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declined to receive the interest, and afterwards, to induce his sonin-law to reside on the mortgaged property, A. B. had promised to allow him to live there rent-free. The son-in-law acted on the promise until A. B.'s death:-Held, that, in equity, no interest was payable until that time. Yeomans v. Williams. Page 131

REMOTENESS.

1

1. Where a bequest is made to persons in esse for life, with remainder to their unborn children, with a general direction that the female children shall take for their "separate and inalienable use," such restriction against alienation is too remote and void. Semble. Armitage v. Coates. 2. Under several bequests to living persons for life, with remainder to their children born and unborn, with a general proviso that the shares of females shall be for their separate inalienable use::-Held, that the restriction against anticipation applied only to the tenants for life, in consequence of a direction for payment to the children and a proviso that their receipts should be good discharges. Ibid. See SURVIVORSHIP, 3.

RENEWAL.

A. agreed to let some premises to B. for three years, and, at the expiration of that term, to grant him a lease for an extended term. A. died, and, three years having expired, B. continued to hold on

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8. On setting aside the sale of a reversion for inadequacy after four years, the purchaser is not entitled to any allowance for the risk he has run in the meantime. Benyon v. Fitch. Page 570 9. On setting aside the purchase of a reversion for inadequacy, the deed stands as a security for the money actually due, and if it be not paid, the bill stands dismissed, which is equivalent to a foreclosure. Ibid.

REVERSIONARY INTEREST.

See JUDICIAL SEPARATION.
REVERSION.

REVIVOR.

1. A sole Plaintiff having died after decree, an order to revive against his devisee was made, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52. Bedford v. Bedford. 342 2. A Defendant having died before answer, an order to revive and also to answer was made against his personal representative under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52. Trench v. Semple. 3. An order to revive, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52, cannot be obtained against executors who have not proved the will, though it is alleged they have acted. Joyce v. Rawlins.

376

465 4. After decree, a suit became defective by the transfer of the Plaintiff's interest. The Plaintiff and his transferees having, after notice, neglected to revive, an order was made, on the application of the

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SEPARATE ESTATE.
1. Property was settled on a feme
coverte for her separate use for
life, with a power to appoint it by
Ideed or will. She executed the
power by will:-Held, that the
appointed property was not liable
to pay a promissory note signed
by her. Shattock v. Shattock.

Page 489
2. A married woman cannot bind
herself by contract, but Equity
holds that she may, by contract,
bind her separate estate.
Her
separate estate will be liable to
pay any debt of hers which she
has secured by writing. Equity
has also held, that it is sufficient
if it be shewn that the married
woman verbally promised that her
debt should be paid out of her
Ibid.
separate estate.
3. The separate property of a mar-

ried woman is not, after her death,
liable to pay her general debts
either in the case of her having
been absolutely entitled to the
property, or of her having only a
life estate with a power to dispose
of it by deed or will. Ibid.
4. The principle of Courts of Equity
is, that, as regards her separate
estate, a married woman is a feme
sole, and can act as such; but this
is only so far as is consistent with
the other principle, viz., that a
married woman cannot enter into
a contract. Ibid.
5. In the administration of the sepa
rate estate of a married woman
after her decease, the debts are to
be paid in order of priority and

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