this dilemma presents itself: if the laws be permitted to operate only upon the cases which were actually contemplated by the law-makers, they will always be found defective; if they be extended to every case, to which the reasoning, and spirit, and expediency of the provision seem to belong, without any further evidence of the intention of the Legislature, we shall allow to the JUDGES a liberty of applying the law, which will fall very little short of the power of making it. If a literal construction be adhered to, the law will often fail of its end; if a loose and vague exposition be admitted, the law might as well never have been enacted, for this license will bring back into the subject all the uncertainty which it was the design of the Legislature to take away. Courts of Justice are, and always must be, embarrassed by the opposite difficulties; and, as it can never be known beforehand in what degree either consideration can prevail in the mind of the JUDGE, there remains an unavoidable cause of doubt, and a place for contention. "Again, the deliberations of Courts of Justice upon every new question, are encumbered with additional difficulties, in consequence of the authority which the judgment of the Court possesses, as a precedent to future judicatures; which authority appertains, not only to the conclusions the Court delivers, but to the principles and arguments upon which they are built. The view of this effect makes it necessary for a JUDGE to look beyond the case before him; and, besides the attention he owes to the truth and justice of the cause between the parties, to reflect whether the principles, maxims, and reasoning which he adopts and authorizes, can be applied with safety to all cases which admit of a comparison with the present. The decision of the cause, were the effects of the decision to stop there, might be easy; but the consequence of establishing the principle which such a decision assumes, may be difficult, though of the utmost importance to be foreseen and regulated."-Paley. Ashton and Others, Rex v. (Indictment—Plead Barton's case (Uttering) Berryman v. Wise (Proof of office) Billinghurst, Rex v. (Bigamy) Banning, Meirelles v. (Letters) Barham's case (Game) (Penalties) Barker's and Arundel's case (Evidence) Beckwith v. Philby (Constable) Belt's and Meade's case (Homicide-Murder) Bevan v. Williams (Ib.) 252 270 151, n. 115 110 320 52, n. 184 14 15, n. 26, n. 147 141 149 236 230 325 23 206, n. |