the estate is to be realised with all reasonable despatch, and, where practicable, is to be distributed in one dividend; if practicable, within six months. No appeal can be brought without leave (In re Dale, 1884, 2 Morr. 92; and see In re Richards, 1887, 4 Morr. 233). Orders for summary administration to the number of 3687 were made in 1905 under sec. 121; 529 in the High Court, and 3158 in the County Court.

The other mode of summary administration in small cases-provided for by sec. 122-may be described as bankruptcy in miniature, and County Court judges have repeatedly testified to its usefulness. It is as follows:-When a judgment has been obtained in County Court, and the debtor is unable to pay the amount forthwith, and alleges that his whole indebtedness amounts to a sum not exceeding £50, inclusive of the debt for which the judgment is obtained, the County Court may make an order providing for the administration of his estate and for the payment of his debts by instalments or otherwise, and either in full or to such extent as to the County Court, under the circumstances of the case, appears practicable, and subject to any conditions as to his future earnings or income which the Court may think just (B. A. s. 122 (1)). The order is not to be invalidated only because the total amount of the debts is found at any time to exceed £50. Such an administration order has a double recommendation. It relieves the debtor by enabling him to pay his debts by instalments, and so gives him a chance of tiding over his difficulties; for after the making of the order no creditor is to have any remedy against the person or property of the debtor in respect of any debt which the debtor has notified to a County Court, except with the leave of that Court, and on such terms as the Court may impose. Any County Court, too, or inferior Court in which proceedings are pending against the debtor, is to stay them on notice of the order. A cheap mode is also provided for realising the debtor's assets when they exceed £10, by the registrar, at the request of any creditor and without fee, issuing execution against the debtor's goods, that is, against what may be termed his surplus assets; for the debtor's household goods, wearing apparel and bedding, and the tools and implements of his trade, to the value in the aggregate of £20, are protected from seizure. The proceeds of the execution are paid by the bailiff to the registrar. It is significant of the value of this machinery that in the last nineteen years no fewer than 61,000 orders of this kind have been made, averaging over 3247 a year. Last year 5543 such orders were made; and this boon is not conferred at the expense of creditors. In more than half the cases the debts were in the end part in full.

ADMINISTRATION IN BANKRUPTCY OF ESTATES OF DECEASED INSOLVENTS.-There are many anomalies in English law, but one of the most curious and least admirable of them, at the date of the Judicature Act, 1875, was that, if a debtor had been made a bankrupt before his death, his estate was administered in one way, if he died insolvent his estate was administered in another way; the forum was different, the principles and procedure were different, the order of payment of debts was different. In sec. 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, the legislature set itself to rectify this anomaly and assimilate the two modes of administration by making the rules for the time being in force in bankruptcy, with reference to certain matters, applicable to the administration of insolvent estates of deceased persons. These matters were the respective rights of secured

and unsecured creditors, debts and liabilities provable, and the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities respectively. But there the assimilation stopped. In sec. 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the legislature, without introducing any further assimilation, has provided a machinery by which the estate of a deceased insolvent is taken out of the hands of the legal personal representative, vested in the official receiver of the Court, and administered-with some necessary qualifications-as if the deceased insolvent had been adjudicated a bankrupt before his death. Any creditor of a deceased debtor whose debt would have been sufficient to support a bankruptcy petition against such debtor, had he been alive, may present the petition for administration. Notice is given to the executor or administrator; and if the Court is not satisfied that there is a reasonable probability of the estate being sufficient for the payment of the deceased's debts, it may make the order. If there are proceedings in Chancery, they may be transferred, and in such a case the costs of the action are payable out of the estate as testamentary expenses (In re J. Chapman, 1883, 1 Mans. 413). A petition for administration may be presented, though there is no administrator as yet appointed (In re Sleet, [1894] 2 Q. B. 797). The rules as to the avoidance of voluntary settlements under the Bankruptcy Act, s. 47, do not apply in insolvent administration (Re Gould, Ex parte the Official Receiver, 1887, 4 Morr. 202); nor the rules restricting the rights of creditors under executions (B. A. s. 45; Hasluck v. Clark, 1898, 5 Mans. 113); nor the reputed ownership doctrine (B. A. s. 44 (iii.)); nor the powers in bankruptcy for the discovery of the debtor's property (B. A. s. 27; Re Hewitt, 1885, 2 Morr. 184). The executor's right of retainer remains untouched (Re Williams, Ex parte Lewis and Evans, 1891, 8 Morr. 65; Re Gilbert, Ex parte Gilbert, 1897, 4 Mans. 337; Re Rhoades, 1899, 6 Mans. 277). There may be set-off under the mutual debts and credits section (s. 38), though the debt due from the insolvent has only ripened into a debt after the insolvent's death (Watkins v. Lindsay & Co., 1898, 5 Mans. 25).

CONSTITUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.-The old London Bankruptcy Court is now consolidated with and forms part of the Supreme. Court of Judicature, and the jurisdiction of the old Court is transferred to the High Court (B. A. s. 94), and is now assigned to the King's Bench Division of the High Court. The judge assigned by the Lord Chancellor, under sec. 94 (2), for the purposes of bankruptcy business, including the powers of the Court under sec. 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869, is Mr. Justice Bigham. He is assisted by five registrars in bankruptcy, who are registrars of the High Court and possess a large jurisdiction. They have power-(a) To hear bankruptcy petitions, and to make receiving orders and adjudications thereon; (b) To hold the public examination of debtors; (c) To grant orders of discharge and certificates of removal of disqualifications; (d) To approve compositions and schemes of arrangement; (e) To make interim orders in any case of urgency; (f) To make any order or exercise any jurisdiction which, by any rule in that behalf, is prescribed as proper to be made or exercised in chambers; (g) To hear and determine any unopposed or ex parte application; (h) To summon and examine any person known or suspected to have in his possession effects of the debtor, or to be indebted to him, or capable of giving information respecting the debtor, his dealings, or property. But a registrar has no power to commit for contempt of Court he can only refer the matter to the judge-nor to exercise the

jurisdiction and powers under the Debtors Act, 1869. Matters or applications may be adjourned-though the registrar has jurisdiction to hear them-to be heard before the judge in open Court, if (1) the parties desire it, or (2) if one of them desires it and the registrar is of opinion that it involves a question of difficulty on the ground of novelty or otherwise. As to what matters must be heard in open Court, see B. R. 6.

The County Courts exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy are the Courts which possessed such jurisdiction at the commencement of the present County Courts Act, and have not been excluded from such jurisdiction by an order of the Lord Chancellor.

A County Court has, for the purposes of its bankruptcy jurisdiction, all the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court (B. A. s. 100; Skinner v. Northallerton County Court Judge, 1899, 6 Mans. 274). Thus a County Court judge may commit for contempt a witness who disobeys an order to attend for examination (R. v. County Court of Surrey, 1883, 13 Q. B. D. 963). If an order requires alteration or amendment, the application should be to the judge himself sitting in bankruptcy (R. v. Northallerton County Court Judge, 1898, 5 Mans. 300). The place of sitting of the County Court for the purposes of its bankruptcy jurisdiction is the town in which the Court holds its sittings for the general business of the Court (B. R. 98, 99). As to when a petition is to be presented in the High Court, and when in the County Court, see Bankruptcy Act, s. 95.

The registrars of County Courts have similar powers to the registrars of the High Court in bankruptcy, except that they cannot grant discharges, or certificates of removal of disqualifications, or approve compositions or schemes, if the application is opposed.

GENERAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT IN BANKRUPTCY.- -When a debtor's estate comes to be administered in bankruptcy, it is plain that a number of questions will arise between the estate and strangers to the bankruptcy. For example, the trustee may have a mere money demand against a person who has dealt with property of the bankrupt (In re Dicken, Ex parte Pollard, 1878, 8 Ch. D. 377; In re Wood, Ex parte Musgrave, 1879, 10 Ch. D. 94; Re Champagne, Ex parte Kemp, 1893, 10 Morr. 285), or a claim against the bankrupt's landlord for an excessive distress levied before the bankruptcy (In re Cliffe, Ex parte Eatough & Co., 1880, 42 L. T. 95; and see Re Wherley, Ex parte Hirst, 1879, 11 Ch. D. 278; Re Jewell, 4 Mans. 28; and Re Barnett, Ex parte Reynolds, 1885, 15 Q. B. D. 169). In such cases it was decided that the trustee should avail himself of the ordinary tribunals for the determination of such questions, and only proceed in bankruptcy where he was claiming by virtue of some higher title than that of the debtor; for instance, that goods of a third party belonged to him, the trustee, by virtue of the reputedownership doctrine, or to recover moneys paid away by the debtor as constituting a fraudulent preference (Re Yates, Ex parte Brown, 1879, 11 Ch. D. 148), or to set aside a settlement as fraudulent against creditors of the bankrupt; the view being that the Court of Bankruptcy was not intended, as Lord Selborne put it, in In re Motion, 1873, L. R. 9 Ch. 192, 210, to draw compulsorily within the sphere of its jurisdiction property, or the owners of property, not vested in the assignee, and not originally subject to the administration in bankruptcy; and see Ellis v. Silber, 1872, L. R. 8 Ch. 83.

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is to invest the Court in bankruptcy with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising in the bankruptcy, but there is this qualification in the case of County Courts having bankruptcy jurisdiction, that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim not arising out of the bankruptcy which might heretofore have been enforced by action in the High Court, unless all the parties to the proceeding consent thereto, or the money, money's worth or right in dispute does not, in the opinion of the judge, exceed in value £200; and see Re Beswick, Ex parte Hazlehurst, 1888, 5 Morr. 105, and In re Richardson and Cook, 86 L. T. 690.

In the case of the High Court, too, though the jurisdiction exists to determine questions arising between the trustee in bankruptcy and strangers to the bankruptcy, the Court has a discretion as to exercising it (In re White & Co., 1884, 1 Morr. 77), and will not in general withdraw causes or matters from the ordinary tribunals. Thus, where a motion was made to the judge in bankruptcy, by the trustee of a bankrupt mortgagor, to have an action brought by the mortgagee in the Chancery Division, to realise his security, transferred to the judge in bankruptcy, the Court dismissed the motion with costs; and see Re Wherly, Ex parte Hirst, 1879, 11 Ch. D. 278.

In In re Somes, 1895, 2 Man. 396, the judge in bankruptcy ordered an action for administration of a deceased partner's estate to be transferred to himself, on the application of the trustee in bankruptcy of the surviving partner.

The rules regulating costs are B. R. 108-128.

APPEALS AND REHEARINGS.-Every Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy under the Act may review, rescind, or vary any order made by it under its bankruptcy jurisdiction (In re Tobias, 1891, 8 Morr. 30). The power, however, is one to be exercised with great caution. Only the Court which made the order can rehear the matter. It is frequently exercised in rescinding receiving orders and reconsidering refusals of discharge. Besides, the power of rehearing an appeal in bankruptcy matters lies at the instance of "any person aggrieved" (B. A. s. 104 (2); Re Friedlander, Ex parte Oastler, 1884, 51 L. T. 309; Re Lascelles, Ex parte Genese, 1884, 1 Morr. 183; Re Langtry, 1894, 1 Mans. 169; Re Lamb, 1894, 1 Mans. 373). See AGGRIEVED. An appeal from the decision of a County Court is to a Divisional Court of the King's Bench Division sitting in bankruptcy, of which Court the judge in bankruptcy must be a member (Bankruptcy Appeals (County Court) Act, 1884, s. 2). Any further appeal to the Court of Appeal can only be by leave of the Divisional Court. As to when leave will be granted, see In re Campbell, 1884, 14 Q. B. D. 32. Solicitors have a right of audience on an appeal to the Divisional Court (In re Barnett, 1884, 15 Q. B. D. 169), but this does not extend to the Court of Appeal (In re Elderton, 1887, 4 Morr. 36). An appeal from the judge in bankruptcy, or from one of the registrars of the High Court in bankruptcy, is to the Court of Appeal, and must also be brought within twenty-one days (In re Courtenay, 1884, 1 Morr. 89), calculated from the date at which the order is signed, entered, or otherwise perfected. Higher the dissatisfied litigant can only go by leave of the Court of Appeal (B. A. s. 104 (b) (c)). As to when this will be given, see Re Tollemache, Ex parte Edwards, 1844, 14 Q. B. D. 415; Re Fussell, Ex parte Allen, 1882, 20 Ch. D. 341. Before entering an appeal, the appellant must lodge in the High Court the sum of £20 as security for

any costs he may be ordered to pay (B. R. 131). The deposit is dispensed with on appeal by the Board of Trade (Re Mutton, 1887, 4 Morr. 115). An appeal to the Court of Appeal must be brought within twenty-one days (B. R. 130).

Appeal against Trustee. If the bankrupt, or any of the creditors or any other person, is aggrieved by any act or decision of the trustee, he may appeal to the Court (B. A. s. 90).

IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE DEBTORS ACT.-The refusal or suspension of a bankrupt's discharge is one form of disciplinary jurisdiction which the Court exercises over delinquent debtors. But there is a higher sanction provided for dishonesty by the Debtors Act, 1869. By sec. 4 of that Act no person is thenceforth to be arrested or imprisoned for making default in the payment of a sum of money. This is the general principle, and it marks a new departure of great significance in the policy of modern law. But to this principle the Act constitutes certain exceptions, six in number, and they are these-1. Default in payment of a penalty, or in the nature of a penalty (Re Nicholson, Ex parte The Board of Trade, 1890, 7 Morr. 257) (other than a penalty in respect of a contract). 2. Default in payment of any sum recoverable summarily before a justice or justices of the peace. 3. Default by a trustee, or person acting in a fiduciary capacity, and ordered to pay by a Court of Equity any sum in his possession or under his control. 4. Default by an attorney or solicitor in payment of costs when ordered to pay costs for misconduct as such, or in payment of a sum of money when ordered to pay the same in his character of an officer of the Court making the order. 5. Default in payment for the benefit of creditors of any portion of a salary or other income, in respect of the payment of which any Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy is authorised to make an order. 6. Default in payment of sums in respect of the payment of which any Court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy is authorised to make an order. Then, by sec. 5 of the same Act, any Court may commit to prison, for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until payment of the sum due, any person who makes default in payment of any debt, or instalment of any debt due from him, in pursuance of any order or judgment of that or any other competent Court; but the power is subject to this important qualification: the jurisdiction to send a judgment debtor to prison is only to be exercised where it is proved, to the satisfaction of the Court, "that the person making default either has, or has had since the date of the order or judgment, the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default, and has refused or neglected, or refuses or neglects, to pay the same" (ibid. s. 5 (2)). In other words, the Court must be satisfied that the debtor has had the means of paying the debt and has not done so. This, as Lord Bramwell points out in Stonor v. Fowle, 1888, 13 App. Cas. 20, 28, is not mere default, but dishonesty, and it is for this dishonesty, not for mere indebtedness, that the penalty of imprisonment is inflicted; and see Re Edgcome, 1902, 9 Mans. 227. The imprisonment is a pure punishment. It does not cancel the debt. As to what are means, see Harper v. Scrimgeour, 1880, 5 C. P. D. 366, and Ex parte Fryer, 1885, 3 Morr. 231. To prove means, the debtor and any witnesses may be summoned and examined on oath. See County Court Rules, 1903, Order 25, rr. 35-37. In estimating means, money derived from a gift may be taken into account (In re Park, 1885, 14 Q. B. D. 597). If the debtor