barnes, QC. and Joseph Walton. Solicitors: for the appellants, Walton, Johnson, and Bubb; for the respondents, Pritchard and Sons.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION.

Trustees

Conversion

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Settlement - Leaseholds Discretion-Power coupled with a Trust - Interference by Court Summons-Rules of Court 1883, Order LV., r. 3.—By a voluntary settlement certain freehold and leasehold premises were given to trustees upon trust for R. B. for life, and after his decease as he should by deed appoint, and in default of appointment upon trust to pay the income thereof to E. B. for her life, and on her death the property to be divided equally amongst the children of R. B. The trustees were empowered after the decease of R. B., at their discretion, to sell the freehold and leasehold premises, and were to hold the proceeds of sale upon the trusts already mentioned. The settlement contained the following clause: The trustees shall after the death of R. B. until all the freehold premises shall be sold pay and apply the rents and profits thereof, or of the unsold part thereof (after payment thereout of all rates, taxes, expenses of repairs, insurance, and other outgoings), in the manner in which the income of the investment representing the net moneys arising from a sale under the trust for sale hereinbefore contained would be for the time being payable or applicable if the said premises had then been sold, and the net moneys arising from such sale had been invested as herein directed." The settlement contained no similar provision applicable to the leasehold premises. The trustees' authorised investments included leaseholds having not less than sixty years unexpired at the time of the investments. R. B. having died without having exercised his power of appointment, the question arose as to whether E. B. was entitled to the net income of the leaseholds in specie, or whether the property must be taken as converted from the time of the death of R. B. On behalf of the children it was contended that the power of sale given to the trustees was in the nature of a trust or duty, and that the court would compel an immediate sale and conversion, as being within the principle of Howe v. Lord Dartmouth (7 Ves. 137). On behalf of E. B. it was argued that the trustees had a discretion as to the time of sale, with which the court would not interfere. Tempest v. Lord Camoys (21 Ch. Div. 571, 576) was relied on. Held, that although there was a duty to sell some time, yet the trustees had a discretion as to the time when they would exercise their power of sale; that the case was governed by the decision in Tempest v. Lord Camoys (ubi sup.); and that when there was a power coupled with a trust or duty the court would enforce the proper and timely exercise of the power, but would not interfere with the discretion of the trustees as to the particular time or manner of their bona fide exercise of it: (Re Burrage; Burningham v. Burrage. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. May 15 and 20.)Counsel for the trustees, John Gent; for the beneficiaries, Renshaw, Q.C. and Leeke; Marten, Q.C. and G. S. Barnes. Solicitors for all parties, W. H. Withall and Co.

Trade Name-Sale of Business with Goodwill-Right of Purchaser to use Vendor's Name-Limitation.-A. sold to B. his business and the good. will thereof. The deed by which the sale was carried out contained an assignment of the premises and the goodwill, but there was no express assignment of the right to use A.'s name. Held, that B. was entitled to use A.'s name in connection with the business so long as he did not thereby expose A. to any liability by holding him out as a person by whom contracts relating to the business were to be made: (Thynne v. Shove. Ch. Div. Stirling, J. May 22.)-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Graham Hastings, Q.C., and Bradford; for the defendant, Buckley, Q.C. and Levett. Solicitors: Ingoldby, Buckley, and Adkin; Keene, Marsland, and Bryden.

Will-Construction-Conversion.-Robert Small, by his will dated the 7th July 1874, devised and bequeathed to his trustees all his real and personal estate upon trust to convert and realise such part thereof as should not consist of investments producing interest and invest the proceeds and receive the income of all property, and thereout to pay to his wife an annuity of £104 per annum for her life, and to pay out of the remaining income to his son George such a sum as in the discretion of his trustees should be proper and sufficient for his maintenance, but so that he should not have power to mortgage or anticipate it in any way. After the son's marriage, then in the event of issue the trustees were to apply such part of the income as the trustees might think reasonable in the maintenance and bringing up of such issue. After the death of the wife and son the trustees were to pay and divide the capital of the trust estate unto and amongst issue equally if more than one. The testator died in 1879, leaving his son George Small surviving. The testator's wife died in his lifetime, George Small died in the year 1884 leaving an only child, viz., a son, Robert William Small. In the year 1882 an order was made for the administration of the testator's real and personal estate, and in 1885 an order was made directing an inquiry whether it would be fit and proper and for the benefit of R. W. Small, who was an infant, that any and what part of the testator's estate should be retained in the condition in which the same was at the

testator's death. Pending this inquiry, and before any certificate was made in answer thereto, viz., on the 17th March 1888, R. W. Small died an infant. The testator's residuary estate consisted partly of real estate. On the death of R. W. Small an originating summons was taken out by the trustees of the will to have it determined whether in the events that had happened the real estate of the testator passed at the death of the infant R. W. Small to the heir-at-law of R. W. Small or to his next of kin. Held, that the testator's real estate passed to the legal personal representative of R. W. Small as personalty: (Re Wragg; Wragg v. Small. Ch. Div.: North, J. May 22.) -Counsel: Cozens-Hardy, Q.C. and Reginald Smith; Napier Higgins, Q.C. and W. Fooks. Solicitors: Pilgrim and Phillips; Frederick Romer.

Will-Construction-Omission of Words in Common Form.-By his will a testator gave certain property to trustees upon trust to pay the income thereof to the widow of the testator's son for life, and after her death "in trust for all the children of my said son who being a son or sons shall live to attain twenty-one years, or being a daughter or daughters shall marry under that age with their mother's consent, to be divided between them share and share alike." The question was whether the gift should be read as extending to a daughter who had attained twenty-one. The will contained powers of maintenance and advancement applicable to all children. Re Daniel's Trusts (L. Rep. 1 Ch. App. 375) was referred to. Held, that the powers of advancement and maintenance afforded some indication of the testator's intention, and moreover, the gift was in formal words, from which were evidently omitted words necessary to complete the form; that although it was true that the common form with the omission of the words read grammatically, yet the intention dominating the form was the expression of the limitation of attaining twenty-one; and that to decide that the testator intended to exclude the daughter attaining twenty-one would be to attribute to him downright madness. Held, therefore, that the court would not be exceeding its functions if it read the will as containing a gift to daughters attaining twenty-one; and that there must be a declaration to that effect accordingly: (Re Hunt; Davies v. Hetherington. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. May 20.)-Counsel: Yate-Lee; Brooke Freeman; Vernon R. Smith. Solicitors: Peacock and Goddard Jobson.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

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Assignment of Chose in action-Debt Collection-Order XIV.-Special endorsement Abuse of Process of Court.-This was an appeal from the order of Hawkins, J., in chambers, varying the order of Master Pollock and giving the defendant unconditional leave to defend. The master had given leave on payment of money into court. The plaintiff was a debt-collector residing in Oxford. He obtained assignments of a number of small debts from creditors of the defendant. On the 31st March, two days before bringing the action, he gave notice to the an indenture dated 21st March 1890, and made defendant's wife of between plaintiff and the several persons and firms " mentioned in the schedule thereto. The schedule contained a list of names and amounts, the total of which was £70 0s. 3d., the sum indorsed on the writ. The affidavit of the plaintiff described the above sum as being "the amount due under and by virtue of an indenture of assignment dated 21st March 1890, &c." Without calling on the defendant, the Court held that the whole transaction was an abuse of the process of assignment, and dismissed the appeal. Defendant's costs in any event: (Comfort v. Betts. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Grantham, JJ. May 23.)-Counsel: for plaintiff, Gwynne James; for defendant, E. Morton Daniel. Solicitors: for plaintiff, Clement (Cheese and Green; for defendant, Lumley and Lumley.

Discovery-Inspection of Documents-Privilege Alternative Claim.Appeal from Hawkins, J., in chambers, dismissing plaintiff's appeal from an order of the district registrar refusing inspection of certain documents. An action for possession of certain property in Birmingham was brought by plaintiff against defendants, as executors of the widow of J. Ryland, the plaintiff's younger brother, who died in 1867, his widow keeping possession under an alleged will, as to which the plaintiff asserted that the widow stated to him that its provisions constituted her tenant for life with reversions to plaintiff and others. Thereupon the plaintiff did not make any claim till the widow's death, when his claim was alternative-as heir-at-law or reversioner under the alleged will. The defendants contended that: (1) the plaintiff was barred by the Statute of Limitations; (2) that the widow as devisee in fee, and not as life tenant under her husband's will, had devised the property to other parties. The plaintiff replied that the statute did not run by reason of the widow's fraud respecting the contents of the will. On plaintiff's application for inspection of the copy of T. Ryland's will disclosed in defendants' first affidavit of documents, privilege was claimed for it, and a further affidavit was made by defendants substantially in the form approved of in Minet v. Morgan (28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 573; 8 Ch. App. 361). The plaintiff contended that, notwithstanding the second affidavit, the first and the pleadings showed that the copy of the will supported the plaintiff's case, either by establishing his title as reversioner or supporting his allegation of fraud. The defendants contended that, as the plaintiff could only succeed by the strength of his own title, and as their defence had disclosed the provisions of the will, inspection could not help him; for (1) if the will constituted the widow owner in fee it could not avail him as regards fraud, for he would have no better; and (2) if he were heir-at-law production of a copy of the will could not avail to prove his brother's intestacy: Minet v. Morgan (ubi sup.) and Attorney-General v. Emerson (48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 18; 10 Q. B. Div. 191) referred to: (Ryland v. Hipkiss and another. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Grantham, JJ. May 23.)-Counsel: for plaintiff, Leslie; for defendants, T. Willes; Chitty. Solicitors: for plaintiff, Goldberg and Langdon; for defendants, Sharpe, Parkers, Pritchard, and Sharpe.

Discovery-Interrogatories-Deposit-When Deposit may be dispensed with-Order XXXI., r. 25. This was an appeal from a decision of Hawkins, J., in chambers, allowing an appeal from an order of Master Archibald made under Order XXXI., r. 25, dispensing with the deposits payable under rule 26 of the same order. The action was for the sum of £1032, arrears of income under an agreement made in 1874. The application to the master was made on the ground of the poverty of the plaintiff, and the affidavits in support of the application accounted for the delay in prosecuting the action on the ground of the extreme poverty of the plaintiffs. A previous action had been delayed by the same cause, and was subsequently consolidated with the present one. Second Sheet.

Hawkins, J., on being informed that the plaintiff did not sue in formá pauperis, reversed the master's order. The affidavits were read, and the case of Newman v. London and Great Western Railway Company (62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 290; 24 Q. B. Div. 454) relied on to support the plaintiff's case. The Court, without calling on the defendant's counsel, held that some very special circumstances should be shown, and that the rule did not apply to such a case as that before it. Appeal dismissed with costs: (Webb v. Webb. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Grantham, JJ. May 23.) -Counsel: for plaintiff, Longstaffe; for defendant, Cyril Dodd, Q.C. Solicitors: for plaintiff, F. A. Doyle; for defendant, Collyer-Bristow, Russell, and Hill.

66

Liability of Shipowners for Coal supplied-Orders solicited from Charterers -This was a question whether persons supplying coal to a vessel at a port of call could recover the price thereof from the owners after they had solicited orders for the coal supplied from the charterers of the vessel. The facts were these: The plaintiffs were coal merchants trading at Galle in the West Indies. The defendants were the owners of the steamship Lauderdale, to which coal was supplied by the plaintiffs under the following circumstances: An agent of the plaintiffs called on P. and Co., the charterers of the Lauderdale, and solicited orders. P. and Co. wrote instructions to the master of the ship to order coal if required from the plaintiffs, and to draw on them for payment. Plaintiffs' agent wrote to his principals, informing them of the state of affairs as regards this particular order. On the ship calling at Galle coal was supplied by plaintiffs, who requested the master to draw a bill for the amount, the master adding the words, for P. and Co.," which the plaintiffs say they accepted under protest. A dispute arose as to what took place on the steamer when this draft was signed. The plaintiffs knew that P. and Co. were charterers, but did not ask to see the charter-party, which was not admitted in evidence at the trial. P. and Co. failed, and the plaintiffs then sued the owners for the coal. The defendants contended that the presumption in favour of the plaintiffs having given credit to the owners was rebutted by proof of the above facts and by drawing on P. and Co. for coal supplied on an order which they themselves had solicited; that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and that the charter-party was improperly excluded from the consideration of the jury. Without calling on the other side, the Court held that the charter-party was not improperly excluded, and that the questions for the jury were ques tions of fact, and there appeared to be no reason to reverse their verdict: (Black v. King. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Mathew, J. May 19.)-Counsel: for plaintiffs, Higgins, Q.C. and J. P. Aspinall; for defendants, Bigham, Q.C. and L. H. Batten. Solicitors: for plaintiffs, Crundall; for defendants, Waltons, Bubb, and Johnson.

Order XIV.-Claim for Possession-Unjust Term-Power of Sheriff to remain in, although Judgment set aside.-This was an appeal from the order of Hawkins, J., in chambers, varying the order of the master, who had given the defendant unconditional leave to defend. The summons was taken out under Order XIV. The facts were, that the defendant entered into possession of the premises at 116, New Oxford-street, under a written agreement providing for a three months' tenancy, at a weekly rent. At the expiration of the three months defendant continued in occupation for a considerable time, at first paying the weekly rent punctually, but, on his getting considerably in arrear, plaintiffs gave him a week's notice to terminate the tenancy, which defendant declined to accept. The action was for possession and mesne profits, no rent being sued for. Two affidavits were read by each party, before the master, which contradicted each other as to certain conversations, alleged to have passed, when the agreement was signed, the defendant's affidavits going to prove that it was then clearly understood that the tenancy was to be for three months and not weekly. The master gave unconditional leave to defend. On appeal to Hawkins, J., in chambers, terms were imposed, the defendant getting leave to defend upon payment of £45 into court for rent then due, but not sued for in this action. This order not having been complied with, plaintiffs instructed the sheriff, who entered and gave possession to them. It was now submitted for defendant that the learned judge had no power to impose such terms, inasmuch as rent was not claimed. Held, that, as there would be a good defence to the action if the defendant's affidavits were true, the court by imposing terms would be practically deciding which of the witnesses were to be believed, and this it declined to do. The terms imposed by Hawkins, J. might do substantial justice, but in no other sense was the order just or legal. The judgment must, therefore, be set aside, and the appeal allowed; costs to be costs in the cause. For the plaintiffs it was submitted that, if the plaintiffs chose to remain in possession, having obtained it peaceably, the court could not order them to withdraw. The Court, therefore, declined to make any order as to possession, but ordered that all proceedings of the court consequent on the judgment should be set aside: (Borough of Finsbury Building Society v. Pearce. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Grantham, JJ. May 23.) Counsel for plaintiff, Spokes; for defendant, Crispe. Solicitors for plaintiff, Boulton, Sims, and Co.; for defendant, Richard Barnes.

Recovery of Small Tenements-Costs-County Court Case not provided for by Rules-Summons directing Registrar to tax on Higher Scale-Order L., r. 19, County Court Rules 1889-County Courts Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), ss. 113, 131, 138.-This was an ex parte application under sect. 131 of the County Courts Act 1888, for a summons to direct the Registrar of the Shoreditch County Court to tax the costs on the higher scale. The action was for recovery of tenements under sect. 138 of the County Courts Act 1888, the monthly value of which was £2. The judge decided in favour of the defendant with costs, and directed that the costs should be taxed by the registrar under whatever scale was applicable. The registrar declined to tax on any but the lowest scale. The only rule applicable to costs in cases of recovery of small tenements is Order L., r. 19, of the County Court Rules 1889, where the court fees are paid on £5. In this case they were paid only on £2. As there was only a claim for possession, it was urged that scale A was the proper one. The County Court judge thought he was bound by the note at the end of the lower scale list of fees in the appendix to the County Court Rules, but he gave leave to the defendant to bring the matter before the court, as he wished to aid the defendant, but thought he had not power to grant costs. Held, that, as proceedings under sect. 131 were in lieu of mandamus, and as the County Court judge had not declined jurisdiction, the court had no power to grant the summons: (Eagle v. Bishop. Q. B. Div.: Wills and Grantham, JJ. May 23.)-Counsel: for applicant, J. Ratcliffe Cousins.

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION.

ADMIRALTY BUSINESS. Collision-Stern Light-Overtaking Ship-Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea, Arts. 2 and 11.-By art. 2 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea: "The lights mentioned in the following articles numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, and no others, shall be carried in all weathers from sunset to sunrise." By art. 11: "A ship which is being overtaken by another shall show from her stern to such last-mentioned ship a white light or a flare-up light." A ship whilst being overtaken by another, which ultimately ran into her, carried a fixed stern light. It appeared that she was navigating in crowded waters, and that vessels were constantly overtaking her. Held, that in such circumstances it was not a breach of arts. 2 and 11 of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea to carry a fixed stern light: (The Stakesby. Adm. Div.: Sir James Hannen. May 15)Counsel for the plaintiffs, Barnes, Q.C. and Raikes; for the defendants, Sir Walter Phillimore and Aspinall. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, Farlow and Jackson; for the defendants, Thos. Cooper and Co. Salvage-Misconduct-Abandonment-Diminution of Award.-Misconduct on the part of salvors may work a diminution in the award, and hence, where salvors having agreed to tow a vessel in distress to a place of safety left the vessel in distress on another steamship coming up, by which the vessel in distress was ultimately saved, but before they had ascertained as a fact that the other steamship would and could take the vessel in distress in tow, the Court held that, in the circumstances, their conduct was blameworthy, and while awarding the other salvors £4100, only awarded them £400, a sum of money which, according to their evidence, would not cover the loss they had incurred by rendering the salvage: (The Tancarville. Ct. of Adm.: Sir James Hannen. May 2.)-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Barnes, Q.C._and Raikes; J. P. Aspinall; for the defendants, Kennedy, Q.C. and Pyke. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Pritchard and Son; Wynne, Holmes, and Wynne; for the defendants, Deacon, Gibson, and Medcalf.

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THE PROPOSED COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. THE Spectator of Saturday last criticises unfavourably Sir Henry James's Bill. It says:-"If Sir Henry James's Bill for erecting a Court of Criminal Appeal passes, we shall very soon find ourselves in the condition of America as regards the carrying out of sentences of death. In an age when the notion of taking human life by judicial action is held in peculiar abhorrence, it is necessary that the wave of moral indignation produced by the narration of the facts of the murder should not have subsided before the penalty of death has to be inflicted. After a month or two has been spent in appealing, and the convict has been kept in agony of suspense which can easily be described as far worse than death,' it is almost impossible to insist upon the infliction of capital punishment. The horror felt at the crime, and the sense of the terrible necessity that exists for deterring future criminals, have died out, and the most active feeling remaining is one of pity for the condemned man. It is to this fact that is due the large immunity from the worst consequences of their acts enjoyed by American murderers. The American public is, to begin with, quite as indignant as ours at a case of homicide, and quite as anxious that the criminal should not escape. After a year of appeals, however, the facts are largely forgotten, and the only people who are really interested in the matter are those who are moving heaven and earth to save the prisoner's life. Naturally enough, the will of those who are keenly interested prevails over that of those who are indifferent, and either a good-natured Court of Appeal is prevailed upon to find some technical mode of escape, or a time-serving State Governor is induced to exercise his authority in favour of those who will give trouble if they do not get their own way. Depend upon it, the same results will follow the introduction of criminal appeals in England. If we adopt Sir Henry James's proposals, the difficulties encountered in carrying out the sentence of death will be multiplied a thousandfold. For those who disbelieve in the good effects of capital punishment, this would no doubt be satisfactory enough; but for persons who, like ourselves, regard the penalty of death as often the only deterrent influence which prevails to prevent the criminal taking of human life, and who greatly dread the outbreak of crime that would ensue on the abolition of capital sentences, the prospect seems full of peril. As we have said on a previous occasion, we are distinctly in favour of taking the exercise of the prerogative of mercy out of the hands of the Home Secretary, and of entrusting it to persons placed above the reach of popular pressure. That, however, does not affect our objection to the notion of erecting a formal Court of Criminal Appeal, and we shall always endeavour to do what is in our power to prevent the adoption of any measure of the nature of that introduced by Sir Henry James."

After dealing with the details of the scheme the writer continues:-"But though we so strongly deprecate the passing of Sir Henry James's Bill, we have no desire to leave matters where they are. We are perfectly willing to admit that it is often necessary to review sentences of death, and at the same time we feel strongly that it is unwise to entrust the power to the Home Secretary. Our opinion is that, in any capital case which appears doubtful, the Home Secretary should be authorised by Act of Parliament to refer the matter to three judges, who shonld have power to use any method of inquiry they may think necessary and advisable for effectively reviewing the decision of the court below. They should be allowed to question and cross-question the prisoner and other witnesses, to hear counsel, to consult with the judge of first instance, and to reconsider both the facts and the law, carrying on their investigations, however, in strict privacy. Their decision should be final, and the prerogative of mercy should be exercised or not exercised solely in accordance with their determination. This plan would prevent the scandal of delay, and secure a tribunal at once independent and elastic. The perfectly clear cases the Home Secretary would decide without referring matters to the three judges; but when there existed any real ground for reconsideration, the very best possible body for exercising the functions of a court of criminal appeal would have been secured. It is in this direction, and not in that of the erection of a chain of appeal tribunals, that we must look for a solation of the present problem. Sir

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COPARTNERSHIP-SEPARATE ESTATE.

IT is a recognised rule of law, as laid down in the case of Ex parte Sillitoe (Gly. & J. 374), and adopted in the case of Nanson v. Gordon (34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 401), that one partner may not prove against the separate estate of a copartner in competition with the general creditors of the firm. The reason of this is obvious, because it may turn out that there is a surplus of the separate estate left over after satisfaction of the separate creditors, which surplus would become the property of the joint creditors, and would be necessarily diminished if the partner were allowed to put in his proof against the separate estate. A distinction, however, was drawn in Re Topping (12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 3), for in that case it was pointed out that, under certain circumstances, a partner could prove against the separate estate of his copartner, i.e., when he was able to show that under no circumstances there could be enough separate estate to meet the debts of the separate creditors. The reason for that, too, is clear, inasmuch as, if there could be no possibility of a surplus which would be available for the joint creditors, the partner who was seeking to prove against his copartner's separate estate would not, if his proof were admitted, be proving in competition with the joint creditors, but merely with the separate creditors; and, in deciding Ex parte Topping, the Lord Chancellor put a note, which appears in the report of the decision, to this effect, that, inasmuch as contingencies might arise which might render the separate estate larger than was contemplated, the proof, i.c. of the copartner, was to be expunged in case an overplus from the separate estate occurred for the benefit of the joint creditors.

That being the law, the case of Re Hind; Ex parte Hind, which will be found reported in 62 L. T. Rep. N. S. 327, came before the Bankruptcy Appeal Court, Justices Cave and Smith, on 13th Feb. last. The facts of the the case where shortly as follows: The two Hinds, father and son, had prior to the year 1888 carried on business together in partnership, and in July of that year the partnership was dissolved. By the terms of the dissolution Hind, the father, was to receive from his son, who took over the partnership debts and carried on the business by himself, the sum of £11,612 178. 3d. as his share of the estate. That sum was secured by a mortgage of the partnership property. Shortly afterwards the son became bankrupt. There was no joint estate, but proofs to the amount of £7000 for debts due and owing by the old partnership of the father and son were admitted against the son's separate estate. Whether these proofs ought ever to have been admitted is a matter with which we need not concern ourselves, for it must be taken as a fact that these proofs were admitted whether rightly or wrongly. Under these circumstances the father put in a proof against the separate estate for his debt amounting to £11,642 17s. 3d., which the trustee in bankruptcy rejected on the ground, amongst others, that a creditor partner cannot prove in competition with his own firm's creditors against the separate ostate of his copartner. The total creditors of the bankrupt had debts amounting to about £23,700, while the assets were £3842. The decision of the trustee was upheld by the County Court judge, and the father appealed. On the appeal it was said that the case came within the meaning of Ex parte Topping, as by no possibility could there be a surplus of the separate estate which would be available for distribution amongst the joint creditors; that, if you deducted from the total debts of £23,700 the father's debt of £11,642 17s. 3d., and also the joint debts admitted to prove of £7000, there still would remain £5200 worth of debts, with assets amounting to £3842. So that, looking at the case from any point of view, there must be a deficiency of £1254, and that deficiency brought the case within Ex parte Topping. The answer to this argument, which answer the court adopted, was, that as joint creditors to the amount of £7000 had been rightly or wrongly admitted to prove against the separate estate, if the father was admitted to prove against the separate estate for his debt he would be proving in competition with the joint creditors. In the words of Mr. Justice Cave, "Here the joint creditors have been admitted to prove against Hinds' estate, and therefore, if the elder Hind is allowed to prove too, the result is that all the creditors will find their dividend reduced. Whatever was the reason, it is a fact that the joint creditors have been admitted to prove, and so the effect of allowing the father to prove would be that he would prove in competition with them." The rule of law therefore, as laid down in Ex parte Ŝillitoe, and adopted in Nanson v. Gordon applied, and the Court upheld the decision of the County Court judge, rejected the proof, and dismissed the appeal.

WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined by an expert from the Sanitary Engineering and Ventilation Company, 65, Victoria-street, Westminster opposite Town Hall [Estab lished 1875], who also undertake the Ventilation of Offices, &c.-ADVT.]

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Monmouth, Tuesday, at 10
Nantwich, Friday
Newcastle-under-Lyme, Tuesday, at 9.30
Newport (I. of W.), Wednesday, at 10
Newport Pagnell, Friday, at 10
Northwich, Wednesday

Cardiff, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Nottingham, Friday, at 9.45)

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Chertsey, Thursday

Chesham, Monday, at 10
Chester, Thursday

Chesterfield, Thursday, at 10; Friday (if necessary), at 10

Clerkenwell, Wednesday, Thursday, and
Friday

Colchester, Friday, at il
Croydon, Tuesday

Cuckfield, Thursday

Derby, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10

Dewsbury, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10 Diss, Tuesday

Easingwold, Thursday, at 10

Gainsborough, Saturday, at 10

Greenwich, Friday, at 10.15

Halifax, Wednesday, at 10

Halstead, Saturday, at 10

Hastings, Monday

Hertford, Wednesday, at 11

High Wycombe, Tuesday, at 11

Holbeach, Tuesday, at 9.30

Holsworthy (Devon) Thursday, at 10

Horncastle, Wednesday, at 10

Oldham, Thursday, at 9; before Registrar
(Bankruptcy), Friday, at 11
Otley, Monday, at 9.45
Oxford, Thursday, at 11.30
Petersfield, Monday, at 10
Pocklington, Friday, at 11,
Redditch, Friday, at 10
Ripon, Saturday, at 9.30
Rochdale, Friday, at 9
Rye. Tuesday

Sheffield, Wednesday and Friday, at 10.30
Shipston-on-Stour, Thursday, at 10
Sleaford, Friday, at 10.30
Southampton, Tuesday, at 10
Southend, Tuesday, at 11

Spalding, Monday, at 10

Stafford, Thursday, at 9.30
St. Helens, Wednesday
Stoke, Monday, at 9.30

Tadcaster, Wednesday, at 10
Taunton, Tuesday, at 10
Tiverton, Saturday, at 10

Wakefield, Thursday (Bankruptcy), at 11
Wigan, Tuesday, at 10

Williton, Friday, at 12

Woolwich, Wednesday, at 10.45

Wrexham, Wednesday

Huddersfield, Thursday and Friday, at 10 Yarmouth, Friday and Saturday

Kingston-on-Thames, Friday

York, Tuesday, at 9.30.

* Other sittings are specially fixed when necessary.

jurisdiction within the district of which the vessel or property to which the cause relates is at the commencement of the proceeding; and (2) “If the foregoing rule be not applicable, then in the County Court having Admiralty jurisdiction in the district of which the owner of the vessel or property to which the cause relates, or his agent in England, resides," &c.; and it has been strongly contended and urged with much ability and great reliance upon the forms and procedure in Admiralty, that the words vessel to which the cause relates can only mean the ship or vessel of the defendant. It is clear that until the passing of the Act of 1869 the jurisdiction of the County Court over claims for salvage, towage, necessaries, or wages, or for damage to cargo or damage by collision, were all in their nature proceedings for services rendered to or injury done by the ship or vessel of the defendant, and in any proceeding in rem the only ship in the contemplation of the parties would naturally and logically be the ship of the defendant; but now by sect. 2, sub-sect. 1, of the Act of 1869 a County Court with Admiralty jurisdiction can try any claim arising out of any agreement made in relation to the use or hire of any ship, and the present action is a proceeding in personam under a charter-party, for the use or hire of the plaintiffs' ship, and complaining of damage resulting from breach of that agreement. It has been argued that the present is not properly a cause relating to a ship, but I do not agree with that view. The expression "cause" relating to a ship only differs from cause relating to the use or hire of a ship as the greater differs from the less. If an action on a charter-party which, ex concessis, is an action upon an agreement relating to the use of a ship, is not an action relating to a ship, it seems difficult to admit that an action for towage or wages is an action relating to a ship. To what ship then does the present cause relate? The proceeding itself is not in rem but in personam, and the only ship indicated is the ship which is the subject of the agreement of hire for breach of which this action is brought. There is nothing in the words themselves "vessel or property to which the cause relates which involves any violence of construction in holding them to be applicable to the ship either of plaintiff or defendant as the case may be. I hold, therefore, that the present cause does relate to the plaintiff's vessel, and as that vessel was within my jurisdiction at the time the cause was entered I decide against the application, and I hold that I have jurisdiction to try this action. I may add that sect. 4 of the Act of 1869, which extends the jurisdiction of County Courts in Admiralty to all claims for damage to ships, whether by collision or otherwise, when the amount claimed does not exceed £300, is plainly intended to cover cases in which damage may be occasioned in many other ways besides collision, and in which the only vessel to which the cause could be said to relate would be the damaged vessel for which the plaintiff brought his action. Whether upon the hearing of this cause it may appear to me more convenient and proper that it should be tried within the jurisdiction of the County Court at Poole is a matter which I may have to consider hereafter, but for the present I dismiss the defendants' application, with costs.

"

NEWCASTLE COUNTY COURT.
Saturday, May 17.

(Before His Honour Judge DIGBY SEYMOUR, Q.C., LL.D.) JOBSON BROS. v. THE POOLE, BALTIC, AND QUEBEC TIMBER COMPANY LIMITED.

over

The

Breach of clause in charter-party—Admiralty juisdiction. His HONOUR delivered the following judgment: This is an action brought in the County Court of Northumberland held at Newcastle on the Admiralty side of this court by the owners of the s.s. County of Durham, Messrs. Jobson Bros., Cail's-buildings, Quayside, Newcastle, assignees of a charter-party dated the 2nd April 1889, made between Messrs. McAllum and Co., of Newcastle, and the defendants, the Poole, Baltic, and Quebec Timber Company Limited, as charterers of the ship, for breach of a clause in the charter-party whereby the defendants warranted a certain depth of water at their wharf at Poole to berth the ship in, and owing to a breach of such warranty the ship ran aground and was damaged. It is expressly agreed between the parties that at the time of the commencement of this action the ship was in the Tyne, and therefore within the Admiralty jurisdiction of this court. The defendants have applied by way of motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, and the question I have to decide is whether their objection is good. As the question is one of great importance to the shipping interest here and elsewhere, and as I believe this is the first occasion on which the point has been raised in any court, I have taken time to consider my decision. So far as the plea may be said to depend upon the general Admiralty jurisdiction of County Courts a charter-party of this description no difficulty exists. difference which prevailed a few years ago between the High Court of Admiralty and the Courts of Common Pleas and Exchequer on the one hand, and the judges of the Privy Council on the other, as to whether County Courts in Admiralty have not under recent legislation a more extensive jurisdiction, in certain matters, than the High Court, has been finally set at rest by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of The Alina (5 P. Div. 138; 5 Ex. Div. 227). This case, and that of Cargo ex Argos (L Rep. 5 P. C. 134) are direct authorities for the proposition that an action on a charter-party by the owner or charterer of a ship is an action on an agreement made in relation to the use or hire of a ship within sect. 4 of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 51), and that that Act has given a jurisdiction to the County Courts which the High Court of Admiralty did not possess. The omission of any form applicable to the present case from the "Statutory forms " given under the Act of 1868 may be explained therefore by assuming that the latter were no doubt compiled from those in use in the High Court which had jurisdiction in the cases mentioned in that Act, but not having jurisdiction in cases like the present, necessarily supplied no forms applicable to the case before me. The only ground, therefore, upon which a plea in denial of the jurisdiction of the court can prevail is that to which the defendants have mainly limited their contention-viz., that the present action has been entered in the wrong district. In the Act of 1869 there is no express clause defining or imiting the district in which proceedings are to be commenced, but by sect. 1 of the Act of 1869, the two Acts of 1868-9 are to be read and interpreted as one Act. Turning then to the Act of 1868, sect. 21, it is provided that proceedings in an Admiralty cause shall be commenced (1) "In the County Court having Admiralty

LAW SOCIETIES.

ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL LAW SOCIETIES.

THE following are the minutes of the annual meeting of the above societies, held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, May 14, Mr. C. T. Saunders in the chair :

Present the under-mentioned societies, represented as follows:-The Berks, Bucks, and Oxfordshire Incorporated Law Society, by D. H. Witherington; the Birmingham Incorporated Law Society, by C. T. Saunders; the Bristol Incorporated Law Society, by H. O'Brien O'Donoghue and Chas. R. Hancock; the Gloucestershire and Wilts Incorporated Law Society, by R. Ellett; the Leeds Incorporated Law Society, by A. Copson Peake; the Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, by Thos. Bellringer and F. Marton Hull; the Manchester Incorporated Law Association, by John Cooper; the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Incorporated Law Society, by Thos. G. Gibson; the Nottingham Incorporated Law Society, by Arthur Barlow; Thomas Marshall, hon. sec.

66

The notice calling the meeting having been read, the accounts for the year 1889, as printed, were presented, and having been audited, were passed. Mr. William A. Jevons and Mr. Thomas Marshall were elected hon. secs. for the year. The subscription of members for the current year was fixed as follows: £2 for the societies whose members do not exceed fifty, and £4 for the societies whose members exceed fifty. REMUNERATION OF PRIVATE TRUSTEES.-Mr. John Cooper, on behalf of the Manchester Law Association, moved the following resolution: That it is expedient that legislative provision be made for the remuneration of private trustees, unless expressly excluded by the author of the trust." Mr. Cooper having stated that several law societies had approved of the proposal [the following societies had written approving the proposal: Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Newcastle, Derby, Sunderland, Chester, North Wales. The following societies had written disapproving the proposal: Leeds, Worcester, Wolverhampton, Worcestershire, Sheffield.], urged that the reasons given against the ordinary rule that work should be paid for were inadequate; that a scale might be framed which would not burden the trust, and that if trustees were paid by commission on the funds received, duty and interest would coincide. As to the objection that no change is needed because the author of a trust may pay the trustee if he chooses, the answer is that testators and others do not consider the trouble involved by trusteeship, and that the case of a new trustee is not provided for. The objection that professional trustees would be encouraged was open to the answer that there might be a worse evil-that of persons who manipulate a trust for their own benefit. The admitted difficulty of fixing a fair scale might, he thought, be got over, and had not been found insuperable in other cases.-Mr. Bellringer, Liverpool, seconded the resolution, which was supported by Mr. Gibson, Newcastle, and in principle by Mr. C. R. Hancock, Bristol. On the other hand, Mr. Witherington, Berks, Bucks, and Oxon; Mr. Peake, Leeds; Mr. Barlow, Nottingham; Mr. Ellett, Gloucestershire and Wilts, were for various reasons opposed to the proposal. Mr. Cooper, in reply, admitted the value of the discussion, and thought it better that the matter should stand over for further consideration, and that in the interval a draft scale of charges might be prepared. THE BANKRUPTCY BILL (1890).—The chairman called attention to an interview which took place on the 9th May between a deputation from the London Chamber of Commerce and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach on this subject, at which the President of the Board of Trade had thrown out the

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