his passions, and form his conduct according to the dictates of wifdom, humanity, and virtue, the earth would no longer be defolated by cruelty; and human focieties would live in order, harmony, and peace. In those fcenes of mischief and violence which fill the world, let man behold, with fhame, the picture of his vices, his ignorance, and folly. Let him be humbled by the mortifying view of his own perverseness; but let not "his heart fret against the Lord."

BLAIR.

SECTION V.

On difinterested Friendship.

I AM informed that certain Greek writers (philofophers, it feems, in the opinion of their countrymen) have advanced fome very extraordinary pofitions relat-ing to friendship; as, indeed, what fubject is there, which thefe fubtle geniufes have not tortured with their fophiftry?

The authors to whom I refer, dissuade their disciples from entering into any strong attachments, as unavoidably creating fupernumerary difquietudes to thofe who engage in them; and, as every man has more than fufficient to call forth his folicitude, in the course of his own affairs, it is a weakness they contend, anxiously to involve himself in the concerns of others. They recommend it also, in all connexions of this kind, to hold the bands of union extremely loofe; fo as always to have it in one's power to ftraiten or relax them, as circumstances and fituations fhall render most expedient. They add, as a capital-article of their doctrine, that," to live exempt from cares, is an efsential in

gredient to conftitute human happiness: but an ingredient, however, which he, who voluntarily distresses himself with cares, in which he has no necefsary and perfonal intereft, must never hope to pofsefs."

I have been told likewife, that there is another fet of pretended philofophers, of the fame country, whose tenets, concerning this subject, are of a still more illiberal and ungenerous caft.

The propofition they attempt to establish, is, that "friendship is an affair of felf-intereft entirely; and that the proper motive for engaging in it, is, not in order to gratify the kind and benevolent affections, but for the benefit of that assistance and support which is to be derived from the connexion." Accordingly they afsert, that those perfons are most disposed to have recourse to auxiliary alliances of this kind, who are leaft qualified by nature, or fortune, to depend upon their own ftrength and powers: the weaker fex, for inftance, being generally more inclined to engage in friendships, than the male part of our species; and those who are deprefsed by indigence, or labouring -under misfortunes, than the wealthy and the profperous.

Excellent and obliging fages, thefe, undoubtedly! To ftrike out the friendly affections from the moral world, would be like extinguishing the fun in the natural: each of them being the source of the best and moft grateful fatisfactions, that Heaven has conferred on the fons of men. But I fhould be glad to know, what the real value of this boafted exemption from care, which they promife their difciples, juftly amounts to? an exemption flattering to felf-love, I confefs; but which, upon many occurrences in human life, fhould

:

be rejected with the utmoft difdain. For nothing, furely, can be more inconsistent with a well-poised and manly fpirit, than to decline engaging in any laudable action, or to be difcouraged from perfevering in it, by an apprehenfion of the trouble and folicitude, with which it may probably be attended. Virtue herself, indeed, ought to be totally renounced, if it be right to avoid every possible means that may be productive of uneafinefs for who, that is actuated by her principles, can obferve the conduct of an oppofite character, without being affected with fome degree of fecret difsatisfaction? Are not the juft, the brave, and the good, necefsarily expofed to the difagreeable emotions of diflike and averfion, when they refpectively meet with inftances of fraud, of cowardice, or of villainy? It is an efsential property of every well-conftituted mind, to be affected with pain, or pleasure, according to the nature of thofe moral appearances that present themselves to obfervation.

If fenfibility, therefore, be not incompatible with true wisdom, (and it furely is not, unless we fuppofe that philofophy deadens every finer feeling of our nature,) what juft reason can be assigned, why the fympathetic fufferings which may refult from friendship, fhould be a fufficient inducement for banishing that génerous affection from the human breaft? Extinguish all emotions of the heart, and what difference will remain, I do not fay between man and brute, but between man and a mere inanimate clod? Away then with those auftere philofophers, who reprefent virtue as hardening the foul against all the softer impressions of humąnity! The fact, certainly, is much otherwise. A truly good man is, upon many occafions, extremely fuf

ceptible of tender fentiments; and his heart expands with joy, or fhrinks with forrow, as good or ill fortune accompanies his friend. Upon the whole, then, it may fairly be concluded, that, as in the cafe of virtue, fo in that of friendship, those painful sensations, which may fometimes be produced by the one, as well as by the other, are equally infufficient grounds for excluding either of them from taking pofsefsion of our bofoms.

They who infift that "utility is the firft and prevailing motive, which induces mankind to enter into particular friendships," appear to me to diveft the afsociation of its most amiable and engaging principle. For, to a mind rightly difpofed, it is not so much the benefits received, as the affectionate zeal from which they flow, that gives them their best and most valuable recommendation. It is fo far indeed from being verified by fact, that a sense of our wants is the original cause of forming these amicable alliances; that, on the contrary, it is obfervable, that none have been more diftinguished in their friendships than thofe, whofe power and opulence, but, above all, whofe fuperior virtue (a much firmer fupport) have raised them above every necefsity of having recourfe to the afsiftance of others.

The true diftinction, then, in this question is, that "although friendship is certainly productive of utility, yet utility is not the primary motive of friendship." Those selfish fenfualifts, therefore, who, lulled in the lap of luxury, prefume to maintain the reverfe, havo furely no claim to attention; as they are neither qualified by reflection, nor experience, to be competent judges of the fubject."

Is there a man upon the face of the earth, who would deliberately accept of all the wealth, and all the afflu

ence this world can beftow, if offered to him upon the fevere terms of his being unconnected with a fingle mortal whom he could love, or by whom he should be beloved? This would be to lead the wretched life of a detefted tyrant, who, amidst perpetual fufpicions and alarms, pafses his miferable days a ftranger to every tender fentiment; and utterly precluded from the heart-felt fatisfactions of friendship.

Melmoth's Tranflation of Cicero's Lælius.

SECTION VI.

On the Immortality of the Soul.

I was yesterday walking alone, in one of my friend's woods; and loft myself in it very agreeably, as I was running over, in my mind, the feveral arguments that establish this great point; which is the bafis of morality, and the fource of all the pleasing hopes and fecret joys, that can arise in the heart of a reasonable creature. I confidered thofe feveral proofs drawn,

Firft, from the nature of the foul itself, and particularly its immateriality; which, though not abfolutely necessary to the eternity of its duration, has, I think, been evinced to almost a demonstration.

Secondly, from its passions and fentiments; as, particularly, from its love of existence; its horror of annihilation; and its hopes of immortality; with that secret fatisfaction which it finds in the practice of virtue; and that uneafinefs which follows upon the commission of vice.