Bills of Sale.--James Weir. [V. M. Coutts Trotter.] of Ceylon.) of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Court of Ceylon.] Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Court of Ceylon.] the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Phillimore.] Ceylon.] Ceylon.] the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Phillimore.] Supreme Court of Ceylon.] G. G. Phillimore. [G. G. Phillimore.] . Burgage Tenure.-Prof. F. W. Maitland. Cabinet, The.-J. P. Wallis. [R. Geoffrey Ellis.] Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Cargo.--- The Hon. Mr. Justice Phillimore ; and G. G. Phillimore. [G. G. Phillimore.] Carrier.-D. M. Kerly. [N. G. L. Child.] Certiorari.-G. H. B. Kenrick. Cesser, Proviso for.-H. W. Challis. [C. Johnston Edwards.] Ceylon.-Alexander Pulling. Chambers, Chancery Division.--Charles Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court. Chambers, Judges'.-.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office. Chambers of Commerce.-G. H. Knott. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Champion.-R. Geoffrey Ellis. Chancel.-J. Arthur Price. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Chancellor.-D. M. Kerly. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Chancellor of the Exchequer.—Sir Thomas Raleigh, K.C.B. Channel Islands.-Sir Thomas Raleigh, K.C.B. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon.] Charities.--A. D. Tyssen. Charity Commission.-G. B. M. Coore. [A. D. Tyssen.] ADDENDA AND ERRATA VOLUME I Page x. col. 2, 1. 22, for “Common Pleas," read “Chancery.” 301, last line, for “one-third,” read “one-fifth." 307, l. 9, to reference to Alkali Works Regulation Act, 1906, add “6 Edw. VII. c. 14.” 620, 1. 45, for the sentence beginning “ But it has been held,” read “Where a solicitor who is appointed executor and trustee, and who is authorised by the will to charge for all business done by him in relation to the estate as if he were a solicitor employed by the trustees, attests the will, he is not entitled to any profit costs for business done in relation to the estate, as the right to charge profit costs can only be claimed under the will, and is a beneficial interest, which he is precluded from claiming by sec. 15 of the Wills Act, 1837, 1 Vict. c. 26 (In re Pooley, 1888, 40 Ch. D. 1). viii ENCYCLOPÆDIA 62 60 Gifts over on Bankruptcy, see GIFT. 26 Imprisonment under the Debtors Administration of Estate of De- 14 Jurisdiction of the Court in Bank- After-acquired Property of Bank- Avoidance of Voluntary Settle- Petition in Bankruptcy- 31 Private Deeds of Arrangement, see Composition or Scheme of Arrange- CREDITORS' DEEDS. Constitution of the Bankruptey Proof of Debts 62 Public Exainination of Debtor Deeds of Arrangement, see Credi- Realisation of Property 52 Relation back of Trustee's Title Disclaimer of Onerous Property 44 Removal of Trustee Discovery of Debtor's Property 36 Remuneration of the Trustee Disqualifications of Bankrupt 27 Reputed Ownership Foreign Debtor 13 Statement of Affairs by Debtor 21 . . . HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.—The problem of insolvency is one which has presented itself in all countries and all ages. In early communities the strict law of debtor and creditor is left to take its course; and 1 harsh as that solution is, it has at least the merit of maintaining a high standard of integrity. The possibility of getting rid of debts by bankruptcy, or a composition without paying them in full, undoubtedly relaxes a debtor's moral fibre. Hence, at the time of the French Revolution, the National Convention passed a resolution that any man who contracted a debt should never be free from liability to pay it—a resolution commendable as a counsel of perfection, but, as legislation for the France of the eighteenth century, an anachronism. The principle which the resolution of the French Convention embodied has been, however, the principle of most, if not all, primitive communities : a man had to pay his debts to the uttermost farthing; and if he could not pay with his property, he had to pay with his person, which, in societies where slavery prevailed, was an asset of some value. Nothing, as Sir Henry Maine observes, strikes the scholar and jurist more than this severity of ancient systems of law towards the debtor, and the extravagant powers which they lodge in the creditor. It brought many early States to the brink of ruin. In Athens a revolution was only averted by Solon's seisactheia and the abolition of enslavement for debt. At Rome, after long internecine struggles, the Lex Pætalia Papiria at last permitted a citizen to save his liberty by pledging his oath that he was solvent; but for the insolvent debtor there was still no mercy—such was the sanctity of contract in Roman eyes. It was not until the time of Julius Cæsar that a debtor became entitled to his discharge on formally giving up everything to his creditors—cessio bonorum. This cessio bonorum marks the commencement of the true principle of bankruptcy. The early Teutonic codes exhibit the same Draconian severity as those of Greece and Rome. The insolvent debtor falls under the power of his creditor, and is subject to personal fetters and chastisement; and later on, among the Germans, the witepeow might often be seen working out by his labours a debt that was due to his master. It is not a little remarkable, as Sir Frederick Pollock and Professor Maitland observe, apropos of the above (History of English Law), that our common law knew no process whereby a man could pledge his body or liberty for payment of a debt; neither at common law was the body of the debtor liable to execution for debt, except in the case of the king's debtor. It is interesting to observe how imprisonment for debt came about. No right of arrest on a judgment in debt is given by the express words of any statute, but the law gave in certain cases a right to arrest a delinquent or defaulter for the purpose of securing his appearance at trial, where, for instance, he was flying the realm; and it came to be held, by some strange medieval logic, that wherever the law gave this right of arrest on mesne process, a capias ad satisfaciendum would lie upon the judgment itself (1795, 3 Salk. 286). Thus began the long and dreary annals of bailiffs, sponging-houses, the Marshalsea, and the Fleet. The ordinary law of debtor and creditor, though it may suffice for a primitive state of society, soon shows itself inadequate either to meet fraud or to secure the equitable distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets. It would, if uncontrolled, result in such assets being scrambled for by creditors, under writs of execution. Accordingly, some system of administration becomes, at a certain stage in the history of all civilised States, a necessity for traders in the first instance, afterwards for debtors generally; and, in obedience to this necessity, we find in our own |
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