declined to receive the interest, and afterwards, to induce his sonin-law to reside on the mortgaged property, A. B. had promised to allow him to live there rent-free. The son-in-law acted on the promise until A. B.'s death:-Held, that, in equity, no interest was payable until that time. Yeomans v. Williams. Page 131 REMOTENESS. 1 1. Where a bequest is made to persons in esse for life, with remainder to their unborn children, with a general direction that the female children shall take for their "separate and inalienable use," such restriction against alienation is too remote and void. Semble. Armitage v. Coates. 2. Under several bequests to living persons for life, with remainder to their children born and unborn, with a general proviso that the shares of females shall be for their separate inalienable use::-Held, that the restriction against anticipation applied only to the tenants for life, in consequence of a direction for payment to the children and a proviso that their receipts should be good discharges. Ibid. See SURVIVORSHIP, 3. RENEWAL. A. agreed to let some premises to B. for three years, and, at the expiration of that term, to grant him a lease for an extended term. A. died, and, three years having expired, B. continued to hold on 8. On setting aside the sale of a reversion for inadequacy after four years, the purchaser is not entitled to any allowance for the risk he has run in the meantime. Benyon v. Fitch. Page 570 9. On setting aside the purchase of a reversion for inadequacy, the deed stands as a security for the money actually due, and if it be not paid, the bill stands dismissed, which is equivalent to a foreclosure. Ibid. REVERSIONARY INTEREST. See JUDICIAL SEPARATION. REVIVOR. 1. A sole Plaintiff having died after decree, an order to revive against his devisee was made, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52. Bedford v. Bedford. 342 2. A Defendant having died before answer, an order to revive and also to answer was made against his personal representative under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52. Trench v. Semple. 3. An order to revive, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52, cannot be obtained against executors who have not proved the will, though it is alleged they have acted. Joyce v. Rawlins. 376 465 4. After decree, a suit became defective by the transfer of the Plaintiff's interest. The Plaintiff and his transferees having, after notice, neglected to revive, an order was made, on the application of the SEPARATE ESTATE. Page 489 ried woman is not, after her death, |