this in fact is Ariftotle's own doctrine in his third book De anima, where he alfo afferts, with Plato, that actual knowledge and the thing known are all one: τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐσιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπισήμη τῷ equal. Whence it follows that the things are where the knowledge is, that is to fay, in the mind. Or, as it is otherwife expreffed, that the foul is all things. More might be faid to explain Ariftotle's notion, but it would lead too far. 311. As to an abfolute actual existence (b) of fenfible or corporeal things, it doth not feem to have been admitted either by Plato or Ariftotle. In the Theatetus we are told, that if any one faith a thing is or is made, he must withal fay, for what, or of what, or in respect of what, it is or is made; for, that any thing should exist in it felf or abfolutely, is abfurd. Agreeably to which doctrine it is alfo farther affirmed by Plato, that it is impoffible a thing fhould be fweet, and fweet to no body. It must neverthelefs be owned with regard to Ariftotle, that, even in his Metaphyfics there are some expreffions which feem to favour the abfolute exiftence of corporeal things. For inftance, in the eleventh book fpeaking of corporeal fenfible things, What wonder, faith he, if they never appear to us the fame, no more than to fick men, fince we are always changing, and never remain the fame our felves? And again, he faith, Senfible things, although they receive no change in themfelves, do nevertheless in fick perfons produce different fenfations and not the fame. Thefe paffages would feem to imply a distinct and abfolute existence of the objects of fenfe. 312. But it must be obferved, that Ariftotle diftinguifheth a twofold existence, potential and actual. It will not, therefore, follow that, ac(b) 264, 292, 294. cording cording to Ariftotle, becaufe a thing is, it muft actually exift. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphyfics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philofophers, as not admitting a poffible existence diftinct from the actual: from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or fweet or any fenfible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in confequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no fenfe but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not fee, and therefore both blind and deaf feveral times in a day. 313. The inexéxeras eras of the Peripatetics, that is, the fciences, arts, and habits, were by them diftinguifhed from the arts or ελέχεια dregal, and fuppofed to exift in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This feems to illuftrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the foul of man.. In was the Platonic doctrine, that humane fouls or minds defcended from above, and were fowed in generation, that they were funned, ftupified, and intoxicated by this defcent and immerfion into animal nature. And that the foul, in this views or lumber, forgets her original notions, which are fmothered and oppreffed by many falfe tenets and prejudices of fenfe. Infomuch that Proclus compares the foul, in her defcent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the fea, and there contracting divers coats of fea-weed, coral, and fhells, which stick clofe to him and conceal his true shape. 314. Hence, according to this philofophy, the mind of man is fo reftlefs to fhake off that flumber, to difengage and emancipate herfelf from thofe prejudices and falfe opinions, that fo ftraitly befet and cling to her, to rub off thofe covers, that difguife her original form, and to regain her primæval ftate and first notions: Hence, that perpetual ftruggle to recover the loft region of light, that ardent thirst and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which fhe would neither feek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when attained, except fhe had fome prænotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant like habits and sciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called out and roused by recollection or reminifcence. So that learning feemeth in effect reminiscence. 315. The Peripatetics themfelves diftinguish between reminifcence and mere memory. Themiftius obferves that commonly the beft memories go with the worst parts; but that reminifcence is moft perfect in the moft ingenious minds. And notwithstanding the tabula rafa (d) of Ariftotle, yet fome of his followers have undertaken to make him fpeak Plato's fenfe. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth as agreeable to his mafter's doctrine, that learning is reminifcence, and that the vs xat is in children. Simplicius alfo, in his commentary on the third book of Aristotle ei Juxus, fpeaketh of a certain interiour reafon in the foul, acting of it self, and originally full of it's own proper notions, πλήρης ἀφ' ἑαυτῇ τῶν οἰκείων γνωςῶν. 316. And as the Platonic philofophy supposed intellectual notions to be originally inexiftent or innate in the foul (e), fo likewise it fuppofed fenfible qualities to exift (though not originally) in the foul, and there only. Socrates faith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you fee is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes, (d) 308. (e) 309, 314. or or in any place at all. And in the Timæus Plato teacheth, that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies produce that painful fenfation we call heat. And Plotinus, in the fixth book of his fecond Ennead, obferves that heat and other qualities are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act, in the fire: that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities light, heat, and colour, From all which it is plain, that whatever real things they fuppofed to exift independent of the foul, thofe were neither fenfible things, nor cloathed with fenfible qualities. 317. Neither Plato nor Aristotle by matter, An, understood corporeal fubftance, whatever the moderns may understand by that word. To them certainly it fignified no pofitive actual being. Ariftotle defcribes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity nor quality nor effence. And not only the Platonifts and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known, neither by fenfe, nor by any direct and just reafoning, but only by fome fpurious or adulterinę method, as hath been obferved before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the fixteenth century, denies it to be any fubftance at all, for, faith he, nequit per fe fubfiftere, quia fequeretur, id quod non eft in actu effe in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the Ægyptians fuppofed matter fo far from including ought of fubftance or effence, that, according to them, God produced it by a feparation from all fubftance, effence or being, ἀπὸ ἐσιότητα Σποχισθένης υλότης. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Ariftotle, Theophraftus, and all the antient Peripatetics. 318. According to thofe philofophers, matter is U only only a pura potentia, a mere poffibility. But Anaximander, fucceffor to Thales, is reprefented as having thought the fupreme Deity to be infinite matter. Nevertheless though Plutarch calleth it matter, yet it was fimply o negov, which means no more than infinite or indefinite. And although the moderns teach that fpace is real and infinitely extended; yet if we confider that it is no intellectual notion, nor yet perceived by any of our fenfes, we fhall perhaps be inclined to think with Plato in his Timæus, that this alfo is the refult of Aoyiopos vol or fpurious reafoning, and a kind of waking dream. Plato obferves that we dream, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it neceffary, that whatever exifts fhould exift in fome place. Which place or space (f) he also obferves is μετ' αναιθησίας ἁπλὸν, that is to be felt as darkness is seen, or filence heard, being a mere privation. 319. If any one fhould think to infer the reality or actual being of matter from the modern tenet, that gravity is always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but narrowly fean the modern demonftration of that tenet, and he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth no more than this, that gravity is proportionable to weight, that is to it felf. Since matter is conceived only as defect and mere poffibility; and fince God is abfolute perfection and act; it follows there is the greatest distance and oppofition imaginable between God and matter. Infomuch that a material God would be altogether inconfiftent. 320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodness that perfects all things, is the fupreme being. Evil, defect, negation, is not the object of God's creative power. From V250 2700 motion |