country, running side by side with the ordinary law of debtor and creditor, a long series of bankruptcy enactments. There have been no less than thirty-eight Bankruptcy Acts in the last three hundred and fifty years, each Act adding its stone to the building of the finished fabric. The first rude foundation of bankruptcy law is laid by the Statute 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 4, "Against such as do make Bankrupt." This statute recites that "divers and sundry persons, craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's goods, do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any their creditors their debts and duties, but at their own wills and pleasures consume the substance obtained by credit of other men for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason, equity, and good conscience." What the law had its eye upon here was evidently the fraudulent debtor. For redress, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, the Chief Justices of either bench, and others of the Privy Council, are by the Act empowered, on complaint, "by their wisdoms and discretions" to take the offender, his lands, tenements, annuities, and offices, as well as his money, goods, chattels, wares, merchandise, and debts, wheresoever they may be found, and to sell them for satisfaction of the creditors; that is to say, to every of the said creditors a portion, rate and rate alike, according to the quantity of their debts." Here is bankruptcy in embryo. Then Still the evil grew, and to meet it Parliament, in 13 Eliz. c. 7, expanded the provisions of Hen. VIII., defining with more precision acts of bankruptcy, and enlarging the power to examine persons. 1 Jac. I. c. 15, added another stone-the first bankruptcy legislation against voluntary settlements. Here, too, is enacted a penalty from which our modern bankrupt may congratulate himself on having escaped, namely, "if convicted of perjury on his examination, of having to stand upon the pillory in some public place, by the space of two hours, and have one of his ears nailed to the pillory, and cut off." 21 Jac. I. c. 19, is still more severe, for the debtor who "renders not some just reason why he became bankrupt" is treated to the same discipline of the pillory and ear-cropping. Here, too, appears, for the first time, the reputed ownership doctrine. As a side-light on the subject, we may note that in the procession of the "Seven Deadly Sins" of Dekker the dramatist, as they appear drawn in seven several coaches through the seven several gates of the city, bringing the plague with them, "Fraudulent Bankruptcy" takes the lead. Charles II.'s reign and Anne's go on with the building. Then 7 Geo. I. c. 31, adds another important stone, making debts payable at a future day provable. 5 Geo. II. c. 30, makes a bankrupt's not submitting to be examined, or concealing goods to the value of £20, felony, without benefit of clergy, and begins the anti-gambling legislation in bankruptcy. Any debtor who has lost £15 in one day over cards, dice, tennis, billiards, shovel-board, cock-fighting, and so on, loses the benefit of the Act. Here, too, appears the mutual debts and credits rule for the first time. Then in 46 Geo. III. c. 135, come "protected transactions"; and, with 6 Geo. IV. c. 16, the principle of deeds of arrangement. 1 & 2 Will. Iv. c. 56, first introduces on the scene a Court of bankruptcy and the official assignee. All this time, it must be remembered, down, that is, to the beginning of the nineteenth century, and for some years later, the privileges of bankruptcy were confined to traders. For non-traders the old harsh law of debtor and creditor still ruled, but in 1813 began a series of Acts (53 Geo. III. c. 110; 7 Geo. IV. c. 57; 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110; and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116), known as the Relief of Insolvent Debtors Acts, designed, as the preamble of the last Act states, to "protect from all process against the person, such persons as have become indebted without any fraud, or gross or culpable negligence, so as, nevertheless, their estates may be duly distributed among their creditors." From this it was but a step to extend the law of bankruptcy-as the Act of 1861 did-to non-traders. These Bankruptcy Acts, from the Statute of Henry VIII. to the Acts of to-day, are, as all legislation must be, a series of experiments. They are a building up and a pulling down-readjustments to the changing conditions and sentiments of the community-more especially the commercial community. The chief characteristic of the later Actsthe Acts of 1849, 1861 and 1869-is an oscillation in the mode of administration between the opposite principles of private and of official administration, the methods now of one, now of the other, predominating -a reflection of the eternal conflict between individualism and socialism. In the Acts of 1849 and 1861 officialism was in the ascendant. Then, in the Act of 1869, the pendulum swung back in favour of a creditors' administration. In the Act of 1883 we have the legislature, pressed with the abuses of creditors' administration, reverting to officialism in a very pronounced form, but seeking, at the same time, to combine with it. the advantages of a creditors' administration-consulting, that is to say, the wishes of the creditors as far as possible in all matters of management and realisation. "The estate for the creditors," not for the debtors, nor for the trustee, is its motto. This is one salient feature of the Act. The other is its disciplinary character. The Act of 1883 recognises, for the first time, that the trading methods and conduct of a debtor are not matters merely between him and his creditors, but concern the interests and welfare of the whole trading community and of the State. To this end-the inculcation of a high standard of commercial morality-a large number of the provisions of the Act are directed. ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY.-The legislature has, in the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, defined fully and precisely what acts or defaults by a debtor, amenable to the bankruptcy laws of England, will render him liable to be made a bankrupt, that is, to have his property taken into the possession of the Court, and equitably distributed pro rata among his just creditors. These acts and defaults, which embody the results of a long experience, dating back to the reign of Elizabeth, are defined by the Act of 1883, and are commonly known as "acts of bankruptcy." They are not confined to acts or defaults which are indicia of insolvency; they embrace acts and defaults which evince (for instance) an intention on the part of the debtor to deprive his creditors of their remedy against his person, as by departing out of England, or evince an intention on the part of the debtor to deprive his creditors of their remedy against his estate, as by making a fraudulent conveyance of his property. Any of these, if unexplained, evidences a condition of things which, in the opinion of the legislature, entitles a creditor, with a sufficient interest, to apply to the Court for protection. As these statutory acts of bankruptcy and these only, for the category is exhaustive-are the basis of all proceedings in bankruptcy, it is desirable to state them in the very words of the Act (s. 4)—“ A debtor," which means not a debtor all the world over, but a debtor who is subject to the law of England (In re Pearson, 1892, 9 Morr.. 185, 189), "commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the following cases : "(a) If in England or elsewhere he makes a conveyance or assignment of his property to a trustee or trustees, for the benefit of his creditors generally: "(b) If in England or elsewhere he makes a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery, or transfer of his property, or of any part thereof: "(c) If in England or elsewhere he makes any conveyance or transfer of his property, or any part thereof, or creates any charge thereon which would, under this or any other Act, be void as a fraudulent preference if he were adjudged bankrupt : "(d) If, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, he does any of the following things, namely, departs out of England, or, being out of England, remains out of England, or departs from his dwelling-house, or otherwise absents himself, or begins to keep house: "(e) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if execution against him has been levied by seizure of his goods, under process, in an action in any Court, or in any civil proceeding in the High Court, and the goods have been either sold or held by the sheriff for twenty-one days: Provided that, where an interpleader summons (see INTERPLEADER) has been taken out in regard to the goods seized, the time elapsing between the date at which such summons is taken out and the date at which the sheriff is ordered to withdraw, or any interpleader issue ordered thereon is finally disposed of, shall not be taken into account in calculating such period of twenty-one days (substituted by sec. 1 of Bankruptcy Act, 1890): "If he files in the Court a declaration of his inability to pay his debts, or presents a bankruptcy petition against himself: “(g) Îf a creditor has obtained a final judgment against him for any amount, and execution thereon not having been stayed, has served on him in England or, by leave of the Court, elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act, requiring him to pay the judgment debt, in accordance with the terms of the judgment, or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor or the Court, and he does not, within seven days after service of the notice, in case the service is effected in England, and in case the service is effected elsewhere then within the time limited in that behalf by the order giving leave to effect the service, either comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he has a counter claim, set-off, or cross-demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt, and which he could not set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained. Any person who is for the time being entitled to enforce a final judgment shall be deemed a creditor who has obtained a final judgment within the meaning of sec. 4 of the principal Act (Bankruptcy Act, 1890, s. 1): "(h) If the debtor gives notice to any of his creditors that he has suspended, or that he is about to suspend, payment of his debts." One further act of bankruptcy must be added. A judgment debtor is to be deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy if the Court, upon application for his committal, under sec. 5 of the Debtors Act, makes a receiving order against him under sec. 103 (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. Before examining these acts of bankruptcy in detail, it should be observed that words defining acts of bankruptcy are, as Lord Justice Bowen said (Ex parte Chinery, 1884, 12 Q. B. D. 342, 346), to be construed as strictly as if they occurred in a section defining a misdemeanor, the reason being that the commission of an act of bankruptcy entails disabilities and often penal consequences. Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors.-The ground of a conveyance or assignment for the benefit of creditors (s. 4 (1) (a)) being made an act of bankruptcy is that the debtor by such assignment denudes himself of the property available for payment of his debts, and puts that property in a different course of distribution from what the bankruptcy laws direct (Stewart v. Moody, 1835, 1 Cr. M. & R. 777). The conveyance or assignment, to come within the clause, must be of substantially the whole of the debtor's property (Re Glanville, Ex parte the Trustee, 1885, 2 Morr. 71). It need not be by an instrument actually transferring the legal and equitable interest. A declaration of trust will come within the clause, such a declaration being by the practice of conveyancers a recognised mode of conveyance (Ex parte Hughes, [1893] 1 Q. B. 595). An assignment by a debtor for the benefit of his trade creditors only is not within the clause (Re Phillips, Ex parte Barton, 1900, 7 Mans. 277), not being on a strict construction of the clause-an assignment for the benefit of his creditors generally. The conveyance or assignment need not be made as was formerly the law-in England. It is available as an act of bankruptcy under the words "or elsewhere," though made abroad, provided the debtor is subject to the English law. A deed of conveyance or assignment, though unstamped, may be given in evidence for the purpose of proving an act of bankruptcy under the clause, the reason being that it is not sought in such a case to enforce the deed (Re Hollinshead, Ex parte Heapy, 1889, 6 Morr. 66). As to an assignment for the benefit of creditors by way of deed of arrangement, see CREDITORS' DEED. Fraudulent Conveyance (s. 4 (1) (b)).-Fraudulent conveyances under this clause fall into classes-(1) Conveyances fraudulent under 13 Eliz. c. 5; (2) conveyances fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Law (see per Parke, B., Young v. Waud, 1853, 8 Ex. 234). 1. Cases under 13 Eliz. c. 5.-Any conveyance which is calculated to defeat or delay creditors is fraudulent within the meaning of 13 Eliz. c. 5, unless it is made upon good consideration and bona fide. It must be both (Twyne's Case, 3 Coke, 80; Smith's L. Cas., 10th ed., p. 1). A conveyance may be for good, that is, valuable consideration, and yet not bona fide, as where the purchaser is a party to a design to defeat and delay the vendor's creditors (Re Cranston, Ex parte Cranston, 1892, 9 Morr. 160, 170; Re Sinclair, Ex parte Chaplin, 1884, 26 Ch. D. 319). Even a conveyance in consideration of marriage, which is the highest of all considerations, may be fraudulent if it is part of a scheme to defraud creditors (Columbine v. Penhall, 1853, 1 Sm. & Giff. 228; 65 E. R. 98, where a solicitor-scrivener married a woman with whom he had cohabited for seven years, settling the whole of his property upon. her, and subsequently became bankrupt; see also Re Pennington, 1886, 3 Morr. 268, and Wenham v. Lyon, 1891, 64 L. T. 88). A conveyance, too, may be fraudulent, though the person making it had at the time no debts, if he is about to engage in a hazardous or speculative business, and the conveyance is a device on his part to put the property out of the reach of possible future creditors (Mackay v. Douglas, 1872, L. R. 2. Cases under the Law of Bankruptcy.-In this class of cases the An example of a fraudulent conveyance, which has not been uncommon in the last few years, has been where an insolvent trader has formed a " one-man company" to take over his business, and has transferred his property to it. The right, in such a case, of the company, as an independent persona, to claim the property against the trustee as a "protected transaction" within sec. 49 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, depends on whether the company had notice of the fraud or not (Re Slobodinsky, Ex parte Moore, [1903] 2 K. B. 567). Fraudulent Preference (s. 4 (1) (c)).-To constitute a fraudulent preference the last of this group of acts of bankruptcy-the debtor must, first of all, be unable to pay his debts as they become due; and, secondly, the giving a preference must be the debtor's dominant view (Sharp v. Jackson, [1899] A. C. 419; affirming New's Trustee v. Hanbury, [1897], 1 Q. B. 607; In re Bird, 1883, 23 Ch. D. 695), though it need not be his sole view. This subject of fraudulent preference will be found dealt with more fully at p. 42. Departing out of England (s. 4 (1) (d)).—If the alleged act of bankruptcy is the debtor departing out of England, or remaining out of England, or departing from his dwelling-house, or otherwise absenting himself, or beginning to keep house, the intent to defeat or delay must be proved as a matter of fact, depending on all the circumstances, as Buller, J., says in Williams v. Nunn, 1814, 1 Taun. 270, 275; In re Parr, 1821, 1 Rose, 387, and not as a mere conclusion of law as much (so James, L.J., observes in Ex parte Meyer, 1871, L. R. 6 Ch. 188) as in any criminal case where the intent is necessary to constitute the crime. A man being pressed by debts at the time is not conclusive (In re Parr, 1 |