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one another, as well as on the particles of light, for producing most of the phænomena in nature? But in reality, thofe minute particles are only agited according to certain laws of nature, by fome other agent, wherein the force exifts and not in them, which have only the motion; which motion in the body moved, the Peripatetics rightly judge to be a mere paffion, but in the mover to be ivipya or act.

251. It paffeth with many, I know not how, that mechanical principles give a clear folution of the phænomena. The Democritic hypothefis, faith doctor Cudworth, doth much more handfomely and intelligibly folve the phænomena, than that of Ariftotle and Plato. But things rightly confidered, perhaps it will be found not to folve any phænome"non at all. For all phænomena are, to fpeak truJy, appearances in the foul or mind; and it hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures and motions fhould produce an appearance in the mind. Thofe principles, therefore, do not folve, if by folving is meant affigning the real, either efficient or final caufe of appear ances, but only reduce them to general rules...

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252. There is a certain analogy, conftancy, and uniformity in the phænomena or appearances of na ture, which are a foundation for general rules: and thefe are a grammar for the understanding of na ture, or that feries of effects in the vifible world; whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pafs, in the natural course of things. Plotinus obferves, in his third Ennead, that the art of prefaging is in fome fort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that fo far forth as analogy obtains in the universe, there may be vaticination. And in reality, he that foretells the motions of the

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planets, or the effects of medicines, or the refult, of chemical or mechanical experiments, may be faid to do it by natural vaticination.

253. We know a thing when we understand it: and we understand it, when we can interpret or tell what it fignifies. Strictly the fenfe knows nothing. We perceive indeed founds by hearing, and charac ters by fight but we are not therefore faid to understand them. After the fame manner, the phæ nomena of nature are alike vifible to all but all have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or understand what they fignify, or know how to vaticinate by them. There is no queftion, faith Socrates, in Theæteto, concerning that which is agreeable to each perfon; but concerning what will in time to come be agreeable, of which all men are not equally judges. He who foreknoweth what will be in every kind, is the wifeft. According to Socrates, you and the cook may judge of a dish on the table equally well; but while the difh is making, the cook can better foretell what will enfue from this or that manner of compofing it. Nor is this manner of reasoning confined only to morals or politics; but extends alfo to natural science.

254. As the natural connexion of figns with the things fignified is regular and conftant, it forms a fort of rational difcourfe (a), and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent caufe. This is agreeable to the philofophy of Plato and other ancients. Plotinus indeed faith, that which acts naturally is not intellection, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do. And it must be owned, that, as faculties are multiplied by philofophers according to their operations, the will may be distinguished from the intellect.

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But it will not therefore follow, that the will, which operates in the courfe of nature, is not conducted and applied by intellect, although it be granted that neither will understands, nor intellect wills. Therefore, the phænomena of nature, which ftrike on the fenfes and are understood by the mind, form not only a magnificent fpectacle, but also a most coherent, entertaining, and inftructive difcourfe; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This language or difcourfe is ftudied with different attention, and interpreted with different degrees of fkill. But fo far ás men have ftudied and remarked it's rules, and can interpret right, fo far they may be faid to be knowing in nature. A beaft is like a man who hears a strange tongue, but underftands nothing.

255. Nature, faith the learned Doctor Cudworth, is not mafter of art or wifdom: Nature is ratio merfa & confufa, reafon immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it and confounded with it. But the formation of plants and animals, the motions of natural bodies, their various properties, appearances and viciffitudes, in a word, the whole feries of things in this visible world, which we call the courfe of nature, is fo wifely managed and carried on, that the moft improved human reason cannot thoroughly comprehend even the leaft particle thereof; fo far is it from feeming to be produced by fuddled or confounded reafon.

256. Natural productions, it is true, are not all equally perfect. But neither doth it fuit with the order of things, the ftructure of the univerfe, or the ends of providence that they fhould be fo. General rules, we have feen (4), are neceffary to

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make the world intelligible: and from the conftant, obfervation of fuch rules, natural evils will fometimes unavoidably enfue: things will be produced, in a flow length of time, and arrive at different de-, grees of perfection.

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257. It must be owned, we are not conscious of the fyftole and diaftole of the heart, or the motion, of the diaphragm. It may not nevertheless be, thence inferred, that unknowing nature can act regularly, as well as ourselves. The true inference, is, that the felf-thinking individual, or humane perfon, is not the real author of those natural motions.And in fact no man blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right. The fame may be faid of the fingers of a musician, which fome object to be moved by habit which understands not; it being evident, that what is done by rule muft proceed from fomething that understands the rule; therefore, if not from the musician himself, from fome other active intelligence, the fame perhaps which governs bees and fpiders, and moves the limbs of those who walk in their fleep.

258. Inftruments, occafions, and figns (b) occur in, or rather make up, the whole vifible course of nature. Thefe, being no agents themfelves, are under the direction of one agent concerting all for one end, the fupreme good. All those motions, whether in animal bodies or in other parts of the fyftem of nature, which are not effects of particular wills, feem to fpring from the fame general caufe with the vegetation of plants, an ætherial spirit actuated by a mind.

259. The first poets and theologers of Greece and the eaft confidered the generation of things, as afcribed rather to a divine caufe, but the Phyfici (b) 160.

to natural caufes fubordinate to, and directed ftill by a divine; except fome corporealifts and mechanics, who vainly pretended to make a world without a God. The hidden force that unites, adjufts, and causeth all things to hang together, and move in harmony, which Orpheus and Epedocles ftyled love; this principle of union is no blind principle, but acts with intellect. This divine love and intellect are not themfelves obvious to our view, or otherwise difcerned than in their effects. Intellect enlightens, Love connects, and the fovereign Good attracts all things.

260. All things are made for the fupreme good, all things tend to that end: and we may be faid to account for a thing, when we fhew that it is fo" belt. In the Phædon, Socrates declares it to be his opinion, that he, who fuppofed all things to have been difpofed and ordered by a mind (c), should not pretend to affign any other caufe of them. He blames phyfiologers for attempting to account for phænomena, particularly for gravity and cohefion, by vortexes and æther, overlooking the to ayals and to dov, the ftrongest bond and cement which holds together all the parts of the univerfe, and not difcerning the caufe it felt from thofe things which only attend it.

261. As in the microcofm, the conftant regular tenor of the motions of the vifcera and contained juices doth not hinder particular voluntary motions to be impreffed by the mind on the animal fpirit; even fo in the mundane fyftem, the fteddy obfervance of certain laws of nature, in the groffer maffes and more tonfpicuous morions, doth not hinder, but a voluntary agent may fometimes communicate particular impreffions to the fine aetherial medium,

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