Macklin, Murphy, and Others' Case. The prisoner was indicted for murder. DURHAM Sum. Assizes, 1838. If several persons act a common The intent, every act done by in further intent is done If a deadly It appeared that a body of persons had assem- together with bled together, and were committing a riot. constables interfering for the purpose of dispers- each of them ing the crowd and apprehending the offenders, re- ance of that sistance was made to them by the mob, and one by all. of the constables was beaten severely by the mob. weapon be The different prisoners all took part in the violence used, some by beating him with sticks, by throwing stones, and others by striking with their fists. Of this aggregate violence the tinued vioconstable afterwards died. used, an intention to kill is to be some so from a him a fist. inferred-not blow with From con lence, after much beating, an in kill may be Alderson, B.—The principles on which this case tention to will turn are these:-If a person attacks another inferred. without justifiable cause, and from the violence used death ensues, the question which arises, is, whether it be murder or manslaughter? If the weapon used were a deadly weapon, it is reasonable to infer that the party intended death; and if he intended death, and death was the consequence of his act, it is murder. If no weapon was used, then the question usually is, was there excessive violence? If the evidence as to this be such as that the jury think there was an intention to kill, it is murder-if not, manslaughter. Thus, if there were merely a blow with a fist, and death ensued, it would not be reasonable to infer that there was an intention to kill-in that case, therefore, it is manslaughter. But if a strong man attacks a weak one, though no weapon be used, or if, after much injury by beating, the violence is still continued, then the question is, whether this excess does not shew a general brutality, and a purpose to kill, and if so, it is murder. Again, if the weapon used be not deadly, e. g. a stick, then the same question as above will arise for the determination of the jury, as to the purpose to kill; and in any case, if the nature of the violence, and the continuance of it be such as that a rational man would conclude that death must follow from the acts done, then it is reasonable for a jury to infer that the party who did them intended to kill, and to find him guilty of murder. Again, it is a principle of law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent, every act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done by all. The act, however, must be in pursuance of the common intent. Thus, if several were to intend and agree together to frighten a constable, and one were to shoot him through the head, such an act would affect the individual only by whom it was done. Here, therefore, in considering this case, you, the jury, must determine, whether all these prisoners had the common intent of attacking the constables-if so, each of them is responsible for all the acts of all the others done for that purpose; and, if all the acts done by each, if done by one man, would, together, shew such violence, and so long continued, that from them you would infer an intention to kill the constable, it will be murder in them all. If you would not infer such a purpose, you ought to find the prisoners guilty only of manslaughter. Verdict-Manslaughter. Hodge's Case. The prisoner was charged with murder. The case was one of circumstantial evidence taken The altogether, and contained no one fact, which The prisoner was well acquainted with her, and had been seen near the spot, (a lane), in or near which the murder was committed, very shortly before. There were also four other persons together in the same lane about the same period of time. The prisoner, also, was seen some hours after, and on the same day, but at a distance of some miles from the spot in question, burying something, which on the following day was taken up, and turned out to be money, and which corresponded generally as to amount with that which the murdered woman was supposed to have had in her possession when she set out on her return home from market, and of which she had been robbed. Alderson, B., told the jury, that the case was made up of circumstances entirely; and that, b fore they could find the prisoner guilty, they must be satisfied, "not only that those circumstances were consistent with his having committed the act, but they must also be satisfied that the facts were such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the prisoner was the guilty person." He then pointed out to them the proneness of the human mind to look for-and often slightly to distort the facts in order to establish such a proposition-forgetting that a single circumstance which is inconsistent with such a conclusion, is of more importance than all the rest, inasmuch as it destroys the hypothesis of guilt. The learned Baron then summed up the facts of the case, and the jury returned a verdict of Not guilty. Her husband accompanied her, but remained outside.-Held, The evidence was, that she had gone from house ing base coin. to house uttering base coin, and that her husband accompanied her to the door, but did not go in. Bayley, J., directed the jury to infer, that she was acting under the coercion of her husband, and coercion. to find her not guilty. Note. The following case, for which the editor is indebted to the kindness of Baron Alderson, affords an illustration of the doctrine of coercion, as applicable to the relationship of husband and wife. that the wife acted under the husband's Rex v. Martha Hughes. LANCASTER 1813. Martha Hughes, the wife of Patrick Hughes, The law, out of tenderness was indicted for forging and uttering three 21. to the wife, Bank of England notes. if a felony be committed in |